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This study aims to explore the ideological implications of globalization, asking 
whether the global diffusion of guidelines and economic schemes leads to a parallel 
diffusion of interpretations, hopes and ideologies. I focus on the globalization of 
clinical trials sponsored by pharmaceutical companies to assess the efficacy and safety 
of new therapeutic compounds. I analyze the ways in which this globalization has been 
framed by the members of ethics committees, which are bodies responsible for 
assessing clinical research proposals submitted by both multinational companies and 
local researchers. I focus on the situations of South Africa and Brazil, two countries 
that have witnessed an important expansion in the number of global clinical studies 
conducted in their territories. 
My theoretical framework is the theory of communicative action proposed by 
German sociologist Jürgen Habermas. According to this theory, social actors can be 
either self-oriented and frame the social context as an instrument (instrumental 
rationality), or take other actors into account and search for intercomprehension 
(communicational rationality). 
Even though the presence of these two rationalities was detected in my study, 
it was seen that rationalities are composed by sub-groups, specks of rationalities, 
which I propose to name mentalities. The description and interpretation of the seven 
mentalities identified in my study (pragmatic, bioethical, technical, healing, 
communitarian, analytical and critical) is the main task undertaken in this thesis. 
Interpreting mentalities is important to understand the political debates taking 
place in South Africa and Brazil (and, potentially, other countries). To engage in 
debates, social actors frequently mobilize claims and ideas gleaned from different 
mentalities. Over the last decades, the bioethical, technical and healing mentalities 
have acquired an important force and legitimacy. However, discordant discourses 
continue to be voiced, drawing on the ideological tools provided by the analytical and 
critical mentalities. Thus, ethics committees can be seen as a political arena, 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
 Globalization has reached a stage of high development, triggering processes 
whose consequences go beyond economic issues. Nowadays, it is possible to witness 
the formation of huge multinational corporations, the emergence of institutions 
endowed with international duties, the establishment of academic and scientific 
partnerships involving several countries, the intense circulation of products and people 
crossing over national frontiers, among other phenomena. It is then necessary to 
undergo important economic, infra-structural and institutional changes in many 
countries. By comparing the current historical situation with that which prevailed at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, it is possible to conclude that nowadays, 
people communicate, travel, buy and sell, research, learn and teach, in new ways. It is 
therefore important to ask if such changes have been accompanied by ideological 
shifts. In other words, the question arises whether new, globalized forms of 
communication, economic relations and academic studies can somehow lead to the 
emergence of new forms of thinking. 
 In my study I propose that, in an advanced phase of globalization, certain social 
processes and relations are also globalized, favouring the internationalization of some 
ideas, hopes and claims. These ideological patterns become socially available, that is, 
they can be recognized, consented to, and finally voiced by different individuals when 
they are asked to identify relevant issues and express their views. Thus, economic and 
technical globalization has provoked the parallel globalization of some rationalities and 
mentalities, which can be marshalled and diffused in different national and regional 
contexts. 
 The topic, although framed here from the viewpoint of sociological and cultural 
studies, has important linkages to economic, political and geographical approaches. In 
order to look at it with the particular tools of sociology and anthropology, but without 
refusing a fruitful dialogue with other disciplines, it is important to frame the questions 
to be explored accurately. Understanding the nature of globalization, as well as its 
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relations to the ideological domain, is therefore the first task to be accomplished here. 
The next section aims to realize this initial definition and exploration. 
 
1.1. GLOBALIZATION AND IDEOLOGY 
 
 Relations between economic structures and ideologies constitute a classic topic 
in sociological and anthropological studies. In this section I refer to some analysts who 
are commonly mentioned when one deals with this issue. In a sense, one could say 
that the topic is already present in Saint-Simon’s (1821/1925, 1803/1925) writings, in 
which the French thinker looked for an economic system which could derive from, as 
well as lead to, views of the world that oppose the dominant capitalist model. 
 Marx also strived to build up an interpretation to counter the dominant 
capitalistic ideology. Looking for a scientific interpretation, Marx proposed an analysis 
based on the idea of class structure. According to him, each social class, by engaging in 
market relations, would eventually develop its own class consciousness. In this way, 
the role played in the economic system would imply not only certain social relations 
but also the formulation of certain aspirations and worldviews. In the Marxian 
interpretation, capitalism would be underpinned not only by productive activities and 
unequal exchanges in the market, but also by sets of ideas springing from this 
economic structure. Hence, the famous Marxian concept of fetishism of commodities, 
according to which material products can assume a decisive position in the capitalist 
economy because, on the one hand, they hold human labour, whereas, on the other 
hand, they are thought to be endowed with a natural, intrinsic value (Marx, 
1867/1990). 
 The tradition founded by Marx was explored by subsequent thinkers for whom 
ideology, consciousness and fetishism were paramount concepts. I am referring to 
analysts such as Gramsci (1948/2005), Marcuse (1964/1991), Habermas (1973), 
Poulantzas (1974), Olin Wright (1984/1989) and Lojkine (1981). 
 Simmel’s (1903/1950) equally classic interpretation deals with the ideological 
stances triggered by modern society, and especially urban life. Analyzing the 
emergence and consolidation of a monetary economy, Simmel (1900/1997) concluded 
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that money is a social mediator entailing impersonal relations and asking for practical, 
objective calculations. 
Rationalization was also a key topic in Weber’s interpretation. Focusing on 
social action, taken as the basic unit of analysis, Weber explored the process through 
which society becomes more and more rationalized. Therefore, capitalism would be 
the economic manifestation of rationalizing trends that can also be verified in 
administration (bureaucracy), production (technology), knowledge (scientific 
exploration), music (graphic notations), among other fields. Therefore, modern society 
would be characterized by a specific mindset and ways of organizing objects and 
relations (Weber, 1979). In Weber’s interpretation, primacy is given neither to 
ideologies nor social relations. This is why he could identify a strong reciprocity 
between the capitalist system and the protestant ethic (Weber, 1930/2001). 
 Weber’s theoretical project was taken over by subsequent sociologists. 
Bourdieu (1989) proposed the famous concept of “cultural capital,” stating that social 
opportunities have to do with the possession of money (economic capital) but also 
with access to some cognitive skills, frequently acquired through education. Breen’s 
(2002) work is another example, in which Weber’s ideas are associated with a class 
analysis. 
 Therefore, the history of sociological thought is full of examples in which 
analysts have shown interest in relationships between economic structures and 
ideologies. In anthropology, this interest is not less pronounced. Already in the first 
classic anthropological studies, carried out by Malinowski (1922/1987), Mauss 
(1923/1990) or Evans-Pritchard (1940/1974), a strong point was made that cultural 
notions, the organization of labour and the circulation of goods are deeply intertwined 
phenomena. 
 Leroi-Gourhan (1984) explored the relationships between techniques used by 
social groups (“external environment”) and the range of conceptions available in these 
groups (“internal environment”). Fernandes (1964/2008) studied the axiological 
patterns that emerged in Brazil in the transition from a society based on slavery to a 
capitalist society organized in classes. 
 In more recent social science studies, the relations between economy and 
ideology continued to be explored. In these analyses, however, a new element tends 
to be stressed: globalization. It is claimed that economy and productive activities do 
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have impacts on expectations, interpretations and hopes held by social actors, and 
that such impacts can be quite strong in the framework of a globalized economy. 
 Ulrich Beck (1986/2005) claimed that globalization brings about environmental 
threats, spreading concerns that go beyond social classes and old social structures. 
Milton Santos (2000) analyzed the global diffusion of the capitalist technical system, 
arguing that this “techno-sphere” influences the formation of a “psycho-sphere,” 
defined as a set of aspirations, hopes, ideas and critiques. Scheper-Hughes (2000) 
detected the emergence of new wishes and personal projects subsequent to the 
formation of a “global traffic in human organs.” Salter (2007) analyzed the contents of 
hope inserted into globalized networks of stem cell research, which frequently clash 
with the cultural standards of some countries. Sandall, Benoit, Murray and colleagues 
(2009) analysed the ideological effects of the professionalization and privatization of 
maternity service systems. 
 Clearly, the topic is too broad to be fully reviewed here.1 The intention of this 
brief overview is to point out that many social science studies have already explored 
the relations between economy and ideology, and, more specifically, between 
globalization and ideology. However, we are still lacking more detailed studies to 
show, in very concrete ways, the changes, in terms of discourses and opinions, 
experienced by those people who are engaged in globalized activities. Moreover, it is 
important to understand how the ideological products of globalization overlap with, or 
take over, the cultural traditions of particular countries and places. In other words, 
previous studies on globalization and ideology have not enabled us to disentangle, in 
people’s everyday actions and speech, globalized ideological elements from ideas that 
are locally available in the form of cultural, axiological traditions. Thus, my study aims 
to help understand the shifts undergone by the ideological dimension of social life as a 
consequence of globalization. 
 In order to carry out this study I draw on the theory of communicative action, 
proposed by German sociologist Jürgen Habermas. As we shall see in the following 
chapter, this theory enables us to fully understand the ideological blends provoked by 
globalization. In terms of empirical topic, I focus on pharmaceutical activity and, more 
                                                     
1
 As explained and justified in the next chapter, the literature review of my specific topic will be gradually  
presented throughout this thesis. 
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precisely, the conduct of global clinical trials and the diffusion of the ethics committee 
model. The reasons for this empirical choice are presented in the following sections. 
 
1.2. Globalization of clinical research 
 
 In order to study the axiological consequences of globalization, it is important 
to select an economic activity that is endowed with a twofold characteristic. On the 
one hand, this activity must have reached high degrees of internationalization, so that 
social actors recognize it as a relevant issue in different countries and cities. On the 
other hand, it must be somehow undergoing changes, so that social actors look at it 
with interest, discomfort or suspicion, engaging in reflections. 
 Pharmaceutical activity meets these requisites. Nowadays, medicines occupy 
an important part of everyday life, as shown by three phenomena. First, many 
conditions that were not seen as pathological have received the label of diseases, 
being therefore considered as dysfunctions to be treated with medicines, in a process 
that has  been called “medicalization” (Conrad, 1992). Second, global pharmaceutical 
corporations have been formed whose operations encompass vast lists of countries 
(Magalhães, 2003, Bicudo, 2006). Finally, the use of medicines has become so normal 
that they are sometimes incorporated into non-scientific beliefs and framed as magic 
products, being expected and hoped to be effective (Fisher, 2009, Lefèvre, 1991, Van 
der Geest et al., 1996). In addition to having attained such high degrees of 
normalization and globalization, pharmaceutical activity meets our second requisite: 
since the 1990s, it has undergone an important shift. 
Indeed, if one focuses on the first stages of drug development, a promising field 
of study is opened up. Over the last years, several pharmaceutical companies have 
intensified their investments in clinical trials. These trials are studies through which 
new therapeutic compounds are tested in human beings, in order to verify their 
efficacy and safety, and eventually, if results are positive, derive new medicines. It is 
known that in 2008, 60 to 70% of R&D investments made by pharmaceutical and 
biotech companies were directed to these kinds of clinical tests (Voi Consulting, 2009). 
From the pharma companies’ standpoint, clinical trials began to become a 
strategic activity in the 1960s, a period in which a plethora of new compounds was 
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formulated. According to Epstein (2007, p. 32), the modern clinical trial is “[…] a 
method of formal experimentation that became prominent only after World War II 
[…].” One of the first trials carried out by a company was a 1956 study undertaken by 
the British laboratory Searle, which recruited patients in Porto Rico to test a 
contraceptive drug (Petryna, 2009). At this time, however, clinical studies were not 
largely conducted, and many companies launched medicines without carrying out very 
detailed tests on human beings. 
In 1962, the US Congress, by amending legislation of the Food and Drugs 
Administration (FDA), determined that all new therapeutic compounds should undergo 
clinical studies to have their efficacy and safety assessed (Angell, 2005, Lakoff, 2007, 
Petryna, 2009, Shah, 2006, Timmermans and Berg, 2003). This event became a 
watershed in the history of trials. “These new regulations institutionalized the 
randomized clinical trial as the scientific gold standard in health care, in turn providing 
the preferred raw material for evidence-based medicine evaluations” (Timmermans 
and Berg, 2003, p. 166). 
Even though this shift provoked an expansion in the number of trials 
undertaken by the industry, studies remained concentrated in the United States and 
Europe, where most pharma companies have their headquarters. This scenario only 
began to change in the 1980s. Since that moment, a series of phenomena have turned 
the globalization of trials into a feasible project. The following list provides us with a 
historical summary. 
 
 1970: the FDA determined that all clinical trials should include the technique of 
randomization, a research method in which patients are assigned at random to 
different study arms (Petryna, 2009, p. 23)2 
 1987: the FDA authorized drug companies to submit new drug proposals by 
presenting data collected only outside the United States (Epstein, 2007, p. 197-
198, Shah, 2006, p. 7) 
 Late 1980s: creation of today’s large Contract Research Organizations (CROs), 
companies that offer clinical-research-related services to pharma companies. 
                                                     
2
 In most trials, there are two arms. One group of patients receive the candidate medicine, while the other 
group receives a placebo. In other trials, the candidate drug is compared to an active medicine which is 
already available on the market. 
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The flexibility offered by CROs has made it easier to globalize clinical trials 
(Fisher, 2009, Petryna, 2009, Piachaud, 2002, Shuchman, 2007) 
 Early 1990s: in tandem with the signature of the Trips agreement and the 
emergence of the World Trade Organization, the International Conference on 
Harmonization (ICH) was created, an agreement established between the 
European, American and Japanese pharmaceutical agencies, aimed to 
normalize the regulatory frameworks of these three regions 
 1995: the World Health Organization published the Good Clinical Practices 
(GCP), a range of guidelines to be complied with in the design, conduct, 
auditing and analysis of clinical studies. Even though these rules are not strictly 
followed by the industry, they have become an important reference for 
physician-investigators in many countries (Petryna, 2009, p. 107-108): “[...] for 
the clinical trials industry, ICH-GCP standards made clinical data from 
international research sites transferable and acceptable to regulatory bodies in 
[…] major markets. It also would make it easier for a new drug to be registered 
by different countries and marketed globally” (Petryna, 2009, p. 24) 
 Early 1990s: the FDA declared it would consider the offshoring of studies, and 
the consequent inclusion of ethnic variations into studies, as a positive factor3 
 
These phenomena slowly made the globalization of trials become an attractive 
option from the industry’s viewpoint. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, all 
the key multinational pharma companies were already conducting an important 
proportion of their clinical studies outside the United States. Wyeth, for instance, 
conducted 70% of its trials outside the United States in 2006; whereas GlaxoSmithKline 
conducted half of its studies outside the United States and Western Europe in 2007 
(Julie Schmit, quoted by Petryna, 2009, p. 13). 
Indeed, the 1990s witnessed a steady and rapid globalization of clinical studies 
(Epstein, 2007, Fisher, 2009, Petryna, 2006, Petryna, 2009). In addition to the events 
summarized above, other factors could be invoked to explain the globalization of trials, 
but it is difficult, if not impossible, to point to a main cause. Elsewhere (Bicudo, 2011), I 
                                                     
3
 Details of these events can be found in the texts quoted. Particularly detailed accounts are presented in 
Petryna’s and Shah’s books. 
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listed some reasons frequently stressed by analysts: lower costs faced by companies in 
some settings, for some types of studies; the willingness to include an ethnically 
diverse study population in trials; difficulties of finding patients to enrol in trials in 
Europe and the United States; among others.4 Following the globalization of clinical 
trials, some countries, such as India, China, Brazil or Poland, have become strategic 
research settings for pharma companies. 
Therefore, whenever I speak of global trials in this thesis, I am referring to 
clinical studies whose conduct involve the participation of two or more countries, 
whose research centres comply with procedures and standards established by the 
global management of the study.5 Even though global trials can be managed by state 
or non-profit organizations, I am especially concerned with trials sponsored and 
conducted by the trials industry (pharma companies and CROs). This is so because 
“industrial” trials tend to be ideologically more controversial (and therefore richer for 
sociological enquiry) because of the intervention of financial concerns and economic 
schemes in medical research. 
 
1.3. GLOBALIZATION OF THE ETHICS COMMITTEE MODEL 
 
Many of the regulations and standards that are nowadays in place have been 
provoked by scandals in the history of clinical research. For example, when the US 
Congress made the conduct of trials mandatory, in 1962, the main purpose was to 
forestall the repetition of stories such as the thalidomide scandal, which had been 
recently unravelled by the media. In fact, the history of clinical research has always 
been marked by examples of abuses and exploitations, such as the Nazi studies.6 
As soon as trials became a global phenomenon, new scandals came to light. In 
1994, for instance, a study was undertaken in Africa to test the efficacy of AZT to 
prevent perinatal transmission of Aids (Bayer, 1998, Petryna, 2009). Women who 
joined the study did not understand it, and placebos were used even in face of the 
                                                     
4
 We shall mention other reasons in the following chapters. As we shall see, depending on the perspective 
that one adopts to speak of trials, one reason is selected to play the role of “main cause” of the 
globalization of trials. 
5
 I am not drawing any distinction between the following expressions: “clinical trial,” “clinical study,” 
and “clinical research.” Even though a distinction can be established, it is not important in the framework 
of my thesis. 
6
 We shall come back to this point in Chapter 4. 
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evidence that the drug was very likely to halt the infection of newborn babies. This 
case showed that the globalization of clinical trials seemed to offer a huge leeway for 
scandals to emerge, especially because studies were being transferred to poor 
countries with illiterate, poor populations. 
In order to fight such troubles, the ethics committee model was proposed. An 
ethics committee is a collective (generally multidisciplinary) body, responsible for 
receiving research proposals to be undertaken in particular research settings 
(generally, hospitals, medical practices and research institutions). Committee members 
must analyse the project by considering its scientific worth, practical feasibility, and 
ethical soundness, allowing, postponing or refusing the conduct of studies. According 
to the World Health Organization (2000, p. 1), ethics committees “[...] are responsible 
for carrying out the review of proposed research before the commencement of the 
research. They also need to ensure that there is regular evaluation of the ethics of 
ongoing studies that received a positive decision.” 
 Ethics committees were firstly created in the United States, where they are 
called Institutional Review Boards. First versions appeared as early as the 1920s, being 
created to deal with specific clinical issues such as sterilization or abortion. However, 
this period did not witness the creation of many committees, which began to 
proliferate subsequently. As we did with global trials, let us consider the following list, 
which summarizes key moments in the ethics committee model’s early (American) 
history. 
 
 1953: a federal document mandated the presence, in US hospitals, of boards to 
inspect procedures that, apparently, were not in line with established medical 
procedures (Eckenwiler, 2001, p. 38-39, Kohlen, 2009, p. 64) 
 1966: the National Institutes of Health published guidelines instructing 
researchers to let their studies be assessed by a body of specialists not involved 
in the project (Levine, 1995) 
 1970: federal laws were published mandating the review, by an ethics 
committee, of every study receiving public funding 
 1971 to 1978: following the publication of many scandals and abuses in clinical 
research, a National Commission was appointed to cope with problems in 
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medicine and research. Lately, the group became the so-called President’s 
Commission, which encouraged the creation of committees in hospitals 
(Kohlen, 2009, p. 65-67, Rothman, 1991, p. 188-189) 
 1974: publication of the US National Research Act, according to which 
researchers should follow the rules of the National Institutes of Health, 
submitting all their research projects to an ethics committee for ethical 
approval (Shah, 2006, p. 75, Epstein, 2007, p. 44) 
 1975: The World Medical Association published the Declaration of Helsinki, 
stating basic rules and principles for human experimentation. The document 
prescribed the creation of ethics committees to analyze research projects 
(Shah, 2006, p. 75) 
 1979: the US President’s Commission published the so-called Belmont Report, 
which contained principles to guide the ethical review of research projects 
(Kohlen, 2009, p. 67, Lederman, 2006) 
 1980s and early 1990s:  committees were diffused in the United States, being 
formed in most hospitals (Kohlen, 2009, p. 85-88, Rothman, 1991, p. 255) 
 Early 1990s: the US Inspector General recommends that the FDA encourages 
and fosters the creation of ethics committees outside the United States 
(Petryna, 2009, p. 38) 
 2000: the US National Bioethics Advisory Commission publishes a report stating 
that studies submitted to the FDA should undergo ethical review both in the 
United States and the countries where participants are recruited (Petryna, 
2009, p. 212 note 57) 
 
Thus, regulatory institutions in the United States, after promoting a successful 
diffusion of ethics committees in the country, began to encourage the international 
diffusion of ethics review boards. In addition to these recommendations, the industry 
itself started asking for committees, insofar as the ethical review of trials would help it 
prove that clinical studies are fair and accurate. “In order to conform to new global 
trade rules, countries had to establish new regulatory bodies, mandate ethical review 
boards, and support a culture of ethics and accountability” (Petryna, 2009, p. 119). 
Studying the implementation of ethics committees in Germany, Kohlen (2009, p. 95) 
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concluded that the process amounted to “a re-make of the US-American model of 
these committees.” Promoting this type of “re-make” in several countries was at least 
an ancillary aim of US institutions, pharma companies, CROs, and also local 
administrators. 
Therefore, ethics committees have turned into one of the prerequisites to be 
met by nation-states in order to join the universe of global health research. The history 
of global trials mingles with the history of the globalization of ethics committees. In my 
study, I focus on the ideological consequences of this twofold globalizing process. 
However, in order for my study to be feasible, it is necessary to select particular 
situations. I propose to focus on the South African and Brazilian situations, for reasons 
that are explained in the following section. 
 
1.4. GLOBAL TRIALS AND ETHICS COMMITTEES IN SOUTH AFRICA AND BRAZIL 
 
 As the United States and Europe are regions from where clinical trials have 
been globally disseminated, most social science studies on global trials and ethics 
committees focus on these regions. Therefore, it is important to look at these issues 
from the viewpoint of other countries, where the expansion of global trials has 
assumed very particular features. My study also aims to help fill this gap in our 
comprehension of global clinical research. Indeed, I highlight the situations of South 
Africa and Brazil, two countries that have experienced the globalization of trials as 
passive receivers, rather than active diffusers, of global pharmaceutical research. 
 To be precise, the United States is the only country that was able to constitute 
a national ethics review system in the fullest sense of this adjective. In other countries, 
review systems emerged in the context of globalization and used the American 
framework as an inspiration. The main difference between the United States and 
countries like South Africa and Brazil is that in the United States the expansion of trials 
and the diffusion of ethics committees constituted a slow process, which took many 
decades, as explained in the previous section. In South Africa and Brazil, the arrival of 
global trials and the creation of committees underwent a sudden expansion, allowing 
little time for these countries to adjust to new trends. Thus, as Santos (2000) claimed, 
we cannot assume the existence of smooth continuities and similarities between the 
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“scale of ordering” (countries from which globalizing trends spring) and the “scale of 
doing” (countries targeted by these trends). 
 Brazil has become one of the key emerging settings for global trials over the 
last decades. Nowadays, the biggest pharma companies and CROs have offices in the 
country, which figures in almost all pivotal international studies. Due to fundamental 
regulatory changes implemented in 1996, this year can be considered a watershed in 
the history of clinical trials in Brazil. Before this year, as Petryna (2009, p. 159) explains, 
Brazilian guidelines on clinical trials were vague, and ethics committees were scarce, 
“isolated and played a ‘symbolic function.’” This situation proved politically 
unsustainable in the face of the rapid expansion of global studies in the country since 
the early 1990s. On the one hand, concerns were growing about the unethical 
recruitment of people for international trials. On the other, pressures from 
international institutions and companies urged Brazil to modernize its regulatory and 
ethics review system. 
 In response to these sudden changes, the Ministry of Health, by means of its 
National Council of Health, published the 1996 Resolution 196, the first Brazilian 
guideline to address clinical research in detail. Prior to this publication, a 
multidisciplinary group based in the National Council, and led by physician Willian 
Saad, promoted a series of debates, involving several sectors of society (pharma 
companies, patients, hospital administrators, physicians, among others). At the end of 
this process, the group wrote and published the Brazilian Resolution, which proposed 
the creation of the National Commission for Research Ethics (Conep, Commissão 
Nacional de Ética em Pesquisa) and encouraged the formation of local ethics 
committees in hospitals and universities. Saad became the first chair of Conep, which 
assumed the responsibility for two main tasks. On the one hand, the Commission 
oversees the work of local ethics committees. On the other, it became responsible for 
reviewing research projects in the so-called “special areas” (áreas especiais), which 
include genetic studies, research with foreign funding, studies on new medicines, 
studies involving indigenous populations, among others. Thus, every study classified as 
a “special area” must go through a two-layer process, being reviewed by both Conep 
and the local committees of research sites where participants are recruited. 
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 Highly informed by bioethical concerns,7 the group that published the 
Resolution 196 wished to formulate very broad guidelines, in order to encompass 
every kind of study involving human beings. In 2005, Saad, still chair of Conep, recalled 
the publication of the Brazilian Resolution by saying: “We thought not only of medical 
research but of how to do a Resolution pertaining to human beings while preserving 
and protecting its aspects in terms of health” (Saad, 2005). 
 By this period, clinical trials had become a thriving activity in Latin America 
(Dainesi and Elkis, 2007). It is known that, in the late 1990s, the region was displaying 
the world’s most intense expansion in terms of global trials (DataEdge, 2001). Brazil, as 
a regional economic leader, appeared in an outstanding position. From 1995 to 2001, 
investments in clinical trials underwent a 411% rise in the country (Bicudo, 2006). The 
presence of good research infrastructure and high-skilled researchers, as well as the 
modernization of the regulatory system, help to explain such an astonishing growth 
(Bicudo, 2006, Petryna, 2009). In certain medical specialties, such as cancer or heart 
diseases, Brazil has internationally renowned institutions and physician-investigators. 
Hence, the rapid expansion of trials in some specific fields, as exemplified by Silva and 
collaborators’ (2011) study focusing on transplant-related trials. However, most global 
trials were concentrated in the southern part of the Brazilian territory. Nowadays, 
some global CROs have 50% of their studies installed in only two cities: São Paulo and 
Porto Alegre, which have become the main hubs of clinical research in Brazil. 
 The expansion of global trials in South Africa has been more modest than in the 
Brazilian case. This fact is understandable if we consider that according to estimates of 
the United Nations (2011), the Brazilian population is more than four times bigger than 
the South African population, and according to the International Monetary Fund 
(2011), the Brazilian economy is more than seven times bigger than the South African 
economy, in terms of GDP. Nevertheless, South Africa has also been targeted by the 
globalizing trends of the 1990s. One of the reasons is the vast population of HIV-
infected people in the country, accounting for 17% of the national population in 2008, 
according to the United Nations. Thus, South Africa turned into an inescapable setting 
for the study of anti-retroviral drugs. Nowadays, all big pharma companies have their 
units there and, in the case of CROs, the country is frequently their only location in the 
                                                     
7
 On this point, see Chapter 4. 
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entire African continent. Thus, CROs have selected South Africa to be a regional 
headquarter, from which the operations of representatives based in other African 
countries are managed. 
 In spite of the relatively modest weight of the South African economy, the 
country’s participation in global trials is worth noting. “According to an article in the 
July 2003 edition of the ‘CRAdvisor Newsletter’, a South African Department of Trade 
and Industry Survey, conducted in 2000, revealed that South Africa is currently 
awarded 0.6% of the world’s clinical research contracts from international research 
companies and clinical research organizations (CROs), and has the capacity to conduct 
2.5% of the current global work” (Baird and Van Niekerk, 2004, p. 33). 
 Like Brazil, South Africa could attract global trials due to its appropriate medical 
environment. In the 1960s, some South African hospitals already had sophisticated 
infrastructures, like the Groote Schuur Hospital in Cape Town, where the world’s first 
heart transplant was performed in 1967. However, this dynamics was limited to a small 
number of hospitals, in areas from which most people were excluded. With the end of 
the apartheid regime in 1994, these geographical inequalities have been fought by 
means of modest national policies. Even though important clinical hubs can be found 
across the country (in cities like Durban, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town), the most 
important sites continue to be concentrated in the province of Gauteng, and mainly 
the cities of Johannesburg and Pretoria (where most of the South African population 
lives). By 2003, as explained by Shah, many CROs were operating in the country, 
targeting especially the most developed hospitals and universities. “At institutions like 
the University of Stellenbosch drug companies would soon be proposing over sixty new 
trials every year” (Shah, 2006, p. 104). 
 The Medicines Control Council is the agency that oversees pharmaceutical 
production and registry in the country. It was founded in 1965 but its current 
organization is not very old. “South Africa first implemented GCP guidelines in 2000 
and updated them most recently in 2006” (Voi Consulting, 2009, p. 26). In 1996, by 
means of the National Drug Policy, the country signalled its willingness to modernize 
its regulatory framework. However, the required complementary law, called Act 59, 
was approved only in 2003. In the same year, the South African Parliament approved 
Act 61, known as the National Health Act, restructuring the health system. One of the 
key measures was the creation of the National Health Research Ethics Council 
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(NHREC), which became the central agency responsible for overseeing the ethics 
review system. Contrary to what happens in Brazil with Conep, the NHREC does not 
review research projects, being only responsible for establishing ethics guidelines and 
monitoring the local ethics committees’ operations. As the legal text puts it, the 
NHREC must, among other functions: “set norms and standards for conducting 
research on humans and animals, including norms and standards for conducting 
clinical trials” (Parliament of South Africa, 2003, p. 74). 
 Under the sway of globalizing trends, both South Africa and Brazil had, 
therefore, to implement relatively quick adjustments in their institutional and legal 
frameworks. One of the most pressing needs was the constitution of a national review 
system based on ethics committees. Shaken by the liberalizing trends that prevailed 
worldwide in the 1990s, both countries entered the twenty-first century trying to 
modernize their economies and acquire relevant positions in the international 
scenario. Participation in global trials was seen as an appropriate strategy to help 
reach these goals. As a consequence, it was necessary to provide foreign regulatory 
agencies, and especially the trials industry, with the institutional structure that was 
required. In 2001, both countries had already joined the International Conference on 
Harmonization (ICH) and Good Clinical Practices (GCP), with the implication that they 
should constitute their ethics committee system, for as Petryna (2009, p. 159) claims, 
the ICH-GCP framework “includes guidelines for institutional review boards.” 
 On this point, the two countries adopted different solutions. In Brazil, 
Resolution 196 encouraged the proliferation of ethics committees, stating that: 
“Institutions where studies involving human beings are undertaken shall constitute 
one research ethics committee or more, depending on their needs” (Conselho 
Nacional de Saúde, 1996). In South Africa, the National Health Act stated that: “Every 
institution, health agency and health establishment at which health research is 
conducted, must establish or have access to a health research ethics committee [...]” 
(Parliament of South Africa, 2003, p. 76). By allowing research sites to simply “have 
access to” an ethics committee, rather than establishing their own committees, the 
South African law made the diffusion of reviewing boards less intense than in Brazil. In 
2011, South African NHREC registered 30 committees in the whole country, whereas 
Brazilian Conep, in the same year, registered 608 committees, a number that at the 
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time of my fieldwork was still growing every day.8 The following maps show the spatial 
distribution of ethics committees in both countries. 
 
                                                     
8
 These figures were provided by NHREC and Conep during my fieldwork. 
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Map 1.1. Spatial distribution of ethics committees in 
South Africa (30 committees): 2011 
Map 1.2. Spatial distribution of ethics committees in 
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As the maps show, the geographical inequalities of Brazil are reflected in the 
ethics review system. Most committees are concentrated in the economically dynamic 
southern states, with 166 agglomerated in the state of São Paulo and 70 committees in 
its northern neighbour, Minas Gerais. Generally, the states with less than 31 
committees do not receive global trials, holding only academic studies conducted by 
local researchers. In South Africa the distribution is more balanced than in Brazil, but 
the province of Gauteng occupies an outstanding position, with 13 committees, 
followed by the Western Cape (where the city of Cape Town is located) with 6 
committees. 
In Brazil the most important research sites are situated in state universities, 
which have their own committees. South African universities and government 
hospitals are also key research sites, but private practices and hospitals play an 
important role as well. Generally, these private sites do not have ethics committees, 
and contract the reviewing services of two private committees located in Pretoria. 
These two private committees, which are organized as companies receiving fees for 
their tasks, are the only boards with these features in the country.9 As a consequence, 
private committees (an institutional form which is absent in Brazil) play a pivotal role in 
the South African review system. 
To summarize, since the 1990s South Africa and Brazil have undergone decisive 
changes as a consequence of efforts spent mainly in the United States, “exporting the 
IRB [Institutional Review Board] model,” to use Petryna’s (2006, p. 55) words. As I 
claimed at the beginning, the globalization of trials and ethics committees is arguably 
provoking crucial changes in the ways in which social actors frame and interpret social 
issues. My study, by focusing on the South African and Brazilian contexts, aims to 
unravel the nature of these ideological processes, as explained in the following section. 
 
1.5. AIMS AND QUESTIONS 
 
 According to Braun (2005), several sorts of ethics committees have been 
diffused throughout the Western world over the last decades in order to deal with 
                                                     
9
 As we shall see, one of these committees took part in my study. 
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issues brought about by the development of medical technologies. By 2009, for 
instance, the ethics committee model had been largely adopted even in sub-Saharan 
Africa, a world region with a relatively small number of clinical studies (Nyika et al., 
2009). This phenomenon implies not only the diffusion of a certain sort of institutional 
form but also the necessary proliferation of a new type of social actor: the ethics 
committee member. Nurses, physicians, lawyers, bioscientists, among other 
professionals, are mobilized to engage in the review of research projects that are 
frequently submitted by multinational companies. Thus, a group of actors becomes 
involved in issues whose scope goes beyond their immediate local and national 
contexts. By entering in contact with bioethical guidelines, meeting other professionals 
in the regular committee meeting, being confronted by cutting-edge research 
methods, or learning the procedures and particularities of global trials, these 
professionals cannot avoid being exposed to new sets of discourses, ideas, 
explanations and ideologies. At the same time, they must look at these emerging 
ideological elements in the light of beliefs and notions they have carried for long years. 
For these reasons, ethics committee members constitute an invaluable group for those 
who wish to understand the ideological combinations and shifts made possible by the 
globalization of clinical trials. 
According to Milton Santos (1979/2003), under-developed countries, by 
installing technological infrastructures imported from central countries in the 1970s, 
ended up putting their geographical configuration at the disposal of an international 
political project elaborated outside of their territories. If material infrastructures can 
carry political projects, it is worth asking if the importation of institutional forms, such 
as ethics committees, can also have impacts on the political and ideological dimensions 
of a country. The answer seems to be positive, for as Petryna (2009) explained, many 
countries adopted the ethics committee model in an attempt to realize a requisite of 
institutional efficiency and rapidity which was in tune with multinational companies’ 
aspirations. 
Another clue is offered by Lakoff (2005), who showed how the globalization of 
trials depends on previous diffusions of some cognitive frameworks, such as medical 
standards making it possible to compare and commensurate health conditions by using 
scales and diagnosis methods. However, we are still lacking interpretations to show 
how these broad ideas (such as efficiency and institutional swiftness) are assimilated 
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and processed at an individual level. Moreover, it is important analyze how this 
individual understanding is channelled back into the political life of national 
institutions. These are also aims of this thesis. 
It is crucial to point out that my study has not only a philosophical but also a 
sociological and political relevance. The diffusion of certain ideologies frequently 
underpins the adoption of certain political projects. For example: 
 
“Today insubstantial promises, which are based upon a potential that is difficult 
to assess properly and which will take time to develop fully but which are 
amplified through the media, excite the imagination of industry and the public 
and influence decisions about which parts of basic research are to be funded 
and which lines of inquiry are to be pursued (although, in ‘objective’ scientific 
terms, one may seem just as promising as the other). Collusions of interest 
emerge almost unaided which tread a thin line between authentic belief in the 
future potential and mere rhetoric of ‘selling’ a particular line of research to 
politicians and the public” (Nowotny et al., 2001/2007, p. 38). 
 
However, the contact with technical and institutional forms diffused by 
globalization may also trigger resistances. In this way, social actors, instead of 
accepting trends and ideas spread by global actors, may refuse them and look for 
alternatives. That is why, as Certeau (1990, p. 79) claimed: “It is impossible [...] to 
reduce the operations of a society to a dominant type of procedures.” From this point 
of view, ethics committees constitute an arena crossed over by several political 
ideologies, being therefore similar to scientific advisory committees, whose meetings 
“[...] serve as forums where scientific as well as political conflicts can be 
simultaneously negotiated” (Jasanoff, 1990, p. 237). In this way, discourses voiced by 
ethics committee members would constitute, at the same time, specks of culture and 
specks of political projects. “Culture, here, is not cults and customs, but the structures 
of meaning through which men give shape to their experience; and politics is not 
coups and constitutions, but one of the principal arenas in which such structures 
publicly unfold” (Geertz, 1973, p. 312). Thus, by looking at ethics committees, we can 
see culture and politics being enacted and actualized by concrete social actors. 
32 
 
Depending on the standpoint chosen by ethics committee members, the 
meaning of global trials, pharmaceutical research, and national health policies can vary 
immensely. Even though they are all supposed to carry out an “ethical” assessment of 
research proposals, the precise scope of this adjective has not been (and maybe 
cannot be) precisely determined. As Braun (2005) pointed out, people attribute very 
different meanings to the concept of “ethics.” Thus, for a study that focuses on 
globalization and ideology, the example of committee members constitutes a rich 
topic, for two main reasons. Firstly because, as I have just claimed, they participate in 
meetings in which the viability and worth of research proposals are discussed. 
Therefore, they must, to a greater or smaller degree, engage in what Arendt (1963, p. 
82) described as the “[...] wearisome processes of persuasion, negotiation, and 
compromise, which are the processes of law and politics.” Secondly, debates about 
clinical trials belong to the professional life of committee members who are, 
consequently, likely to end up formulating a discourse about trials, pharma companies, 
CROs, among other topics, thus going beyond a simple commonsense view. 
This second point is crucial. Indeed, as committee members tend to formulate 
these structured views about clinical trials, a discourse analysis can be undertaken in 
order to grasp the discursive elements and structures that are being marshalled. 
Conducted with accuracy and imagination, this analysis can unravel the ideological 
changes, upheavals and resistances entailed by the globalization of trials and ethics 
committees. Thus, it is possible to realize that, even though “globalization” (in the 
singular) is generally fostered by one single economic and technical rationale, the 
ideological responses it generates allow us to identify different “globalizations” (in the 
plural), for people never cease to attribute different meanings to the same events. 
I thus present the main questions of this thesis as follows: 
 
 Does the globalization of trials lead to a sort of ideological harmonization, in 
the sense that people start adopting the same views and discourses regardless 
of their geographical contexts and social lifestyles? 
 Can ethics committees be seen as a sort of global community, in the sense that 
committee members share an ideological framework? 
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 Is the political and economic power of pharma companies and CROs somehow 
underpinned by ideological processes? 
 How important are national characteristics for people who are systematically 
concerned with global procedures and processes? 
 
From these questions, another set of more specific goals can be derived: 
 
 What are the rationalities expressed by committee members? How could we 
describe and name these rationalities? 
 Is it possible to identify, in one person’s discourse, different composing 
elements? Can we describe the philosophical and social history of these 
ideological components? 
 In spite of the social, geographical and economic differences between South 
Africa and Brazil, can we identify similarities in the discourses voiced by ethics 
committee members in these countries? 
 Is there any type of rationale that is promoted and diffused by trials 
companies? How would such transmission happen? How could we describe this 
rationale? 
 Is it really possible to claim that ethics committees are political arenas in which 
divergent ideologies struggle for ideological legitimacy? 
 
In order to address these questions, I am presenting a text organized in the 
following fashion. In the second chapter, I shall present the research methods used in 
my study. The actual analysis begins in Chapter 3, where I first introduce the concept 
of mentalities and describe the first approach to clinical trials, named pragmatic 
mentality. Chapter 4 presents two more mentalities (called bioethical and 
communitarian). The description continues in Chapter 5, in which the technical and 
analytical mentalities are focused on. The two final mentalities (named healing and 
critical) are presented in Chapter 6. Finally, the general Conclusion retakes and 
explores central ideas presented in the previous chapters. 
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As the historical descriptions of this Introduction have shown, global trials 
sprang from some countries (the headquarters of pharma companies) to other 
countries; regulatory agencies, which have a national scope, played central roles; and 
the ethics review system has always assumed national (rather than regional or 
international) features. Therefore, the national state and all the legal instruments 
associated with it are decisive in our analysis. As Habermas explained, there is 
permanent communication between the national legal dimension and the everyday 
communicative negotiations undertaken by individuals in their search for 
constitutional rights. “Because these rights must be interpreted in various ways under 
changing social circumstances, the light they throw on this context is refracted into a 
spectrum of changing legal paradigms” (Habermas, 1996, p. 387). Therefore, the 
comprehension of political and legal trends depends on the comprehension of 
everyday communicative practices, and vice-versa. 
In order to see these combinations between individual, national and global 
dimensions, it is crucial to look for mediations. Ethics committees can be framed as 
mediating institutions. On the one hand, they are located at social positions that 
Habermas defined as the “periphery” of the political system, because they are 
composed by citizens who master the basic cultural tools of a country. On the other 
hand, ethics committees have some contact with what Habermas (1996) called the 
“core area” of the political system, because in addition to being composed by many 
scientists and experts, they are directly linked to national agencies and Ministries of 
Health. In the light of the South African and Brazilian situations, therefore, I try to 
unravel the ways in which these individual, national and global scales have been 






2 Chapter 2 – Methodology 
 
As explained in the Introduction, my study has cultural and political dimensions. 
In addition, we will be dealing with complex issues (clinical trials and ethics 
committees) that have been targeted by debates and legal changes in two different 
countries (South Africa and Brazil) and two different world regions (Southern Africa 
and Latin America). In order to cope with all these aspects, it was necessary to choose 
flexible strategies of research, analysis and final exposition. In this chapter, I introduce 
my main theoretical basis, analytical tools and strategies pertaining to literature 
review. Firstly, I describe the theory I draw on. Secondly, the ways in which I approach 
literature will be explained. After describing the methods used to prepare and conduct 
the fieldwork, I explain how my interviews were analyzed. Finally, I describe the 
statistical tools I utilized. 
 
2.1 SOCIAL ACTIONS, RATIONALITIES, AND ETHICS COMMITTEES 
 
In my study, I draw on the theory of communicative action proposed by 
German sociologist Jürgen Habermas (1981/1987, 1996) in the early 1980s. The use of 
this theory is due to three reasons. Firstly, even though social theories help us 
interpret particular cases, they are primarily aimed to explain broad processes and 
trends. It seems to me that Habermas’ theory is endowed with the capacity to explain 
several phenomena taking place in contemporary society. Secondly, the globalization 
of trials seems to imply a division between notions that tend to be globalized and 
traditional ideologies that are generally embedded in local contexts. As we shall see, 
Habermas’ theory points to a basic division that can be applied to this dual nature of 
global trials. Finally, ethics committee members are engaged in constant 
communicative processes, insofar as they analyze written documents and discuss 
research projects with their colleagues. Thus, it seems appropriate to look at these 




As any sociological explanation wishes to do, Habermas’ theory aims to explain 
the ways in which people create conditions for living together. The basic idea is that by 
means of social actions, people can not only realize practical tasks but also convey, 
recognize and negotiate meanings. Social action implies communication, and this is 
why one speaks of “communicative actions.” 
Claiming that actions contain communication amounts to recognizing a twofold 
process. On the one hand, social actors must pay attention to established rules, 
predetermined meanings and possible statements, for actions are always socially 
limited. On the other hand, there is a content of freedom in communicative actions, 
for they are used in order to engage in negotiations and therefore reach states of 
mutual agreement (Habermas, 1981/1987, Habermas, 1996). However, it is important 
to consider that depending on their purposes and resources, social actors can 
undertake their actions in two different ways. More precisely, they can express two 
different rationalities. 
 Some actors are more resourceful and have the capacity to shape and modify 
the surrounding conditions, including other actors as well as material means. For these 
actors, it is crucial to strive to modify the worldly conditions in order to realize a 
“strategy.” In this way, these actors frame and use the surrounding conditions as a 
means, a tool, an “instrument.” This is why one can talk about an “instrumental 
rationality.” 
 
“We name instrumental one action oriented towards success, when we 
consider it from the point of view of the pursuit of technical rules of action and 
when we assess the degree of efficiency of an intervention in a context of state 
of things and events [...]” (Habermas, 1981/1987, p. 295). 
 
 Therefore, instrumental rationality presupposes the existence of a plan, a 
project, as well as the capacity to shape the surrounding world in order to realize this 
project. Instrumental actors are always searching for targets and trying to reach 
success. 
 On the other hand, there is a set of actors who are not able to realize the 
requisites of instrumental action. For these actors, the surrounding conditions are not 
seen as means of actions but as elements with which one’s actions have to be 
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harmonized. Here, the main intention is no longer the realization of a strategy but the 
search for “intercomprehension.” It is necessary to undertake negotiations and look 
for agreements so that different actions can be combined through communicative 
processes. Therefore, one identifies communicative actions. 
 
“[...] I speak of communicative actions when the action plans of participant 
actors are not informed by egocentric calculations of success but by acts of 
intercomprehension” (Habermas, 1981/1987). 
 
However, it is crucial to understand that the concepts of instrumental and 
communicative rationality do not refer to personal and psychological stances. As 
Habermas (1981/1987, p. 296) explains: “[...] this elucidation should not be 
understood as a psychological task. I do not aim to characterize behavioural 
dispositions empirically, but to grasp general structures of processes of 
intercomprehension [...].” Therefore, the theory of communicative action focuses not 
so much on personal motivations, but on states of things and social contexts. Even 
though Habermas does claim that instrumental actors hold egocentric projects, the 
fundamental aspect of their actions is not this egocentric stance but the fact that they 
can frame social contexts as instruments. This is why one speaks of instrumental, 
rather than egocentric, action. 
In the framework of my study, it is important to point out some basic traits of 
these two rationalities. Firstly, instrumental actors pursue specific targets, which 
become their main concern, whereas everything else tends to be regarded as simple 
tools. In order to realize their strategies, instrumental actors can impose their views 
either “[...] instrumentally, by influencing the action situation directly, or strategically, 
by influencing, through calculations, the decisions of their counterparts.” In this way, 
instrumental action frequently mobilizes general concepts and patterns of behaviour 
so that their plans can be realized in different social conditions. In their turn, 
communicative actors can never impose projects, insofar as intercomprehension is 
paramount and “[...] agreements cannot be induced and exercised from outside but 
has to be accepted as valid by the participants” (Habermas, 1981/1987, p. 297). Thus 




 Secondly, one could argue that the instrumental rationality is wordly whereas 
the communicative rationality is mundane. On the one hand, the calculations 
undertaken by instrumental actors take into account the established, fixed conditions 
of the world. Without these considerations, projects would rapidly prove unviable and 
unsuccessful. On the other hand, intercomprehension never derives from rigid 
processes; rather, it is something that must be created through the communicative act 
itself. Therefore, communicative actions are certainly based on material and practical 
conditions but they always strive to go beyond such conditions and bring about new 
elements to the world (Habermas, 1981/1987, p. 302-303). 
 However, when focusing on the individuals’ point of view, the broad idea of 
rationality cannot fully explain ideological processes. This conceptual limitation is 
explored in the following chapters, in which I propose to solve this theoretical 
limitation by introducing the concept of mentality. 
 
2.2 APPROACH TO LITERATURE 
 
 In my study, I strived to conduct a very detailed analysis of my interviews, 
delving into the structures of my interviewees’ discourses. This careful examination is 
necessary in order to look at individual discourses in the light of debates taking place in 
society. According to Geertz (1973, p. 313): “Each study struggles to draw broad 
generalizations out of special instances, to penetrate deeply enough into detail to 
discover something more than detail.” The study of ethics committees allows us to 
realize these passages because as claimed by Kohlen (2009, p. 135), committees are 
situated at an “institutional level,” mediating between the “individual level” (moral 
decisions) and the “societal-political level” (institutions and public agencies). 
 Realizing these passages with success requires an active analysis of discourses. 
In other words, it is necessary to grasp the meanings invoked by committee members 
in the light of the concepts offered by the theory I am mobilizing here. In this way, the 
aim is to carry out a cultural analysis such as the one proposed by Geertz (1973), in 
which the anthropological text converses with the speeches voiced by the “natives” 
studied. To put it with Denzin’s (1997, p. 41) words: “A written text becomes a 
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montage (and a mise-en-scène) – a meeting place where ‘original’ voices, their 
inscriptions (as transcribed texts), and the writer’s interpretations come together.” 
 My purpose is to make my interpretation converse not only with my 
interviewees’ discourses but also with the authors and interpreters I quote. In this 
way, it is important to note that throughout my text, authors will be quoted in three 
different ways. Firstly, some authors (such as Petryna, Fisher and Epstein) will be 
quoted as sources of information and data about clinical trials. From these studies 
come relevant examples that underpin my analysis, even though these examples are 
adjusted to fit into a different theoretical framework. 
Secondly, some authors will be quoted as examples of claims expressing 
mentalities. In these circumstances, there will be no difference between these authors’ 
claims and the claims voiced in the interviews I conducted. For example, if we focus on 
a typical bioethical claim (like “research subjects must receive full and clear 
information about their participation in research”), it is easy to see that many authors, 
in their studies on clinical trials, came to express this bioethical view. In this way, I will 
refer to these authors in Chapter 4, when dealing with the bioethical mentality. This is 
why this thesis lacks a chapter called “literature review.” In order to make my 
exposition clear and coherent, it proved to be more interesting to spread my literature 
review throughout my text, grouping different authors according to the mentality 
favoured by their interpretations. 
Thirdly, there is a group of texts and ideas that I quote in order to underpin my 
interpretation theoretically. Therefore, this thesis is punctuated by several 
“interventions” from authors such as Habermas, Arendt, Geertz, Santos, Certeau, 
among others. As explained before, Habermas provides me with my principal 
theoretical framework, by means of his communicative action theory. The choice of 
other theoretical contributions was made, mainly, on the basis of their suitability for a 
communicative explanation. In a certain sense, these authors’ theories enable us to 
look at society and space in the light of communicative processes. 
Milton Santos, in his geographical theory, explored the consequences of 
globalization for non-central countries. He stressed the formation of “spatial densities” 
as a result of the globalizing process. In addition to “technical,” “scientific” and 
“informational densities” in some places and cities, one can identify the emergence of 
“communicational densities” characterized by the formation of contexts in which 
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human contacts and the circulation of news are facilitated. Thus, his theory helps us to 
see some situations (as well as some bodies like ethics committees) as favourable 
places for communication to take place. 
 Certeau’s philosophical work explored the appearance of unexpected social 
rationales in the interstices of the dominant capitalist logic. According to him, this 
phenomenon has to do with the construction, by the users of the city, of alternative 
ways to grasp and interpret urban reality. Certeau’s theory, therefore, enables to 
investigate ethics committees as bodies in which unexpected rationales can emerge in 
spite of the force of dominant ways to frame clinical research. 
 Arendt’s work is quoted by Habermas himself at decisive points of his texts. The 
main idea that comes from Arendt’s work is a definition of social action that enables a 
communicative approach. The social actor is framed as someone who initiates a 
dialogue whose future development cannot be foreseen. In addition, Arendt advanced 
many philosophical ideas that help to build up the communicative interpretation 
looked for in this thesis. For instance, she claimed that “[...] whatever men do or know 
or experience can make sense only to the extent that it can be spoken about” (Arendt, 
1958/1998, p. 4). 
 Clifford Geertz has become widely famous by his important linguistic, semiotic 
interpretations of culture. According to him, culture is at the same time an active and 
passive phenomenon, insofar as it is constructed by social actors who will 
subsequently live under the strong influence of their own cultural constructions. Thus, 
Geertz’ ideas allow us to look at ethics committees as bodies composed by actors that 
build up interpretations, being at the same time conditioned by the force of their 
ideological creations. 
The concept of mentality, which is at the core of my thesis, comes from 
Simmel’s theory. According to Simmel, social actors are constantly giving ideological 
responses to the manifold stimuli they get from their urban environment. Thus, 
sociological and cultural analyses must focus not only on practical actions but also on 
the ideological products of social life. This is a major inspiration for my thesis, which 
certainly constitutes an effort to apply Simmel’s idea to the contemporary period. 





2.3 FIELDWORK AND RESEARCH METHODS 
 
 In my study, I look at global clinical trials from the viewpoint of ethics 
committee members. The goal is to identify the meaning (or meanings) imparted by 
these social actors to issues pertaining to clinical trials. Because of this communicative 
and semiotic approach, it does not seem appropriate to use the so-called grounded 
theory, which, as explained by Charmaz (2003, p. 258), generally disregard the 
controversial dimension of  social phenomena, suggesting that “[...] data have an 
objective status.” 
Therefore, the actual discourses voiced by committee members acquire a 
decisive worth in my approach. Hence the choice of individual interviews. As Rubin and 
Rubin (1995) explained, interviews are not suitable for identifying concrete actions and 
preferences but are of great importance when it comes to identifying what actors 
think about their actions and preferences. 
It might be argued that discourses voiced by people may not express their 
actual thoughts and feelings, being used, rather, to deceive and bewilder. From a 
sociological point of view, this circumstance does not pose any problem, as the main 
purpose of sociological analysis is not to grasp the individuals’ inner reality but to 
understand patterns of communication and relationship. Thus, even though speakers 
do not disclose true feelings and thoughts, they certainly voice discourses that are 
socially meaningful. To use Todorov’s (1984) distinction, what matters in 
sociological/cultural analyses is not “truth” (the disclosure of the inner universe) but 
“verisimilitude” (the expression of messages that make sense within a certain social 
context). Therefore, there is no need to look for natural, genuine interpretations, for 
as Geertz (1973, p. 15) teaches us, interpretations are always “fictions,” “[...] in the 
sense that they are ‘something made,’ ‘something fashioned’ […] not that they are 
false, unfactual, or merely ‘as if’ thought experiments.” 
Thus I avoided what Silverman (2001, p. 287) called “naive interview,” which 
takes place when the interviewer considers the interviewee’s point of view as an 
explanation. It is important to convey the precise import I am attributing to individual 
verbal discourses. These latter, in the framework of my interpretation, are relevant 
because of two characteristics. On the one hand, claims voiced by particular individuals 
realize a historical mediation, for they are expressed with words and notions 
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formulated in the past while being advanced in a particular moment in the present. In 
Hacking’s (1990, p. 8) terms: “Sentences have two powers. They are eternal, and they 
are spoken by flesh and blood.” On the other hand, verbal discourses realize a social 
mediation, for they are shaped by the local contexts in which they are voiced, being 
also informed by broad debates taking place nationally or even globally. In this sense, 
verbal discourses, when carefully analyzed, are endowed with the revelatory capacity 
that Geertz (1973, p. 23) identified in “small facts”: “[…] where an interpretation 
comes from does not determine where it can be impelled to go. Small facts speak to 
large issues […] because they are made to.” 
My research project consisted in using two principal research instruments: 
interviews with committee members and the observation of regular committee 
meetings. Through the readings undertaken in this PhD’s first year, I became familiar 
with the idea that in some ethics committees, institutional hierarchies can play a 
decisive role, an issue that is underlined by some authors (Eckenwiler, 2001, Kohlen, 
2009, Rothman, 1991). According to these interpreters, some committee members 
(especially laypeople) can feel somehow intimidated while discussing issues pertaining 
to clinical trials with other members (especially physicians). Thus, in order to make 
sure that my interviewees would speak freely and with no intimidation, I decided to 
conduct individual rather than collective interviews. Focus groups would not have 
been helpful either, for my aim was to delve into my interviewees’ discourses and, as 
explained by Fern (2001), in focus groups people frequently get distracted by 
interruptions and therefore much information can be lost. Even though I focus on 
individual discourses, I am interested in global processes; thus, it would not have been 
completely appropriate to conduct case studies, which always stress the individual 
example, as explained by Stake (2003). 
Thus, one of the main tasks to be accomplished in my study was to verify the 
expression and organization of discourses pertaining to global trials. It was clear that 
such verbal expressions can also emerge in committee meetings, in which members 
are supposed to present and discuss particular research proposals. Therefore, my 
observations were aimed, on the one hand, to verify the ways in which ideas and 
claims are advanced by members when engaging in the ordinary discussions of 
projects; on the other hand, observations enabled me to detect some non-verbal signs 
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that influence the members’ attitudes in meetings, thus contributing to a non-verbal 
discussion. 
One of the main tasks of my PhD’s first year was to identify and contact key 
ethics research committees in South Africa and Brazil, inviting them to join my study. 
As for Brazilian committees, the choice of potential participants was easy because I 
had previously conducted a Master’s study that focused on the pharmaceutical 
production in Brazil and in which clinical trials appeared as an ancillary topic (Bicudo, 
2009). Thus, I was aware of the main research sites in Brazil. As for South African 
committees, the identification of relevant institutions was undertaken through my 
literature review, insofar as some papers, reports and books on clinical trials 
sometimes mention key sites. In addition, I used the website clinicaltrials.gov to verify 
what the South African institutions are which generally take part in trials sponsored by 
pharma companies. After many months of contacts, explanations and some negative 
replies, I received positive answers from four Brazilian and three South African 
committees. After receiving ethical approval from King’s College ethics committee, I 
began the fieldwork in Brazil in March 2011. 
Parallel to my PhD, I started another research project called “Finding 
participants for global trials: recruitment companies in the UK, Spain, France, Brazil 
and South Africa.” This project focused on the organization of global trials, and 
particularly the strategies used for recruiting research subjects, in these five countries. 
With a travel grant from the European Science Foundation (Drugs Exchange Program), I 
conducted interviews with different professionals engaged in global trials in Spain and 
France, completing the study with other interviews in the UK, Brazil and South Africa. 
Therefore, in my fieldwork in South Africa and Brazil, I interviewed committee 
members for my PhD study, as well as other professionals for the parallel project. 
Thanks to these parallel interviews in Brazil, I could verify that nowadays, the 
Brazilian city of Porto Alegre has become a research hub, displaying the biggest 
expansion, in terms of clinical trials, over the last years. Thus I tried, and managed, to 
include another committee, based in Porto Alegre, into my PhD study. I also realized 
successful contacts with Conep, the national ethics agency of Brazil, being able to 
include it into my study as well.10 At that point, I had had positive answers from six 
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 With consent from Conep, the members interviewed, and King’s College ethics committee, this is the 
only committee that is identified in my study. This is so because the discourse of Conep’s members has a 
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Brazilian committees. In order to look at each case more accurately, avoiding too 
superficial views, I decided to exclude one of these committees from my fieldwork. 
Here, the criterion I used was purely practical: the committee excluded is located in a 
city that is somewhat distant from São Paulo, where I was based. The Brazilian 
fieldwork lasted three months (March to May 2011), involving observations in three 
committees and 25 interviews. 
The fieldwork in South Africa started in June 2011. Here, there were no 
changes: all the committees that initially agreed to take part were studied in my 
fieldwork. However, another practical issue had to be addressed in South Africa. I was 
based in Cape Town, where two committees focused on in my study are situated. The 
third committee is in Pretoria, which is far away from Cape Town. The solution I found 
was to study this committee in one single day. Thus, I interviewed three members in 
the morning, observed the meeting in the afternoon, and conducted a fourth interview 
in the evening. The whole activity lasted about 10 hours. At the end of a three-month 
stay in South Africa (June to August), I observed meetings in all three committees, and 
interviewed 17 members. 
Committee members joined my interviews in three ways: 
 
1. By spontaneously responding to a collective invitation circulated by email by 
the committee chair 
2. By being personally invited by me, either by email or telephone 
3. By being approached by me in the committee meeting 
 
Strategy 1 enabled committee members to spontaneously join my study 
whereas with strategies 2 and 3, I could select people in terms of professional 
background and the role they played in the meetings, thereby diminishing the risk of 
volunteer bias posed by strategy 1. The second strategy came to be the most 
successful, for it allowed me to obtain the biggest numbers of interviews in all the 
committees studied. 
The following tables present a summary of my fieldwork. 
                                                                                                                                                           
different nature and content, as they are based in a national commission rather than a local committee. 




















Psychologists Bioethicists Lawyers 
Natural 
scientists 
Pharmacists Statisticians Physicians TOTAL 
Brazil 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 0 8 25 
South 
Africa 
1 2 4 0 1 1 1 1 1 5 17 

















Bioscientists Physicians TOTAL 
C1: public university, 
São Paulo 
0 0 1 1 1 3 
C2: public hospital, 
São Paulo 
2 1 0 0 2 5 
C3: public university, 
São Paulo 
1 2 1 2 3 9 
C4: Conep, Brasília 0 0 1 2 1 4 
C5: private hospital, 
Porto Alegre 
0 1 2 0 1 4 
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 Table 2.1 gives us a detailed review in terms of the professional background of 
my interviewees. Because of confidentiality issues, the last two tables (2.2 and 2.3) are 
less detailed in terms of professional categories. The terminologies used in these two 
tables will be employed also in the statistical tests, as summarized below: 
 
 Lay members, nurses and social workers 
 Social scientists, including sociologists, anthropologists and psychologists 
 Bioethicists and lawyers 
 Bioscientists, including natural scientists, pharmacists and statisticians 
 Physicians 
 





Table 2.4 – Committees studied: 2011 
 



















4 Brazil Brasília 
National 
commission 
 B 0 
















* To preserve the committees’ confidentiality, I am classifying them, in terms of size, into three 
groups: A – from 1 to 20 members; B – from 21 to 40 members; and C – 41 members or more 
 
 
 These committees represent different institutional situations, being based in 
public and private hospitals, universities, one private hospital and one national 
committee. In addition, committee 8 is organized as a private company, receiving 
direct fees for its reviewing tasks. As explained in the Chapter 1 – Introduction, this 
committee reviews research proposals to be conducted in South African private 
hospitals and practices, which generally do not have their own committees. There is 
another private committee in South Africa, also based in Pretoria. 
 As Table 2.4 above shows, 11 meetings were observed during my fieldwork (6 
in Brazil and 5 in South Africa). Thus, it was possible to circumvent what Adler and 
Adler (1998) point to as the main limitations of observational techniques: the 
precarious generalizability of information and the lack of precision. My observations 
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 The geographical location of these cities in indicated in Map 1.1 and 1.2, page 28. 
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were made more generalizable because they involved five different committees, as 
well as different moments. In this way, my observations were provided with the 
remedies of time variation, which is recommended by Kidder (1981), and place 
variation, recommended by Lofland (1994). In addition, precision was obtained by 
combining the observations with another research method (interviews), as 
recommended by Adler and Adler (1998). 
My purpose was not to intervene or transform these social contexts and, 
therefore, I stayed away from the characteristics that according to Kemmis and 
McTaggart (2003), define action research. On the contrary, in all cases I tried to 
assume discreet attitudes, never interfered in the committees’ discussions, and tried 
to remain as unnoticed as possible. In committees 3, 6 and 7, these goals could be 
reached. In committee 3, for instance, the members sat around a very long table, while 
I took my seat in a separate chair; thus, I was actually sitting at many members’ back, 
and covered from the view of many others more. In these three committees, I was 
then free to take detailed notes during the meeting. In committees 2 and 8, however, I 
was invited to share the table with the members. Then, I did not feel at ease to write 
long sentences and decided to take notes very sparingly, just writing down some 
words. After the meeting, I used these words to remember relevant points and take 
detailed notes. 
 Meetings proved a good opportunity to approach members and invite them for 
interviews. In committee 3, for instance, most members had become quite familiar 
with my presence after my third observation; thus I felt comfortable to approach them 
and propose interviews. This strategy was particularly useful for professionals who are 
represented in small numbers in committees, such as lawyers and lay members. 
In spite of the relevant information gleaned from these observations, my analysis 
requires detailed discourses that cannot be voiced in a busy committee meeting. Thus, 
my main source of information had to be the individual conversation with members in 
the interviews. In the following section, I describe the qualitative analysis of these 





2.4 CONDUCT OF INTERVIEWS 
 
Due to cultural reasons, interviewing people was less complicated in my native 
country (Brazil) than in South Africa, a country I had never been to before. However, 
this difficulty was tempered by two circumstances. First, I had conducted many 
interviews with committee members and clinical research professionals before going 
to South Africa. Thus, I was very familiar with the issues and jargon pertaining to global 
trials. Second, even though my three-month stay did not allow me to have a deep 
understanding of the South-African culture, I did grasp some of its aspects, especially 
by interacting with people in non-research contexts and reading several newspapers. 
All the interviews were recorded with permission from the interviewees. There 
was only one situation (in São Paulo) in which the interviewee did not allow the 
recording to be done, and then I took notes while talking to him. In average, interviews 
lasted 44 minutes and 33 seconds. The longest interview (in Cape Town) lasted 72 
minutes, while the shortest one (in São Paulo) took only 14 minutes and 7 seconds. 
The interviews were semi-structured, with open questions explored according to the 
feedback received from the committee member. However, I tried to repeat some key 
questions in all interviews.12 The structure used to guide my interviews is presented in 
Appendix 1. 
While conducting the interviews, I tried not to influence the interviewees’ 
responses by means of ideas and key words voiced in the questions. Therefore, I used, 
as it were, neutral (and sometimes even vague) questions, such as: “In your opinion, 
what is the main goal of clinical research?” or “Do you think there is any difference 
between academic research and the studies sponsored by the industry?” As my 
analysis developed, in the fieldwork, I was able to identify some key ideas and 
expressions fraught with ideological implications. These expressions (such as 
vulnerability, risks and benefits, methodology, exploitation, interests, among others) 
were carefully avoided in my questions. Thus, before using them, I waited for the word 
(or its description) to be spontaneously invoked by the interviewee. 
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 In the following chapters, when I quote parts of interviews, these questions will appear many times. 
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2.5 ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEWS 
 
 Four different softwares were used in the analysis of my interviews. Recordings 
were listened to with Media Player; the actual quotes were written down in Word; 
basic information of interviewees and committees was kept in a small database in 
Access; and an index of relevant issues addressed by interviewees was made by using 
Excel. 
I listened to each interview at least three times, transcribing the most 
important parts, and translating the interviews conducted in Portuguese into English.13 
My main concern was not to identify personal and original claims. As I am interested in 
ideologies that are somehow normalized in society, I focused, rather, on claims that 
tend to be repeated and voiced by different interviewees in different contexts. Thus, it 
is necessary to introduce a concept that will be crucial throughout my text: the 
concept of claim. 
By speaking of claim, I refer to verbal statements that appear in many 
interviews, though under different forms. It is, therefore, a sort of standardized idea, 
being voiced by different committee members in order to express views about clinical 
research. From the committee members’ standpoint, claims seem to offer two 
advantages. On the one hand, they have their social history, being therefore full of 
meaning. On the other hand, they can be expressed in several ways, be it through 
sophisticated concepts or by means of ordinary language.  
 For example, during my fieldwork a very widespread claim (that is, a claim that 
was voiced by many committee members) was the idea that clinical research subjects 
must be provided with full and clear information about the study to be conducted. In 
the following quotes, we see two different ways in which this claim emerged in my 
interviews. 
 
“And in your opinion, what is the main goal of clinical research? 
[...] The most important thing (I’m saying it from my point of view), the most 
important thing [...] is the participation of patients, of research subjects, to see if 
they’re conscious, responsible, if they understand what they’re signing, if they receive 
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all the information about the project, all the instructions... So I really pay attention to 
see whether the consent form will clarify the subjects’ minds, so to say [...] So the 
language must be very clear, objective, a simple language, with no technical terms [...] 
That is why I ask for clarity... All the details. The more, the better.” 
(São Paulo/C3/Lay member/05-11) 
 
“And do you generally find problems in the [consent] form? 
That is rare because nowadays, as you know, the industry and the researchers have 
already learnt... There are any sorts of templates on the internet [...] The consent form 
ends up having to be very specific in terms of what is to be done with the patients, as 
well as the protections and safeguards to be offered, even though it is to say: ‘We 
cannot guarantee that this new medication is better than your old medication but that 
is why we’re proposing you to try it, because that will help us know if it is equally 
effective or not.’ That must be absolutely clear [...] You must have written guarantees 
that what is being done, first, is aimed to improve, it is a study where, of course, 
you’re being “used” (with quotation marks) in order to see if the new agent is good or 
bad, and that you can withdraw at any moment, and that you have rights to any kind 
of information. That must be clearly stated.” 
(São Paulo/C2/Physician/04-11) 
 
 This is the way I shall be quoting parts of interviews throughout my text. My 
questions and comments are quoted in italics. I tried not to cut sentences many times, 
even though this had to be done sometimes, because in oral discourses there are often 
repetitions. Moreover, cuts are necessary not to extend the text very much, in terms of 
word count. In order to protect my interviewees’ confidentiality, I am using codes after 
each quote. This code expresses four elements of the interview: the city where the 
conversation happened; the committee number (as shown in Table 2.4); the 







must be read in the following manner: the interview was conducted in São Paulo; the 
person is based in committee 2; he or she is a physician; and the interview happened 
in April 2011. 
 After having detected different types of claims, I tried to verify the ways in 
which claims are combined. It was possible to see that certain claims tend to appear in 
tandem. For example, the idea that full information must be imparted to patients is 
very frequently combined with the idea that patients must be let free to take 
autonomous decision pertaining to their participation in clinical trials. Therefore, 
particular combinations of claims lead to the formation of discourses, expressing 
particular mentalities. From Chapter 3, my task is to describe and interpret discourses 
and mentalities. 
 In my study, I could identify the existence of seven mentalities, which received 
the following names: pragmatic, bioethical, communitarian, technical, analytical, 
healing, and critical. The claim presented above (stressing the importance of full 
information) was found to be generally (but not exclusively) voiced by people who hold 
the bioethical mentality. The actual association between claims and mentalities 
derived from my historical and sociological analysis, as we shall see in the following 
chapters. 
 While analyzing the interviews, I realized that this kind of interpretation opens 
up some leeway for a quantitative analysis.  The basic procedure is simple: each time a 
certain claim is voiced, a score is attributed to this claim and its respective mentality. 
However, it was necessary to take into account the emphasis with which claims are 
voiced. Depending on the emphasis, a particular score was attributed. I describe the 









Table 2.5 – Types of claims and scores 
Type of claim Characteristic Example Score 
Central 
The main point made by 
the interviewee 
“When you’re reviewing a protocol, what is 
your main concern? 
Hm... It is... I suppose, in a sense, it is that 
the people will know... First of all, it is there 
is a sense of... that people will be informed 
about what is going on. So it is to know, 
myself, what they’re doing, what the 
researcher wants to do, and to make sure 
that all that information will be available at 




[Here, the idea of full information is the 
core of the interviewee’s statement.] 
3 
Ancillary 
A secondary point in the 
interviewee’s speech. 
Often, the point 
emerges as an example 
to underpin the main 
statement. 
“Do you think that for those who don’t have 
a medical background, reading a protocol 
can be somehow more difficult? Can there 
be further difficulties? 
I think so. There are many technical terms 
that those who are not physicians will not 
understand [...] And then, I think, what can 
they analyze, basically? The ethical part. 
Would I do... Would I agree to participate in 
this study? [...] And something that is very 
important is the informed consent form. If 
that person who is not a physician reads the 
form and doesn’t understand it because 
there are too many technical terms, he or 
she will surely question that [...].” 
(São Paulo/C1/Physician/04-11) 
 
[Here, the idea of full information appears 
as a secondary point.] 
2 
Confirmatory 
The interviewee quotes 
a generally accepted 
idea, agreeing with it 
“And do you have a different view about the 
research that is sponsored by the industry? 
I told you, I know studies that say that. 
Trials sponsored by the industry tend to 
have much more positive results for that 
product than studies done by universities 
without funding from the industry.” 
(São Paulo/C3/Social scientist/05-11) 
 
[The interviewee agrees with the studies 




Type of claim Characteristic Example Score 
Indirect 
The point is only 
suggested, but not 
explicitly stated, by the 
interviewee 
“I am very proud of being in the committee, 
even though I consider this work to be 
somewhat dry, you know, because, as I told 
you before, in the analysis of a project I 
don’t dare to invade the questions that are 
specific to the medical specialty, and I stick 
only to legal issues, legal consequences, and 
especially the issue of informed consent, in 
order to see if everything is respected, if the 
rights are respected or not.” 
(Porto Alegre/C5/Lawyer/05-11) 
 
[The idea of full information to participants 




The interviewee agrees 
with a statement 
presented in my 
question 
“Do you consider it [participation in the 
committee] as work or your work is as 
nurse? 
No, I don’t consider it as work [...] 
If it is not work, how could we consider it? 
I think it is a scientific contribution, you 
know, a contribution [...] 
A contribution to science... 
Yes, yes, surely [...]” 
(São Paulo/C2/Nurse/04-11) 
 
[The interviewee clearly agrees with my 





 Confirmatory claims were sparingly voiced by my interviewees. Repetitive 
claims were also very rare, for I strived to let claims emerge spontaneously.  I always 
tried to ask the type of question that Krueger (1994, p. 57) described as “open-ended 
questions,” which leads to a reply that “[...] reveals what is on the interviewee’s mind 
as opposed to what the interviewer suspects is on the interviewee’s mind.” The fact 
that repetitive claims were given a small score (1 as opposed to 3 for central claims) is 
a quantitative compensation for the fact that in these rare cases, the interviewee, 
instead of voicing a spontaneous claim, simply confirms what my intervention 
suggests. 
Thus, for each claim, I had a classification (in terms of mentalities) and a score 
(in terms of types of claims). I added up all the scores, in order to obtain the overall 
score of the interview. I grouped the scores voiced according to their mentality 
(pragmatic, bioethical, communitarian, and so on). Then, considering the overall score, 
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I verified the percentage obtained by each mentality. Thus, after analyzing one 
interview, I had something like: 
 
 
“Overal score: 90 
Bioethical mentality: 12% (or 0.12) 
Technical mentality: 7% (or 0.07) ...” 
 
 And so on. The following quote shows one answer given by one of my 
interviewees. The answer is broken into different parts, in order to exemplify how I 





Table 2.6 – Analyzing discourses: an example 
Interview Analysis Justification 
“In your opinion, what is the main goal of 
clinical research? 






Score = 1 
The interviewee only 
suggests the idea that 
patients must be protected 
                                                                                                                     
and to do the trials in an ethically sound 
manner, with the informed consent of the 
participants. For me that is very important. If 
people don’t know the things that can go 
wrong with the trial, how can that be informed 
consent? So they need to be told: ‘This is the 
first time we’re trying it on humans,’ for 
instance. ‘We’ve done it in animals but now 
we’re doing it in humans. These were the 
things that we found as side effects or 
whatever in the animal population.’ So I think 
people should know those kinds of things. And 
then, also... What was the question again? 
What is the main goal of clinical research. The 
main target. 




Score = 3 
This is the main point made 
by the interviewee in this 
section 
                                                                       As I 
said, trials should be done in a safe way. 




Score = 0 
As the idea had been 
advanced before, no score is 
attributed here. 
                                                             I know that 
it is unpredictable how drugs would... their 
effect on the body if they’ve been studied for 





Score = 2 
The interviewee advances 
the communitarian idea 
according to which there is 
always a certain degree of 
uncertainty in research. The 
claim is, however, a 
secondary point to her main 
statement. 
the people doing the trial should try and limit 
the effects or side effects (as much as they 
can) of the drugs that they’re testing or... As 
much as knowledge they have should into 
making it fairly safe for people. 




Score = 0 
In a different way, the 
interviewee repeats the 
claim that research subjects 
should be protected against 
harms in trials. 
                                                                                     
And then, also, I would like people to inform 




Score = 0 
She finishes by reiterating 
her main argument. 
 
  
 Thus, I am not attributing scores when the idea is repeated within the same 
section. A new section begins when I ask a different question, changing the topic of 
conversation. In this way, one same claim can, and frequently was, repeated in 
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different sections of the whole interview, receiving many points. The final quantitative 
outcome of the section quoted above is: 
 
 
Overal score: 6 
Bioetical mentality: 0.50 (50% of the overall score 3) 
Communitarian mentality: 0.50 
 
 In appendix 3, I present the full transcript of one of my interviews, as well as its 
quantitative analysis. 
These figures were used in order to perform some statistical tests, as I explain 
in the following section. 
 
2.6 STATISTICAL TOOLS 
 
Quantitative discourse analysis has been used in some social science studies. 
Different approaches have been chosen, such as counting some words which are 
value-laden (Steger and Wilson, 2012), classifying preferences with ideological rating 
scales (Kalt and Zupan, 1990), running statistical analysis based on the use of discourse 
markers (like “you know” or “look”) (Czerwionka, 2012), organizing quantitative 
rankings of ideas or statements (Hobson and Niemeyer, 2011, Rinne and Fairweather, 
2012), or measuring the occurrence of certain types of talks (like questions, advice or 
affirmations) (Li et al., 2007).  
Drawing on Habermas’ theory, Ma (2012) defends the viability of mixed 
methods claiming that quantitative analyses can help grasp aspects that may not be 
completely unveiled in qualitative analyses. “Since conditions such as money and 
power often escape the explicit awareness of actors and thus may not be explicated by 
hermeneutic or interpretivist methods alone, analytical methods such as statistical 
analyses of large-scale data may be demanded for generating a ‘big picture’ of the 
phenomenon” (Ma, 2012, p. 1865). 
 Statistics appears as an ancillary tool in my thesis. This is a qualitative study and 
the fieldwork was conducted accordingly. However, while analyzing my interviews, it 
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was seen that some ad-hoc statistical instruments could be used to further support my 
interpretation. Moreover, my quantitative analyses were not permitted to hinder the 
complexity of the qualitative interpretation. It is possible to say that in applying some 
quantitative analyses, I adopted the stance described by Creswell and Clark (2007) as 
multiple paradigms, for I did not oblige myself to circumvent contradictions and 
paradoxes for the sake of numerical coherence. In addition, I did not follow the 
patterns proposed in the aforementioned or other mixed methodologies, because the 
particular features of my interpretation asked for an equally particular quantitative 
design. 
 By using SPSS 17, I utilized some descriptive and analytical methods to display, 
and perform calculations with, my data. The first resource I used is the boxplot, with 
which I show the distribution of the ratios I obtained for different mentalities. For 
example, the following boxplots (I am calling them discourse boxplots) show the ratios 
obtained for the pragmatic and technical mentalities in all my interviews. 
 
 




 These boxplots show that the proportion of technical claims voiced by my 
interviewees was bigger than the proportion of pragmatic claims. The lowest 
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proportion of pragmatic claims was of 0, whereas the lowest proportion of technical 
claims accounted for 0.06. The median score of pragmatic claims was of 0.09, whereas 
the median score of technical claims was of 0.17. 
 My analyses of interviews revealed that I could not have a very accurate idea 
about people’s discourses for interview recordings lasting less than 30 minutes. Thus, 
in order not to distort my statistical analyses, I divided my 42 interviews into two 
groups: 
 
 Weak interviews: lasting less than 30 minutes 
8 cases 
 Strong interviews: lasting 30 minutes or more 
34 cases 
 
In order to perform calculations and build graphics (as explained below), I used 
only data from strong interviews. Thus, weak interviews were used only as sources of 
examples of claims. 
By running histograms (which are presented in Appendix 4), I found out that 
part of my data is non-normally distributed. When this occurred, non-parametric tests 
were used; otherwise, I performed parametric tests, according to what is 
recommended (Leech et al., 2008, Kinner and Gray, 2004). 
We shall see that in some situations, I divided my interviewees into groups 
(professional groups, for example). As each group is composed by a small number of 
interviewees, significant differences do not always appear. Thus, in most cases, we can 
only show some tendencies, which can nevertheless complement the main qualitative 
analysis. However, there were cases in which it was possible to assess tendencies 




 To compare pairs of groups, I used the Paired-samples T test 





 To compare two related groups, I used the Wilcoxon test, always quoting exact 
values. 
Justification: this is the classic test for comparing two groups when non-
parametric data are analyzed. Exact values are specially suitable when one 
works with small samples 
 To compare three or more related groups, I used the Friedman test 
Justification: this is the recommended test for more than two groups when 
data are non-normally distributed. The Kendall’s tau-b test could be used, but 
this test is more suitable to compare trends, which is not the case here 
 To compare two independent groups, the Mann-Whitney test was performed, 
and exact values quoted 
Justification: this test is suitable for two groups with non-normally distributed 
data 
 To compare three or more independent groups, the Kruskal-Wallis test was 
performed, and exact values quoted 
Justification: This is the appropriate test for nonparametric data and more than 
two samples 
 To correlate variables, I used the Spearman correlation 
Justification: as I am working with small samples, the alternative test (Pearson 
correlation) could prove too conservative, underestimating some correlations 
(Leech et al., 2008). Thus, as I explain in the following chapters, some variables 




One descriptive tool, which I created for the purposes of this study, is what I am 
calling discourse graphic. As explained before, each mentality has some claims that are 
associated to it. Thus, I divided each mentality in sub-groups of claims, obtaining 
detailed results. For example, after having analyzed one interview, I had the following 




“Overal score: 109 
 
Pragmatic mentality: 0.22 (or 22%) 
 Claim PRAG1: 0.11 
 Claim PRAG2: 0.03 
 Claim PRAG3: 0.08 
 
Bioethical mentality: 0.09 (or 9%) 
Claim BIO7: 0.01% ...” 
 
 And so on. Therefore, the ratios of different mentalities were divided into sub-
groups of claims. As a result, the overall discourse voiced by one interviewee could be 
represented with a graphic, as the following example shows. 
 
 







The graphic is composed by two main areas: the communicational rationality 
(on the left) and the instrumental rationality (on the right). As explained before, this 
division was proposed by German sociologist Jürgen Habermas. In addition, there are 
eight sub-areas corresponding to the mentalities I identified in my study. The 
pragmatic mentality occupies two sub-areas because, as we shall see, it belongs to 
both the communicational and the instrumental rationalities. 
Each group of claims is represented by one bar. In the example above, we can 
classify this discourse as bioethical, for two reasons. First, the majority of claims voiced 
fall within the field of bioethical mentality. Second, bars are longer in this sub-area, 
meaning that bioethical claims took the biggest proportions in the interviewee’s 
overall score. As we can see, the most important group of claims is BIO6 (15.4%). This 
group of claim stresses the importance of national and international guidelines in 
ethical reviews undertaken by committee members.14 
A full list of claims voiced by my interviewees and represented in discourse 
graphics, as well as their classification according to mentalities, can be found in  
From the next chapter, I present my interpretation of global trials, rationalities 
and mentalities. Before beginning, however, it is important to remember that when 
Habermas speaks of rationality, he is not referring to the ways in which individuals 
think. Neither does the present thesis adopt such individualistic stance. Committee 
members’ particular psychological processes are not the target of my interpretation. 
Here, individuals’ claims are rather means to understand broad ideological processes 
that have been running in this period of advanced globalization. 
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 This is discourse graphic number 24. The numbers of discourse graphics have no meaning. They 




3 Chapter 3 – Background knowledge: 
the pragmatic mentality 
 
 
 In this chapter, we begin to analyse the information collected in my fieldwork. 
We shall focus on a basic, widespread approach to clinical research. Initially, it is 
necessary give some brief clarification. 
 As explained in the previous chapter, I draw on Habermas’ (1981/1987, 1996) 
theory of communicative action. In my study, the concept of rationality has to undergo 
an adaptation in order to be applied to the empirical examples I focus on. During my 
fieldwork, by conducting interviews and observing some ethics committee meetings, I 
could identify two main patterns with which people frame the globalization of clinical 
trials. Exploring the characteristics of these two ideological stances, I concluded that 
they can be seen in the light of Habermas’ concepts. Therefore, I arrived at the 
following description. 
 
 In ethics committees, instrumental rationality is expressed whenever 
committee members deal with research projects by handling principles and 
concepts with which an objective, almost universal assessment of research 
proposals is sought. Committee members would be supposed to verify whether 
particular studies fit into established regulatory, moral and scientific moulds 
(such as bureaucratic forms, randomization or ethical principles), which are 
then considered as the most relevant aspect of an ethical review 
 
 Committee members express the communicative rationality whenever they 
foreground financial, social or scientific particularities of research projects. In 
this way, committee members would be supposed to take into account specific 




sites’ infrastructures, national needs, among others) in order to verify whether 
research is feasible and necessary or not 
 
It is important to identify and study these two stances toward clinical trials 
because they provide the underpinnings of political debates taking place in South 
Africa and Brazil, but other countries as well. Thus, the present study is in tune with 
the theory of communicative action’s tenets, in the sense that I do not aim to 
undertake psychological analyses but to grasp social and political patterns. 
Nevertheless, my fieldwork revealed that it is not enough to talk about 
rationalities. When dealing with social debates, we are in need of two other concepts: 
discourses and mentalities. After discussing these concepts in the following section, we 
move on to analyzing the features of the pragmatic approach to clinical trials, focusing 
on its characteristics, sources and implications. 
 
3.1 ETHICS COMMITTEES, DISCOURSES, AND MENTALITIES 
 
In a sense, committee members are decision-makers. However, it is important 
to verify how they can (or must) take decisions. Even though ethics committees are 
frequently seen as bodies that take collective decisions, this is not always the case. 
Depending on the committee’s organization, most projects are reviewed by only one 
person. Of eight committees I studied, only two (committees 2 and 4)15 do not employ 
the so-called fast-track system. In this process, which is reserved for so called “low-
risk” projects, proposals are assessed by only one committee member, whose final 
decision is not discussed in the meeting. Clinical trials proposed by pharma companies 
never go through fast-track assessments. However, the whole protocol submitted by 
companies is generally read by only two reviewers, and their judgements are 
subsequently discussed in the meeting. “High-risk” projects are read by two reviewers 
in all the committees I studied, excepting committee 8, in which all the members are 
sent the whole protocol.16 However, the members of committee 8 do not actually read 
projects as a whole, focusing instead on topics pertaining to their particular expertise 
                                                     
15
 Information about each committee is presented in Chapter 2, Table 2.4, page 50. 
16
 This is a professional committee, in which members are remunerated for their work. 
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areas. In committees 6 and 7, all the members are sent the summary of all protocols, 
as well as consent forms, some days before the meeting.17 
Of course, this organization has to do with the voluntary nature of the 
committee members’ work. If all members were supposed to assess all the protocols 
received by the committee, their work should be done on a professional (and 
remunerated) basis. Therefore, most research proposals end up being fully assessed by 
only two reviewers, while the other committee members only have access to either 
summaries or verbal descriptions made by colleagues in the meeting. As a 
consequence, many committee members end up looking at the review (that is, the 
actual reading of research protocols) as their main responsibility. 
 
“Do you think that the meeting is the most important part of the committee’s work? 18 
No. No, the reviewers must be well-prepared. So when they come to the meeting, that 
is just presenting the review. If the reviewer comes in unprepared and one of the 
committee members pick up one of the ethical issues and then say: ‘Well, how do they 
address this? Because this is an ethical issue that needs to be discussed in detail in the 
protocol itself.’ And if the reviewer looks at page two and tries to find it and etcetera, 
then it is going to waste a lot of time [...] So that preparation that happens before the 
time is very important.” 
(Cape Town/C6/Physician/08-11) 
 
“Would you say that the meeting is the most important moment in the work in the 
committee? 
No. Not at all. I think the meeting is a silly thing. The meeting is important when you 
have an important issue to discuss, that is true. But when you don’t have it, it is not 
[...] In the meeting you attended, we discussed protocols, spelling mistakes, mistakes... 
These are issues for people who don’t have anything serious to discuss, effectively. 
When there is an issue... ‘Placebo in victims of violence versus anti-depressives.’ This is 
a serious discussion [...] 
But generally, these discussions don’t happen in the meeting. 
They happen when there is a project, Edison, when there is a project like that. It 
doesn’t happen as a general topic for the meeting [...] 
                                                     
17
 By observing the meetings of these two committees, I realized that most members do read summaries 
and consent forms prior to the meeting. 
18
 When I quote parts of interviews, my questions and comments are presented in italics. 
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If the meeting isn’t the main moment, what would be the main moment? 
Oh, I think it is the reading.” 
(São Paulo/C2/Physician/04-11) 
 
 The two quotes above do not express deviant stances. Actually, my fieldwork 
led to a quite surprising finding: of 27 committee members to whom this question was 
asked, 14 people considered the meeting as an ancillary moment in their set of duties. 
Therefore, it is certainly possible to say that there is a decisive individual content to 
ethics committees’ operations. Even though some research projects can be considered 
as relatively simple,19 committee members are often confronted by innovative 
research techniques that may trigger doubts and dilemmas, asking for a decision that 
is often taken individually and has to be issued in terms of yes (accepting the research 
proposal), no (refusing it) or maybe (asking for corrections and or clarifications). As 
such decisions must be taken on a regular basis, committee members end up 
formulating their own concepts and ways of assessing protocols. As Habermas (1993, 
p. 3) explains: “In complex cases decision-making strategies themselves must be 
developed; then reason seeks reassurance concerning its own procedures by becoming 
reflective [...].” 
Here, we come to a central point: even though people are asked to develop 
“strategies” to cope with dilemmas and take decisions, such strategies do not always 
result from original, personal formulations. As we shall see throughout my exposition, 
people may, and really do, mobilize patterns of ideologies which are socially available 
in order to tackle problems presented by everyday life. Rationalities (namely, the 
instrumental and communicational rationalities) are the basic patterns on which 
people rely. Thus, for instance, when assessing a clinical protocol, one committee 
member identifies some issues that can be seen either in the light of general principles 
(instrumental rationality) or from the point of view of contextual factors 
(communicative rationality). 
However, my research enabled me to realize that at an individual level, 
rationalities are too broad and complex to be fully assimilated and handled. Instead, it 
                                                     
19
 Indeed, the majority of studies reviewed by ethics committees are students’ projects that come to be 
classified as “low-risk studies” and go through the “fast-track” system. In South Africa, for instance, I 
attended a committee meeting in which, out of 30 proposals discussed, only 5 were clinical trials 
submitted by pharma companies. 
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is possible to surprise people mobilizing specks of rationalities, which seem to be more 
meaningful for particular individuals. Therefore, I came to identify what I propose to 
call mentalities, which are the ideological components of the two main rationalities. 
When talking about mentalities, I am not referring to psychological or 
psychiatric phenomena. The term comes from German sociologist Georg Simmel 
(1903/1950), who claimed, in a classic text, that life in big cities implies the 
assimilation of a particular “mental life.” With this expression, Simmel referred to a 
mindset developed by the inhabitants of big cities in order to cope with the numerous 
stimuli generated by the urban environment. Urban inhabitants can therefore 
formulate quick responses without getting paralyzed by frequent and complex 
calculations. Exactly as Simmel did, I speak of mentalities to describe the ideological (or 
cultural) resources with which people process and solve dilemmas proposed by 
everyday life. In my study on ethics committees, I came to identify the following seven 
mentalities. 
 
1. The pragmatic mentality focuses on practical aspects of clinical protocols, such 
as financial interests of companies and institutional interests of researchers 
2. The bioethical mentality operates with general principles in order to identify 
aspects through which research projects can be compared and commensurated 
3. The technical mentality stresses scientific aspects of research, looking at 
research projects from the viewpoint of the generation of knowledge 
4. The healing approach considers clinical research as an endless effort through 
which new therapies and medicines are generated 
5. The communitarian mentality focuses on local and contextual aspects, being 
especially concerned with socially marginalized groups 
6. The analytical mentality delves into the scientific intricacies of research 
projects, considering clinical research as part of a broad social structure 





As we shall see later in this chapter, pragmatic concerns are shared by the 
instrumental and communicative rationalities. Thus, it is possible to present the 
following scheme, which will guide us in our trajectory: 
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Figure 3.1 – Rationalities and mentalities 













































































Depending on aspects of individual biographies, mentalities appear not only as 
ideological options but as the only means available in order to cope with everyday 
concerns. Therefore, people do not always enjoy high degrees of ideological flexibility 
and “[…] the question arises of how autonomous the public is when it takes a position 
on an issue […]” (Habermas, 1996, p. 375). Depending on the issue at stake, one’s 
ideological autonomy may only consist in the choice between different mentalities in 
order to voice meaningful claims. 
On this point, the idea of concern acquires a decisive weight. Social actors need 
to handle rationalities and mentalities because society is always imposing concerns. As 
Arendt (1958/1998, p. 57-58) explains, social reality is not defined by biological 
similarities between people but “[...] by the fact that, differences of position and the 
resulting variety of perspectives notwithstanding, everybody is always concerned with 
the same object.” Therefore, the proliferation of issues perceived as deserving 
attention and reflection reinforces mentalities, which emerge as ways to respond to 
these concerns. 
Globalization tends to endow mentalities with international reach. In the field 
of clinical research, the globalization of studies, procedures and economic schemes 
obliges different countries to cope with similar issues. For those people who tend to be 
more aware of international clinical protocols (such as ethics committee members), a 
similar range of concerns arise in different contexts. Therefore, each mentality is likely 
to undergo a more or less important development in different cities, regions and 
countries. These processes tend to acquire momentum in our contemporary period, 
when people are used to the idea of world history. According to Arendt (1958/1998, p. 
47), this idea was greatly reinforced by the French and American Revolutions, when 
people trumpeted the existence of “[...] events which would concern all men qua men, 
no matter where they lived, what their circumstances were, or what nationality they 
possessed [...].” 
 Therefore, mentalities are the product of a twofold phenomenon. On the one 
hand, they come to cross over national frontiers and emerge in different contexts, 
defining homogeneizing trends. On the other, there are fragmenting trends, because 
mentalities draw on differences between ways of living and ideological biographies, 
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which make people choose certain mental resources instead of others. As Durkheim 
(1932) noted, the division of social labour, as well as the complexification of societies, 
gradually undermines the homogeneous ideological pattern that prevailed in ancient 
societies. 
 Rationalities and mentalities are mobilized not only to deal with concerns but 
also to identify those concerns themselves. For instance, the financial interests of 
pharma companies are regarded as major troubles from the viewpoint of the 
pragmatic and communitarian mentalities but tend to be considered as minor points 
by people favouring the technical approach. In this sense, mentalities influence the 
ideological organization of social life. “For to organize means to organize some things 
in and other things out” (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982, p. 8). 
 Habermas (1996) points out that communicative actions are expressed not only 
by means of verbal messages. Actually, every human action carries a certain message 
that can be understood by other social actors. Nevertheless, verbal messages are 
certainly a privileged way to convey mentalities, especially in the framework of my 
study, in which interviews were used as a basic research instrument. These interviews 
allowed me to verify how people select claims20 from different mentalities in order to 
build up a discourse. Therefore, discourses can be defined as what results from the use 
that people make of claims and mentalities. They are personal constructions of 
meaning, based on what is available in the mental life of a social group. 
 To be sure, in some cases the ideological combinations made by individuals, in 
their discourses, turn out to be very original or even curious. This is why the 
identification and comprehension of mentalities is not a straightforward task. My 
research process was marked by the effort to solve a difficult puzzle of claims. Before 
my fieldwork, I could identify the approaches composing the instrumental rationality, 
but I could not go beyond this initial step. In the fieldwork, by interviewing people, 
some claims seemed to escape the rationales of the pragmatic, bioethical, technical 
and healing mentalities. By the middle of my fieldwork in Brazil, I realized that I was in 
fact dealing with other mentalities, expressing a parallel (communicative) rationality. 
After the fieldwork, going back to the notes taken at the beginning of my PhD, I saw 
that some claims had been wrongly classified. However, the identification of the 
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 On the concept of claim, see Chapter 2, section 2.5. 
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pragmatic mentality has always been quite straightforward, which is due to its 
simplicity and immediacy. 
 
3.2 THE PRAGMATIC MENTALITY 
 
O’Reilly and colleagues (2009) argued that “ethics” is produced by means of the 
ethics committees’ work. Even though this argument can be accepted, it is important 
to underline that different committee members produce different accounts of ethics 
(or different mentalities). 
As it was shown in Figure 3.1 (page 71), the pragmatic mentality underpins the 
whole mental life, being shared by the instrumental and communicative rationalities. It 
is a sort of driving force for all the other mentalities, which emerge as responses to the 
mental challenges proposed by the pragmatic mentality. With a discourse graphic,21 a 
visual description of the role played by the pragmatic approach can be made. 
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 The discourse voiced by this interviewee (a physician) is dominated by 
bioethical claims and complemented by some technical and healing claims. The 
interviewee also voiced all possible pragmatic claims. Thus, the structure of this 
discourse is firmly underpinned by the pragmatic mentality’s basic assumptions. 
In spite of this pivotal position, the pragmatic mentality is actually composed by 
simple notions and claims. Nevertheless, it is certainly worth studying, for in the 
framework of sociological/cultural analysis, complexity does not always signify 
relevance. As Geertz argued, there is much interest in studying notions that are 
considered as self-evident, taken-for-granted ideas by a certain social group. The study 
of common-sense notions also helps us understand “how culture is jointed and put 
together” (Geertz, 1983, p. 93). In Habermas’ terms, we are referring here to 
background knowledge, that is, a set of fundamental assumptions largely shared in a 
social group, constituting binding notions. 
 
“From the very start, communicative acts are located within the horizon of 
shared, unproblematic beliefs; at the same time, they are nourished by these 
resources of the always already familiar. The constant upset of disappointment 
and contradiction, contingency and critique in everyday life crashes against a 
sprawling, deeply set, and unshakable rock of background assumptions, 
loyalties, and skills” (Habermas, 1996, p. 22). 
 
 In clinical research, these basic, simple, common-sense, unshakable 
assumptions are concentrated in the pragmatic mentality. The following sections are 
aimed to analyze its main features. 
 
3.2.1 Clinical research and financial interests 
 
According to Geertz (1983, p. 76), common sense is “[...] historically 
constructed and [...] subjected to historically defined standards of judgement.” In 
other words, the ideological contents of background knowledge vary according to 
historical periods. Nowadays, in the field of clinical research, there is a notion that 
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imposes itself and is quickly accepted even by those who do not have access to precise 
figures: the universe of clinical trials has been largely dominated by multinational 
companies. 
The idea that clinical research has been subordinated to commercial rationales 
is reinforced by the recognition that over the last years, companies have been 
responsible for the actual design of clinical studies whereas physicians have become 
ancillary players. Hence, the idea that “[...] in the context of clinical trials, it is the 
pharmaceutical companies with the scientific expertise dictating tasks to physicians” 
(Fisher, 2009, p. 233 note 44). As one of my interviewees put it: 
 
“[...] often GPs become a sort of handmaiden of the pharmaceutical companies 
because they’re just, you know, handing on medications rather than doctoring [...] Ten 
years ago we had a lot more original research in the committee than we do today. And 
a lot of money might be coming in from the pharmaceutical research but it doesn’t 
always... but it doesn’t go to the sort of broader university context. It tends to go to 
researchers who are involved with the pharmaceutical company. It is very profitable 
for them to do it, but it doesn’t necessarily involve research expertise and competence 
within the faculty.” 
(Cape Town/C7/Social scientist/07-11) 
 
In the face of such assumptions, an awkward contradiction emerges. On the 
one hand, clinical trials are indirectly associated with health care, which is thought of 
as an altruistic service. On the other hand, it is known that companies are seeking 
private interests and their activities, therefore, would be at odds with altruistic 
purposes. Even though people can concede that in certain aspects, companies are 
helping to make important discoveries, there remains the background assumption of 
essential financial motivations. 
 
“By listening to you, I had the impression that from your point of view, clinical trials 




[Taking breath.] No, that is not strictly true [...] Coming back to my field (it is biological 
trials), they taught us an awful lot about the workings of certain kinds of inflammatory 
arthritis. So they have contributed from that point of view, but that is not their main 
aim. So please don’t get me wrong. The main aim of these trials, I said before, is to sell 
their product. 
Okay, so the scientific... 
The scientific aspect is there but it is secondary.” 
(Cape Town/C6/Physician/08-11) 
 
Thus, the pragmatic mentality is based on the assumption that there are 
financial interests underpinning the clinical trials’ universe. Before moving on to 
exploring other aspects of this approach, we shall focus on some ideological sources of 
the pragmatic mentality. 
 
3.2.2 Ideological sources 
 
During the conduct of my PhD, I developed a sort of parallel, informal study. 
Sometimes, by revealing to friends and acquaintances that I was studying clinical trials, 
I witnessed interesting reactions. I verified that for many people, clinical trials are 
quickly associated with problematic studies, exploitation and huge financial interests. 
Even though these observations are not as accurate and systematic as my interviews, 
they certainly enabled me to have some contact with the background knowledge. 
Over the last decades, analysts and the media have focused on clinical trials 
and circulated some basic facts and stories through which people have become aware 
of big shifts in the world of clinical research. As a summary, we can point to the 
following aspects: 
 
 Clinical studies used to be carried out and funded by state institutions but have 
subsequently been dominated by multinational pharmaceutical companies 
(Epstein, 2007, Angell, 2005, Busfield, 2006, Bodenheimer, 2000, Petryna, 2009, 
Seruga et al., 2010, Fisher, 2009) 
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 The number of multicentre, international clinical trials has been growing 
steadily since the 1980s (Petryna, 2006, Epstein, 2007, Fisher, 2009) 
 Due to business secrecies, pharma companies prefer not to disclose much 
information, preventing, for instance, the creation of comprehensive registries 
of trials being carried out worldwide (Petryna, 2009, Fisher, 2009) 
 A plethora of companies have been created whose goal is to help pharma 
companies to conduct clinical trials in a more financially efficient way (Petryna, 
2009). These new actors involve, among others: “[...] private practices, 
dedicated research centers, site management organizations (SMOs), contract 
research organizations (CROs), for-profit, commercial institutional review 
boards (IRBs), central patient recruitment companies, and clinical trials 
advertising agencies” (Fisher, 2009, p. 5) 
 Among these new economic actors, Contract Research Organizations have 
proved especially aggressive in terms of results and financial efficiency 
(Mirowski and Van Horn, 2005, Fisher, 2009, Petryna, 2009) 
 Another important new actor is the company specialized in finding and 
recruiting subjects for clinical trials (Anderson, 2003, Epstein, 2007, Mirowski 
and Van Horn, 2005, Fisher, 2009) 
 Many partnerships involving pharma companies, CROs, researchers and state 
institutions have been established in order to develop clinical trials 
(Bodenheimer, 2000). “So it was just part of the new climate to do clinical trials 
pretty much the way the pharmaceutical industry wanted them done” (Angell, 
2005, p. 102) 
 A big proportion of medicines approved by regulatory agencies does not really 
amount to big scientific and therapeutic advances (Busfield, 2006, Abraham, 
2009, Angell, 2005, Petryna, 2009), being instead aimed to explore market 
niches (Fisher, 2009, Petryna, 2009) 
 There has been some evidence of strong relationships between regulatory 
agencies and pharma companies (Abraham, 2009, McGoey and Jackson, 2009, 
Busfield, 2006) 
 Companies are striving to speed up the recruitment process, in an attempt to 




The globalization of trials itself can be included into this list, insofar as it has 
also been motivated by economic considerations. It is really hard to separate the 
conduct of global trials from the operations of multinational companies. 
From these observations, one derives the pragmatic idea that the financial 
interests of pharma companies and CROs are somehow distorting the universe of 
clinical research. From this viewpoint, clinical studies have turned into mere tools to 
protect business privileges, as stressed by Busfield (2006, p. 307): “[…] since another 
company may be working on a competitor product and seeking to establish its 
superiority, the first may need to engage in further defensive testing.” 
 
“Do you think there are fundamental differences between an academic study and a 
trial sponsored by the industry? 
[...] I think the academic research is more honest than the one sponsored by the 
industry, ’cause the industry’s got an ulterior motive: to sell their products [...] 
Especially in the drug trials, you get so lot of comparative trials, comparative trials, it is 
comparing and comparing... But there is a good... This drug is good. Why waste... Why 
must now we have another protocol? Why do we need another drug which is, 
essentially, absolutely equal to the other one? It is the same... It is the same 
ingredients and everything [...] In the drug companies, there is a lot of comparisons 
[...] 
And why? 
Because they want to have a new drug that they can put on the market and it is 
business. It is business [...].” 
(Cape Town/C7/Lay member/08-11) 
 
To be sure, the public is not aware of all the details of clinical trials. However, 
some data and stories do come to be largely circulated, especially by the media. In this 
way, many people end up reflecting at least on some aspects of clinical trials. These 
considerations can go beyond a basic level whenever clinical research and 
pharmaceuticals suddenly become a big national issue. Here, South Africa provides us 
with an instructive example. 
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In 1997, the South African government passed a law aimed to facilitate the 
access of people infected with HIV to anti-retroviral medicines. Measures included a 
mechanism of parallel imports, so that the country could circumvent patents and buy 
cheap generics. In the following year, 39 large pharma companies opened a lawsuit 
against the South African government, claiming that their intellectual property rights 
had been violated. In 2001, after much criticism against those companies and large 
publicity both in South Africa and internationally, the companies withdrew their case 
(Shah, 2006). In South Africa, the story continues to be recalled whenever 
pharmaceutical production is at stake. For instance, I interviewed a committee 
member who also works for the Medicines Control Council (MCC), the South African 
regulatory agency. 
 
“[...] I suppose it must be difficult to reject a protocol from Pfizer, for example, from the 
big... 
It doesn’t matter how big the company is. We’ve been challenged; we’ve been taken 
to court. We won some cases, we lost some cases, we’ve had appeals... At the MCC 
[...] I don’t know whether ethics committees have been challenged but in the MCC, we 
have been challenged.” 
 
 Regardless of the amount of publicity that these stories manage to acquire, 
they always contribute to somehow shape the background knowledge. Hence the 
cautious (or unfriendly) reactions I got from some friends after mentioning my PhD 
study on global trials. To be sure, information about clinical research seldom go 
beyond the level of superficiality, but this is precisely the point to be made here: 
background knowledge is powerful because its contents can be easily assimilated by 
most people. To use Geertz’s (1983, p. 91) concepts again, we are dealing with 
common-sense notions endowed with “accessibleness”: “[...] there are really no 
acknowledged specialists in common sense [...] Being common, common sense is open 
to all, the general property of at least, as we would put it, all solid citizens.” 
 This is what defines the force of the pragmatic mentality. It draws on direct, 
immediate observations of the world, spawning basic notions that are shared by 
almost everybody and making it possible for people to be focused on the same issues 
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and engage in conversations about them. For ethics committee members, the 
pragmatic mentality plays a decisive role. Under the sway of its stimuli, members 
become concerned about the same phenomena and are invited to subscribe to mental 
formulations that are, at the same time, individual (because there are personal ways to 
deal with pragmatic concerns) and collective (because the committee works as a group 
and research proposals need to be collectively discussed at some point). 
 In the following section, we explore the concerns embedded in the pragmatic 
approach in more detail. 
 
3.2.3 The problematic nature of clinical trials 
 
Thanks to the considerations presented above, the pragmatic mentality 
assumes that clinical trials have a potentially problematic nature. In this vein, Petryna 
(2009) stressed that pharma companies often use cost-benefit calculations in order to 
deal with adverse events, therefore creating conflicts between care and search for 
profits. This same point was made by some of my interviewees. 
 
“[...] We’ve seen a lot of cases, drug companies that keep making this calculation 
where they say: ‘We did it and a tiny fraction of the cases... For most people, it helped 
them, and for a tiny fraction, people got terrible sick and died a terrible death. But it is 
very small. And so we figure out that if we sell a billion dollars of this drug in a year, 
ten people will die a horrible death and, if they all sue us, we figure it is going to cost...’ 
So they start saying: ‘Well, dying a long, horrible death isn’t a reason to stop the drug. 
If that happens, then we have to figure out how much they will sue us for, how much 
we will have to pay, and: is it worth it?’ [...] I do think that drug companies have to 
always be taking the marketization of their drug into account and into all their 
calculations. That is how the system works. So the role of the ethics committee is to 
try to understand that logic and monitor it and then keep it from getting too... too, you 
know, dangerous.” 




 What is more, pragmatic claims stress that in addition to holding financial 
interests, companies make sure that such interests are continuously hidden from the 
public’s eyes. 
 
“Do you think there is any difference between a study that is done by a physician, a 
researcher, and a study that is done by the pharmaceutical industry? 
Of course, many times the interests can be different, you know. Because, for instance, 
the pharmaceutical industry is purely concerned with capitalism, earning money, 
promoting a medication... I think in this research, there is a good and a bad side, but 
the bad side will never be very clear. It will never be very clear.” 
(São Paulo/C2/Nurse/04-11) 
 
“But do you think that these differences can increase the probability of harms in the 
research proposed by the industry? 
Do you mean, is it the industry potentially more harmful than academic research? 
Yeah. 
[...] I think drug companies do have a lot more resources than us. And they’re a lot 
harder to penetrate in terms of transparency and accountability [...] If I think that a 
professor is doing too much research and is starting to put together too many projects 
and is not doing them well, I can go ask the head of department there to give me a list 
of all the projects or ask that professor to give a list of all the projects, and you can get 
it, because we’re part of the same institution or the same world, in a way. But no drug 
company is going to be doing that [...] When you’re trying to assess, in a study, the 
whole range of contextual variables that matter, it is much harder to learn about that 
[...].” 
(Cape Town/C7/Social scientist/08-11) 
 
 What is at stake here is the status of research subjects enrolled in clinical trials. 
Within the framework of highly advanced economic schemes, people’s dignity and 
integrity would be jeopardized. Petryna (2009, p. 28), for instance, expressed her 
concerns with trial participants, claiming that: “Their particular characteristics make 




“I would like to know whether you think there is any difference between academic 
research and research sponsored by the industry. 
There is much difference [...] The financial part, in the studies sponsored by the 
industry, is massive, is very strong, whereas academic research depends on national or 
local funding, which many times is not sufficient, right? [...] Another big difference is in 
terms of concepts. For the pharmaceutical industry, research subjects are many times 
research objects, they’re people who are going to provide some data, whereas in 
academic research, which is conducted by a postgraduate student, there is greater 




 This impression is further fostered by the presence of calculations and 
statistical methods, which are always mobilized in clinical trials. These procedures tend 
to be associated with the annihilation of spontaneity and humanity. As a consequence, 
what would derive from clinical studies “[...] is not a population of living beings with 
certain biological regularities, but rather a market of consumers characterized by 
purchasing trends” (Lakoff, 2005, p. 137). 
 By reading the quotes I have presented so far, some people might argue that 
we are dealing with huge truisms. However, this is precisely the point to be made here. 
Background knowledge is composed by elementary assumptions deriving from the 
direct observation of the world. Here, we could repeat Geertz’s (1983, p. 89) 
description of common sense: “The world is what the wide-awake, uncomplicated 
person takes it to be [...] the really important facts of life lie scattered openly along its 
surface, not cunningly secreted in its depths.” Thus, the pragmatic mentality should 
not be considered as a set of pre-given inclinations. We are not dealing with notions 
that would spontaneously emerge in the social actors’ minds. Their appearance 
depends on immediate observation and experience. However, these notions impose 
themselves with overwhelming weight, insofar as they spring from immediate 
observations that can hardly be denied. 
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the pragmatic mentality does not 
only recognize simple facts; it also makes people be concerned with these facts. This 
does not mean that committee members become suspicious towards pharma 
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companies (at least, not at this mental level). It means that the recognition of 
pragmatic claims triggers a special attention, a sort of moral alertness. 
 
“Do you think there is any kind of difference between clinical research which is done 
academically and clinical research which is sponsored by the industry? 
Oh, I do think so. The issue of interests, right? [...] I think, when it involves the 
pharmaceutical industry, it is also linked to... financial interests, to financial profits, 
you know [...] I think, because of this invasion of the scientific and biomedical domain 
by marketing interests, I think ethics committees should be more careful in analysing 
studies with funding from pharmaceutical companies, for instance.” 
(São Paulo/C3/Social Scientist/05-11) 
 
“Do you think there is any type of protocol that deserves more attention from an ethics 
committee? 
[...] if it comes from a drug company, you know... A drug company would be followed 
up differently than a NGO that wants to go do a project, you know, just because you 
assume that the drug company has interests that are potentially at odds with the 
safety of the patients. You know, it is potential, I’m not saying it is, but it requires you 
to pay more attention. You know, if a very large Northern drug company comes down 
and says: ‘Hey! We want to help you! We want to do this trial! It is going to be really 
good for you.’ And we’re like: ‘Aaaah...’ 
[Laughter.] 
That might be true but let’s pause, you know [...].” 
(Cape Town/C7/Social scientist/08-11) 
 
 Therefore, “the profit motive of pharmaceutical companies” (Fisher, 2009, p. 
95) must be not only recognized but also dealt with, especially by committee members 
who frequently engage in “conversations” with research proposals submitted by those 
companies. Financial interests are considered to have the capacity to compromise the 
scientific soundness of a protocol, the safety of people enrolled in a trial, and the 
future of research participants. Of 42 committee members interviewed in my 




“So you are concerned about the fact that there are foreign companies conducting 
clinical trials in South Africa. 
And also, I am concerned with standard of care. You might get the best standard of 
care during the clinical trial; when it ends, what happens? There is also a problem 
about post-trial access, and we saw it during the time of HIV, when they were coming 
to the country, trying anti-retrovirals, when the trial is over they go, the patient shows 




 Thus the oblivion to which research subjects may be subjected is another 
problem deriving from economic interests. Some people seem to be concerned also 
with the so-called professional research subjects, who try to enrol in successive trials in 
order to receive monetary compensations for participation. The topic has been 
focused on in some social science studies (Fisher, 2009, Petryna, 2009, Shah, 2006, 
Abadie, 2010). Even though this topic brings us too close to the communitarian 
mentality (it is actually shared by the pragmatic and communitarian approaches), there 
is an important lesson to be gleaned here: in the pragmatic mentality, there is a special 
concern with practical, everyday issues. Eventually, all social actors (including 
companies, researchers and research subjects) tend to be seen from the viewpoint of 
their immediate purposes. They are almost converted into interested agents, who 
would be striving to maximize their benefits at any moment. 
Therefore, the pragmatic mentality does imply an individualist perspective, in 
the sense that it assumes the existence of a plethora of agents taking decisions on the 
basis of their practical experiences. Thus, I am referring to the philosophical dimension 
of the word “pragmatic,” which points to a mutual influence between the experiences 
of the world and the practical notions and decisions formulated by people. We are 
dealing with a practical, deductive reasoning, which derives general ideas from direct 
empirical observations. 
As Figure 3.1 suggests, the pragmatic mentality holds the seeds of both the 
instrumental and communicative rationalities, because it is composed by two 
complimentary aspects. On the one hand, the pragmatic mentality fails to ideologically 
combine health research (an altruistic activity) with commercial enterprises (a 
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particularistic activity). Therefore, the pragmatic mentality entails concerns with 
individualities, possible conversations, intercomprehension, and these are the very 
seeds of the communicative rationality and its related mentalities. On the other hand, 
the pragmatic approach acknowledges the existence of individual agents taking 
decisions according to their own motivations. In this way, it legitimizes the search for 
egoistic goals, general yardsticks, reification, and other seeds of the instrumental 
rationality. Even though Habermas did stress the relevance that the background 
knowledge holds for both instrumental and communicative actors, he did not stress 
sufficiently that both rationalities have their roots deeply embedded in the 
background knowledge, thus sharing their social cradle.22 
This is the complexity that hides behind the apparently simplistic claims of the 
pragmatic mentality. According to the classic explanation by Poincaré (1908), as soon 
as our research instruments become powerful enough, we can discover “simplicity 
behind complexity,” as well as “complexity behind simplicity.” In the case of clinical 
trials, the simple/complex assumptions of the pragmatic approach can be summarized 
as follows: 
 
1. Research subjects look for the solution of their health problems 
2. Pharma companies and CROs look for profits 
3. Clinical researchers look for economic compensations and institutional 
privileges 
 
By the way, these are the basic assumptions of interpretations that point to 
“[...] the commercial interests of the pharmaceutical industry and the health interests 
of consumers” (Abraham, 1993, p. 393). 
As mentioned in the introduction, globalization is seen in a different light 
depending on the approach held by social actors. From a pragmatic point of view, 
globalization has to do with the global diffusion of economic schemes that are 
                                                     
22
 Habermas talked about “pragmatic reason” in HABERMAS, J. 1993. Justification and application: 
remarks on discourse ethics, Cambridge, Polity Press. This is the definition he gives: “Pragmatic tasks are 
informed by the perspective of an agent who takes his preferences and goals as his point of departure.” (p. 
5-6) Even though this definition does not differ very much from my idea of pragmatic mentality, it clearly 
attaches pragmatism to the instrumental rationality, taking it away from the communicative rationality. 
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potentially problematic because they tend to overshadow other types of 
preoccupation. 
So far we have focused on concerns brought about by the occurrence of 
financial schemes in clinical trials. As we shall see subsequently, this is not the only 
source of pragmatic concerns. 
 
3.2.4 Researchers and interests 
 
By reading the quotes presented in the previous section, one might have the 
impression that in the pragmatic mentality, all problems disappear as soon as one 
leaves the world of industrial trials and reaches the realm of academic research. 
However, the practical and immediate observations of the pragmatic approach come 
to identify new challenges in academic clinical studies. The basic concern, here, is the 
close relation that some researchers maintain to companies. “The industry’s 
ideological advantage is compounded by the fact that doctors are often willing allies of 
the industry […] Indeed, the industry and profession largely stand in a symbiotic 
relation” (Busfield, 2006, p. 308). In this way, there is no separation between a 
supposedly pure and a supposedly corrupt world, for “[…] it cannot be assumed that 
the social interests of scientists and scientific knowledge can be adequately discussed 
in isolation from each other” (Abraham, 1993, p. 428). 
Obviously, ethics committee members are aware of these issues. One of my 
Brazilian interviewees, for instance, mentioned one research proposal she had 
reviewed, in which an important methodological flaw was detected. She declared to be 
surprised by the fact that the physician-investigator, who was capable to identify the 
problem, was nevertheless willing to go forward with the study proposed by a pharma 
company: 
 
“But do you think that the researcher, in that case, didn’t see it [the methodological 
flaw] or decided to overlook it? 




Well, I have the impression that there is a certain conflict of interests between the 
competence of the guy... You know, if you think about it, generally, the PIs [principal 
investigators] are doctors in that expertise area, and I imagine that this is the criterion 
of CROs when they recruit researchers for the industry, you know. If I, who don’t work 
on the area and don’t even have a bachelor degree in that area of medicine and 
pharmacology, can realize it, I can only suspect that there is a certain conflict of 
interests in the sense that the project involves much money, it is an additional money, 
even though it is not much money, it is an extra [...] And the person ends up not doing 
the review and assumes that the industry designs projects so nicely, that: ‘Okay, we’ll 
sign it. That is fine. How much will I get? Oh, okay. So we’re done, I’m the principal 
investigator’ [...].” 
 
 From the basic assumption that some investigators can also be seduced by 
economic interests, one can derive claims such as the one voiced by Shah (2006, p. 56): 
“Thousands of practicing physicians are enticed into witching their patients to new 
drugs through industry-sponsored postmarketing trials.’” Here, we are dealing with a 
well-known range of concerns that come under the label of conflicts of interests (Topol 
and Blumenthal, 2005). From this point of view, researchers would be not only 
researchers but “entrepreneurial agents” or “pharmaceutical emissaries” (Fisher, 
2009, p. 35-36). 
 Other aspects that make researchers be interested agents are also considered. 
It is recognized that academic life implies the search for titles, degrees and prestige. 
Clinical research can then be used in order to pursue these egoistic targets. From this 
standpoint, researchers, even though they are not motivated by economic reasons, 
may end up reifying people and conducting research in too reckless a fashion. 
 
“How would you define the main goal of an ethics committee? 
I think it is to refrain the studies that aren’t really coherent [...] There may be 
outcomes but the main goal will be the profits, in the case of industrial studies; or it 
will be the researcher’s doctoral thesis. It is not only the industrial research. The 
researcher may do the research, write the thesis and abandon the patients afterwards, 





“Today, what is your main motivation in your work in the committee? 
[...] I am motivated because I know that wishing to present an important and 
outstanding academic work, some individuals forget that they have the social 
responsibility not to expose society to unnecessary situations. When I get these 
studies to evaluate, I ask the researchers to rethink and I ask what the project’s 
purpose is [...] Because, frequently, the willingness to present a good work may 
prevent the individual to realize the consequences of the project. Every project has 
consequences [...] It is important for the individual to know that there is a limit, that 




 Some interviewees recognized that for many students, the conduct of a clinical 
study has become an obligation without which their degree cannot be obtained. Thus 
certain recklessness could be expected from this type of researcher. These 
considerations foster the basic pragmatic notion according to which all types of social 
agents are striving to reach practical and immediate goals. Eventually, the pragmatic 
approach comes to be applied to ethics committees themselves. The outcome is an 
image of committees being threatened, or even permeated, by many economic and 
academic interests, as we shall see in the following section. 
 
3.2.5 Pragmatic committees 
 
As we have seen, the pragmatic mentality foregrounds the presence of financial 
and academic interests in clinical trials, framing the conduct of studies as more or less 
problematic. In this approach, ethics committees would not be immune to the 
practical issues of everyday life. 
In the pragmatic mentality ethics committees are perceived as another actor of 
an institutional (and frequently academic) environment. In some interpretations, 
committees are seen as institutional authorities judging the work undertaken by the 
researchers (Dixon-Woods et al., 2007, O'Reilly et al., 2009). For instance, Dixon-
Woods and collaborators (2007, p. 799) pointed out that: “Applicants must ‘submit’ 
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(the verb is used explicitly) to the committee; must make full disclosures and display 
their credentials as competent, trustworthy researchers; and must permit the 
exposure of their proposal to critical scrutiny [...].” 
Alternatively, committees can be seen as players subjected to economic and 
academic pressures realized via researchers. Of the eight committees I studied, I was 
able to interview four committee chairs (two in each country). These interviewees (but 
especially the Brazilian ones) declared that sometimes researchers get disappointed or 
angry toward some committee’s decisions, and the committee chairs are sometimes 
personally targeted by such feelings. Normal members also declared that committee 
members can be put under pressure by greedy, anxious researchers willing to begin 
their studies as soon as possible. Eckenwiller (2001, p. 47) voiced a typical pragmatic 
observation by saying that: “It is [...] likely that many if not most IRB members are 
acutely aware of the financial environment in which they operate and of the 
importance of clinical research in their institutions’ economic viability. Their 
professional lives are shaped by pressures to increase revenues.” 
 
“[...] Let’s imagine that I’m going to work as a committee member. 
Yeah. 
What are the.... What is the advice you would give me so that I can be a good 
committee member? 
[Laughter.] Stay away. [Laughter.] Sorry [...] you have to have an adequate amount of 
time. Secondly, I think, you must ensure that you’re not going to be bullied, be... 
Bullied is a colloquial term... but pressured into going in one direction [...] 
And who could put me under pressure? 
[...] I mean, I’ve had situations in which I asked four or five questions [to the 
researchers who had proposed the study]. They will answer three adequately, two 
inadequately. So I go back to them, get more advice. They might have answered one of 
those questions half adequately [...] And then, pressure will come that we have to... 
We are supposed to give them an answer in a certain length of time. So you see what I 





 However, there are occasions in which pressure assumes less psychological, 
and more concrete, forms. 
 
“Do you think that reviewing and reading a protocol involves a subjective aspect? 
Oh, absolutely. Several, right? [Laughter] [...] There must be, but I’ve never seen it 
explicitly, but I believe there are power relations [...] Let’s say you’re reviewing a 
project from a professor who is the chair of your department and your current boss. 
To what extent can you deliver an impartial analysis of the project, considering power 
relations? 
Even though the professor won’t know who the reviewer is. 
Even though the professor won’t know who the reviewer is. [Pause.] Because it is not a 
review... How do you call it? It is not a peer-review. It is not a review like the one that 
happens in scientific articles, you know. Here it is different. All the members sit in the 
meeting room. When people are given the list with the projects, they know what the 
projects you’ve been given are. It is not blind. 
And this information circulates.  
It may circulate. The secretaries know. Have you seen how many secretaries sit in the 
meeting room? There are four or five, I guess, in average [...] So it is not blind. I don’t 
even know if it should be, but I am saying that to give an example that the subjective 
aspect is always present, you know, and power relations are always present as well.” 
(São Paulo/C3/Social scientist/05-11) 
 
“If I told you that I am going to work in an ethics committee, as a reviewer, what is the 
advice you would give me so that I can be a good reviewer and a good committee 
member? 
[...] You should not say: ‘Oh, this project is very fine, it is from my good friend, so I’m 
going to approve it.’ I think you have to be very focused. For instance, sometimes 
there are some projects... You have friends and enemies within academia. If I see it is 




In the pragmatic mentality, committees are framed as social agents engaged in 
practical matters and solving practical problems. Once they are part of an institutional 
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environment, they may also hold “conflicts of interest.” For example, Bosk and Frader 
(1998) admit that a certain committee may be willing to approve studies whose 
conduct could make its hospital appear high-skilled and modern. 
Due to practical considerations, committee members may be pushed toward 
either the approval of research proposals (when these latter come from bosses or 
friends, for instance) or toward the refusal of projects. One interviewee considered the 
possibility of a committer member’s refusing a project in a research domain he or she 
wants to pioneer: 
 
“[...] There may be people in the committee who would like to do the same type of 
thing and then, I’m just wondering how... how fair would they be to this person whose 
work they’re reviewing, you know [...] I’ve often wondered... Say, if [the committee 
member] is a doctor working on HIV and there is an HIV trial coming, and if he’s 
interested in the same things, how... subjective or objective would this person be 
when he reviews the trial? [...] 
Ah, because he’s involved... 
In the same area, perhaps [...].” 
(Cape Town/C6/Nurse/08-11) 
 
In the pragmatic mentality, the institutional independence of committees is 
framed as a resource of difficult conservation. That is probably why most interviewees 
think that committee members should not receive payments for the work they do. Of 
31 members I asked this question to, 18 people condemned payments in ethics 
committees. Generally, interviewees fear the interference of too strong conflicts of 
interest. They tend to associate payments with murky motivations, professional 
committees23 with regrettable compromises. There is no professional committee in 
Brazil but there are two in South Africa, both based in Pretoria and playing a central 
role in the South African ethics review system.24 One of these committees participated 
in my study. I addressed these issues in an interview with one of its members. 
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 Committees that receive fees for their reviewing work. 
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 In South Africa, many studies include private hospitals and practices, which do not have their own 




“As the committee is private, the members get paid for the work. 
Yes. 
Okay. And do you think that because they get paid, they tend to do a better work 
compared to other committees? 
I think so. I really think so. Because, you know, it is long hours and hard work and I... 
And I have to perform [...] I’ve heard from committees where members do not get 
paid and it is a problem. It is a problem to get members to attend meetings, it is a 
problem to get members to review documents, to make, you know, contributions to 
meetings because [...] they’ve got so many other things that they have to do [...] 
But do you think there are fundamental differences between a private committee and 
other types of committee? 
Hm, you know what, I think conflict of interests. We’ve got very little conflict of 
interests in our meetings [...] there is no conflict of interests whereas, I think, if you’re 
in a institution, the chances of the investigator also being a member of the committee 
or the investigator-supervisor being a member of the committee or the head of the 
department where they’re doing the research... So there is a lot of conflict of interests 
in institutions because the members and the investigators are both from the same 
group of people [...] So, I think, we’re much more independent. You know, we don’t 
have anyone to look at over our shoulder, knowing that, you know, if I am not going to 
approve your research tomorrow, you know, I’m your boss and... you know. And it 
happens. I mean, I’ve heard of a lot of instances where studies get pushed through 
because it is the head of the department that is doing that, or things like that. We 
don’t have that problem.” 
(Cape Town/C8/Lawyer/07-11) 
 
 Thus, against the idea that in professional committees there are economic 
conflicts of interest (which tends to be a strong idea because it is embedded in the 
background knowledge), this interviewee mobilizes the idea of institutional conflicts of 
interest in non-professional committees (which also sounds like a good point because 
it is also embedded in the background knowledge). 
 To summarize, an ethics committee, in the pragmatic approach, is seen as one 
of the actors immersed in an institutional and hierarchical environment where 
practical targets must be pursued. However, there is another aspect that is put 
forward by the pragmatic mentality: hierarchies involve not only relations between the 
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committee and the research site but also relations within the committee itself. 
Generally, the majority of committee members are physicians, a profession which may 
be associated with professional arrogance. For instance, one committee member, who 
had been in the committee for only a couple of months by the time of our interview, 
told me that in her first meeting, she got surprised with the physicians’ kind attitude. 
 
“So you hadn’t imagined that the meeting would be friendly. 
No. 
How did you imagine it before beginning? 
I don’t know, when you congregate several areas, and especially medicine... Medicine 
is very superior (that is what they think, you know), superior, the holders of power and 
knowledge, you know, they have access to science. They have an institutional 
solidarity. But at least the physicians who are in the committee are really friendly.” 
(São Paulo/C2/Nurse/04-11) 
 
 Differently from this committee member, other interviewees claimed that they 
do feel the professional and scientific superiority of physicians. In many situations, 
members lacking a medical or scientific background, and particularly lay members, can 
feel intimated in the face of sophisticated methodological and clinical discussions.25 In 
a study by Storch and Griener (1992), for instance, it is claimed that in Canadian 
hospitals, ethics committees constitute a space to which nurses have precarious access 
and in which they do not feel at ease. In the pragmatic approach to ethics committees, 
therefore, there is an underlying assumption that committees, instead of promoting 
debate and participation, are reinforcing hierarchical differences in research sites 
(Rothman, 1991, Bosk and Frader, 1998, Eckenwiler, 2001, Kohlen, 2009).  
In my fieldwork, I was allowed to attend some meetings of two Brazilian 
committees and identified a non-verbal, almost symbolic hierarchical sign. Meetings 
happen during the working time of many committee members. Health professionals 
(nurses, physicians, laboratory workers and pharmacists) go to the meeting room 
wearing their white working clothing, which creates a clear visual difference in relation 
to lay members and social scientists, who wear informal clothes, as well as to lawyers, 
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 I come back to this topic in Chapter 5, section 5.3.6. 
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who prefer formal suits, ties or dresses. Some physicians, in addition to their white 
clothes, display a distinctive sign: they simply let the stethoscope hang round their 
necks during the whole meeting. 
A Brazilian physician told me that due to his medical knowledge, he comes to 
be a sort of “advisor” in the meetings. 
 
“You said you end up being a sort of advisor in the committee. Do you think that 
because you fulfil this function... [...] I mean, do you think that in the meeting, you fulfil 
an outstanding function? 
It shouldn’t be so, but, I mean, as sometimes my opinion has to be in terms of yes or 
no, in an alternative... 
A scientific opinion. 
Yes, or an opinion that, for instance, will solve a disagreement, you know, then, 
obviously, I’m in an outstanding position, but it shouldn’t be so. I think that opinions 
are weighted in a balanced way there [...] But, for instance, there are particularities in 
the committee, and that is when the committee becomes strong, collectively. When I 
have a legal doubt, for instance, the lawyers will give their opinion. 
And then they’ll have an outstanding position. 




 For people holding a particularly strong pragmatic approach, participation 
within the committee comes to be framed as a network of power relations, demanding 
wise strategies. 
 
“Is there anyone in the committee that you consider as a friend? 
[Laughter.] [...] I think there certainly are [...] Academia is ruled through all kinds of 
conventions and relations and hierarchies and things like that [...] Well, those things 
happen in the committee as well [...] Medical doctors often assume greater authority 
than other academics [...] So those, sort of, nuances of academic life, those, sort of, 
power relations in academia happen in that committee as well [...] So for instance, 
medical doctors in the committee play a very different role and have a very different 
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stake than people who are not medically trained. And even more so social scientists or 
people with a social science background, including anthropologists, sociologists and 
some other people. They have a very different stake. They have less interest in the 
success of medical research or in medical research making profits or being profitable, 
and they have more stake in looking at the participants. So if you accept that that is 
true, and if you accept that those power relations are going on, then it becomes 
important to build blocks, to ally yourself with other people who have similar views 
[...] I only do that with people who I share something with. So they are mostly other 
social scientists on the committee and I sort of try to understand their views, I try sort 
of match or align my views to theirs [...] In the meeting, I do that because it is not 
enough on the committee to just say something, you need not to be alone saying it [...] 
So sometimes you can prepare a sort of strategy for a meeting. 
[Laughter.] [Pause.] Maybe, maybe not. I am not going to say that.” 
(Cape Town/C7/Social scientist/08-11) 
 
 Therefore, the ideological alertness instilled by the pragmatic mentality is 
applied to different circumstances. Be it in their indirect relations to researchers or 
their direct relations within the committee, members are constantly invited to weight 
the implications of their practical actions. 
However, it is important to note that at the level of the pragmatic mentality, we 
are not yet dealing with moral judgements. Even though people recognize the 
interplay of financial, institutional and professional interests, the pragmatic approach 
does not frame them in terms of good and bad events. That is probably why, in the 
quotes presented throughout this chapter, claims were frequently accompanied by 
cautious remarks such as: “I’ve never seen it explicity,” “I’m just wondering” or 
“Maybe, maybe not.” Here, committee members are only acknowledging the presence 
of issues whose assessment and judgment are postponed by the pragmatic mentality 
and must then be realized by other mentalities. The pragmatic approach is an endless 
source of concerns and dilemmas but when it comes to solutions and answers, it is 
completely sterile. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, other mentalities emerge to 






The pragmatic mentality forms therefore the basis on which the committee 
members’ communicative actions lie. In order to depict the widespread use of 
pragmatic claims, let us consider the following table. 
 
 







“Pharma companies and CROs bring 
their financial interests to the 
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 The table shows that pragmatic claims tend to be voiced by a considerable 
number of committee members.27 The claim that stresses financial interests of the 
trials industry proved particularly widespread, being spontaneously voiced by 29 of 42 
interviewees (and by 94% of my South African interviewees). Interestingly, there was a 
rather even distribution in both countries. However, there seems to be differences in 
terms of educational background, as shown in the following discourse boxplot:28 
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 The percentages on this column were calculated over the total number of interviews (42). 
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 It is important to remember that I let these themes emerge spontaneously during the interviews. 
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Figure 3.3 – Pragmatic mentality (South Africa and Brazil): 




 We can look at these boxplots as forming two layers. First, there is a layer 
composed by bioethicists, lawyers, physicians and bioscientists, who voiced pragmatic 
claims quite sparingly. The second group is composed by lay members, nurses, social 
workers and social scientists, who proved more willing to advance pragmatic claims.29 
Interestingly, this difference could be verified quantitatively, in spite of the small size 
of each group. By performing a statistical test,30 I identified a statistically significant 
difference between these four boxplots (p=0.05). In order to verify where the 
difference really is, I performed another test,31 comparing pairs of groups, and 
identified a significant difference only between the group of social scientists and the 
group formed by physicians and bioscientists (p=0.01). 
 Thus the acquisition of certain scientific knowledge (especially in biosciences 
and medicine) seems to undermine the proliferation of pragmatic concerns. When it 
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comes to social scientists, the high performance in terms of pragmatic claims can be 
explained by their disciplinary emphasis on contextual factors, making them recognize 
and eventually accept some practical assumptions. In the case of lay members and 
nurses, one could expect higher levels of pragmatic claims. However, these 
interviewees seem to be over-concerned with their own lack of scientific knowledge, a 
preoccupation that prevents the pragmatic mentality from developing freely.32 
 Nevertheless, in spite of these differences, Table 3.1 offers good evidence 
about the widespread use of pragmatic claims, especially when it comes to recognizing 
the interference of financial interests in clinical trials. Thus few people would be willing 
to contest the basic idea that “[...] the main business of clinical research is not 
enhancing or saving lives but acquiring stuff: data. It is an industry, not a social service” 
(Shah, 2006, p. 176). To be sure, different ideological consequences can be derived 
from this elementary recognition, but if we focus on the recognition itself, forgetting 
its subsequent developments for a while, it can be said that we are dealing with the 
ideological force pointed out by Habermas (1996, p. 24), a force that is stronger than 
any social sanction based on social grounds or “plausible reasons.” 
By assimilating the contents of background knowledge, committee members 
are learning the basic rules of the game they are supposed to play. Once these 
essential rules are acknowledged, the challenges proposed by the pragmatic mentality 
can be ideologically dealt with. In fact, as soon as our attention moves from shared 
knowledge to ideological disagreements, we rapidly realize that in contemporary social 
groups, there is a good leeway for axiological differences.  “The more societal 
complexity increases and originally ethnocentric perspectives widen, the more there 
develops a pluralisation of forms of life accompanied by an individualization of life 
histories, while the zones of overlapping lifeworlds and shared background 
assumptions shrink” (Habermas, 1996, p. 25). Thus the shared contents of background 
knowledge are not likely to become numerous and complex in a social life that 
promotes social and ideological differences. Such ideological differentiation happens, 
though, at a different level of the mental life, at which background knowledge turns 
into foreground knowledge. These differentiating process are focused on in the 
following chapters.  
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4 Chapter 4 – Background and foreground knowledge: 
the bioethical and communitarian mentalities 
 
 In this chapter, two new approaches to clinical trials are studied. Firstly, 
however, we introduce the concept of foreground knowledge, which will be important 
for understanding the relations between the basic pragmatic approach and other 
approaches. We then move on to analyzing several characteristics of the bioethical and 
communitarian mentalities, in a discussion that will involve the issues of vulnerability, 
risks, globalization and regulations, among others. 
 
4.1 THE CONCEPT OF FOREGROUND KNOWLEDGE 
 
In the previous chapter, we focused on the pragmatic mentality, whose views 
about clinical research compose an ideological framework that can be interpreted with 
Habermas’ (1981/1987, 1996) concept of background knowledge. It was claimed that 
certain notions become widely accepted and used by several types of social actors, 
therefore acquiring the status of almost taken-for granted ideas. Nevertheless, 
ideological life could not gain true consistency and permanency by only relying on 
practical, simple, intuitive background notions. There must also be a range of 
debatable ideas, which comprise the biggest part of our ideological life. 
It was shown that the pragmatic mentality has a problematic nature, insofar as 
its typical claims point to dilemmas and threats that could transform clinical research 
into a reckless activity. Therefore, the pragmatic approach never ceases to provide 
stimuli and questions but fails to present ideological responses to solve these 
problems. In order to find out solutions, it is necessary to mobilize arguments, 
explanations, debates, comparisons, ideological challenges, among other resources 
which do not fit the superficial nature of pragmatic claims. In other words, the 
relatively simple assumptions of background knowledge bring about problems that 
demand much more sophisticated and systematized notions. It is necessary to build up 




Even though Habermas did not propose a complementary concept to 
background knowledge, he did assume that in certain situations, notions lose their 
taken-for-granted status and begin to be contested and scrutinized. Therefore, 
background knowledge can sometimes be looked at in the light of social and political 
debates. “One can do this only by converting it from a resource into a topic of 
discussion, at which point – just when it is thematized – it no longer functions as a 
lifeworld background [...]” (Habermas, 1996, p. 22-23). 
 Thus, there is a crucial dimension of ideological life that requires debate, 
discussion and contestation, constituting the foreground knowledge. On the one hand, 
this knowledge is constantly stimulated by the dilemmas imposed by the background 
knowledge. On the other hand, foreground notions acquire the status of theories and 
explanations which are used to justify beliefs and claims embedded in the background 
knowledge. The following figure summarizes this circularity, which will be further 
studied in the present and next chapters. 
 
 













 Thanks to this conversation, ideologies can be nurtured by both the immediate 
force of background knowledge and the production of theories, which can only be 















becomes not only real but intersubjective. “Culture, this acted document, thus is public 
[…] Though ideational, it does not exist in someone’s head; though unphysical, it is not 
an occult entity” (Geertz, 1973, p. 10). 
 Ethics committees constitute an interesting space to study this circularity. On 
the one hand, as showed in Chapter 3, committee members are certainly informed by 
background notions. On the other hand, committees are also a space in which ideas 
and interpretations are discussed, therefore allowing the emergence of foreground 
knowledge. By presenting their views about particular research projects, as well as 
discussing general concepts of clinical research, committee members can refine their 
notions and therefore “experience meaningfulness,” to use Arendt’s (1958/1998, p. 4) 
telling expression. By discussing ideas, committee members acquire a “voice,” as 
Certeau (1990) would put it, in the sense that they express the reasons sustaining their 
convictions. 
 Whenever and wherever there is discussion, there are also impending 
dissensions. People engaging in debates must cope with the possibility of having their 
stances threatened or deconstructed. According to Habermas (1996, 2008), reasons 
are unstable insofar as they can always be confronted by other reasons that may be 
more powerful or consistent. For ethics committee members, dire threats must be 
continuously faced, especially in countries such as South Africa and Brazil, where 
clinical research has undergone a rapid expansion in few years. 
According to Arendt (1958/1998, p. 252), “[...] history is a story of events and 
not of forces or ideas with predictable courses.” Mentalities can also be seen as 
ideological events of uncertain development. In this chapter, we explore the sources, 
features and political consequences of the bioethical and communitarian mentalities, 
which are largely responsible for the circularity between background and foreground 
knowledge. 
 
4.2 THE BIOETHICAL AND COMMUNITARIAN MENTALITIES 
 
In order to carry deep-rooted, immediate claims (background knowledge) and 
convert them into structured, debatable claims (foreground knowledge), a great 
ideological effort is needed. Several arguments and concepts have to be mobilized in 
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this passage. On the one hand, it is necessary to look for coherent associations of 
arguments, without which discourses rapidly succumb to the sway of opposing 
discourses. On the other hand, the realm of foreground knowledge does not involve 
practical and simple assumptions, as was the case in the pragmatic approach. 
Whenever discourses are to be debated and contrasted, they can no longer be simply 
informed by the unspecific evidences that prevail in background knowledge. Subjected 
to debate, they also need to be sustained by the projects, interests and specificities of 
those actors who voice them. In other words, their political and social situatedness has 
to be clarified; the first way to realize this task is to adopt a particular rationality 
(either the instrumental or communicational rationality). 
These two basic ideological tasks (the construction of coherence and the 
adoption of one rationality) are conducted at the level of the bioethical and 
communitarian mentalities. This is why these two approaches are quite complex, in the 
sense that they hold several types of claims, mental connections and concerns. The 
following sections aim to present the basic features of these approaches. It is 
important to address them together, as they have some similarities, common 
preoccupations and, in some instances, share certain claims. In this sense, we will 
speak of conversation, referring to the fact that approaches do not have an 
independent existence. Without the supporting or conflicting voice of other 
mentalities, without engaging in conversations, one particular mentality would be 
nothing but a futile accumulation of clever arguments. 
 
4.2.1 Vulnerability, deception, and protection 
 
Elsewhere (Bicudo, 2011), I addressed the issue of “social exploitation” in 
global trials, stressing that for some social scientists, the exploitation of research 
subjects and developing countries is a pivotal concern. The pragmatic mentality 
proposes the image of greedy and untameable multinational companies willing to 
reach their targets by any means. There can emerge the idea that the action of global 
companies can have more devastating effects for some research subjects than others. 
This is one of the points of departure of both the bioethical and communitarian 
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mentalities: the idea that research subjects and countries, but especially the ones 
which are deemed more “vulnerable,” are in need of protection. 
 
“And in your opinion, what is the main goal of an ethics committee? 
[...] of course, an ethics committee must focus on the research subject and look from 
there. I mean, you’re working with people [...] So you must... I think an ethics 
committee must protect the study subjects.” 
(Pretoria/C8/Bioscientist/07-11) 
 
“In your opinion, what is the main goal of a research ethics committee? 
Our main goal is to protect the public in which the research is going to take place and 
through which the findings of the research are going to be extrapolated. So that is the 
main aim, because they have nobody else that is going to speak on their behalf [...].” 
(Cape Town/C6/Physician/08-11) 
 
 Such concerns have to do with the historical and philosophical sources of the 
approaches focused on here. Both are inspired by examples of abuses and scandals 
that took place in past clinical studies, although they derive different conclusions from 
this evidence. 
 Even though the issues of vulnerability, exploitation and protection are 
common to both mentalities, they deal with them in a quite dissimilar way. In the 
bioethical approach, exploitation is said to emerge whenever crucial information is 
hidden from research subjects. Thus, people cannot fully understand the clinical study 
and take an autonomous, informed decision. To use Rapley’s words, this mindset is 
highly informed by a “classic Kantian liberal version of autonomy”: 
 
“This is a cognitive autonomy, where individuals are self-sufficient, with views, 
thoughts and decisions being generated ‘from within’, with the premise that 
we have a solo ‘internal’ state, that we ‘own’ our own thoughts, that we exist 
apart from our social relations” (Rapley, 2008. p. 434). 
 
 Clearly, ethics committee members cannot sustain this stance, which stresses 
the research subjects’ individual autonomy, without being particularly conscious of 
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their own individual autonomy. Thus, it is possible to grasp one of the main features of 
the bioethical mentality: its being highly informed by individualistic references. As 
Habermas (1993, p. 6) noted: 
 
“Ethical questions by no means call for a complete break with the egocentric 
perspective; in each instance they take their orientation from the telos of one’s 
own life. From this point of view, other persons, other life histories, and 
structures of interests acquire importance only to the extent that they are 
interrelated or interwoven with my identity, my life history, and my interests 
within the framework of an intersubjectively shared form of life [...].” 
 
Because of this preoccupation with the provision of information in trials, the 
issue of informed consent to research has become a sort of mantra for many ethics 
committee members. In my fieldwork, out of 42 interviewees, 24 mentioned the topic, 
be it in a direct, indirect or ancillary way. From this point of view, the situation gets 
particularly tricky when one considers that in clinical trials, information is provided to 
participants through consent forms that frequently contain technical and scientific 
terms. A key task for ethics committees would therefore be to enforce explanations 
with which research subjects are made fully informed and let free to take decisions. 
Interestingly, in Brazil the consent form is called “informed and free consent form” 
(termo de consentimento livre e informado). 
Obviously, it is frequently hard, if not impossible, to produce those utterly 
informed and autonomous subjects, a failure that has been interpreted with the 
typical bioethical idea of therapeutic misconception (Appelbaum et al., 1982, Fisher, 
2006, Kimmelman, 2007, Lidz and Appelbaum, 2002, Madsen et al., 1999, Madsen et 
al., 2007).33 In its search for a true informed, free consent to research, the bioethical 
mentality helps consolidate “[...] the withdrawal of the individual into an ‘inward 
domain of consciousness’ where it finds the only ‘appropriate region of human liberty’ 
[...]” (Arendt, 1963, p. 137). 
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 There have been efforts to commensurate and measure this so-called therapeutic misconception. As a 
result, a scale has been proposed. See CHOU, P. H. B. & O’ROURKE, N. 2011. Development and initial 
validation of the Therapeutic Misunderstanding Scale for use with clinical trials research participants. 
Aging & Mental Health, 16, 145-153. 
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In the communitarian mentality, vulnerability and exploitation acquire more 
concrete features. The problems are mainly associated with socioeconomic matters 
such as poverty and illiteracy. In this way, some groups, as a consequence of their 
social conditions, are framed as being less prepared to deal with the technical 
information, as well as financial temptations, introduced by global trials. Thus: “If the 
history of human experimentation tells us anything [...], it is that the potential for 
abuse will fall heaviest on the poorest and most powerless among us” (Shah, 2006, p. 
xi).34 
The following table presents some examples of how these questions were 
addressed by my interviewees. 
  
                                                     
34
 On similar interpretations in the domain of social sciences, see BICUDO, E. 2011. "Geographical 
randomization" and "Social exploitation" in clinical research: world trials in Santiago, Chile. Health and 




Communitarian  Bioethical 
 
“Do you think it is possible to say that a 
committee has to protect people? 
[...] that is a difficult question [...] because we 
also say that people need to be autonomous. 
But [...] I just want to stress that my personal 
view is that autonomy does not work very 
well in the context of medical research, 
because people do not always understand [...] 
In the evidence that we have that consent do 
not always work, in light of that evidence, and 
because people are mainly poor and mainly 
more vulnerable in this research context, I 
think we can assume that people have been 
induced to take risks [...] And I think in that 
context, this ethics committee does have a 
duty to protect research participants from 






“Do you think that there is some part of the 
protocol that deserves more attention from a 
reviewer? 
[...] I feel quite strongly that I try to maintain 
participants’ autonomy in things like trials where 
one might say: ‘Why is the company doing that 
study here? We won’t get the medicines.’ I do 
feel that, provided that it is safe, that actually 
should be the participants’ decision. You know, 
if they are prepared to go onto the study, say, 
for two years, knowing for well that in the 
consent form they insisted that [...] they won’t 
get the drug at the end of two years, I believe 
that is actually up to the participant to decide 




“Do you think there is any kind of protocol 
with which reviewers need to be more careful? 
[...] I think the way you approach the research 
subjects is very important, because they are 
already in a delicate situation. It is not like the 
interview we’re doing, because nobody is sick 
here [...] People can do everything to improve 
the situation, be it their own situation or that 
of another patient, you know. And here in the 
hospital, because it is an academic hospital, 
what I often see... I mean... The physician is 
god [...] I mean, we have very needy patients, 
so the physician is god. When they talk to the 
physician, they’re almost talking to god. So 
the physician asks: ‘Oh, do you want...’ 
Sometimes, they get afraid [to say no] [...].” 
(São Paulo/C3/Bioscientist/05-11) 
  
“[...] Today, after these years of work, what is 
your main motivation to continue to work in the 
ethics committee? 
[...] not to leave the research subject lacking 
basic information to take a conscious decision. 
Actually, what anyone wants in life is an 
individual issue. If a cancer patient has tried all 
the procedures without finding a solution for the 
disease and wants to take part in spite of the 
risks, I think that is adequate, as long as the 
person know what is being done. So the 
committee members... it is not up to us to judge 
personal things. We simply wish to make sure 
that research subjects are given adequate 





 When talking about protection, people may be referring to different things, 
depending on whether they tend to embrace the bioethical or communitarian view. In 
bioethical terms, defending research subjects amounts to making sure that all relevant 
information is provided in the informed consent process so that people can take free 
decisions. This is a key target for a mindset that proposes the idea of “solving problems 
by ethical discussions and not by deeds” (Kohlen, 2009, p. 215). In the communitarian 
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approach, protection acquires a more concrete nature, having to do with the refusal of 
studies that might harm people physically. 
 
 
Communitarian  Bioethical 
 
“But why don’t you agree with this kind of 
oncologic trial? 
No, I don’t agree when someone is going to die 
[...] and you do an experiment on him. Because 
[laughter] you can give him a placebo as well. I’m 
sorry, you can’t give a man who’s dying a placebo 
[laughter]. 
Yeah, but the industry would say that, maybe, the 
protocol could help to expand the life of these 
subjects. 
But for how long? 
For some months. 
You can’t... They don’t know. They don’t know 
for how long. But the man is suffering. He’s 





“When you’re reviewing a protocol, what is your 
main concern? 
[...] Again, the patient is the focus, or the... the 
persons being (they’re not always patients), the 
persons being researched. Those are the ones 
that you have to protect [...] You must see that 
they’re not going to be exploited in any way. 
That you see that they get sufficient 
information. For instance, the information sheet 
and the consent form and all this, we go through 
them to make quite sure that the language... the 
person understands; that there is nothing in 






“In your opinion, what is the main goal of an 
ethics committee? 
In my opinion, it is protection of the participants 
[...] We are seeing more and more 
pharmacogenetic studies, blood is collected or 
samples or blood or tissues or whatever, sent 
overseas and we’ve got capacity in our country to 
do that. So what one sees is intellectual property. 
It is going out. And we think it must be 
discouraged [...] Then they know everything 
about our DNA and we don’t know anything 
about it. So South Africa is far-advanced, 
probably Brazil too. They can come and build 
capacity, and the tissues should remain in our 







“I think that the correct thing would be to offer 
training courses to teach researchers about the 
proper ways of presenting an informed consent 
form [...] You have to inform people and let 
them free to choose, instead of deviating them 
towards the side you want them to direct their 




 As the two quotes at the bottom show, in the bioethical mentality, concerns 
with the consent form are extended to the consent process whereas the 
communitarian mentality generates a concern with the body, extending it to samples 
extracted from bodies and displaying an unease with a potential “commodification of 
the body” (Scheper-Hughes, 2000). This communitarian concern with samples is not 
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surprising, for as Haddow (2005) argued, organs and other bodily parts are frequently 
framed as the continuation of people’s bodies. 
Actually, we are in a murky zone, where both mentalities share strong claims 
but, at the same time, have strong disagreements. As the quotes above show, the 
issue of autonomy, which is so important within the bioethical discourse, is almost 
despised by the communitarian approach, which foregrounds contextual factors 
undermining free choices and autonomy. However, the quotes also let us see that 
these approaches can be combined quite smoothly. The following example is a single 




Question “Do you have an example of an ethical problem in clinical research? 
Bioethical 
Well, it would be under all the main heading of beneficence. So who 
benefits from it? You know, if the participants don’t benefit at all and 
they’re taking all the risk, then that would be a problem. 
Communitarian 
                                                                                                            If persons 
are going to have severe side effects and they’re not well-looked after 
afterwards, you know, so what kind of care does a person that gets 
injured during the study... do they have any care? Does anybody 
follow-up on them or do they fall back on themselves? Are there any 
resources allocated for that? 
Bioethical                                                       Are they properly informed? 
Communitarian 
                                                                                                                    You 
know, we’ve got eleven official languages in South Africa. 
Bioethical/Communitarian 
                                                                                                                    So do 
they only take the consent in English? How well is the consent taken 
in the other languages? So where do you want to do the research? 
Depending on where it is in South Africa, there is a dominant 





 This interviewee came to take a communitarian concern (the existence of 
different languages in South Africa) and mix it with the issue of informed consent, a 
typical bioethical point. 
These two mentalities take the basic concerns of background knowledge in 
order to build more systematic discourses. Because of this capacity to generate 
foreground knowledge from background knowledge, and also because of their 
manifold blends, the communitarian and bioethical discourses seem to be the ones 
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which are the most frequently voiced by committee members. The following discourse 
boxplots give us an idea.35 
 
 
Figure 4.2 – Discourse boxplots according to mentalities 




Performing a statistical test,36 I verified a large statistical difference between 
these boxplots.37 We can see that, compared to other mentalities, the bioethical and 
communitarian ones were voiced in greater proportions by my interviewees. Their 
average proportions (0.27 and 0.24 respectively) were indeed very close to each other. 
The technical mentality seems to occupy an intermediate position (the average score 
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 On the methods used to build up these boxplots, see Chapter 2. 
36
 Friedman’s test. 
37
 The p value is less than 0.0005. 
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was 0.22).38 Finally, the other mentalities displayed low scores (their average score 
were either equal to or less than 0.08). 
The diffusion, agreements and disagreements of the bioethical and 
communitarian mentalities have to do with their historical sources and developments, 
which will be discussed in the following section. 
 
4.2.2 Philosophical and historical sources 
 
As claimed in the previous chapters, mentalities derive from long historical 
developments. The mentalities which are focused on in this chapter have been 
decisively influenced by hazards and scandals taking place in clinical research, but they 
deal with these issues differently. 
The bioethical approach has been fostered and shaped by stories that circulate 
in the world of clinical trials, talking about deception, deaths, abuses and exploitation. I 
am referring to past examples such as the thalidomide scandal (Petryna, 2009, 
Timmermans and Berg, 2003), the Tuskegee study (Rothman, 1991, Angell, 1997, 
Lederman, 2006, Epstein, 2007, Petryna, 2009, Kohlen, 2009), the experiments with 
prisoners in the United States (Rothman, 1991, Epstein, 2007, Fisher, 2009, Petryna, 
2006), the Willowbrook study with mentally retarded children (Kohlen, 2009, Bosk, 
1999/2008), the Aids studies in Africa (Epstein, 2007, Petryna, 2006), or the studies 
conducted without informed consent with victims of the Bophal accident in India 
(Chattopadhyay, 2012).39 
Another famous case, the Trovan trial (Petryna, 2006) conducted by Pfizer in 
Africa, has even inspired The constant gardener, a 2001 novel by John le Carré, 
subsequently adapted into a film. In my fieldwork, this book was cited by an 
interviewee in Cape Town whereas the film was mentioned by a committee member in 
São Paulo. In the following quotes, we have two examples of interviewees referring to 
past scandals in clinical research. 
 
                                                     
38
 However, I shall make an important qualification in Chapter 5, section 5.3.6. 
39
 For numerous and detailed examples of gloomy, cruel experiments with human beings, see MORENO, 
J. D. 2000. Undue risk: secret state experiments on humans, New York ; Basingstoke, W.H. Freeman, 
1999. and SHAH, S. 2006. The body hunters: testing new drugs on the world's poorest patients, New 
York/London, New Press. 
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“Do you think the analysis of a protocol involves a subjective dimension? 
[...] Let’s say it is an ideological, rather than subjective, dimension, perhaps, especially 
when it involves multinational companies, because they have bad name, because 
people know that some companies used disabled and vulnerable subjects to conduct 
some unnecessary studies, especially outside Brazil, you know. There are so many 
news that come from Africa and even the United States, talking about the past use of 
sick people, prisoners and so on in certain studies that were somewhat inhuman [...].” 
(Porto Alegre/C5/Lawyer/05-11) 
 
“In your opinion, what is the main goal of an ethics committee? 
I think it is to protect patients [...] They can’t know beforehand what is going to 
happen to them. So there must be an intermediation, which prevents abuses [...] Since 
the first studies... I mean, what the Germans did to Jews, what the Americans did to 
black people in prisons, what some schools did to poor students. There was nobody to 
protect them [...].” 
(São Paulo/C2/Physician/04-11) 
 
 In the bioethical mentality, such examples are used as evidence in order to 
claim for regulations and principles with which the protection of research subjects 
would be streamlined. Not surprisingly, then, the principle of informed consent to 
research, which is nowadays so important for this mentality, was firstly stated in the 
1947 Nuremberg Code, whose writing was firmly motivated by the Nazi research 
abuses carried out during the Second World War. Some stories can also become locally 
or nationally famous, as is the case of a malaria study once conducted in Brazil. 
 
“[...] some things cannot be justified. For example, in a malaria study, infecting people 
with malaria, with mosquitoes biting people and then giving them a medicine to see 
whether it is effective for malaria, this should not... Right? So in order to know if that 
medicine is effective for malaria, should I first infect people with malaria? There are so 





 Of 42 interviewees, 10 recalled past abuses in trials. I got intrigued by the 
constant repetition of these stories. It seemed to me that I was facing not only an 
effort of remembrance but also an effort to organize ideas and examples. As Arendt 
(1963, p. 222) claimed: 
 
“[...] if it is true that all thought begins with remembrance, it is also true that no 
remembrance remains secure unless it is condensed and distilled into a 
framework of conceptual notions within which it can further exercise itself. 
Experiences and even the stories which grow out of what men do and endure, 
of happenings and events, sink back into the futility inherent in the living word 
and the living deed unless they are talked about over and over again.” 
 
By analyzing the structure of stories of scandals in clinical trials, I discovered the 
presence of a general pattern, as summarized below: 
 
I. Greedy, interested actors wish to conduct a clinical study 
II. Using regulatory and social loopholes, the study is conducted, causing harms 
and deaths 
III. Regulatory and social tools are created to prevent new scandals 
IV. New loopholes appear slowly, enabling the conduct of new forms of abusive 
studies 
 
In this way, it is possible to go back from step IV to step I, and the circle never 
ceases to be repeated. This way of thinking can be interpreted as mythical thought, in 
Lévi-Strauss’ (1958/1974, p. 231) terms: 
 
“A myth always refers to past events [...] However, the intrinsic worth that is 
attributed to it depend on the fact that these events, considered as having 
started at a given moment, also constitute a permanent structure, which refers 




Indeed, in the stories repeated in the domain of clinical research, it is possible 
to identify a series of “symbolic operations” such as those which are described by Lévi-
Strauss (1958/1974, p. 248): 
 
“The mythical thought derives from the consideration of certain oppositions 
and tends to mediate between them progressively. Let us say that two terms, 
between which the passage seems impossible, are firstly replaced by two 
equivalent terms that can be mediated by a third term. Subsequently, one of 
the extreme terms and the intermediate term are, in their turn, replaced by a 
new triad, and so forth.” 
 





Table 4.1 – Symbolic operations of the bioethical mentality 
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 The first pair is “Good and Bad,” for as we shall see,40 this is the moving dyad 
animating the bioethical approach. This pair, which seems irreconcilable, is subject to a 
replacement: “Good” is replaced with “Health” whereas “Bad” is replaced with 
“Illness.” “Drug” appears as the mediating term that links the extreme terms together. 
Subsequently, in the second operation, “Health and Drug” are selected to form a new 
pair, which goes through a new replacement, and these operations can be endlessly 
repeated. It is important to stress this mythical nature of the bioethical mentality in 
order to understand two of its pivotal philosophical and political features. 
Firstly, there is great capacity to cope with frustrations and contradictions. 
Apparently, for instance, there is no way to reconcile the use of placebos in clinical 
trials with the health needs of research subjects. However, these two terms (“Placebo 
and Need”) can be replaced with new terms, like “Risks and Benefits.” Thus, we would 
be right in the third operation of the previous table, ready to introduce a new term: 
“Consent process.” The resulting discourse would be something like: “In spite of 
placebos’ being at odds with the research subjects’ health needs, such risks must be 
incurred in order to glean benefits, in a procedure that is acceptable as soon as people 
are informed about what is going on.” Even though such operations and discourses 
may sound weak or even cynical, their widespread use testifies to their philosophical 
and political efficacy. Eventually, there is no ethical matter or scientific antinomy that 
cannot be tamed by means of bioethical symbolic operations. This is why it can be said 
that “[...] the myth is simultaneously in language and beyond it” (Lévi-Strauss, 
1958/1974, p. 230). This is also why the bioethical mentality has been proving useful 
not only for committee members (who assess the worth of research proposals) but 
also for clinical researchers and the trials industry itself (that can justify even their 
most heterodox research methodologies). This cultural capacity to accommodate 
almost every controversy is the very source of what Guillemin (1998, p. 60) called the 
“inherent conservatism” of bioethics. 
 Secondly, the bioethical approach tends to be globalized quite swiftly. Mythical 
thoughts depend on a particular structure (such as the one which was presented in the 
previous table), and not so much on particular contents. Thus mythical stories can be 
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efficaciously repeated no matter what the language is. As Lévi-Strauss (1958/1974, p. 
232) explains: 
 
“[...] the worth of the myth as myth is preserved in spite of translations. 
However big our ignorance about the language and the people’s culture from 
where it is collected, a myth is perceived as myth by every reader, all over the 
world. The substance of the myth lies neither in style nor in the mode of 
narration nor in syntaxes, but in the story that is told.” 
 
This is why I could come across the same stories in interviews conducted in 
cities as different as São Paulo, Brasília, Pretoria or Cape Town. 
 The communitarian mentality has different sources. Although indirectly, the 
classic study conducted by Renée Fox (1959/1998) helps us understand its basic 
features. Focusing on a research ward located in a teaching hospital, Fox explored the 
uncertainties faced by some physicians who had to provide health care to, and conduct 
research on, terminally ill patients. That group of physicians/researchers had to deal 
with diseases whose causes and features were barely understood at that time. “Partly 
as consequence, many of the experiments conceived by the Group were highly 
empirical in nature: ‘trial and error shots in the dark’ of which the outcome was very 
uncertain and unpredictable […]” (Fox, 1959/1998, p. 31). 
 Even though medical knowledge is currently more sophisticated, as opposed to 
the situation of the 1950s, uncertainty could not be rubbed out from clinical 
experiments. To a good extent, James Conant’s words, quoted by Fox (1959/1998, p. 
31), continue to be valid: “In spite of an enormous amount of experimentation by 
chemists in making new substances and pharmacologists in testing then on animals 
and on men, one can say that it is almost impossible to predict the action of a chemical 
substance of a given structure on a human being […].” 
 Such uncertainties exist not only at the stage in which drugs are prospected 
and assessed but also at latter moments, when final medicines are already on the 
market. On the one hand, there are many examples of drugs being commercialized for 
many years and being subsequently withdrawn from the market because of harms and 
deaths they had provoked (Busfield, 2006, Fisher, 2009, Petryna, 2009). On the other 
hand, clinical response to drugs depends on individual biological characteristics, which 
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prevent us to be sure that a certain medicine will have the same beneficial effect for 
every person. It is known that approved medicines frequently provoke adverse 
reactions and hospitalizations. Thus uncertainty is not only typical to clinical research 
but can also be found in health care at large, even though it reaches higher degrees in 
that first phase in which new therapies have not been established yet. 
 What is more, every clinical study combines traits of experimentation with 
traits of care. Such circumstance was grasped by Fox (1959/1998, p. 53), who said that 
in the ward she studied, physicians had to solve a “[...] conflict between their 
obligations to advance knowledge and their responsibility to promote the welfare of 
their patient-subjects.” In a clinical study, personal relations and human idiosyncrasies 
may, as it were, compromise the accuracy of medical and statistical tools. Mueller 
(1997, p. 68), for instance, talks about “close relations between nurses and patients” in 
clinical studies. In this way, clinical trials combine not only the advantages of 
experimentation and care (whatever they might be) but also their uncertainties. 
 In the bioethical mentality, research and care are clearly separated. By the way, 
the idea of therapeutic misconception relies precisely on this separation. One research 
subject will be said to hold misconception whenever he or she is not able to clearly 
understand that a clinical study is being undertaken, excluding logics and relations 
typical to health care. In the communitarian mentality, however, research and care can 
never be disentangled. In addition, the communitarian approach does not operate 
with mediating, alleviating terms such as the principle of informed consent. Here, 
uncertainties and paradoxes cannot be circumvented. There is no way to deprive trials 
of their problematic, uncertain features. Recognizing the insurmountable gray areas 
defined by trials is indeed a basic feature of the communitarian mentality. 
 
“And do you think that committees, nowadays, are well-equipped to prevent harm in 
clinical research, in the way they are organized today? 
[...] I think they do their best. Some harm is bound to happen. You know, it is not 
bound, but harm does happen [...] ’Cause research... A lot of research that is not in a 
laboratory and it is with people often leads to messy things. It is not... You know, it is 
not neat. It is ups and downs [...].” 




“[...] What was the question again? 
What is the main goal of clinical research. The main target. 
[...] As I said, trials should be done in a safe way. I know that it is unpredictable how 
drugs would... their effect on the body if they’ve been studied for the first time, but, 
still, the people doing the trial should try and limit the effects or side effects (as much 
as they can) of the drugs that they’re testing [...].” 
(Cape Town/C6/Community/08-11) 
 
 Thus even though people expect that risks can be minimized, they acknowledge 
that there will always be uncertainties in experimentation. From this point of view, the 
passage from health care to clinical research is always deemed a problematic event, 
for experiments are thought of as holding more uncertainties. 
 
“Does it take time to review a protocol? 
[...] Obviously, when patients are involved, one has to be extra-careful that one isn’t 
withdrawing treatment. In fact, one of the trials we’re looking at today41 is... someone 
wants to withdraw recognized treatment and replace with placebo, which I think that 
has got very major ethical consequences [...].” 
(Cape Town/C6/Physician/08-11) 
 
 Withdrawing treatment, and going from health care to research, will always be 
seen as problematic in the communitarian mentality. This mentality has emerged not 
because of examples of researchers acting unwisely, as was the case for the bioethical 
mentality. In the communitarian approach, one can never be certain to act wisely 
enough. Such dilemmas can only be intensified by the evidence that many studies are 
conducted with people generally considered as socially and economically vulnerable.  
Hence, some claims like the one advanced by Fisher (2009, p. 32): “The poor and 
uninsured have become the groups whose disenfranchised bodies are used in the 
name of medical progress and pharmaceutical profit.” 
 Here we get to the core of the communitarian philosophical underpinnings: the 
element of compassion. As Hannah Arendt explains, compassion, as a social moving 
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force, was discovered during the French Revolution. At that time, but also today, its 
main expression assumes the form of feelings flowing from advantaged people 
towards disadvantaged people. 
 
“What counted here, in this great effort of a general human solidarization, was 
selflessness, the capacity to lose oneself in the sufferings of others, rather than 
active goodness, and what appeared most odious and even most dangerous 
was selfishness rather than wickedness [...]” (Arendt, 1963, p. 76). 
 
 On this point, the choice of South Africa and Brazil proved particularly 
interesting for my study. Due to their vast populations of poor people, these are 
countries where the communitarian approach is most likely to emerge and become 
strong.42 Obviously, compassion was not a motive of which my interviewees spoke 
openly. However, the analysis I am proposing, as well as many other types of analyses, 
would be impossible without going beyond what is explicitly said. Moreover, it is 
important to consider that in the communitarian mentality, feelings play a major role. 
As we shall see,43 people holding this approach are willing to imagine themselves in 
the research subjects’ place. Compassion is certainly a driving force that allows 
realizing this intention, weakening barriers and mediations between men.44 
Thus there is much leeway for passion and compassion, in a sort of emotional 
stance that people can barely translate with words. “Passion and compassion are not 
speechless, but their language consists in gestures and expressions of countenance 
rather than in words” (Arendt, 1963, p. 81). Indeed, people who tend to embrace the 
communitarian mentality are the ones which frequently struggle to convey their 
thoughts in a precise way. Such difficulties became clear to me in the course of some 
interviews, like in the following example. 
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 Both the English and Portuguese languages share a characteristic that occurs in some other languages: 
“poor” (or “pobre”) can be either a noun (meaning someone having few economic resources) or an 
adjective used to describe people (meaning someone who inspires compassion). 
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 Section 4.2.7. 
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 When a drug proves to be beneficial for research subjects in a phase 3 trial, the study’s sponsor can 
organize a new trial, with the same study population, so that people continue to access the drug until 
regulatory approval is eventually issued. Such type of pre-approval study is often referred to as 
“compassionate use.”  
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“In my observations of the meetings, I had the impression that you’re concerned about 
samples being sent abroad. 
Yes. 
And why? 
Ah, again, I think the objective of the scientific enterprise is to do good science. So it 
shouldn’t matter where that science takes place, and it is equally unethical to argue 
that you cannot send any samples abroad for scientific investigation if South Africans 
themselves do not do the research, right? Doing research is not just a right, I think it is 
also a duty. So just as scientific researchers in South Africa can’t claim to... to have a... 
Okay, let me just stay there. So doing scientific research is not just a right, it is also a 
duty, right? That point is quite important for me [...].” 
(Cape Town/C7/Bioethicist/08-11) 
 
 While this interviewee was trying to formulate the answer cited above, I had 
the impression that she presumed that her explanation would be much more 
straightforward than it really was. Indeed, holders of the communitarian approach feel 
the emotional force of their stance but face difficulties to express it systematically. 
Some approaches (especially the technical and bioethical) are driven by almost 
ready-made concepts and tend to be more “talkative.” They are marked by this “cold-
blooded” attitude that according to Mauss (1936, p. 22), can be described as a “[...] 
mechanism that slow things down and inhibits uncoordinated movements; by slowing 
things down, this mechanism enables a coordinated response composed by 
coordinated movements going towards the chosen goal.” In its turn, the 
communitarian discourse depends on personal and sometimes emotive choices to be 
conveyed. It is the approach of cut sentences, oral attempts and pauses. It could be 
said that, in their task to transform background knowledge into foreground knowledge, 
the bioethical mentality is faster and more efficient than its communitarian 
counterpart. 
In order to further explore the features of these approaches, we move on to 





4.2.3 The issue of risks 
 
The previous considerations are important to understand how the bioethical 
and communitarian approaches frame the issue of risks in clinical research. In the 
bioethical mentality, one never speaks simply about risk. According to the binary 
bioethical logic, there must be an opposing element, which comes to be the idea of 
benefit. Hence, the famous idea of a risk-benefit ratio in clinical research. 
 
“Among the several projects that get to the committee, do you think there is any type 
of project that deserves special attention from reviewers? 
[...] We’re always more careful with sponsored [by companies] studies [...] But [...] 
everything we do with patients in medicine involves risks and benefits. Risks should 
never outpace benefits. Benefits should always win. So you always have to assess that. 
The benefits of the study will be good, but are risks bigger than benefits? [...]” 
(São Paulo/C1/Physician/04-11) 
 
“But do you think that when you’re reviewing an industrial protocol, you have a 
different stance toward the protocol? 
No [...] I’ll be very careful, especially if the medicine has not been approved in the 
country, you know... Because I’m concerned about the risks that the procedures 
(which include medicines in the case of clinical trials) will offer to research subjects, 
you know, and about doing the right balance between risks and benefits [...].” 
(São Paulo/C3/Social scientist/05-11) 
 
 One of the bioethical mentality’s biggest deeds was the introduction of 
calculation into the realm of ethical committees. Actually, efforts to apply objective 
calculations in subjective and moral questions have been present for a long time. 
According to Arendt, Bentham provided a decisive contribution for this project by 
proposing his “pain and pleasure calculus,” “introducing the mathematical method 
into the moral sciences [...]” (Arendt, 1963, p. 309). When it comes to clinical research, 
moral calculations are always referred to the individual life, which as Arendt (1963, p. 
311-312) explains, has become the “supreme standard” in modern society. 
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 In the bioethical approach, research has good dimensions, for it enhances the 
human existence, but also many sorts of drawbacks, for individuals may be harmed in 
the course of studies. At the very core of the bioethical mentality, we find this endless 
search for the good, which is typical to the sphere of ethics (Habermas, 1993). In 
addition, goods and bads are thought of as elements of a calculation. As Mazur (1985, 
p. 26) explains, the risk-benefit perspective assumes: 
 
“[...] (a) that goods and bads are commensurable in the sense that they can be 
measured by some common metric so that one can be compared against 
another; (b) that goods and bads should be traded off against one another; and 
(c) that the person or group can maximize its utility by maximizing the net 
profit of goods-minus-bads.” 
 
 Of course, the idea of a risk-benefit ratio, or a balance between risks and 
benefits, expresses an important amount of linguistic freedom: it suggests an 
objectivity that cannot really be realized in the assessment of clinical protocols, 
because different committee members can obviously get to different ratios. However, 
the philosophical target here is not the introduction of numerical calculations but the 
conduct of moral ethical calculations whereby an initial element (risk) can be 
complemented by another element (benefit), thereby underpinning the bioethical 
symbolic operations.45 
Once again, we are in front of a successful and widespread idea. Out of 42 
people interviewed in my fieldwork, 16 referred to the risk-benefit balance, be it in a 
direct, indirect or ancillary way. As Hacking (1990, p 4) points out, the idea has become 
a sort of official rationale for many types of decision makers, who therefore tend to 
“replace judgement by computation.” 
 With this rationale, people can assess not only particular research projects but 
also broader phenomena taking place in society. Hence the occurrence of claims such 
as the one voiced by Shah (2006, p. 164): “[...] just as ethics committees evaluate the 
risks and benefits of individual trials, society must evaluate the risks and benefits of 
the entire business of human experimentation.” In this way, by enabling the conduct 
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of moral calculations, the bioethical mentality brings about a “proto-objective” logic 
that will be further developed by the technical mentality. 
 This is another source of this approach’s force.  The bioethical mentality, by 
making it possible to “quantify” and “objectify” moral reflections, has filled a pivotal 
gap within the universe of instrumental rationality. Thanks to it, one can tame the 
uncertainties and threats presented by the pragmatic approach, moving towards the 
technical approach rather smoothly. In the previous section, I claimed that the 
bioethical approach operates by mediations. Now we see that it is itself a mediator 
(assuming an ideological position between the pragmatic and technical mentalities), 
and this is also why symbolic, mediating operations are so crucial to it. 
 The communitarian approach deals with the issue of risks in a more direct way. 
As explained before, committee members holding this approach argue that 
uncertainty can never be circumvented or tamed in clinical research. Therefore, the 
idea of calculation cannot be invoked. Deeply concerned with local and concrete 
factors, the communitarian approach rejects the abstract stance proposed by the risk-
benefit perspective. 
 One of my interviewees voiced a vast range of communitarian concerns, as the 
following discourse graphic46 shows: 
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Figure 4.3 – Discourse graphic n. 5 




Here, as is normal in the communitarian mentality, pragmatic claims have an 
important weight. This interviewee’s discourse is deeply marked by a communitarian 
view of ethics committees (claim COMM7). At a certain point of this interview, having 
felt the presence of strong communitarian concerns, I asked him a question aimed to 
“test” his communitarian stance, and this is the answer I was given: 
 
“Do you agree that any type of research involves a certain amount of harm? 
I think any type of research involves the risk of harm. I also find that risk and harm get 
confused all the time. You know, people say: ‘Are there risks in the research?’ You 
know, risk is just a chance [...] Other thing is saying: ‘Are there harms in this research?’ 
A harm is an event. I can’t tell you if the research was harmful until the research is 
finished and you can see if you’ve had the event. So the risk is the probability and the 
harm is the event. So I think that any research process, because it involves people 
doing that, interacting, being out in the world, you know, somehow engaging, then 
there is always some kind of (even if it is unattended), you know, some kind of harm 




 This distinction could not be more instructive for our purposes here. Risks 
would be the predictable, manageable, calculable terms (or “probabilities”) assumed 
by the bioethical mentality whereas harms would be the uncertain phenomena (or 
“events”) that haunt the communitarian mentality. According to Hacking (1990, p. 96), 
French mathematician and physicist Poisson made a distinction that has some 
similarities to the one advanced in the previous quote: “probability” is the force of the 
evidence we have to affirm that a certain event will take place, while “chance” is  a 
concrete feature of the event, its tendency to occur. 
 Mazur (1985) also talked about two different mindsets. On the one hand, there 
is the risk-benefit perspective, as explained before. On the other, there is an attitude 
that refuses these trade-offs by claiming that some goods are so precious that they 
cannot be balanced against bads. Driven to its highest levels, this second mindset can 
turn into a “humanist perspective.” “In essence, it says that one cannot appraise 
qualities as diverse as beauty, human life, and industrial profit in any common 
currency, and to even attempt such comparisons degrades the human condition” 
(Mazur, 1985, p. 27). The communitarian mentality certainly frames qualities such as 
human life, particularity and originality as fragile resources that need to be protected 
from commensurations. Here, affects come to play, being particularly effective 
because they make calculations of pros and cons become redundant (Finucane et al., 
2000). 
As a consequence of these ideological differences, there is disagreement in the 
ways in which our two mentalities frame the globalization of trials, an issue that is 
explored in the following section. 
 
4.2.4 Global trials from a bioethical and communitarian viewpoint 
 
The following discourse graphic, depicting a bioethical discourse, derives from 





This committee member has a 
background in social sciences and became 
gradually interested in bioethics, on which 
she did her postgraduate studies. Generally, 
bioethical discourses do not display such 
high scores in terms of pragmatic claims. 
Another exceptional feature, here, is the 
presence of a relatively important score in a 
critical claim (CRIT17). In spite of these 
characteristics, this discourse can certainly 
be seen as expressing the bioethical 
mentality. As the graphic shows, the main claim is BIO4, which stresses precisely the 
risk-benefit ratio in clinical research. 
Calculations pertaining to risks and benefits are also the main ideological tool 
with which the bioethical mentality frames the globalization of clinical trials and the 
operations of multinational companies. Therefore, every country should balance the 
goods and bads implied by clinical studies. The same interviewee gave me the 
following explanation. 
 
“So maybe this balance between benefits and risks is more complicated in clinical trials 
[than in academic studies] and especially international trials. 
Yeah. Yeah. Inevitably (I think the same with Brazil), the benefit is going to the 
developed world, without a doubt, and particularly to the US. Often, they’re doing the 
trial purely so that they can be registered with the FDA; they’re needing the numbers. 
But, equally, your researchers argue that it does expose them to international 
research. They do use some of the money that they are given from the trials to 
improve the services that they are offering [...] It is an indirect benefit, again, but it 
does keep the researchers... It teaches good research methods, usually, although they 
haven’t been involved in the design of the protocol [...] You know, they do learn to 
conduct research fairly thoroughly. So there is that side of the benefit equation [...].” 
(Cape Town/C7/Bioethicist/07-11) 
 




 The success of each mentality depends also on the possibility of applying their 
claims to global issues. In the previous quote, the interviewee used the idea of risks 
and benefits to frame global research. According to her, even though actors who are 
based in developed countries are more likely to reach their goals with global trials 
(risk), local researchers are “exposed to international research” and can therefore 
learn “good research methods” (benefit). From a bioethical point of view, the 
globalization of trials is seen as a moral equation asking for solution. Countries should 
only accept to take part in global studies if more benefits than risks can be gleaned. 
Eventually, every research protocol must be assessed individually so that committees 
verify where benefits and risks go to. 
 
“Are you somehow concerned with the fact that today there are many protocols being 
conducted in several countries at the same time? 
[...] I’m not concerned with the fact that there are different countries, as long as the 
populations... For instance, it is done in Germany, France, Brazil, United States... I’m 
not concerned about that. What does concern me is when they do it only in Brazil, 
when a new medicine, whose effects to research participants are unknown, is tested 
only in Brazil and not in Germany where the medicine comes from [...] Or when it is 
tested in India, Brazil and Peru. Why don’t they test it in Switzerland, Germany, in the 
First World? Are we guinea pigs? [...] But when the study is multicentre and 
international, with all the countries facing the same risks and gleaning the same 
benefits, in order to know how the medicine works in different populations, that 
doesn’t concern me so much [...].” 
(São Paulo/C1/Physician/04-11) 
 
 When focusing on these issues, the communitarian mentality tends to lead 
people to take very suspicious positions. Here, this mentality is decisively shaped by 
the remembrance of international relations considered as exploitative. Eventually, 
countries and regions are almost thought of as individuals. The strongest countries 
would be prone to inflict several types of sufferings on the weakest ones. The basic 
example is colonization, whose remembrance haunts the communitarian mentality, 
always renewing the image of colonies exploited and impoverished by colonizers. The 
field of medical care and research also belongs to this history. As Comaroff and 
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Commaroff (1992) showed, medical practices were used to discipline colonized groups, 
and African colonies were turned into huge medical laboratories. 
 The communitarian mentality also draws on recent, contemporary inequalities. 
For instance, the uneven global distribution of research activities and infrastructures 
can be emphasised (Busfield, 2003, Busfield, 2006). On this point, pragmatic concerns 
manage to permeate the communitarian approach quite efficiently. What could be 
viewed as opportunities for international partnerships (in a technical approach) ends 
up being the source of dire concerns. 
 
“Do you think there is any type of protocol that deserves more attention from an ethics 
committee? 
[...] I think things like, you know, how much you’re going to... taking blood. I think 
those issues. I would be concerned about making available... I have concerns about, 
you know... I know open access is a good thing but making available, you know, all the 
biological material from South Africa into, you know, the hands of the first world... You 
know, we just don’t have the same access and skills [...].” 
(Cape Town/C7/Anthropologist/07-11) 
 
“Are you somehow concerned about the fact that today there are many foreign 
companies conducting clinical trials in South Africa? 
Yes, I do... because I just have the idea that they think this is a population, in Africa 
(I’m not only talking about South Africa but in Africa) it is a population that they can 
come in, do a trial and go out. Sometimes I’m worried about: what about afterwards? 
Don’t they make that drug available to that... to the participants in the trial that they 
have done in a particular country? [...] those are the things I’m concerned about, that 
they are multinational companies, they perhaps don’t think of the people they leave 
behind when they’ve done their trials.” 
(Cape Town/C6/Nurse/08-11) 
 
 Therefore, global clinical research, and especially protocols sponsored by the 
pharmaceutical industry, is seen as one of the causes and consequences of global 
inequalities. In the communitarian mentality, globalization is framed as an endless 
source of inequalities and exploitation. Hence, the need for voicing claims such as the 
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one made by Epstein (2007, p. 199): “For the most part [...], rich Western countries will 
be reaping the benefits of the substantial and growing corpus of research now being 
conducted on the bodies of the global poor.” 
 For those who firmly subscribe to communitarian views, international research 
efforts can eventually be seen as sources of several imbalances. In a sense, global 
inequalities would impair the application of concepts and procedures formulated in 
rich countries to the reality of poor countries. As Hauser and Johnston (2011, p. A8) 
claim: “Another issue relates to uncertain generalizability of findings from global trials, 
due to differences between the population studied in the developing world and the 
target population, usually in the developed world.” 
 
“[...] we have had clinical trials, particularly (it must be similar for Brazil) where clinical 
trials are structured for the developed world to be rolled out in the developing world 
and the criteria that they’re using for admission to the trial are maybe criteria that are 
relevant in the developed world but it is prejudicial or racialist or discriminatory in the 
developing world [...].” 
(Cape Town/C7/Social scientist/07-11) 
 
 International differences are stressed in this way because, as we have seen, the 
communitarian approach focuses on concrete factors, whether they are personal or 
national. 
Once again, it is important to take into account the conversations between the 
communitarian and bioethical mentalities, which can be combined almost freely. In 






“Do you think there is some kind of protocol that deserves more 
attention from an ethics committee? 
Bioethical/Communitarian 
Hmmm... [Pause.] You know, we imagine diseases... For instance, like 
HIV-Aids [...] I think we need to pay attention to vulnerable 
populations. If someone would like to do a trial in prisoners, we say: 
‘Why prisoners? And why prisoners only?’ So you have to look 
whether there is small coercion. 
Communitarian 
                                                                 Remember, South Africa, most of 
the participants are... in our experience, they are black people. Most 
of the researchers are white people. 
Bioethical 
                                                                         How do they obtain consent? 
Do they use interpreters? Do these people understand? I mean, 
medical students don’t understand some of the informed consents 




 Therefore, the more advanced the globalization of clinical trials, the bigger the 
number of issues to be coped with by these two mentalities. One might suppose that 
the global diffusion of codes and guidelines pertaining to clinical research could 
appease the situation. However, as claimed subsequently, regulations themselves are 
the basis for new agreements and disagreements between mentalities. 
 
4.2.5 Views about regulations 
 
Committee members holding the bioethical approach hasten to talk about 
regulations, guidelines and codes as fundamental tools, which render clinical trials safe 
and sound. For some interviewees, references to national and international regulations 
punctuated the whole discourse, as in the following examples. 
 
“In your opinion, what is the main goal of an ethics committee? 
One main goal, protect the integrity of the patients. And everything else around it... 
And it is in principle linked to these guidelines which are called Good Clinical Practices 
(GCP). And GCP guidelines have two objectives and that is... You know about GCP? [...] 
the ethics committees base their opinions, actually, on GCP, on Declaration of Helsinki 





When you first came to the committee, did you know the work of the committee, did 
you... 
No, I hadn’t seen a protocol in my life before. And in those days, the application forms 
were so detailed and I used to look out for things such as [the Declaration of] Helsinki, 
IBPI,47 insurance, payouts and that sort of thing. Today most of that is taken care in the 
application form. So I used to sort of... I was a Helsinki specialist. Every time a protocol 
came up and the Helsinki wasn’t mentioned, I put my hand up [in the committee 
meeting] and said: ‘Helsinki!’ And the [committee] chair then knew exactly that it 
wasn’t [...] Do you know what Helsinki is?” 
(Cape Town/C7/Lay member/05-11) 
 
 On this point, the Brazilian situation is particularly interesting. In 1996 the 
country published its first guidelines on clinical research with human beings, the so-
called Resolution 196, which also created the National Commission for Research Ethics 
(Conep). Therefore, the Brazilian system review became organized around two main 
bodies: ethics committees, responsible for the local review of projects, and Conep, 
which oversees the national system and reviews some protocols. At that time, the 
Brazilian Society of Bioethics managed to have a strong influence upon the process, 
making the Resolution be decisively shaped by bioethical principles. In my interviews in 
Brazil, people holding a bioethical approach mentioned, almost proudly, the 
importance and the binding presence of the Resolution. 
 
“One last comment! We talk a lot about difficulties, don’t we? But we have to 
recognize the big advancements that it was possible to make. We’ve advanced in the 
research quality. That is evident to me. The research that was done in the 1990s, at 
the beginning of the 1990s [...] is not comparable to the research that is done in 2011, 
in terms of quality, and much is due to the system [...] the CEP-Conep system helped 
us very much. A big contribution, among others, is that nowadays people talk about 
research ethics [...].” 
(São Paulo/C4/Bioethicist/05-11) 
 
                                                     
47
 Intrabiotics Pharmaceuticals (IBPI) is a private company that runs some clinical trials. The interviewee 
has probably read an ethical manual prepared by the company. 
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“I have always thought: Oh, there must be a moment in the review that the reviewer 
may get stuck due to a lack of scientific, technical or juridical knowledge. 
[Pause.] In the Resolution 196 (which is very clear), protocols must be assessed from 
an ethical or bioethical point of view by any person, including those from the 
community. So the protocol’s structure must be clear, so that the person is able to 
read it [...] The person who assesses the project must know and understand what is 
being proposed by the project, and whether the project benefits the patient or not. 




 Thus, the CEP-Conep system, and especially the Resolution 196, has become 
fundamental principles for committee members holding the bioethical mentality. 
Particularly telling is the history of a Brazilian person who spontaneously joined her 
committee. In her first visit to the committee, she was given the Resolution 196 to 
read and become familiar with the bioethical universe.  
 In some of its aspects, the bioethical mentality share similarities with juridical 
thought. In the next section, it is shown that general principles are decisive for this 
mentality. In this way, there tends to emerge a sort of juridical logic, based on general 
rules. As Bosk and Frader (1998, p. 114) explain: 
 
“[…] once structural problems have been turned into ethical problems, there is 
a social tendency to turn them into legal ones. This move places an emphasis 
on contending parties, formal rules of procedure [...], and then justifications for 
action in terms of principles. The emphasis here becomes not just this case but 
all cases that could arise in the future and would be like this case.” 
 
Not surprisingly, then, the bioethical approach can emerge, and assume 
practically the same features, in different cities. By the same token, it is not surprising 
that the globalization of guidelines on clinical research is warmly welcomed by the 
holders of this mentality. 
 Actually, an ethics committee could also be framed as a sort of jury, which 
would be responsible for applying “bioethical laws,” arranging preventions and 
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reparations. As showed by some authors, committees have been considered as bodies 
having the ability to prevent disputes from going to courts (Rothman, 1991, Bosk and 
Frader, 1998, p. 97). Thus, some people seem to assume that committees are 
supposed to make a sort of early justice, hampering legal troubles before they take 
place. If there is a symbolic role played by committees, this is represented by the idea 
of justice being made through the review and conduct of clinical trials.48 
 Committee members embracing the communitarian mentality tend to mention 
regulations and standards much less frequently. Of course, such references can also 
happen, for as claimed before, moments in which the communitarian and bioethical 
approaches converse are not rare. However, those people seem to presuppose “[...] 
the unpredictability inherent in experimental work even in the relatively regulated and 
standardised form of the randomised controlled clinical trial” (Will and Moreira, 2010, 
p. 8). 
 This does not mean that the communitarian mentality lacks any kind of juridical 
sense. However, the inspiring idea, here, would be that of natural rights of men. The 
French revolution, which discovered compassion as a social force, was also responsible 
for stating, in the Declaration of the Rights of Man, the binding presence of natural 
rights common to all human beings. Based on this idea, the society that emerged from 
revolution “[...] was supposed to rest upon man’s natural rights, upon his rights insofar 
as he is nothing but a natural being, upon his right to ‘food, dress, and the 
reproduction of the species,’ that is, upon his right to the necessities of life” (Arendt, 
1963, p. 63). In clinical research, these types of rights can be quickly identified, 
especially by committee members who are concerned with health care and the 
research subjects’ physical integrity. 
 Differently from the bioethical mentality, the communitarian mentality does 
not consider international regulations as satisfactory safeguards for the so-called 
vulnerable populations and countries. On the contrary, regulatory frameworks are said 
to reflect international inequalities. In this way, poor countries would hold fragile 
regulations that cannot hamper abuses in clinical research. For example, Angell, whose 
studies on pharma companies and clinical trials is strongly marked by communitarian 
                                                     
48
 In my statistical analyses, bioethicists and layers were grouped together because of two reasons: the 
ideological similarities between bioethics and the juridical thought, as explained here; and the fact that, in 
my fieldwork, bioethicists and layers tended to express similar views. 
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concerns, compared the United States regulations with those of poor countries, 
reaching the following conclusion: 
 
“Research in the Third World looks relatively attractive as it becomes better 
funded and regulations at home become more restrictive. Despite the existence 
of codes requiring that human subjects receive at least the same protection 
abroad as at home [United States], they are still honored partly in the breach. 
The fact remains that many studies are done in the Third World that simply 
could not be done in the countries sponsoring the work” (Angell, 1997, p. 848). 
 
Four of my interviewees echoed this concern. 
 
“[...] Over the last years, there has been a big expansion of clinical trials in countries 
like South Africa and Brazil. Do you think that this growing number of protocols is really 
important and necessary? 
[...] I think some of the growth in places like South Africa, Brazil or other places is that 
drug companies are finding it harder to do work in Europe and the US, because of the 
regulatory systems there, and it is easier to get it done here. This is also not a good 
reason, you know, to be doing it here, but that is part of it [...].” 
(Cape Town/C7/Anthropologist/08-11) 
 
 This concern with international inequalities is decisively informed by another 
basic feature of the communitarian approach: its attempt to identify and protect 
particularities. 
 
4.2.6 Between principles and particularities 
 
As claimed before, the instrumental rationality (to which the bioethical 
approach belongs) helps to realize the ideal of commensurability, according to which 
different qualities are reduced to comparable aspects. On the other hand, the 
communicational rationality (to which the communitarian approach belongs) 
foregrounds particularities. This division cannot be manifested in the pragmatic 
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mentality, which is composed by very basic claims and concerns. Nevertheless, as soon 
as one tries to voice controversial, debatable claims, and therefore bring the discourse 
to the level of foreground knowledge, the distinction between commensuration and 
particularity begins to become clear. 
On this point, the communitarian mentality shows its emphatic dimension. 
Indeed, people holding the communitarian approach seem to be strongly distressed by 
any kind of enterprise through which local, national, personal or social specificities are 
despised. The frequent use of principles by the bioethical approach sounds particularly 
annoying. Hence, some claims such as: “Impartial moral reasoning [...] appears unable 
to uphold ideals of respect for persons, and at times their communities, and social 
equality for potential participants of research and intended beneficiaries” (Eckenwiler, 
2001, p. 49). 
For committee members, such concerns emerge in the form of claims stressing 
particular national problems. In South Africa, for instance, the huge population of 
people infected with HIV, as well as racial differences, are issues generally commented 
with a communitarian vein. 
 
“Over the last years, there has been a big expansion of international clinical trials in 
countries like South Africa. 
Hm hm. 
Do you think that this growing number of protocols is really important and necessary? 
For South Africa? Yes. Because we have a big problem. If you think about HIV alone, 
the companies put a lot in HIV research coming out of this country [...] But this is the 
problem... Going back to vulnerable groups, you get over-researched. A lot of our 
groups are over-researched, because they set in there, they’ve got this disease and 
people say: ‘Well! We can use them! We can use them!’ [laughter] You know, when 
you take the number of participants in each trial and then you add... Add up all the 
participants in only HIV trials, you probably get half of the population! They’ve got to 
make sure that you don’t get the same person doing three, four trials. 
Yeah, ’cause HIV trials are huge! 
Usually, they take thousands of people and every time they go, it is 150 Rand or 
whatever it is. You can make a living out of it, but you have to take all those different 
drugs, which is not so good [laughter]. That is why they’re vulnerable.” 




“Over the last years, there has been a big expansion in clinical protocols in countries 
like Brazil and South Africa. Do you think this big number of protocols is really 
necessary and important? 
[...] It is... As long as people are skilled in carrying out clinical trials... The only problem 
in South Africa, 90% of participants are black but 90% of researchers are white, and I 
don’t understand why more and more black people are not being recruited to 
participate in clinical research. I don’t... 
Black doctors. 
Yes, black doctors.” 
(Pretoria/C8/Pharmacist/07-11) 
 
 In the three South-African committees I studied, the vast majority of members 
could be considered as white people.49 Of my 17 South African interviewees, only 
three members could be visually considered as black. All these three interviewees 
spontaneously declared themselves as black and trumpeted complaints about racial 
differences in clinical trials in the country. 
 On this point, the content of compassion that fills the communitarian mentality 
reappears, leading people to voice concerns with socially disadvantaged groups. Thus, 
clinical trials would be further institutionalizing social problems. This is the stance 
informing, for instance, the claim made by Lakoff (2005, p. 32-33), according to which 
the medicalized and institutionalized approach to psychiatric patients transforms “an 
individual experience of suffering” into a general, impersonal case. We are once again 
dealing with an emotive content that since the times of the French Revolution, have 
subjected people to “the boundlessness of their sentiments” (Arendt, 1963, p. 84-85). 
 Therefore, the communitarian approach is constantly disrupted by medical and 
statistical enterprises, which gathered their forces in order to build up an abstract and 
impersonal view of the human body. Epstein described this view, claiming that it has 
disregarded specificities for the sake of a general explanation in which the white male 
individual has often been taken as the model of human being. 
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 I attended meetings in all these committees. 
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“A crucial stage in the standardization of the patient, the quantification of 
medical research, and the increased reliance on the human subject as an 
experimental object was the emergence of the randomized, controlled clinical 
trial as a distinctive kind of medical experiment” (Epstein, 2007, p. 48). 
 
Still according to Epstein, randomization abolishes particularities by turning 
subjects into hollow clinical cases, while turning researchers into “blind” followers of a 
protocol. 
 In the bioethical mentality, however, the existence of general concepts does 
not seem to cause major ideological disturbances.  On the contrary, it is frequently in 
tune with the use of principles that is typical to this approach. Here, committee 
members tend to be seen as representatives of professional groups. In this way, an 
ethics committee would be what results from the combination of different expertises. 
 
“And do you think that nowadays ethics committees are well-equipped to protect 
people? 
Well... I mean, if you look at the way that this ethics committee has been composed... 
Our chairperson is a medical doctor [...] And also the lady who presented the 
protocols. There are two medical doctors. The guy that sat on your right [during the 
meeting50] is a pharmacist [...] So there is enough medical knowledge. This girl who 
were sitting here, she looks at protocols from a psychology point. This lady that was 
sitting here, she is a legal person, and so is other person. Two legal people. This guy is 
a layperson and the lady here is a layperson [...] So we are able to look for the 
problems that might pop up. I mean, where there can be transgressions? There can be 
transgressions in medicine, in the study design, in the legal rights of your patients... So 
we, hopefully, intercept with all of that [...].” 
(Pretoria/C8/Bioscientist/07-11) 
 
 Hence, some people consider that “[...] in order to effectively review protocols, 
ERCs  [ethics research committees] should be composed of members of diverse 
backgrounds [...]” (Nyika et al., 2009, p. 192). From this viewpoint, members are 
representing their expertise area, as well as representing themselves as rational 
                                                     
50
 This interview happened right after the committee meeting. 
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thinkers in the Kantian sense of the word. According to Rothman (1991), the bioethical 
model avoids individual deliberations and takes collective decisions as a moral 
template. Consequently, the bioethical mentality appreciates the idea of consensus, 
which is precisely the situation in which different autonomous individuals come to 
make their judgements coincide. When this coincidence comes to play, a sort of 
mighty and impersonal will emerges, imposing itself over the individual wills. 
 
“So the main idea [in a meeting] is to reach consensus. The review is subjective, but 
the committee’s decisions are taken by several people, so this subjectivity should be 




 As Arendt explains, a distinction was drawn in the seventeenth century 
between two models of social contract. “One was concluded between individual 
persons and supposedly gave birth to society; the other was concluded between a 
people and its ruler and supposedly resulted in legitimate government” (Arendt, 1963, 
p. 169). The bioethical mentality is inspired by the second type of contract. The 
“governor,” to which members have to transfer their “power,” is the committee’s will. 
Thus, even though everybody is free to voice views and opinions, everybody has also 
to comply with the decisions taken by the group. Hence, some (apparently) paradoxical 
statements such as the one voiced by one interviewee: 
 
“Sometimes there are people who agree or disagree, there is debate and there is 
consensus. And when there is consensus, this consensus is followed even though some 
people still disagree [...].” 
(São Paulo/C1/Physician/04-11) 
 
Eventually, the obstinate search for consensus can create a false sense of 
democracy and legitimize a model that can systematically ignore divergent views. It is 
possible to argue that in ethics committees, the bioethical and technical mentalities 
always tend to prevail (for reasons that I try to clarify all over this thesis). This techno-
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bioethical approach ends up forming this abstract “Ruler” with which other mentalities 
have to compromise and or struggle. 
The bioethical discourse often stresses broad ideas such as autonomy and 
justice, drawing less attention to social contexts (Kohlen, 2009, Bosk, 1999/2008). In 
1978 the so-called Belmont Report was issued, proposing that research should be 
based on the principles of respect, beneficence and justice. Since then, many people 
look at clinical research through the lenses of these and other principles, in an attitude 
that was called “principlism” (Bosk, 1999/2008). Eventually, principlism would instil a 
model of thought in which “[...] there is a single, correct solution for each ethical 
problem, which is largely independent of person, place, or time” (Bosk, 1999/2008, p. 




“When you’re reading a protocol, do you somehow think about the people who are 
going to take part in the study? 
In which sense? 
[Pause.] Hm... Er... Actually, I’m asking this question to know to which extent... After 
having read several protocols, as you have, to which extent patients end up becoming 
something abstract and barely concrete. 
But they are abstract [...] Aren’t they? [Laughter.] Essentially, they are abstract [...] For 
the researcher, they are not abstract, but for those who assess [the study], they are 
certainly abstract. Not only for those who assess the protocol but also for those who 
assess articles, for those who assess anything related to the study and don’t deal with 
patients. So I think this is where there is a fundamental difference, which doesn’t 
mean that you’re not going to defend ethical principles in the procedures within that 
protocol. But you defend ethical principles abstractly... of course. Conceptually. It is 
not something practical [...] That is why it is abstract [laughter]. 
[Laughter.] And don’t you think that an ethics committee has any type of duty or 
responsibility toward the patients? 
It has a responsibility toward the protocol [...] It is the researcher who has the 
responsibility toward the patients. 
And what does it mean to have a responsibility in relation to the protocol? 
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It is to approve the protocol by observing the adequate principles, whether they are 
scientific or ethical.” 
(São Paulo/C3/Physician/04-11) 
 
This example of pure bioethical/technical discourse is rare, for bioethical claims 
are generally accompanied and tempered by the communitarian approach and its 
contextual concerns. Nevertheless, the bioethical mentality does strive to look at 
clinical trials through the lenses of general principles. 
 
“Today, what is your main motivation in your work in the committee? 
Protecting research subjects [...] I get technical underpinning from Resolution 196, 
verify whether the project is in tune with Resolution 196, with the principles of 
beneficence, nonmaleficence and justice, and if it is not in line with this ethical 
analysis, I refuse it [...].” 
(São Paulo/C2/Nurse/04-11) 
 
 Principlism has an ideological corollary: if the same principles can be applied 
everywhere, then the review of clinical protocols depends not so much on personal 
talents but on the acquisition of techniques and skills. Eventually, a good committee 
member would be someone who has undergone appropriate bioethical training. In its 
turn, the communitarian mentality stresses subjective, concrete factors shaping the 
committee’s work (such as time available for reading research projects) and relies 
much more heavily on personal relations and help between members than on written 









“This [debate about the use of placebos] is 
something that seems to have no solution, 
doesn’t it? We can’t know where it goes. 
Actually, if we evaluate this question here, there 
will be a certain view, a group will see it in a 
certain way, in Joinville51 there will be another 
view, in London there will be another view. As we 
are talking about human beings, groups are very 
particular and will look at it with different eyes, 
different notions, different personal life histories. 
So the view will vary according to the group that 
evaluates that question, you know. 
So there is a subjective and even regional 
dimension in the assessment of a protocol. 
A very strong dimension. Yes.” 
(Brasília/C4/Microbiologist/04-11) 
  
“[...] Let’s imagine that I am going to work as a 
committee member, in a private committee. 
What is the advice you would give me so that I 
can be a good committee member? 
Ah... I think your first thing that is really 
important is basic training in how to review 
protocols... Okay, first you have to start a basic 
training in the philosophy of ethics, research 
ethics [...] And, I think, once you’ve got that 
behind you, learning how to review protocols 
and how to review informed consent 
documents is very important. You know, what 
do we look at? What is important? You know, 
you look at it from an ethical and a scientific 
perspective [...] once you’ve got the training 
behind you [...], you can pretty much take any 
kind of proposal, whether it is... whatever the 
indication is. And from an ethical perspective, 
you can say, you know, this is okay or it is not 
[...].” 




“Okay. Let’s imagine that I am going to start 
working in an ethics committee. What is the 
advice you would give me for me to be a good 
ethics committee member? 
Well, many things [...] You have to learn to hear 
but you have to learn to speak as well. Only 
hearing is not good. What else? You have to focus 
very precisely on what you have to analyze. If you 
don’t know it, don’t analyze, ask for help, ask for 
support from someone because there is always 
someone who knows it, because, as you see, 
there are specialists from several areas here [in 
the committee]. There is someone who knows it 
[...] If you have time available and like what you 
do, you don’t have to think twice. You have to 
dedicate yourself indeed.” 
(São Paulo/C3/Lay member/05-11) 
  
 
“Let’s imagine that I’m going to be a member of 
this committee. What would be the advice that 
you would give me so that I can be a good 
committee member? 
Well, we’ve got a specific training program that 
takes two afternoons where we give you all the 
information [...] We’ve got a booklet that we 
hand out and say: ‘This is what is expected of 
the reviewers, this is what you specifically look 
for [...]’ 
But is there any advice that you would give me 
at the personal level? 
Ah... [Pause.] I don’t think anything specifically... 
I think most of the concerns would be 
addressed in our normal working procedures 





 Whereas holders of the bioethical view stress the importance of technical and 
theoretical training, holders of the communitarian approach focus on personal 
relations within the committee and are suspicious about universal assessments. 
                                                     
51
 Joinville is a city in the South of Brazil. 
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Obviously, these discordances lead to different ways in which people frame ethics 
committees and speak of their own activities as ethical reviewers. 
 
4.2.7 Bioethical and or communitarian committees 
 
According to the two mentalities described in this chapter, what would be the 
definition and duties of both ethics committees and committee members? Basically, 
the communitarian mentality leads people to frame committees as part and 
representative of the surrounding community, which can be thought of as the scientific 
community in which the committee operates, a region or the whole country. In the 
bioethical mentality, committees are seen as a sort of moral calculator, applying 
general principles to particular cases. 
 
 




 “[...] I have been in this committee for eight 
years, I have studied a lot of protocols, I’ve 
learnt a lot about science [...] but I don’t... I do 
not read protocols from the point of view that I 
know anything about science [...] I look for the 
things that the man on the street would look 
for when he reads a consent form or reads an 
information sheet. I look at it from his point of 
view.” 
(Cape Town/C7/Lay member/05-11) 
  
“So in your opinion, what is the goal of the 
committee? 
Evaluate the beneficence, the nonmaleficence 
and theeeeeee...... The beneficence, the 
nonmaleficence and... [pause] and the legality of 
research [...] I’ve forgotten the other word. 
There is another word. I’ve forgotten it. So I 
mean, that is what you evaluate in an ethics 
committee [...] To which extent there are 
benefits, from which point it is harmful or brings 
about harms rather than benefits, and the 




“When you’re analyzing a project, do you 
somehow think about the participants, about 
the people who are going to join it? 
Yes, I do. As I told you, when I read an informed 
consent form, or when I read the description of 
what is going to be done, I always imagine my 
father, my mother, myself, joining that study, 
whether I would appreciate that. And when I 
read the form, I look at the protections that are 
offered to people in the case they have any 
damage, in the case things don’t go as 
expected. Adverse events do happen and are 





“In your opinion, what is the main goal of an 
ethics committee? 
One main goal, protect the integrity of the 
patients. And everything else around it... And it 
is in principle linked to these guidelines which 
are called Good Clinical Practices (GCP). And GCP 
guidelines have two objectives and that is... You 






 Therefore, the bioethical mentality tends to have a procedural view whereas 
the communitarian mentality frames ethics committees from a personal and social 
perspective. As one of my interviewees put it: “Don’t just do the trial and leave the 
community just like that.” This sentence was voiced in Cape Town by a nurse whose 
discourse turned out to be dominated by communitarian claims. When she joined the 
committee in 1993, still in the apartheid era, she felt insecure and ashamed because 
she was the only “female,” “coloured” member, to use her terms. Afterwards, 
however, she perceived to have a role to play. In the following quotes and their 
respective discourse graphics, I am contrasting this nurse’s claim with a claim voiced by 
a Brazilian committee member: 
 
 
Communitarian  Bioethical 
 
 
“As I grew into this work, I realized: ‘But I’m the 
one talking for the patient here, or the 
participant, because people would talk about 
the scientific things and forget about the 
patient, you know. So at that time I could see 
what my role was [laughter].” 
  
“Do you think these people [committee 
members] who are working on a voluntary basis 
should earn something? 
No [...] in theory, ideologically and 
philosophically speaking, this is something that 
should be voluntary, I don’t see why we would 
be remunerated if this is a bioethical advisory, 

















Figure 4.5 – Discourse graphic n. 15 
(Cape Town/C6/Nurse/08-11) 
  




 As these discourse graphics show, pragmatic claims tend to be more important 
in the communitarian mentality. For the bioethicist, the major concern is the provision 
of information to participants, who should be let free to decide about their 
participation (claim BIO8). The nurse affirms to be particularly concerned with 
participation of poor people, less educated subjects and children in trials (COMM10). It 
is interesting to note the coherence of the nurse’s discourse, who voices all possible 
claims from PRAG2 to ANALYT10.5, denoting a smooth passage from background to 
foreground knowledge. As the quote above suggests, she began to feel at ease as a 
committee member in the precise moment when she “discovered” the communitarian 
approach. By representing subjects, she could somehow balance the weight of the 
physicians’ scientific knowledge. Sometimes, the communitarian mentality appears as 
a sort of “ideological revenge,” for the committee members who feel to be the most 
prepared to represent the community are the ones who lack a medical and scientific 
background. 
 From this communitarian point of view, belonging to an ethics committee 
fosters the feeling of local or national relatedness. Some committee members are 
eager to claim that they are in fact carrying out a service for their institutions or places. 
 
“Nowadays, what is your main motivation to work in the committee? 
[...] I think it is maybe continuity. Sometimes I want to stop but I don’t know, I think I 
contribute [...] I think today there might be two people to do what I do. So it would be 
too big a sacrifice for the hospital. And I like the hospital. It is the place where I 
studied, my friends are based here, I found opportunities... from here I was indicated 
to hold positions, to be the director... I mean, I can’t avoid feeling the obligation to 
give something back.” 
(São Paulo/C2/Physician/04-11) 
 
“But do you consider it [the participation in the committee] as work? 
No, I consider it as a communitarian contribution, so to say. I think each of us must 
give a bit of contribution in a voluntary service [...] To me it is a service I am always 





 To be sure, these emotive and grand communitarian claims tend to flirt with 
religious (and more precisely, Christian) conceptions. According to Arendt, whenever 
social actors are motivated by strong sentiments, as was the case during the French 
Revolution, they start assuming that their good deeds should remain hidden. Extracted 
from the human heart (where it originally lies) and exposed in the public realm, the 
goodness of such deeds would be rapidly vitiated (Arendt, 1963). For committee 
members who embrace the communitarian mentality, the limited publicity of 
committees comes to be seen as a positive phenomenon, for they can therefore 
realize the communitarian ideal of being good community members while keeping 
their goodness protected and hidden. On this point, the following claim voiced by a lay 
member is very interesting: 
 
“Today, what is your main motivation to continue to work in an ethics committee? 
Look, it is what I say: I don’t see myself not doing anything for the benefit of something 
[...] I need to do something for someone. I feel fulfilled... And I don’t talk about it, I 
don’t comment on it [...].” 
(São Paulo/C3/Lay member/05-11) 
 
 Thus, keeping silent about the deed, not mentioning it, seems to be considered 
as a pivotal aspect of the good action. This interviewee displayed strong 
communitarian concerns. Being retired and therefore having enough free time, she 
does, in addition to her participation in the committee, other services that she 
considers as “voluntary”: she provides different sorts of help in two hospitals in São 
Paulo, and she often takes part in legal juries as lay member. This is the discourse 





Even though the weight of 
pragmatic claims is not important here (an 
atypical event for the communitarian 
mentality), the graphic does present some 
typical features of the communitarian 
approach, including an important 
conversation with bioethical claims. The 
claim she repeated the most frequently is 
precisely COMM7, which points out that 
committee members should look at 
research protocols from the subjects’ 
viewpoint, protecting and representing the community. 
 Blending bioethical and communitarian claims is also possible when people talk 
about their views on ethics committees. In this way, a committee would be framed, for 
instance, as a body that protects the community by means of moral calculations. In 
order to show this phenomenon, I am cutting the answer given by one interviewee 
into different parts: 
  
Figure 4.7 – Discourse graphic n. 25 





“Do you think that for those [members] who don’t have a medical 
background, reading a protocol can be somehow more difficult? Can there be 
further difficulties? 
Communitarian 
I think so. There are many technical terms that those who are not physicians 
will not understand, but I mean, for example... When you are here in this 
environment [the committee], you can ask a physician and so on [...] For me, 
the technical analysis, even though it is in cardiology or psychiatry, is easier. 
It is different for laypeople. And then, I think, what can they analyze, 
basically? The ethical part. Would I do... Would I agree to participate in this 
study? If I were this patient and were asked to take an injection, collect 
samples, have an anaesthetic to undergo a procedure, would I participate? 
Bioethical 
So I think this has to be the risk-benefit calculation for those who are not 
physicians, right? In addition: is it in line with the regulations? And something 
that is very important is the informed consent form [...] 
Communitarian 
                                                                                                               You have to put 
yourself in the patient’s position. Maybe, from this point of view, it is easier 




 All the features, similarities and differences we have seen in this chapter have 
important social and political consequences. Indeed, the bioethical and communitarian 
mentalities frame committees and society in different ways. In the following section, 
these aspects are explored. 
 
4.2.8 Political implications of the bioethical and communitarian mentalities 
 
The bioethical mentality appears to be favoured by bioethicists, lawyers, 
physicians and bioscientists whereas the communitarian mentality tends to be 
particularly attractive for lay members, nurses, social workers and social scientists, as 













We can analyse these graphics from three perspectives. Firstly, we can 
compare particular groups by moving from the communitarian to the bioethical 
mentality. Testing statistical differences between the two mentalities,52 it was possible 
to verify a large difference for social scientists (p=0.001). Calculating the effect size 
statistic,53 the result was of 0.84, a number that according to Cohen (1988), indicates a 
large shift. In other words, when choosing between bioethical and communitarian 
claims, social scientists seem to be strongly attracted by the latter. There is also a 
significant difference for physicians and bioscientists (p=0.04). Here, there is also a 
large shift (effect size statistic = 0.71) but in the opposite direction: these professionals 
seem to strongly favour bioethical claims. For other professionals, statistically 
significant differences were not verified.54 These committee members seem to play 
with the complementarity between the mentalities without displaying particular 
preference for any of them. 
Secondly, focusing on the bioethical mentality (Figure 4.9), we see that social 
scientists had the lowest scores, confirming the conclusion that they are not very likely 
to voice bioethical claims. Finally, focusing only on the communitarian mentality 
(Figure 4.8), the boxplots do not allow us to see differences clearly. 
                                                     
52
 I am assuming that for these mentalities, data are normally distributed. Therefore, I performed a 
parametric test (Paired-samples T Test). 
53
 Eta squared. 
54
 As explained in Chapter 2, my data are not powerful to identify statistical differences, because there is 
a small number of interviewees in each group. 
Figure 4.8 – Communitarian mentality 
(South Africa and Brazil): discourse 
boxplots according to background 
 
Figure 4.9 – Bioethical mentality 
(South Africa and Brazil): discourse 
boxplots according to background 
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Therefore, statistical analyses enable us to suggest two phenomena. First, 
physicians and bioscientists seem to foreground bioethical rather than communitarian 
claims. Second, for social scientists, the opposite tendency is verified. In effect, social 
scientists, for disciplinary reasons, stress contextual factors, a typical feature of the 
communitarian mentality. Moreover, it was argued that social scientists are 
particularly connected to the background knowledge,55 another characteristic of the 
communitarian mentality. 
As we have seen,56 the bioethical mentality praises reviewing techniques. As a 
consequence, it is the approach that can be the most easily applied by ethics 
committees. In addition to offering principles that are supposed to underpin the 
committees’ debates and assessments, it admits the presence of standardized 
procedures to review research projects. If nowadays ethics committees of many 
countries operate under more or less the same conditions, using similar application 
forms, consent forms and checklists, this is due, to a large extent, to a bioethical 
conception according to which clinical protocols, as well as their ethical review, can be 
commensurated and standardized. As Timmermans and Berg (2003, p. 64) explain, 
standards make it possible to cope with more complex tasks while simplifying the work 
undertaken by individuals, and therefore promoting a “partial delegation from worker 
to tool.” Indeed, some of my interviewees declared to esteem the initial work 
undertaken by the committee’s secretaries, who organize all the documents 
composing the research proposal and sometimes comment on the potentially 
problematic aspects of a protocol. By listening to the descriptions made by some 




“Is reviewing a protocol an activity that takes you much time? 
It depends entirely on the quality of the submission. Generally, low risk studies [...] 
would go quickly because we’ve designed our application form as such that there are 
quite a number of tick boxes, you know, the kind of crucial stuff. Does it comply with 
                                                     
55
 See Figure 3.3, page 99. 
56
 Section 4.2.6. 
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Helsinki 2008? And they [members] sort of tick the box after seeing how they 
[researchers] are going to cope with confidentiality and anonymity [...].” 
(Cape Town/C7/Bioethicist/07-11) 
 
 Certainly inspired by the memory of such tasks, some members seem to regret 
the automatisms of committees. 
 
“This is the boring part of a committee. The committee has no intellectual bright or 
things like that. The committee is a... an automatic thing, an automatic working 
mechanism that must be almost repetitive. You’re doing your post-graduate studies 
and you have to submit thirty documents. There must be someone to check your thirty 
documents, do you understand? [...] There is no need for new ideas. It is not a place 
for intellectual effervescence. 
It is more routine than creativity. 
It is routine. There is no creativity whatsoever [...].” 
(São Paulo/C2/Physician/04-11) 
 
 Nevertheless, standardized procedures provide committees with objective 
yardsticks, which can also be used in order to convey their “accuracy” or 
“productivity.” According to one of my Brazilian interviewees, her committee 
considered for a while to obtain an ISO certification to attest the quality of its work. 
These procedures and bureaucratic processes also help signal the committee’s concern 
with legitimate rules, even though this concern may remain at a purely formal level. As 
some authors showed, the maintenance of bureaucratic and formal structures, as 
symbols of legal compliance, is sometimes more effective, for the survival of an 
institution, than any actual compliance (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, Hawkins, 1984, 
Edelman, 1992). 
Thanks to the procedural efficiency it supposes, but also to its symbolic 
operations, the bioethical mentality copes with dilemmas in a quite smooth way. For 
instance, the pragmatic approach introduces concerns pertaining to economic 
interests in clinical trials. The bioethical response to this question comes in the form of 
a new commensuration: every clinical trial proposed by the industry contains 
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comparable types of financial issues; therefore, it is possible to deal with them via 
standardized procedures. The next step is the preparation of economic forms and 
standardized budgets, with which committees can assess economic interests and verify 
whether they represent risks to research subjects or not. 
 Bioethical procedures, as well as bioethical notions, are most likely to be 
reinforced within committees in the years to come. Of 42 people interviewed in my 
fieldwork, 13 declared to have done courses or studies in bioethics or research ethics, 
from online courses to doctoral studies. It is known that some committees often ask 
specialists to give talks to their members. In the committees I studied, bioethicists and 
lawyers are the professionals the most frequently invited to provide such type of 
support.57 As a consequence of these phenomena, committees have become 
promoters of the bioethical mentality. On this point, the following discourse boxplots 
(derived from 34 strong interviews) are very illustrative. 
 
 
Figure 4.10 – Bioethical mentality: 
scores according to years of experience in the committee58 
 
                                                     
57
 Also in Germany, hospital committees frequently invite bioethicists to give talks to their members. On 
this issue, see KOHLEN, H. 2009. Conflicts of care: hospital ethics committees in the USA and Germany, 
Frankfurt/New York, Campus Verlag. 
58
 In Brazil, committee members generally have a four-year (renewable) stay in the committee. I adopted 





 These boxplots show that members who have been in committees for longer 
periods (9 years or more) voiced the biggest proportions of bioethical claims in their 
discourses. From the first to the third group, the median passes from 0.20 (members 
with 0 to 4 years in the committee), through 0.29 (5 to 8 years), to 0.31 (9 years or 
more). Only one interviewee, indicated as a dot (number 24) did not follow this 
pattern. This is a Brazilian nurse who has been in the committee for four years and 
voiced a very high level of bioethical claims in his interview. No statistically significant 
difference was identified for these boxplots but if we exclude this interviewee from the 
calculation, the difference appears (p=0.03).59 Interestingly, by performing a post-hoc 
test,60 it was seen that the difference lies between the first and second groups. Thus, it 
seems that by staying more than four years in an ethics committee, members can be 
permeated by an important range of bioethical concerns. For the group of old 
members (9 years or more), there is actually a slight reduction in the average of 
bioethical scores, signalizing the acquisition of other types of concerns (especially 
analytical and critical ones). 
 We can also analyze these data in terms of correlation. Considering all my 34 
strong interviews and performing a statistical test,61 it was verified a positive 
correlation of 0.36 between the level of pragmatic claims and the experience in the 
committee.62 According to Cohen (1988), this indicates a medium correlation. Thus 
whenever the committee member goes from one group to another, the proportion of 
bioethical claims increases at a medium rate. The coefficient of determination is of 
0.12, meaning that 12% of the increase in bioethical claims is explained by the increase 
in the years of experience. 
These findings further support my argument that committees have become 
bioethical schools, so to say. Old members, due to their long exposure to the bioethical 
environment of committees, have this sort of claims deeply embedded in their 
discourses. 
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 I performed the One-Way ANOVA test. 
60
 Tukey test. 
61
 Spearman correlation. 
62
 The p value is of 0.03. 
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In many situations, people join an ethics committee without having clear 
knowledge about the committee’s procedures and responsibilities. In this way, an 
ethics committee will always appear, for those who are newcomers, a less bewildering 
universe when there are ready-made yardsticks, targets, written formulas and guiding 
principles to help members, a task that can certainly be more easily fulfilled by the 
bioethical than the communitarian mentality. 
 In addition, the bioethical view has undergone a well-known process of 
institutionalization over the last decades, assuming a “dominant position” in the field 
of medicine (Bosk, 1999/2008, p. 4). Many countries have witnessed the creation of 
societies, groups and committees whose main purpose is to deal with medical 
problems by handling bioethical principles and sometimes taking decisions (Guillemin, 
1998, Bosk, 2002). As said before, the formulation of the 1996 Brazilian Resolution 196 
was decisively influenced by the Brazilian Society of Bioethics, described as the 
“embryo of the Resolution” by an interviewee who participated in that process as 
member of this Society. 
 As a consequence of this strong position acquired by the bioethical mentality, 
some committee members claim that bioethical operations and calculations must be 
applied not only to clinical research but to every human activity. 
 
“But do you think that if they [committee members] got paid, the payment would 
compromise their work... somehow? 
[...] It doesn’t seem right to have to be paid to be on an ethics committee. Ethics is 
high above anything else. You know what I mean? 
No [laughter.] 
Ethics... Ethics is supreme, a sort of... not god, but it is a very high part of research. It is 
the number one thing. It is the basis. The basis of the research is the ethics. No matter 
what you’re doing, you’re looking at the ethics. Everything has to go through ethics. So 
ethics is the basis of... it is the standard [...] It is like being the government. I’m not 
saying that the government in this country doesn’t get over-paid [laughter]. Probably 
in Brazil too. 
Yeah. [Laughter.]” 




 As a result of such grand conception, the bioethical approach, as well as the 
ethics committee model, is expected to conquer any kind of activity and scientific field. 
 
“[...] if today we could dare to say that from 90 to 95 percent of all protocols reviewed 
by the [CEP-Conep] system are directly related to the field of health and maybe 5 
percent to other fields, this is not because only 5 percent of the studies involving 
human beings in Brazil are done in other fields. This is because the fields of law, 
anthropology, psychology, you know, are not yet adequately aware in order to 
understand that what they do affects individuals in their personality, the people (I 
belong to a personalist line), people in their personality [...] as much as the study of 
the pharmaceutical industry. So the point is that we have to expand by making people 
aware [...] So there is still a vast area, a huge set of fields that have not yet discovered 
that a study in the field of education has all ethical aspects of a study in the field of 
pharmacology, and it can be even more invasive and maybe even more harmful.” 
(São Paulo/C4/Bioethicist/05-11) 
 
As one admits that every kind of human activity can be seen from an ethical 
point of view, all types of study are therefore commensurated. In the bioethical 
approach, there is no essential difference between a small anthropological study and a 
multinational randomized placebo-controlled trial sponsored by a pharma company. In 
the academia, the political particularities of human sciences are thus eventually 
overlooked. A sociologist, for instance, would have to study a multinational company 
and its deeds while protecting its confidentiality. Nowadays, any social science study 
(like my own study) must go through an ethical assessment that copies the biological 
sciences’ procedures.63 The globalization of bioethical notions, which have been hotly 
welcomed by most universities, creates a state in which the political dimension of 
human sciences gets sterilized. 
 The effects of the communitarian mentality upon the organization of 
committees have been more timid, because of two main factors. Firstly, as noted 
before, this approach is much more dependent on sentiments and intuitive notions 
than its bioethical counterpart, being therefore of difficult translation into oral 
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 While preparing my fieldwork, one Brazilian ethics committee asked me to submit my proposal 
through the Conep system. The struggle to adjust my study to Conep’s rules was so huge and time-
consuming that I had to eventually give up and drop that committee from my study. 
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discourses. The social and political implication of this feature is that people holding 
communitarian concerns would either engage in voluntary services (an ethics 
committee, for example) or keep their concerns protected, without voicing them in 
social spheres. Thus, political and collective programs are not very likely to emerge 
from communitarian preoccupations. 
As an example, one could cite Epstein’s study, which identified the emergence 
of a new attitude toward clinical research in the United States, which Epstein named 
“inclusion-and-difference paradigm.” According to this paradigm, clinical studies must 
take into account the particular features of women, black people, children, and other 
marginalized groups. This (communitarian) approach has been adopted by scientists, 
activists, regulators, policymakers (especially in the National Institutes of Health), 
professional organizations, among other groups, but these actors have not managed to 
reach high degrees of political organization, a failure that undermines the fast diffusion 
of their concerns (Epstein, 2007). Thus, communitarian concerns, in spite of being 
ideologically effective, have failed to be politically effective. 
In some instances, people can be led to adopt quite sharp attitudes towards 
certain policies and technologies. According to Douglas and Wildavski (1982), some 
groups in the United States have become suspicious of technologies and social 
changes, which are thought of as threats to society’s peace and goodness. This kind of 
view is also an expression of the communitarian mentality. It tends to be consolidated 
because as some authors (Slovic, 1999, Finucane et al., 2000) showed, social actors, 
when assessing technologies, recur not only to objective concepts and calculations but 
also to emotions and intuitions. 
However, some practical policies have managed to stem from communitarian 
concerns. In South Africa, for instance, the Medicines Control Council, which regulates 
medicines and clinical trials, has launched a policy called capacity-building. The 
program tries to encourage pharma companies and CROs to diversify the list of 
hospitals and physicians they work with, in an attempt to make clinical trials less 
dominated by a small number of sites and researchers. When submitting research 
proposals for regulatory approval, companies have to provide justifications if they are 
not working with non-traditional hospitals and investigators. Even though this policy 
has not yet produced very important changes, it certainly expresses how 
(communitarian) concerns with national particularities can shape the state’s agenda. 
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Secondly, the communitarian approach has had little impact over ethics 
committees because it does not offer a clear and systematic strategy for the practical 
assessment of research projects (as the bioethical approach does). On the contrary, it 
tends to instil concerns and criticisms that may sometimes compromise the 
“productivity” that committees have been looking for. In South Africa, for example, I 
observed a meeting in which a protocol was discussed whose goal was to assess the 
effects of a certain therapy upon different racial groups. The study was strongly 
opposed by one member on the grounds that racial categories should not be used in a 
country that has been damaged by the apartheid regime. After much discussion, the 
protocol was eventually approved by all the members, excepting that one member, 
who hastened to clearly convey her dissatisfaction about the committee’s decision. 
Subsequently, I had the opportunity to interview this member: 
 
“And why do you think that race is not a good criterion to be used in research? 
[...] We have had enormous arguments [in the committee] over race, particularly 
because people from the developed world (researchers from the developed world) 
want to come in and look at race as a variable to measure certain population groups in 
terms of particular behavioural characteristics, because they know that [...] there is 
still enough coherence among those groups for those characteristics to be measured. 
And they’re often inaccurate, completely inaccurate, because they don’t understand 
what is happening here on the ground.” 
(Cape Town/C7/Anthropologist/07-11) 
 
 This typically communitarian reply, as well as her emphatic attitude in the 
referred meeting, shows that the communitarian mentality does not offer much 
leeway for consensus and concessions.64 Therefore, this mentality is frequently at odds 
with the regulatory duties and tight time frames of ethics committees. 
 However, the communitarian approach did manage to be successful in one 
point: the participation of lay members in committees. Nowadays, the importance of 
having lay members is acknowledged even by people who embrace the technical 
mentality, like the interviewee who voiced the following claim: 
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“Do you think that lay people... people who don’t have a medical background can have 
some problems working in an ethics committee? 
Oh, I think they have a very important contribution, I think, even though they may not 
feel qualified to delve into the science. But I think they pick up a lot. You know, you 
look at fifty protocols every year and you start getting a good idea of what’s good idea, 
what’s not. But I think that, sometimes, their perspective is... quite refreshing of some 




 To be sure, such claims may be used to make one’s discourse sound kind and 
somehow democratic but, once again, I am less concerned with “truth” (the expression 
of sincere claims) than with “verisimilitude” (the selection and organization of socially 
available claims). Anyway, many people, including lay members themselves, also point 
to dire hurdles to be faced by those who join an ethics committee without having a 
scientific background. 
 
“I think lay members, after a while, simply can’t understand the medical speech [...] I 
mean, even I, as a social scientist, I don’t have the knowledge to always engage. I will 
listen very carefully  because of my academic background and because I’ve been so 
long on the committee that I’ve got a body of expertise that allows me to understand 
more of the science [...] But I think that for many lay committee members... They must 
struggle to understand some of what is happening.” 
(Cape Town/C7/Social scientist/07-11) 
 
“Do you think that in an ethics committee [as opposed to other areas of the hospital], it 
is easier for physicians to be friendly? 
I don’t know, but they have to deal with other professionals. Of course, that is what I 
realized in projects that are purely connected to the field of medicine. They are 
superior in what they talk and discuss, you know. So I can only hear and observe and 
see how these relations happen in that environment [...] 
So with certain topics you feel more comfortable to speak than with others. 
159 
 
Yes, for certain things... When they begin these too technical conversations, I can only 
hear, you know. I can only hear because, in fact, it is outside my technical knowledge. 
So I also take that moment as an opportunity to learn, you know.” 
(São Paulo/C2/Nurse/04-11) 
 
 In spite of such difficulties,65 lay members are most likely to continue to figure 
in ethics committees, a phenomenon that can be considered as a victory of the 
communitarian mentality. As explained before, this approach is highly concerned with 
particularities and, as the communitarian tenets go, “[...] the best way to incorporate 
particularity into the review process is to invite greater public participation” 
(Eckenwiler, 2001, p. 38), a claim that echoes the view of other analysts (McNeill, 
1993, Robertson, 1979). Thanks to this minor triumph of the communitarian mentality, 
committees can continue to be a space for encounters between specialists and 
laypeople or, to use Habermas’ (1996, p. 351) words, a space for the “organized 




The following discourse boxplots compare the two mentalities focused on in this 
chapter. 
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 Clearly, there is no significant statistical difference between these 
approaches,66 which means that they are equally likely to be voiced by committee 
members. This tendency can certainly be explained by the complementarity between 
these mentalities. Indeed, their claims can be combined in different ways, and this 
combination never clearly amounts to contradictions. Moreover, it can be said that the 
conversation between these approaches is not only possible but also necessary, 
because it is often impossible to deal with all the issues involved in clinical research by 
mobilizing only bioethical or communitarian claims. In this way, these mentalities 
never cease to provoke and stimulate each other. 
It was shown that considering all the mentalities, these two are the ones which 
tend to influence members’ discourse the most strongly.67 In the case of the bioethical 
approach, this “success” is due to the following reasons: 
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 We have very similar values when comparing the boxplots. The median is of 0.25 and 0.23, 
respectively; the standard deviation is of 0.14 and 0.13. 
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 There are socially diffused concerns with past scandals verified in clinical 
research 
 This approach makes it possible to apply a mythical thought that appease 
dilemmas and appears to solve ethical problems  
 The organization of committees is highly informed by international (bioethical) 
guidelines 
 Bioethical notions permeate committees in several ways (talks by specialists, 
courses to committee members, principles stated in regulations, among others) 
 The bioethical mentality has decisive practical and procedural consequences, 
for it marshals general principles, commensurates research projects and opens 
up much leeway for a standardized processing of research proposals 
 It also introduces a seemingly objective calculation between risks and benefits, 
a notion that can be especially instructive for new committee members 
 
As for the communitarian mentality, its “popularity” stems from different 
factors: 
 
 There are socially diffused concerns with the preservation of particularities 
 Social and international inequalities have proved long-lasting, fostering the 
permanence of compassion as a social driving force 
 Groups considered as socially vulnerable are increasingly recruited in clinical 
studies 
 Many people recognize that even in highly regulated and scientifically designed 
studies, uncertainties cannot be circumvented 
 Committee members are aware that they have much to learn not only through 
written documents but also through relations within the committee 
 
The bioethical approach has been more efficient at forming a theory to 
underpin the committee members’ tasks. Probably, this is why many social science 
studies have focused on the impacts of bioethics, whereas communitarian concerns 
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have been less intensely addressed as a decisive factor of moral assessments. Thanks 
to its theoretical performance, the bioethical mentality allows a smooth passage 
towards the technical mentality. There is also a pathway leading from the 
communitarian to the analytical mentality, but this passage is less straightforward, 
insofar as the communitarian approach is easily influenced by several types of 
concerns, including instrumental ones. This is one of the issues addressed in the 






5 Chapter 5 – Global trials and foreground knowledge: 
the technical and analytical mentalities 
 
 In this chapter, we focus on two other approaches to clinical research. As they 
are organized with some scientific concepts, it is important to begin with a review 
about the connections between ideology and systematic thought. After this review, we 
start focusing on the technical and analytical approaches. Initially, we address the only 
characteristic shared by them: their concern with methodologies advanced in clinical 
studies. Subsequently, we explore their disagreements and ideological conflicts, 
focusing on issues like regulations, globalization, views about ethics committees, 
among others. 
 
5.1 IDEOLOGY AND SYSTEMATIC THOUGHT 
 
In this chapter, we arrive at a level in which ideology is fostered by scientific 
explanations. Thus, it is important not to succumb to the idea that science constitutes 
a morally and ideologically neutral universe. This idea was one of the pillars of the 
positivist project. Indeed, one of the main ambitions of the positivist philosophical 
tradition is the construction of a scientific and philosophical explanation based on so-
called facts whose occurrence and assessment would not depend on individual and 
contextual factors (Carnap, 1966). Although this ambition can be seen as non-realistic, 
it has inspired many scientists all over the world. 
Sociology has devoted great efforts to the comprehension of ideological 
projects lurking behind apparently neutral scientific explanations. A well-known 
contribution was given by Marx (1867/1990), who proposed that scientific models (and 
Marx focused on scientific economy) belongs to a political project of class domination. 
The equally classic Weber’s analysis follows a different pathway. For him, science 
delivers a sort of ideological underpinning upon which a blend of practical, 
bureaucratic and moral rationales outgrows its strength, making it possible to 




world with basic conceptual and technical resources, which remain ignored by the 
majority of social agents (Weber, 1930/2001).  
 Drawing on these classic interpretations, Arendt (1951/2004) further explored 
the mystifying capacities of science, showing that in totalitarian political regimens, 
ideological control was based on the circulation of superficial, and sometimes 
distorted, scientific notions through the media. Marcuse (1964/1991) also undertook 
an important study on the “ideology of advanced industrial society,” a theoretical 
effort to which Habermas (1973) himself adhered to at the beginning of his career. 
More recently, authors have pointed to the role played by scientific concepts in the 
global diffusion of feelings of risk (Beck, 1986/2005), the scientific contributions for a 
global planning that is largely controlled by multinational companies (Santos, 2000), 
the interference of science experts in regulatory matters (Jasanoff, 1990), or the 
upheavals promoted by the sciences of communication, making it possible to 
constitute a “network-society” (Castells, 2004). 
 What has to be stressed is that, in the classic analyses briefly mentioned, one 
identifies the important idea that science implies many types of blends between 
conceptual and political projects. In this way, the formulation (or critique) of scientific 
concepts has consequences not only for scientists but for the whole society. At the 
same time, the aforementioned studies bring about the idea that complex scientific 
theories can be translated into simplified forms, therefore being able to influence vast 
ranges of social actors. 
 The theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1981/1987, Habermas, 1996) 
grasped this last phenomenon with an unprecedented success, stressing that 
technically efficient actions, as well as sophisticated theoretical structures, would still 
be socially and ideologically sterile without being at some point integrated into the 
communicative flow that crosses over society. In other words, the technical and 
ideological supremacy of some actors can only be secured and maintained if this 
supremacy is somehow recognized and reinforced by all types of social actors. 
Therefore, political hegemony cannot really exist within closed social subgroups; it 
depends on tasks of social integration. 
 
“For such tasks, an ordinary language is available, circulating throughout 
society and lying beneath the threshold of the special codes. In the peripheral 
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networks of the political public sphere and in the parliamentary complex, this 
ordinary language is, in any case, already in demand for dealing with 
macrosocial problems” (Habermas, 1996, p. 352). 
 
 In Chapter 3, in which background knowledge was focused on, it was claimed 
that pragmatic notions are strong and effective because of their accessibleness, that is, 
the fact that they can be rapidly understood and communicated by every social actor. 
In the present chapter, we deal with two mentalities whose connections to 
background knowledge are indirect and sometimes almost impossible. However, even 
the technical and analytical mentalities (which are addressed in this chapter) need to 
be translated into the ordinary, “natural language” (Habermas, 1996, p. 360) that is 
generally mastered in society. This is the first point to be made in our description of 
these two new approaches: both the technical and analytical mentalities draw on 
many sorts of medical, statistical, sociological, clinical, biological concepts; yet we are 
not dealing with codes, in the sense that these mentalities would constitute closed 
universes to which only experts would have access. On the contrary, they can only be 
effective and solid because they are integrative, in the sense that all categories of 
committee members, from lay people to physicians, can somehow access and 
understand their contents. 
 In the following section, we analyze a trait that is shared by these two 
approaches. 
 
5.2 ASSESSING METHODS 
 
By reading the descriptions and quotes presented in the previous chapter, one 
might be intrigued by the following circumstance: in the bioethical and communitarian 
mentalities, people voice moral discourses about clinical trials without delving into the 
actual scientific aspects of clinical studies. Indeed, concerns with vulnerability, 
particularity, ethical principles, inequalities and so on, can be advanced without the 
consideration of methodologies, samples, tests, study arms, among other procedural 
details. In the technical and analytical mentalities, these methodological concerns are 
finally voiced. By the way, this methodological attention was the main feature allowing 
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me to “confirm” the existence of the technical approach (hypothesized before the 
fieldwork) as well as “discover” the analytical approach (unravelled by means of my 
interviews). I am referring to claims such as the following ones. 
 
“When you’re reviewing a protocol, what is your main concern? 
Obviously, I ask: Is it scientifically... Does it make sense, scientifically? And it has to be 
justified. I mean, is there no other method of finding out? So you look at the design. Is 
it right? Is it okay? And then, eventually, you look at the ethics. But you have to look at 
the scientific soundness [...].” 
(Pretoria/C8/Bioscientist/07-11) 
 
“How would you define a good protocol, a protocol that is properly presented? 
It depends on the phase, it depends on the structure that you... on the moment when 
that protocol is presented. Obviously, any protocol depends, basically, on an adequate 
justification of its goals and also on proper methodology. But it all depends on the 
phase in which you run that protocol in, whether it is phase I or phase III or 
multicentric, industrial... Every protocol has its characteristics.” 
(São Paulo/C3/Physician/04-11) 
 
 Here, we leave the contextual and philosophical approach to clinical studies (as 
showed in the previous chapter) and move towards a more substantial and direct view. 
This methodological concern is the basic feature of both the technical and analytical 
mentalities. Actually, this is the only point on which they agree. In contrast to the 
relationship between the bioethical and communitarian mentalities, the technical and 
analytical approaches do not engage in frequent conversations. As depicted in Figure 
3.1 on page 71, at this level there are much more frequent “vertical” conversations 
(either technical-bioethical or analytical-communitarian) than “horizontal” 
conversations (technical-analytical). 
The aforementioned attention to methodologies, for instance, can be 
combined with both bioethical and communitarian claims. In the following quotes, I 





Question “When you’re reviewing a protocol, what is your main concern? 
Technical/Analytical 
Main concern to look at is, obviously, the appropriateness methodol... 
Let’s say, back to start, it is the study objective, the questions asked 
(aims and objectives). Is that appropriate? Is the methodology 
appropriate? I tend not to go too much into the basic science behind 
it because I think this is not the responsibility of the ethics committee, 
Bioethical/Communitarian 
but around that, everything largely related to the subjects, to the 
patients, to the volunteers... patient-related issues. 
Technical/Analytical 
                                                                                                   Inclusion 
criteria of the patients,  
Bioethical                                             risk-benefit for the patients, 
Technical/Analytical 
                                                                                                        and an issue 
is, with respect to experimental drugs, to make sure that the patients 
have what is called equipoise (you know that?), that... that the two 
options that they have are more or less, at that point in time, sort of 
equivalent [...] 
Bioethical 
                              Declaration of Helsinki and all these discussion 
points. And it is often the informed consent form that is difficult [...] 
Ethics committees, if they have a comment on a protocol, that is the 






“Is there any section of the protocol that you consider as more 
important? 
Bioethical 
For me, as a layperson [laughter], it would probably be the informed 
consent form but then, also [...], 
Technical/Analytical 
                                                               if a clinical trial is not scientifically 
sound, then how can we give ethical clearance to that kind of trial? [...] 
my view is, if the science of a clinical trial is wrong, then you cannot 
give ethical clearance to it. Like, for instance, inclusion and exclusion 
criteria. If you include in there people that shouldn’t be there... 
somebody has to evaluate that [...] So what I’m saying is that the 
methodology needs to be correct and all the other scientific aspects of 
the study need to be correct as well. 
Bioethical 
                                                                           So for me the importance is, 
firstly, your informed consent form because, of course, there are 
consent forms that are not really informed, because it may be just a 
little bit of information [...] 
Communitarian 
                                                       And remember I said earlier: our people 
are not really that well-versed, the people that are usually taken up in 




 Having identified this methodological concern, which is a point on which the 
technical and analytical mentalities go hand in hand, we begin to address, in the 





5.3 THE TECHNICAL AND ANALYTICAL MENTALITIES 
 
Concerns with methodologies in clinical studies constitute the only aspect that 
could be framed as “politically neutral” in the technical and analytical mentalities. 
From now on, political issues become paramount. In a sense, one can say that the 
technical and analytical mentalities also share a philosophical characteristic: although 
they initially focus on research projects’ details carefully, in subsequent moments they 
go beyond these methodological issues in order to engage in a debate about the ways 
in which clinical trials are assessed both in committees and society. Two major 
consequences stem from this circumstance. 
On the one hand, discourses assume a less pronounced moral vein (in terms of 
“this is not good for us to be doing”) to acquire more political contents (in terms of 
“this is the best way to discuss the issue of trials in committees and society”). On the 
other hand, my text itself is affected by political considerations and it gets more and 
more difficult to describe mentalities without suggesting my personal view about their 
worth. The description of mentalities cannot be done from an abstract point from 
which one can look at mental life without being influenced by any mentality. As it 
seems to me, my interpretation is voiced from an analytical point of view, a claim that 
is valid not only for this chapter but for my whole thesis. This consideration is in tune 
with the theory of communicative action, which invites the analyst to join the 
communicative processes of society, rather than subscribing to “theoretical 
explanations of an interpreter who adopts an objectivating standpoint” (Habermas, 
2008, p. 60). However, adopting an approach (that is, favouring claims derived from a 
particular mentality) does not compromise sociological analysis as long as this 
preference does not lead us to overlook other mentalities. 
Having advanced this clarification, we move on to discussing an initial 





5.3.1 Clinical trials and scientific accuracy 
 
There are very different reasons why the technical and analytical mentalities 
draw attention to methodological issues. In the technical approach, this precaution is 
important insofar as committee members would be supposed to measure, as it were, 
the distance between the established scientific standards and the standards adopted 
in a particular research project. Thus, the basic assumption is the very existence of 
objective, identifiable, recognized scientific standards and yardsticks. This assumption 
is identified in claims such as the one advanced by Abraham (1993, p. 390): 
 
“[…] given certain socially derived and commonly agreed standards of 
communication and reason, objective assessments of knowledge claims can be 
made by reference to those standards. Although scientists sometimes disagree 
wildly, such assessments are sometimes possible because frequently scientists 
do agree on some standards.” 
 
Once this idea has been assumed, it becomes easier to accept that scientific 
standards must be not only acknowledged but also improved. From this standpoint, 
clinical research would be an endless enterprise through which scientific standards are 
tested and scientific knowledge advanced. Hence, the idea that in clinical trials, 
researchers are collecting data and gathering evidence in order to improve human 
knowledge of health and illness. 
 
“In your opinion, what is the main goal of clinical research? 
[...] It is to get observations that we can extrapolate into the future to... to get 
information that would give us the best guess of which direction we should go. 
Advancement of knowledge. Generalization of knowledge.” 
(Cape Town/C6/Physician/08-11) 
 






Advancement. What does advance [laughter]? 
I think that, you know, the application of methods, the application of medicines... 
Advancement, actually, in terms of technologies. Because I see new things that men 
try to standardize... Advancement and standardization [...] You have a medicine for a 
certain thing and now you’re seeing that it can be used for another thing; there has 
been an off-label use and you’re doing a study to prove that it can be used for that 
other thing, and that there can be another indication for it, otherwise you can’t 
officialise that indication [...].” 
(São Paulo/C3/Bioscientist/05-11) 
 
 Thus human progress can be looked for because there are technologies and 
standards in need of constant improvement. The idea of scientific standards has a 
twofold implication. On the one hand, research can be done in accordance with these 
guidelines. On the other hand, guidelines can be violated and therefore turned into 
references with which one could measure the size of scientific errors. Consequently, 
the technical mentality leads to the recognition of good and bad studies. This is what 
one of my interviewees claimed about clinical research: 
 
“If it is well done, it will advance knowledge. 
It will advance knowledge [...] You’re talking almost like blue-sky-research. Clinical 
research is not blue-sky-research but I also think that there is a place for blue-sky-
research, in other words, knowledge for the sake of knowledge... 
But most of times, it is not blue-sky-research, then. 
Not all clinical research is blue-sky-research but we do sometimes encounter research 
which I would say is blue-sky-research, not necessarily intended for direct application 
but I mean, you know, you have to start somewhere, you build on little blocks of 
information and eventually it might lead to something else [...].” 
(Cape Town/C6/Physician/08-11) 
 
 On this point, the technical mentality shows its brotherhood to the bioethical 
mentality. In the previous chapter, it was claimed that the bioethical approach admits 
the presence of goods and bads in clinical research, striving to calculate the risk-
benefit ratio. Equally, the technical approach assumes that research can be either good 
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(“blue-sky-research”) or bad. Studies would not be worth conducting whenever they 
are not in tune with what Abraham (2007, p. 732) described as “valid/coherent 
knowledge claims.” By means of a simple ideological operation, the ideas of knowledge 
and research are given a moral content, thus being presented as social targets. 
 
“So it is possible to say that statistics is also a way to protect people in a protocol. 
I think it is definitely. It is essential [...] I mean, if you put people into a trial which 
cannot detect what constitutes a clinically relevant change, I think that is very unfair 
[...] It is unethical if we subject people to an experiment which cannot lead to the 
required or to the anticipated result.” 
(Pretoria/C8/Bioscientist/07-11) 
 
“[...] I think research is good. So I won’t try to interfere or damage it because it is 
research. I think research is good a priori, because of the examples I gave you: it 
obliges physicians to study, it obliges to be committed to science, it obliges to be 
familiar with very innovative things [...].” 
(São Paulo/C2/Physician/04-11) 
 
Therefore, research comes to be seen as a promoter of not only the 
advancement of knowledge but also the moral soundness of society. This ideological 
operation can be taken to even higher degrees and then research becomes a 
prerequisite for human progress. Jonas (1969, p. 230) described this ideological stance 
as follows: 
 
“[...] science is a necessary instrument of progress; research is a necessary 
instrument of science; and in medical science experimentation on human 
subjects is a necessary instrument of research: Therefore, human 
experimentation has come to be a societal interest.” 
 





“Are you not concerned with the fact that there are studies sponsored by companies? 
No! No. Well, whenever you have research, you have interest behind, either the 
academic interest or this academic interest associated with a commercial or industrial 
interest [...] Financial interests. We live in capitalism. And this is not always bad. This 
can bring about benefits for society, especially when we talk about new drugs [...] 
Everything that is developed in the world is developed through research, be it research 
on human beings, be it research on cement, be it research on atoms, be it research 
on... whatever [...] The development of society is realized through research, through 
the observation of phenomena [...].” 
(São Paulo/C2/Nurse/04-11) 
 
“Well, you have talked about that quickly but I would like to ask: in your opinion, what 
is the main goal of clinical research? 
I think it is, first, to assess and develop new drugs (in terms of medicines), new 
procedures (in terms of surgeries, nutrition and also physiotherapy) [...] In a sense, 
everything must go through research [...] Piaget said that all knowledge is based on 
organization and adaptation. So all the knowledge that comes from clinical research is 
aimed to organize the new procedure and adapt your behaviour to this procedure [...], 
otherwise medicine would be paralyzed, you know, you wouldn’t have had this 
incredible progress you’ve had over the last years. Look, thirty years ago, all you had 
was the X-ray. Nowadays, you have a device that tells what is going on with you almost 
at the level of your cells. This is an incredible progress. Thirty years ago, people died of 
prostate cancer, people with breast cancer, when they got to the hospital, were 
already at a degree... Nowadays, we lose very few people because of that. The 
evolution is indisputable. I’m not talking about Brazil, I’m talking about the world, 
about medicine. It is indisputable, Edison [...].” 
(São Paulo/C2/Physician/04-11) 
 
 Things would not be considered as indisputable by people holding analytical 
concerns. Indeed, the analytical approach is also most interested in research methods 
but its attitude is rather cautious, if not suspicious. Analysts have scrutinized the 
scientific, statistical and clinical procedures generally used in clinical trials. According 
to these analyses, clinical researchers can sometimes prevent research failures from 
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emerging and force the evidence they are looking for to appear. These are some of the 
strategies that have been identified: 
 
 By making inclusion criteria very stringent, one would be able to select a study 
population that is likely to show a good performance for the candidate drug 
(Petryna, 2009) 
 When the candidate drug is compared to a competitor’s drug, this latter can be 
used in doses that do not reflect its normal use, enhancing the positive 
performance of the candidate medicine (Petryna, 2009, Shah, 2006, Busfield, 
2006) 
 In one-to-one comparisons, the performance of the proposed medicine can be 
improved if research subjects were asked to take parallel medicines in addition 
to the candidate compound (Petryna, 2009) 
 In trials for drugs to be used in elderly people, only young people could be 
recruited. As young people tend to show fewer side effects, the appearance of 
safety would then be enhanced (Shah, 2006) 
 Prior to the actual conduct of a trial, pilot studies can be conducted in order to 
identify and exclude research subjects that prove to be more likely to respond 
to placebos (Lakoff, 2007)  
 
“Needless to say, without such protocol tinkering, differences between newer 
and older drugs treating similar conditions would in many cases be narrowed 
substantially” (Petryna, 2009, p. 83-84). Here, there is a concern with pharma 
companies’ and CROs’ operations, as one assumes that they “[...] make the facts and 
select the data that are reviewed by the approval agencies” (Busfield, 2006, p. 305). 
Focusing on different types of clinical studies, some analysts concluded that, compared 
to academic research, trials sponsored by companies are more likely to show positive 
results (Kjaergard and Als-Nielsen, 2002) and that companies fail to publish data when 
study results counter their expectations (Turner et al., 2008, Chan and Altman, 2003, 
Chan and Altman, 2005). 
By paying attention to such examples, one comes to refuse the idea of 
potentially sound studies conducted in accordance with the established scientific 
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standards. Considering that clinical research has been dominated by multinational 
companies (an assumption that is inherited from the pragmatic mentality), holders of 
the analytical approach point out a different “standard”: the savviness of companies 
and researchers that are always willing to “‘engineer up’ the success of trials,” to use 
Petryna’s (2009, p. 187) expression. These same concerns were voiced by a small 
number of my interviewees. 
 
“Do you consider the meeting as the most important moment in the committee’s work? 
Er... no. The most important moment is the analysis of the project. It must be well-
analyzed, you need time for that, it takes time. You need to research. Sometimes we 
have to check whether one reference is accurate or not. From time to time the 
references are not really adequate; that has happened since some time.” 
(Porto Alegre/C5/Physician/05-11) 
 
“Is the review something that takes you much time to do? 
It depends on the project [...] The test of a new medicine, you know, how do I do this 
review? It gives me much work. I go on Medline, I look at the summary of the last 
publications, I see, among the last publications in Medline on that drug, those who are 
not sponsored by pharma companies (because we have the information that projects 
sponsored by the industry tend to show much superior results than studies done in 
universities without funding from companies, you know), another resource I use, when 
I get too concerned [...], is the British National Formulary, BNF68 [...], and based on 
that, I make solicitations. For instance, BNF, the last time I went onto it, I found, for a 
drug under study, a counter-indication, on BNF, that had not been pointed out in the 
project. So I asked them to put that specific condition into the exclusion criteria, 
according to what BNF said.” 
(São Paulo/C3/Social scientist/05-11) 
 
 From this point of view, committee members would be responsible for a sort of 
scientific investigation, in order to unravel methodological inaccuracies. 
 Obviously, the technical and analytical mentalities look at multinational 
companies and globalization with different eyes. In the analytical approach, global 
                                                     
68
 Medline and BNF are two online databases with biomedical information and literature. 
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companies would be actors endowed with a huge capacity to tinker with protocols. In 
the technical approach, companies are seen as competent and resourceful promoters 
of clinical studies. As one of my interviewees put it, “[...] the industry is very developed 
and they prepare good protocols [...] I won’t give their names but it is just a pleasure 
reading those people’s protocols [...].” Bellow, I compare two claims voiced by two 






“Do you think it is possible to say that in clinical 
research, people are testing drugs but they are 
also testing scientific methods? 
[Pause.] [...] I don’t think so. I’ll tell you why. I 
think... Again... Let’s take two situations. I think, if 
you take pure academic research, then they are. If 
you take drug companies, you’re not; you are 
there to show that a drug is better [...] I speak in 
the correction [...] Er... if a company organizes a 
drug test, it is three times more likely to be 
positive for their drug than if an independent 
researcher organizes that research. So I think the 
message is there. I think it is three, it might be 
four, but I think it is three times.” 
 
 
“Do you remember a moment of big disagreement 
[in a meeting]? 
Yes, I have disagreed, strongly, with somebody 
about a clinical trial where I had the impression 
that because it is a big drug company, there is an 
assumption that they’re doing something wrong 
and that it isn’t carefully thought about what is 
being done. And, also, I know that when a big drug 
company puts together a very large study costing 
millions if not billions these days (I mean, we’ve 
got a trial that is recruiting 22,000 people; it is a 
very controversial trial)... but I also know that 
when they put that protocol together, they’ve got 
all the experts around the table, and it wasn’t an 
evil person in a drug company deciding how to do 











Figure 5.1 – Discourse graphic n. 29 
(Cape Town/C6/Physician/08-11) 
  




 In these examples, we have two people with the same background (medicine) 
and sitting in the same committee, but embracing two different mentalities. These 
discourse graphics show how the technical approach tends to draw on bioethical 
claims (one simple claim in the example above), while the analytical approach is 
underpinned by communitarian and pragmatic concerns. 
 The example shown above lets us observe another crucial argument in the 
technical approach: trials sponsored by the industry are said to be more accurate than 
academic studies because companies hold more financial resources to set up 
appropriate research structures. In a report prepared for the Association of Clinical 
Research Organizations, it is claimed: “Although problems with trials sponsored by 
multinational companies are likely to receive more press attention, ethical and quality 
violations often occur in trials initiated by local investigators” (Voi Consulting, 2009, p. 
15). In the technical mentality, another claim tends to be repeated: “The creation of a 
new drug is risky and expensive” (Wood, 2006, p. 618), an idea that suggests the 
scientific accuracy of wealthy companies. 
 
 
“So it is possible to say that the business goals of the industry enhances or improves the 
scientific goals of trials. 
It goes hand in hand. The basis is the business goal and that improves the science in 
the way that, for example, the sample sizes must be appropriate. If you don’t get the 
appropriate sample sizes, you run the clinical trial for ten years and at the end of the 
long way doing clinical trials, nothing is significant because the sample size is not 
appropriate. And that is something industry wouldn’t do [...] So their design of clinical 
trials is very good [...].” 
(Cape Town/C6/Bioscientist/08-11) 
 
“So the main difference between the academic and the industrial research would be 
the scientific expertise. 
I think that is the one part and the other is the quality in terms of conducting the trial. 
In an academic trial, you don’t have the kind of resources and the support staff that 
you do for an industry-conducted trial where CROs come in and do a professional job 
with administrator support etcetera. So there is a big difference from that point of 
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 From this technical point of view, the globalization of trials appears as 
scientifically desirable. In the statistical explanation given by Marschner (2010), for 
example, three reasons are presented that would justify the conduct of global studies: 
the advantages of multicentre studies can be enjoyed at the global scale; results are 
more generalizable; and there is less need for replication, for many ethnicities are 
involved in the study. Thus the technical mentality frames the globalization of trials as 
a scientific imperative. In its turn, the analytical approach considers globalization as a 
phenomenon that enhances the power of multinational companies, expanding the 
leeway for scientific tricks in clinical research. 
 To summarize, the technical mentality operates with the idea of scientific 
standards, subsequently suggesting that big companies have more resources in order 
to comply with them. On the other hand, the analytical mentality, directly influenced 
by pragmatic and communitarian concerns, stresses the tricks that can be done while 
designing and analyzing clinical studies, a phenomenon that requires a more cautious 
attitude towards companies. In the following section, we focus on these two 
approaches’ sources. 
 
5.3.2 Philosophical and historical sources 
 
The emergence of the technical mentality has to do with a very long historical 
development. It is part of a process that Weber (1968) captured with the idea of 
“rationalization.” Into the framework of this slow development, one can certainly 
include social products such as bureaucracy, management, science, accounts, among 
other creations whose effect has been the reduction of the leeway for “subjectivity” in 
key domains of social life. As Porter (1992, p. 646) claimed, “[…] science enshrines 
objectivity, meaning (here) not truth to nature, but impersonality, standardization – 
reducing subjectivity to a minimum.” 
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We are dealing with a powerful mindset that derives abstract and general 
categories from concrete examples. Applied to the domain of medicine, this mindset 
has led to a conception of the human body in which organic and biological differences 
are seen in the light of general concepts. “One quality attributed to the natural 
sciences is the independence of their established facts from local contexts: a given 
chemical element or a chromosome is the same ‘thing’ whether studied in San 
Francisco or São Paulo” (Lakoff, 2005, p. 3). According to Lakoff (2005, 2007), the 
medical thought came to frame diseases as something existing outside of human 
bodies, allowing for more and more ambitious generalizations, until the point in which 
recent techniques, such as genomics, can aspire to eventually become universally 
valid. 
 Thus, the idea of general and objective knowledge (which appeared in some of 
the technical claims previously quoted) is also a historical product. Thanks to a long 
development through which concepts and procedures were slowly harnessed, one 
could eventually generate the idea of conclusions “springing directly from the facts,” 
an image that testify to the “cultural authority of science,” to use Gillespie, Eva and 
Johnston’s (1979, p. 294) words. However, in order to fully grasp the technical 
mentality’s features, it is important to consider how scientific conclusions are generally 
obtained. 
 According to Arendt (1958/1998), modern society, by developing its productive 
forces to unprecedented levels, ended up putting the idea of production at the centre 
of its philosophical framework. Consequently, no human activity is really favoured 
without being somehow related to the fabricating process through which men change 
their material environment and add new useful things to the world. Science could not 
escape from these processes, and the main implication was the central role attributed 
to experiments. In fact, experiments are procedures through which scientists establish 
a material arrangement (the fabricating side of science) and glean scientific knowledge 
(the cognitive side of science). “The use of the experiment for the purpose of 
knowledge was already the consequence of the conviction that one can know only 
what he has made himself [...] The experiment repeats the natural process as though 
man himself were about to make nature’s objects […]” (Arendt, 1958/1998, p. 295). 
 Clinical studies can be seen as experiments in which researchers try to produce 
scenarios that imitate the processes of nature. In this way, they reinforce “the modern 
179 
 
blending of making and knowing” (Arendt, 1958/1998, p. 296). The technical mentality 
could not exist without being underpinned by this active stance of science, nor would 
it be effective without the medical view of bodies, diseases and drugs. 
 It is important to stress that all these ideological constructs belong to very 
broad processes encompassing many social domains. The Industrial Revolution 
represented a watershed in this history. 
 
“The avalanche of numbers, the erosion of determinism, and the invention of 
normalcy are embedded in the grander topics of the Industrial Revolution. The 
acquisition of numbers by the populace, and the professional lust for precision 
in measurement, were driven by familiar themes of manufacture, mining, 
trade, health, railways, war, empire. Similarly the idea of a norm became 
codified in these domains” (Hacking, 1990, p. 5). 
 
From the viewpoint of the theory of communicative action, all these 
developments can be said to have reinforced the instrumental mentality, making social 
groups more controllable and social actions directed to ends more precise. Thus, the 
technical aspect of society has grown bigger and bigger, in the double sense that 
groups can be technically shaped and controlled like instruments, on the one hand, 
and that the impacts of social actions can be anticipated more accurately, on the 
other. This is true not only for practical actions but also for discourses, which can be 
voiced in order to provoke predictable reactions. I am referring here to the 
instrumental use of language, a possibility which was pointed out by Habermas 
(1981/1987) himself. It is because of this instrumental, technical use of language, 
which draws on broad social, philosophical and historical processes, that I speak of 
technical (rather than medical or scientific) mentality. 
 In this very brief historical overview, one should not forget the pivotal role 
played by the statistical thought, which is decisive in clinical trials as well. On this 
point, the first ideological upheaval was provoked, at the end of the nineteenth 
century, by the idea of sampling, according to which some individuals, if carefully 
selected, can be considered to represent the whole population. “This was unthinkable 
during most of the nineteenth century. The very thought of being representative has 
had to come into being. This has required techniques of thinking together with 
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technologies of data collection. An entire style of scientific reasoning has had to 
evolve” (Hacking, 1990, p. 6-7). In many domains, including those which have to deal 
with individual and apparently untameable variations (like medicine), statistics has 
proved invaluable precisely because it can turn variety into regularity, rebel 
inconsistencies into obedient measures. Thanks to blends of mathematical and 
statistical tools, the rationalization of society advanced many steps forward, for 
according to Arendt’s (1958/1998) interpretation, it was now possible to penetrate any 
series of objects and events, which could be rapidly submitted to numerical orders. 
Statistics never cease to show its ability to cope with large numbers, a 
characteristic that can only be highly treasured in a mass society. “There is a seeming 
paradox: the more the indeterminism, the more the control” (Hacking, 1990, p. 2). The 
next step was the admission that the regularities and “normalities” presupposed by 
statistics, instead of deriving from human speculations, must be an inherent 
characteristic of the world and society. From a methodological tool used to undertake 
some (more or less conclusive) tests, statistics have turned into a “synthetic a priori 
truth” (Hacking, 1990, p. 104), especially for those who display the disposition to “trust 
in numbers” (Porter, 1995). 
The technical mentality, having achieved this stage in which quantification is 
not only possible but also necessary, is rapidly endowed with an important political 
feature. With this numeric clothing, it can be globalized more easily, for as Porter 
(1992, p. 644) argued: “Quantification is a form of rhetoric that is especially effective 
for diffusing research findings to other laboratories, languages, countries and 
continents.” Therefore, two phenomena made the globalization of the technical 
approach likely to occur. On the one hand, the simple fact that (by means of pragmatic 
notions) people of different countries become concerned with similar issues pertaining 
to clinical trials. On the other hand, the globalization of trials necessarily entails the 
use of mathematical and statistical concepts with which clinical protocols are 
designed. In this way, committee members have to deal, at some point, with the 
historically and philosophically powerful notions of the technical mentality, according 
to which research proposals should be analyzed in the light of scientific standards, 
statistical methods and objective yardsticks. Hence, some claims such as the one 





“Do you think there are fundamental differences between an academic study and a 
trial sponsored by the industry? 
Ah. Well, that question can be answered in very different ways. So... Scientifically, 
there shouldn’t be, right? Scientifically, they should have the same standards, the 
same guidelines, the same... the same... the same sort of mode of producing 
acceptable knowledge. So over five hundred years of science, we have come to certain 
standards of valid and true and objective knowledge, and pharmaceutical research 
should follow those equally as academic research should do [...].” 
(Cape Town/C7/Bioethicist/08-11) 
 
Compared to this ideological history of the technical approach, the analytical 
mentality can be said to be in its childhood. Actually, one can say that it begun to be 
formulated in the 1980s, as a consequence of social and scientific developments of 
clinical studies. The first observation making it possible to formulate analytical views of 
trials was the flexibility displayed by some drugs, whose final application had little or 
nothing to do with their initial intended use. As Abraham (2007, p. 733) explained: 
 
“[…] scientists have tried [...] to construct numerous drugs for particular 
therapeutic and market categories only to discover during clinical trials that the 
drug-human biochemical interaction produced a completely unexpected 
outcome resulting in the drugs being marketed for entirely different 
therapeutic purposes from those initially constructed (e.g. Viagra).” 
 
From these observations, two crucial ideas have been gleaned. Firstly, the 
hypothesized accuracy of science has been contested by some analysts who have 
observed researchers struggling so as to confirm their “guesses” via clinical trials. 
Secondly, analysts came to unravel the flexible nature of trials, concluding that in the 
same ways in which one trial can be rethought and redesigned in order to produce 
evidence in a new way, it can also be rethought in order to be analyzed and shown in a 
different and sceptical light. 
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One important event underpinning the emergence of the analytical mentality 
was the revelation of inaccuracies (frauds?) undertaken in some clinical studies. For 
instance, McGoey and Jackson (2009) analyzed the case of Seroxat, a 
GlaxoSmithKline’s drug that remained in the market even after the company had 
discovered that it was not only ineffective for its targeted disease (childhood 
depression) but also increased suicidal tendencies in children. Another example is 
Vioxx, a Merck’s anti-inflammatory that remained in the market until 2004. It was 
lately discovered that, in 2001, the company had had enough evidence about the 
cardiovascular risks entailed by the product (Juni et al., 2004, Psaty and Kronmal, 2008, 
Topol, 2004). In Chapter 4, it was claimed that the bioethical approach is fostered by 
the remembrance of past scandals in clinical research. Now we see that the analytical 
approach is concerned with some historical examples as well. Nevertheless, one 
difference needs to be pointed out here. Whereas the bioethical mentality focuses on 
relatively old examples (such as the Nazi studies or the Tuskegee scandal), the 
analytical mentality evokes more recent stories, suggesting that they are somehow 
here, lurking and waiting for the opportunity to happen anew. In addition, the 
analytical approach does not focus on moral issues (such as exploitation, deception 
and consent to research) but delves into scientific and methodological failures of 
studies. 
 In spite of these procedural concerns, the analytical approach does not depend 
on codes and specialized languages. On the contrary, its emergence was mainly due to 
actions of people who did not have a scientific background. On this point, Epstein’s 
(1996) book is crucial to understand the formulation of this approach. He studied the 
conduct of the first Aids trials in the United States, during the 1980s, a period when 
scientists had a very poor comprehension about this disease’s mechanisms. As no 
previous knowledge on HIV was available, studies were based on purely hypothetical 
assumptions. As a consequence, researchers realized that it would be interesting to 
work in cooperation with patients and Aids activists, who held a personal knowledge 
that could bring about important inputs to studies. “Some researchers therefore came 
to welcome, or at least acknowledge benefits of, activists’ participation in the design of 
clinical trials” (Epstein, 1996, p. 336). 
 The events described by Epstein constituted a decisive point of departure for 
the analytical mentality. Stunned by the march of a mysterious and murderous 
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disease, society put the power of science under scrutiny. Suddenly, all scientific 
knowledge that had been gathered during centuries proved futile and some scientists 
decided to draw on some lay knowledge provided by those who directly experienced 
the disease. The analytical mentality is fostered by this idea that in some situations, lay 
“invasions” of medicine may lead to desirable results. The first Aids trials represented a 
historical opportunity to unravel something that, mostly, comes to pass in very subtle 
ways: lay people are not mere receptors of medical knowledge; rather, they assess this 
knowledge on the basis of personal feelings and experiences. For instance, patients, in 
order to take decisions about their diseases, consider what is said by physicians but 
also consult their own feelings and the opinions of friends and relatives, engaging in 
dialogical relations that are decisively influenced by contexts (Ehrich, 2003, Rapley, 
2008). 
 Thus, the analytical approach is also nourished by the laypeople’s confidence at 
delivering some inputs to medicine. In clinical trials, this attitude is made possible 
because of two circumstances. On the one hand, as Epstein (1996) noted, researchers 
do not always agree as to whether study results must be interpreted in one direction 
or another. In fact, drawing on exactly the same data, investigators may advance 
completely discordant conclusions (Abraham, 1993, Richards, 1988). In these 
occasions, the feedback from patients may acquire a special worth. On the other hand, 
there are some clinical studies (in areas such as cancer or other rare diseases) in which 
the conversation between experts and subjects is paramount to assess the actual 
effects of candidate drugs. Thus, in spite of the often obscure language spoken within 
clinical studies, there is still some leeway for lay interventions. “This more immediate 
role of patients in clinical research, combined with the relatively greater accessibility of 
research methods to lay comprehension, explains the enhanced capacity of laypeople 
to intervene in debates about trial design and interpretation” (Epstein, 1996, p. 337). 
 In ethics committees, non-medical “invasions” of medicine are also likely to 
occur, as some proposals pertaining to clinical trials come to be analyzed by nurses, 
lawyers, social workers or lay members. Even though physicians continue to be 
favoured in the review of medical studies,69 some members who lack a medical 
                                                     
69
 I come back to this point in the next chapter. 
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background do manage to obtain a certain amount of expertise, which enables them 
to gauge some substantial scientific aspects of protocols. 
 The history of the technical mentality is completely intertwined with the history 
of clinical trials; one can certainly say that trials could not exist, in the way they are 
organized today, without being complemented by the technical mentality. The 
analytical mentality, however, emerges “from the outside” of trials. From its very 
beginning, it breaks the theoretical and methodological structures of trials, leading the 
interpretation toward new and unexpected directions. In some circumstances, this 
approach does lead to contestation, pointing to inaccuracies in clinical research. In this 
sense, it refuses the accommodating stance of the bioethical approach. The resulting 
posture can be described by using Bosk’s (1999/2008, p. 17) words: we are dealing 
with a “challenge to medicine,” which “[...] was more confrontational in tone, more 
insistent on structural change, and more focused on the politics of health care than 
was the bioethics movement.” 
 This challenging stance exists because the analytical mentality has some 
ideological linkages to “philosophical scepticism.” In this tradition, one doubts the 
basis on which lies the generation of objective and scientific certainties. Knowledge is 
therefore framed as a human production whose existence must be looked at 
cautiously, instead of being automatically trusted. Thus, even though the analytical 
mentality begun to be constituted in the 1980s, it draws, at least partially, on 
philosophical attitudes proposed by old thinkers such as Michel de Montaigne and 
David Hume. 
As a consequence of these phenomena, the analytical mentality, when it comes 
to the ethical review of research proposals, strongly opposes the technical mentality. 
While this latter claims for reviews done by experts, the analytical approach tries to 
soften the differences between reviewers, arguing that everybody has cognitive 
limitations and can acquire useful experience at reviewing proposals. The following 




Analytical  Technical 
 
“I’m a psychiatrist. When I’m reading a 
gastroenterology project, what do I know? You 
have to admit that even though I’m a physician, 
I’m not a general practitioner. After thirty years 
in my specialty, I can no longer think like a 
haematologist who sees new things every day. 
So I have to read the structure [...] I look at the 
protocol’s structure [...].” 
(São Paulo/C2/Physician/04-11) 
  
“And do you think that somebody who doesn’t 
have a medical background would really have 
difficulties at analyzing such type of protocol? 
I think so. I think there must be someone with 
expertise in the area to solve some problems 
pertaining to the scope of the project or some 
things that are more scientific, you know. I think 







“After these years of work in the committee, 
what are the results of your being in the 
committee? 
For starters, it has just broadened my 
knowledge to such an extent that I can’t even 
explain it. It’s also made me more confident to 
be able to participate when there’s debate. 
Okay? So I also have the ability now to say: ‘Ya, 
but you remember that we did that trial two 
years ago; we found out that...’ You 






“So you’ve never got a protocol from the 
industry. 
I’ve never got a protocol from the 
pharmaceutical industry. Thanks God [laughter]. 
You don’t want to. 
I don’t want to. 
Because of this lack of medical knowledge. 
I think, the lack of expertise. The expertise and 
the medical knowledge [...] I understand neither 
the research methodology they use (controls, 
placebos, whether everything is in line with what 
is usually done in this kind of research) nor the 
pharmacology and the harms that are likely to 
be caused to patients, you know [...].” 






“So you think that the fact that you don’t have 
a medical background doesn’t compromise your 
analysis. 
I think it doesn’t. Because, also, if I have 
doubts, I can always talk to other members in 
the same way they ask me questions when they 
have doubts about legislation [...] I see that in 
some aspects, I have some concerns that they 
[physicians] don’t have, and vice-versa. I think 
that in certain aspects, they sort of guess, 
because they have experience, whereas we, as 
lawyers, are more cautious [...] 
For instance. 
I think there are situations in which they allow 
the conduct of studies that may have juridical 
consequences in the future, involving monetary 
compensations or even criminal issues, and 
they don’t pay attention to that [...].” 
(São Paulo/C3/Lawyer/04-11) 
  
“[...] with proper scientific background, you have 
a sufficient critical view to assess protocols in 
any field. 
So by reading a positive, optimistic protocol, 
someone without this scientific background 
would be more strongly influenced. 
Absolutely... [pause] both positively and 
negatively [...] non-physicians frequently refrain 
the scientific progress because they don’t 
understand [...] I mean, you’re not able to 
exactly understand the justification of things or 
the relevance of the proposal, you don’t have a 
proper background for that, and then you don’t 
agree [...] I wouldn’t even say non-physicians, 
I’m talking about scientific background [...] 
Would you be favourable to committees in which 
this scientific background is a mandatory 
prerequisite? 
Look, Brazilian regulations are clear and well-
defined. You have to have members from 
several categories, right? However, you’re asking 
me my personal opinion. I think there should be 







 Thus, whereas the technical approach claims for expert reviews, the analytical 
approach stresses the contributions offered by committee members who lack a 
scientific background. This is not the only point on which these mentalities disagree. In 
the following sections, we shall focus on other aspects. 
 
5.3.3 Applying methods 
 
It was seen that both the technical and analytical mentalities pay a special 
attention to methods advanced in research projects. It is also important to note that 
committee members, when reviewing proposals, also mobilize their own reviewing 
methods. On the one hand, reviewers who embrace the technical mentality reinforce, 
with their review, statistical and clinical procedures used in clinical trials. On the other 
hand, holders of the analytical mentality strive to apply broader reviewing techniques 
and perspectives. 
As for the technical approach, committee members admit that it is necessary to 
“measure,” so to speak, the distance between proposed methodologies and 
established scientific standards. Thus, the technical mentality cannot really be 
exercised without the recognition of binding rules of science. 
 
“How would you define bad science? 
Ah, there are many different ways of defining that. It is a huge question. Bad science is 
partly science that does not respect the agreed standards of good scientific research. 
So when I said before there are all kinds of agreements about what constitutes doing 
good science or what constitutes the production of sort of acceptable new knowledge, 




 Thus the technical mentality never ceases to look for standards and patterns. 
Eventually, the intention is to organize a mighty cognitive enterprise within which 
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everybody (both clinical researchers and committee members) would be able to 
control the research process. Hence, the importance of some visual techniques such as 
graphics, tables and formulas. On the one hand, investigators would derive more 
controllability from techniques such as scans and computing techniques (Waldby, 
2000). On the other hand, committee members would exercise their viewing capacities 
by means of their ethical (re)views. In this sense, ethics committees would be another 
incarnation of the “omni-viewing power” created by “technical procedures,” to use 
Certeau’s (1990) expressions. On this point, some of Foucault’s (1963/1988, 
1975/1999) ideas, such as surveillance and panopticism, can help us understand the 
technical mentality. However, these ideas would rapidly prove much less helpful when 
we leave the technical approach’s domain. 
 Controllability and precision can be more easily reached with the support of 
statistical methods. By measuring deviances and “quantifying expectations” 
(Marschner, 2010, p. 149), statistics has made it possible to deal with the variations 
verified in global trials. As Marschner explains, it is even possible to anticipate the 
variations to be displayed by different world regions in a trial. “By studying the 
expected extent of variation, awareness is created at the outset that can head off the 
potential for surprises at the end of the study” (Marschner, 2010, p. 155). Thus, when 
designing (or reviewing) clinical protocols, one can rely on the yardsticks provided by 
statistics, which as Hacking (1990) puts it, bring about the certainty that regularities 
can be looked for and eventually identified. One of my interviewees stressed the role 
of statistics in a clear way: 
 
“What I see in statistics... It is a toolbox with my tools in there (our mathematical 
tools) that allow me to convert data into information and then the emphasis is: in an 
objective way. That is statistics. 
Hm. Okay. So there is no subjective dimension in the design of a protocol, from a 
statistical point of view. 
No. Not a typical clinical trial, anyway [...] I think the way that statisticians conduct 
statistics is... You know, statisticians are trying to understand the problem [...] So, 
automatically, mathematics is there to talk. I follow the rules of mathematics [...] 





 For some committee members, the statistical accuracy of a research project is 
one of the main criteria leading to its approval or refusal. In the hazardous and 
complex domain of trials, statistical tools seem attractive because they provide 
researchers and reviewers with guidelines to organize elements and constitute 
controllable scenarios. This is another step in the long process through which statistical 
laws acquire a “psychological reality” (Hacking, 1990, p. 205). 
This mindset is therefore produced by and derived from the need for control 
and anticipation. 
 
“Thus one sees the development of multiple technologies of futurity, most of 
which seek to ‘model’ potential futures, notably ‘scenario planning’ construed 
as a part of strategic planning that seeks to develop the tools and technologies 
for imagining potential futures and then managing their consequences” 
(Lentzos and Rose, 2009, p. 236). 
 
In clinical research, these efforts have already led to the creation of software 
that simulates studies before their actual conduct in order to foresee difficulties and 
select methods. 
 Deeply concerned with standards and objectivity, the technical mentality ends 
up leaving little space for subjectivity to be expressed. Randomization70 has turned 
into a major concern precisely because it is supposed to extract personal choices from 
the universe of trials. Even though it is sometimes admitted that perfect randomization 
is an unreachable goal, it is also frequently assumed that a randomly selected sample 
is a “perfectly made” sample. As claimed before, the modern scientific thought uses 
experiments to “produce” scenarios from which knowledge can be gleaned. 
Randomization fits perfectly these ambitions not only because it allows for scientific 
arrangements to be “made,” but also because this production suffers little influence 
from personal preferences. “Randomization [...] has become part of the logic of 
induction, reminding us that induction is not just a matter of thinking but of doing” 
(Hacking, 1990, p. 206). What is important to stress is that the principle of 
                                                     
70
 According to the principle of randomization, research subjects must be distributed at random in the 
placebo group and control group. 
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randomization has become a central guideline not only for those who design clinical 
studies but also for some ethics committee members. 
 
“But from a mathematical and statistical point of view, what would be an ethical 
problem? 
[Pause.] An ethical problem would be if you, for example, if you do something wrong 
in the randomization process [...] If you assign people who are more likely to respond 
to the drug that you want to win, that would be unethical. You know, interfering with 
randomization, for example, would be very unethical. And, of course, unblinding would 
also be very unethical, before the trial is finished, or if your investigator who is to treat 
these patients gets unblinded in the trial where he is supposed to be blinded.71 So, 
basically, it comes to if you, in any way, remove part of the objectivity, then you’re 
compromising the statistics [...] 
So, eventually, subjectivity would be unethical in clinical trials. 
Yes. But subjectivity not in the sense when your assessment is subjective, when you... 
[pause] when you have to sort of, say, you have to record the colour of my eyes. That 
is subjective assessment [...] I’m not talking about that kind of subjectivity. I’m talking 
about subjectivity which favours the outcome for the trial [...].” 
(Pretoria/C8/Bioscientist/07-11) 
 
 From this point of view, personal hopes and preferences can be reduced by 
means of clinical trials, “[...] which are seen as providing evidence to balance 
enthusiasm” (Will, 2010, p. 559). As a consequence of all these ambitions, the 
technical mentality tends to pay attention to standardized aspects of clinical studies, 
almost overlooking contextual factors. 
 
“Would you have an example of a situation in which the ethical principles are 
breached? 
[Pause.] To propose a procedure without having adequate theoretical and laboratorial 
basis for the study to be done. This is the most frequent case. 
                                                     
71
 A “blinded” researcher is the one who does not know which subjects take the candidate drug and which 
subjects take the placebo. 
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So the researcher is able to comply with ethical principles when he or she complies with 
regulations and scientific rules. 
No, not only with regulations but certainly with scientific rules. 




“[...] if you’re doing, for instance, an NIH study and there are five sites, five different 
countries and you’re taking blood samples, it is vital that... all the blood samples must 
be processed in the same lab, otherwise people do different things, in different ways. 
All has to be done by the same people, in the same lab so that you can analyze your 
results accurately. You can’t... NIH72 is giving you the money, they’re paying, they’re 
saying: ‘We’ve got a specialized lab, please send us the blood.’ Some people on this 
committee will say: ‘No, we should be on... capacity-building.’73 Yes, we should be on 
capacity-building but we don’t have the labs at the moment. So in time to come, 
they’ll build up the lab [...].” 
(Cape Town/C7/Lay member/05-11) 
 
  In this last example, the interviewee uses technical concerns with research 
standards in order to counter the communitarian concern about samples and national 
research infra-structures. Concerned with the issue of standards, committee members 
voicing strong technical discourses may end up framing research proposals as scientific 
papers to be assessed in the light of expert knowledge. 
 
“When you are reading a protocol, do you manage to have an idea of how the actual 
research is going to happen? I mean, based on the quality of the protocol, is it possible 
to have an idea of... 
Absolutely. Absolutely [...] a well-written protocol is the one whose structure reflects 
the structure of the scientific work. 
Could a protocol be considered as a previous... 
It is a proposal. A well-written proposal is halfway to a well-written article [laughter]. 
But I mean, in terms of the structure... 
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 The National Institutes of Health (NIH) is a U.S. funding agency. 
73
 On the South African policy called “capacity-building,” see Chapter 4, section 4.2.8. 
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In terms of the structure. It is the same thing. They can be similar. They can and they 
must be similar.” 
(São Paulo/C3/Physician/04-11) 
 
 This interviewee has been in the committee for two years. He is a well-known 
physician and investigator in his therapeutic domain. He conducts academic studies 
and also participates in trials sponsored by pharma companies as principal 
investigator. The following discourse graphic derived from his interview. 
This discourse is decisively 
dominated by two groups of claims: first, 
there is a technical approach to ethics 
committees (TECH13); second, the idea of 
scientific knowledge and its standards 
(TECH11). It is worth noting the ideological 
support from some bioethical claims, as 
well as the almost complete absence of 
claims at the communicational side. 
More than any other mentality, the 
technical approach praises the idea of 
evidence, which is conceived as the conclusion deriving from well-reasoned 
procedures and concepts. Eventually, evidence, which is a human creation, turns into a 
force that no human being can oppose. As Arendt (1963) claimed, mathematical 
evidence, insofar as it faces people with its undeniable force, may become as powerful 
as divine forces. Every mathematical statement (such as two and two is four) “[...] is 
rooted in the physical structure of the human brain, and therefore is ‘irresistible’” 
(Arendt, 1963, p. 194). 
 In contrast to this mindset, the analytical mentality seems to favour moral 
discourse, which “[...] is indeed a statement of reason and even a reasoned statement 
which stands in need of agreement” (Arendt, 1963, p. 194). Thus, the reviewing 
methods marshalled by committee members holding this approach are frequently 
flexible and tentative. It is as though holders of the analytical mentality were striving 
to build up new models of ethical review. During my fieldwork, I was intrigued by the 




fact that only when this approach emerged in the interviews, members displayed very 
deep concerns with the intricacies and details of research proposals. 
 
“But do you think that when you’re reviewing an industrial protocol, you have a 
different stance toward the protocol? 
No, if the protocol involves the test of a new medicine, I’ll follow the procedures I 
described to you, I’ll look at Medline, I’ll be very careful, especially if the medicine has 
not been approved in the country, you know [...].” 
(São Paulo/C3/Social scientist/05-11) 
 
“Do you think there is any part of the protocol that needs to be read more carefully? 
Oh, the methodology [...] The methodology says how you’re going to approach, how 
you’re going to do, whether you’re going to collect blood or not, how you’re going to 
administer, how... I think I’m learning this part [...] When I’m not sure about something 
they say, especially statistical points... So if they use statistical terms and I don’t know 
whether that exists, I look on the internet and find whether that statistical method 
exists, in order to know if they’re not proposing something that doesn’t exist 
[laughter]... Because, I mean, as I don’t know everything, you know (I’m doing a basic 
course on that), so I mean, when they propose: ‘Oh, we are going to apply the tests x, 
y and z,’ and I don’t know whether the tests exist, I look on the internet to know 
whether the tests really exist [...] They describe how the test is and I do the 
comparison to see whether what is said on the internet is said on the protocol [...].” 
(São Paulo/C3/Bioscientist/05-11) 
 
 It is indeed surprising that such carefulness was manifested in so few 
interviews during my fieldwork. Once ethics committees are supposed to analyze 
research proposals, one might suppose that more interviewees would display this kind 
of analytical precautions. In the last example, the interviewee has even been careful 
enough to attend a course on statistics. Thus we see that the review of projects imply 
many kinds of knowledge and some cognitive gaps that some members seem to be 
willing to overcome. On this point, the internet can be a useful tool. Indeed, in the 
examples quoted above, the acquisition of information online is mentioned, and one 
interviewee has even referred to a medical database (Medline). However, analytical 
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claims proved rare during my fieldwork, as can be seen in the discourse boxplots 
presented in Figure 4.2, page 110. 
 Frequently, the analytical mentality tries to look at clinical trials in a historical 
perspective and establish connections between past examples and current research 
practices. Whereas the holders of other mentalities mention only clinical studies they 
reviewed, holders of the analytical approach often refer to recent studies that have 
become classic references in the domain of clinical research. Another typical analytical 
attitude is the reference to texts and studies on clinical trials, mobilized in order to 
support one’s claims. 
 
“In your opinion, what is the main goal of clinical research? 
[...] it is a very wide term [...] The problem is, if you see it from a drug companies’ point 
of view, they are doing research. They’re doing it in a clinical setting, therefore is 
clinical research. But the aim is to promote that drug. And I mean, there are lots of 
examples where things have been twisted slightly. I mean, you only have to look at 
Tamiflu74 [...] They’ve come up with the results but they hide their way. So you’ve got 
to be careful [...].” 
(Cape Town/C6/Physician/08-11) 
 
 Holders of the analytical mentality seem to be aware of details that go beyond 
their everyday experience in the committee. One example comes from the previous 
quote, in which the interviewee referred to the clinical trial that led to the approval of 
a medicine recommended for swine-flu. 
There is a claim moving smoothly from the pragmatic, through the 
communitarian, and into the analytical approach: clinical trials are decisively informed 
by the industry’s financial interests. In the analytical mentality this concern, in addition 
to its moral hues, is covered by social concerns. Moreover, one tries to gather 
arguments and information with which these financial interests can be unmasked. One 
example is the study conducted by Juni and collaborators (2004, p. 2024), in which 
methodological frailties of a clinical study were attributed to the company’s economic 
motivations: “Meta-regression analysis indicated that the funding source largely 
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 Tamiflu is a Roche’s medicine against influenza. In 2009, after an international outbreak of the so-
called swine-flu, the US Food and Drug Administration recommended its use for this disease.  
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explained between-study heterogeneity, with studies funded by Merck indicating 
larger cardioprotective effects of naproxen […].” 
 As this quote shows, holders of the analytical mentality are not refusing 
statistical, clinical, scientific and argumentative tools provided by the technical 
mentality. On the contrary, such tools are frequently mobilized by analysts as well. 
However, this analytical use is realized not to furnish the domain of clinical research 
(like in the technical mentality) but in order to deconstruct clinical research, identifying 
its composing elements and rearranging them into a new order.75 In a sense, analysis 
amounts to ideological betrayal. We are referring to what Certeau (1990, p. 58) 
described as “analytical capacity,” which creates: 
 
“[...] a playing space for ways of using the binding order of place and language. 
Without leaving the position where it needs to live and which dictates certain 
rules, it establishes plurality and creativity. Through a mediating art, it derives 
unforeseen effects” (Certeau, 1990, p. 51-52). 
 
 In clinical research, the main purpose of this “mediating art” is to go beyond 
clinical issues, unravelling the social aspects of trials. Thus, one example of analytical 
ambition would be: “One goal of my research is to understand how wider 
ethnographic contexts inform the design and operation of clinical trials” (Petryna, 
2006, p. 57 - note 7). Social concerns were also voiced by some of my interviewees. 
 
“So you don’t consider the consent form as the part you have to focus on. 
I think it is a part that one has necessarily to pay attention to, but I think there are 
other very important issues, especially in the methodological part [...] I think my 
perspective is more sociological or anthropological. The consent form is the relation to 
one subject [...] but the ethical dimension of research in terms of social aspects, social 
implications, goes beyond this individual dimension [...] The sample size, the place 
where the interviews or the study will be conducted, the time when it will be 
undertaken, whether it will involve patients and their relatives, the issue of 
confidentiality not of the research subject but pertaining to the relations to other 
research subjects, I think those are social questions of research that go beyond this 
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 Etymologically, an “analysis” is a “break-up.”  
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exclusive bilateral dimension (researcher and research subject), you know. And the 
consent form is an individual instrument, because it focuses on the individual. And I 
think the ethical dimension involves the individual in a broader social context, which is 
not addressed by the consent form alone [...].” 
(São Paulo/C3/Social scientist/05-11) 
 
 Thus, the analytical mentality struggles to identify social relations. To describe 
its rationale, we can repeat Becker’s (1996, "Why do we think there is a difference?") 
words: “The point is not to prove, beyond doubt, the existence of particular 
relationships so much as to describe a system of relationships, to show how things 
hang together in a web of mutual influence or support or interdependence [...].” 
 From this point of view, there emerge political concerns, in the sense that 
clinical trials would be “[…] a key technique […] for mediating between pharmaceutical 
companies, clinicians, governments and the public” (Will and Moreira, 2010, p. 1). 
Once again, the analytical mentality confronts the technical mentality by doubting or 
rejecting the assumption that clinical researchers and committee members can be 
carriers of objectivity. Science and politics would thus be strongly intertwined 
(Jasanoff, 1990, Petryna, 2009). 
 Even though the mentalities addressed here come to different or even opposite 
conclusions, they are both informed by precise ideas and shaped by identifiable 
reviewing methods. Whereas the technical mentality accepts the rationale and tools 
mobilized in the design of clinical studies (such as randomization, statistics and 
placebos), the analytical rationale frame these tools as objects of study, which must be 
scrutinized in the light of social interests and relations. Here, we are completely 
immersed into the foreground knowledge, where there is little space for intuitive and 
emotional claims to impose themselves as main arguments. Obviously, the ideological 
differences between the two approaches also define two discordant ways to look at 






5.3.4 Views about regulations 
 
In the analytical (like the communitarian) mentality there is much scepticism 
about the regulations’ capacity to circumvent problems in clinical trials. What is more, 
the global harmonization undergone by clinical guidelines tends to be seen as a threat 
to the comprehension of relevant differences. For example, Timmermans and Epstein 
(2010, p. 70), in a typical analytical vein, pointed out the problem that “[…] we place 
standards and standardization in the foreground as ubiquitous but underestimated 
phenomena that help regulate and calibrate social life by rendering the modern world 
equivalent across cultures, time, and geography.” 
 In addition, holders of this approach also scrutinize research guidelines, 
pointing to weaknesses and flaws, like McGoey and Jackson (2009) did with UK’s 
pharmaceutical rules. Another example comes from Angell (2005), who analyzed the 
Food and Drugs Admistration’s guidelines, stressing that drugs are considered to be 
good enough when compared to placebos, instead of other actual drugs. 
 Here we are not very far from the critical mentality, for which problems and 
flaws are what really matters. Nevertheless, as claimed before, the analytical mentality 
still tries to propose alternative perspectives by working with the current “rules of the 
game.” This is probably why one of my interviewees, who voiced an analytical 
discourse, managed to discover an unsuspected analytical dimension in current 
guidelines: 
 
“So are you somehow concerned about the fact that there are many foreign companies 
conducting clinical trials in South Africa? 
Ah... No. Oh, yes and no. No because we still have a very good regulatory system. 
Trials have to go through ethics committees [...] I cannot answer you whether in fact 
all the ethics committees are as rigorous as they should be. That is another issue. But 
we have a very... We have a format which ensures that we keep a reasonable control 
on what is going on in this country [...] So I wouldn’t be concerned about drug 
companies doing any worse research here than they do in Europe or the States [...] 
Because they comply with global standards. 
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They... Yeah. Most of the trials which are done in this country are multicentre. So the 




 Probably, this interviewee extended his own “rigorous” (analytical) ways of 
reading proposals to the whole reviewing system, which is based on a regulatory 
system that he considers as “very good.” However, this kind of positive (or optimist) 
perspective is quite rare in the analytical mentality. For instance, Petryna detected, in 
the European Union guidelines, loopholes with which there can be a chain of 
outsourcing operations in clinical trials. In this way, “[...] responsibility for the conduct 
of the trial and for insurance, along with civil liability, is continuously transferred to 
third parties who would in practice prove difficult to track” (Petryna, 2009, p. 107). 
In its turn, the technical mentality stresses the idea of progress. Clinical 
research would be submitted to improving trends that include regulatory frameworks. 
Eventually, people admit an overall advancement, in which researchers, committees 
and regulations progress together, adjusting to each other. 
 
“It seems to me that sometimes researchers are more reluctant towards committees 
because they think that committees may refrain the research process. 
Look, this discussion may exist, right? But with time, what happens? The whole system 
gets adjusted to the regulatory framework. If we think about it, we’re talking about a 
framework that is not so old, including Brazil. We’re talking about a bit more than 
fifteen years. It is the time we’ve actually had an adequate definition and regulation 
for ethics committees. That caused an initial difficulty in terms of adjustment from 
some people, of course. Today, I think this is much consolidated.” 
(São Paulo/C3/Physician/04-11) 
 
Thus researchers, regulations and committees are thought of as a single system 
of slow consolidation. From this point of view, there is the subtle, albeit potent, 





“We’ve also developed the pharmaceutical industry to such a large extent... You know, 
something that was often lacking and today anybody follows the correct route is, you 
know, you for example say: ‘A sample size of this magnitude [knock on the table] 
detects such a difference.’ But that difference may or may not be clinically relevant [...] 




“[...] people sometimes have... I wouldn’t say preconceptions, you know, but a view 
that is critical... 
Cautious. 
Cautious about certain protocols [...] I think this belongs to the past [...] I have not 
heard about new examples of multinational companies exploiting vulnerable people.” 
(Porto Alegre/C5/Lawyer/05-11) 
 
 In this way, the technical mentality tends to admit that many ethical problems 
in clinical research have been sorted out. This mindset has a corollary: considering the 
scientific and ethical accuracy of current clinical studies, the heavy bureaucracy of 
ethics committees, as well as the inconsistencies between the operations of different 
committees, may end up delaying or stifling the conduct of important studies (Harries 
et al., 1994, Meade, 1994, Ahmed and Nicholson, 1996, Redshaw et al., 1996). Equally, 
national regulations may be seen as too stringent, threatening further scientific 
developments. Yusuf (2010), for instance, emphatically claimed that “over-regulation” 
has been hampering the conduct of many beneficial trials. 
 
“As a researcher, do you agree that Brazil might improve its performance in terms of 
the ethical review turnaround time? 
Absolutely. However, look, it might improve. Nevertheless, you have today a 
regulatory framework that, one the one hand, is very accurate, and its structure, on 
the other hand, does lead to barriers and long waiting times. As a consequence, Brazil 





“[...] I do sometimes get... I mean, not very often, but there is a certain impression I 
get from some physicians in South Africa about the idea of clinical drug trials: ‘They 
must all be really bad, especially big companies; big companies must be doing things... 
doing harm to patients in order to make profits.’ I think there is very little 
understanding on how those clinical trials are put together and why and what goes 
into putting them together. And the strictness of current regulations, which actually 
make those things quite difficult. And I think there’s far less... there are far fewer 
ethical issues with trials than there were perhaps ten years ago. I’m not saying they 
don’t exist [...], but I think the assumption is always, in our academic setting, that: 
‘We’ve got to look very carefully at those trials because they must be doing some harm 
to the patients; or the investigators are doing it for the wrong motive [...] they must 
have a money motive for doing the trial and not a science motive’ [...] 
Okay, so the review is biased. 
I have wondered about that. It is not something I would say ‘absolutely’ but I do 
suspect that there is an element of it. And from the laypeople, certainly, there is a big 
anti-pharmaceutical feeling. And our lay members have, sometimes, big comments [in 
the meetings] that reflect an inherent bias [...].” 
(Cape Town/C6/Physician/06-11) 
 
 It can be said that in this last quote, the interviewee is dissatisfied with stances 
advanced in all communicative mentalities. Indeed, the suspicious attitude she talked 
about stems from the pragmatic mentality, being reproduced and reinforced by the 
communitarian and analytical mentalities. On the other hand, pragmatic claims 
according to which financial interests come to play in clinical research tend to be 
“tamed” and unproblematized by the bioethical and technical mentalities. 
By observing the quotes presented throughout this chapter, it is perhaps easy 
to see that we are dealing with a political debate whose basic opposing claims can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
 Technical claim: Clinical research, and especially the accurate trials sponsored 
by pharma companies, promotes scientific progress and should be assessed by 




 Analytical claim: Clinical research, and especially the interested trials sponsored 
by pharma companies, may contain distortions and flaws, requiring, from ethics 
committees and government agencies, a large discussion involving people with 
diverse backgrounds 
 
Thus, the technical and analytical mentalities offer not only two divergent 
philosophical stances but also two divergent recipes for the social discussion about 
clinical trials. In order to really grasp the nature of such disagreement, it is important 
to verify the linkages between these two mentalities and pragmatic concerns. 
 
5.3.5 Relations to background knowledge 
 
As claimed in Chapter 4, the bioethical and communitarian mentalities have 
smooth and regular contacts to the background knowledge. At the level of the 
technical and analytical mentalities, however, these contacts depend on a series of 
ideological mediations. In order to understand these processes, it is worth considering 















In Figure 5.5 (which depicts a technical discourse strongly based on bioethical 
claims), pragmatic concerns play a very minor role. In Figure 5.4 (which depicts a 
discourse that can be described as analytical/critical), pragmatic claims are obviously 
much more important. By looking at these graphics, as well as others derived from 
other interviews (some of them presented previously), I got intrigued by the weakness 
(or complete lack) of pragmatic claims in technical discourses. The following scatter 
dot (derived from my 34 strong interviews) gives us another image of this 
phenomenon. 
  
Figure 5.4 – Discourse graphic n. 6 
(São Paulo/C3/Social scientist/05-11) 
 









 This graphic shows us the relation between the proportion of pragmatic and 
technical claims (each interviewee being represented by one star). We can see that no 
interviewee voiced high proportions of both technical and pragmatic claims. Even 
though the visual correlation is not very clear, there seems to be a tendency for 
pragmatic claims to decrease when technical claims increase. In order to assess this 
correlation, I divided the interviewees into three groups: 
 
1. Low level of pragmatic claims: pragmatic scores ranging from 0 to 0.05 
2. Medium level: scores from 0.06 to 0.15 
3. High level: 0.16 or higher 
 
Thus, a discourse is considered to convey a high level of pragmatic claims when 
at least 16% of the interviewee’s claims expressed pragmatic concerns. Finally, using a 
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statistical test76 to correlate the proportion of technical claims and the levels of 
pragmatic claims, I verified a negative coefficient of 0.35, which according to Cohen 
(1988), indicates a medium correlation. Thus, whenever the proportion of technical 
claims increases, the proportion of pragmatic claims decreases at a medium rate.77 The 
coefficient of determination is of 0.12, meaning that 12% of the reduction in pragmatic 
claims is explained by the increase in technical claims. 
The conclusion is: holders of the technical mentality seem to abandon their 
ideological connections to the background knowledge, which as explained in Chapter 
3, is composed by basic assumptions largely shared within society. It is as though 
committee members, by embracing the technical mentality, were sacrificing 
immediate and simple assumptions for the sake of scientific codes. In this way, simple 
ideas of the background knowledge, such as “interest,” lose their taken-for-granted 
nature in order to fit into theoretical structures. Thus, “interest,” rather than being an 
obvious notion that is immediately understood by every citizen, becomes a concept in 
need of definition. This is what happens, for example, when one claims that “[...] 
interests can be systematically related to the biasing of scientific knowledge” 
(Abraham, 1993, p. 389). 
From a common-sense mindset in which no clarification or definition is needed 
(background knowledge), one goes towards an ideological universe in which 
theoretical definition and clarification is everything that really matters (technical 
mentality). We are dealing with a process that Arendt described by speaking of 
“introspection” and “loss of common sense.” 
 
“[...] it is the playing of the mind with itself, which comes to pass when the 
mind is shut off from all reality and ‘senses’ only itself […] Here the old 
definition of man as an animal rationale acquires a terrible precision: deprived 
of the sense through which man’s five animal senses are fitted into a world 
common to all men, human beings are indeed no more than animals who are 
able to reason […]” (Arendt, 1958/1998, p. 284). 
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 Spearman correlation, which is used for non-normally distributed data. 
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 The associated p value is of 0.03. 
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The over-reliance on statistical methods fosters the process, for in the technical 
mentality, the formulation of ideas is no longer based on immediate evidence that one 
grasps in discourses, actions, newspapers, daily conversations, and so on. In clinical 
research, ideas stem from theoretical models whose ultima ratio lies on the statistical 
laws themselves. According to Sismondo (2010, p. 639), statistical evidence does not 
depend on visible elements to emerge, and this is why “[...] what is more fundamental 
is invisible.” In the technical mentality, therefore, the “social evaporation of the 
tangible” (Arendt, 1958/1998, p. 69-70) reaches high degrees. 
In the following table, we can look at the aforementioned three levels of 







Table 5.1 – Proportion of pragmatic claims according to professional background 
 
  Background 
TOTAL78   Lay members, nurses 
& social workers                   
Social 




bioscientists                    
Proportion of pragmatic 
claims 
Low (0 - 0.5) 
1 1 4 8 14 
Medium (0.06 - 0.24) 
5 3 3 5 16 
High (0.25 or more) 
0 3 1 0 4 
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As this table shows, lay members, nurses and social workers did not voice high 
levels of pragmatic claims. They are rather concentrated at the medium level, a 
circumstance that I try to explain in the next section. Apart from one bioethicist, only 
social scientists appeared in the high proportion group. This circumstance is probably 
due to the high levels of communitarian concerns of social scientists,79 generally 
defining an important attachment to the background knowledge. Bioethicists and 
lawyers are concentrated at the low and medium levels. The same phenomenon is 
verified for physicians and bioscientists. Thus, this table confirms the tendency for 
cutting down on pragmatic concerns when one acquires a background in biomedical 
sciences.80 
 As we have seen, the analytical mentality has managed to affirm itself by 
promoting some “lay invasions” of medicine. However, if this process has been 
somewhat successful in clinical trials and ethics committees, the domain of basic 
science continues to be much closed to lay eyes. Epstein (1996) noted this 
phenomenon in the mid-1990s and it is possible to say that things have not changed 
since then. In this way, scientists managed to preserve a set of procedures and 
concepts that protect their expertise and legitimize their codes. In this realm, scientific 
hypotheses must be tested with scientific methods, looked at in the light of scientific 
concepts and lead to scientific conclusions expressed scientifically. By means of such 
metalinguistic operations, background knowledge is lost and one is finally thrown “[...] 
into the prison of his own mind, into the limitations of patterns he himself created” 
(Arendt, 1958/1998, p. 288). 
 As a consequence, holders of the technical mentality, when addressing social 
issues, seem to have difficulties at mobilizing concrete examples and tend to advance 
very unspecific claims. Eventually, the benefits of clinical research are said to be 
gleaned not by particular individuals or groups but by categories such as men or 
humankind. 
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 See Chapter 4, section 4.2.8. 
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 In her study about an Aids-related clinical study, Mueller MUELLER, M.-R. 1997. Science versus 
care: physicians, nurses, and the dilemma of clinical research. In: ELSTON, M. A. (ed.) The sociology of 
medical science & technology. Oxford: Blackwell. had already noted that physicians tended to overlook 
personal aspects of trials, wishing to have rapid access to patients’ clinical information and claiming that 




“In your opinion, what is the main goal of clinical research? 
I think... Actually, when you begin to research things, that will benefit humankind... I 
think a study leaves that world and go to a much bigger world. It can begin in a small 
space, with that researcher, with that group of subjects, but I think this information 
can be brought to the whole world and be used by humankind. I think many studies 
have this goal. By the way, many start in a very small world and they grow until the 
moment in which somebody who is at the other side of the world has access to 
something like that [...] 
But when you say that it leaves a small space and reaches a bigger world... What goes 
to the world? 
The result, you know. The result [...] People will have access to it. Humankind will have 
access to it. For good things, I think, for changing, for advancing. I see clinical research 
as development. 
And the result of research would be a product, a notion... 
Oh, I think it is everything. It is a product, it is a notion. I think many times it is a new 
way to see something [...].” 
(São Paulo/C2/Nurse/04-11) 
 
 In contrast to this abstract discourse, the analytical (like the communitarian) 
mentality seeks particularities and concrete examples. Its main concern is to denounce 
practices that diffuse homogenising rationales and “[...] turn amorphous, 
heterogeneous experience into a calculable problem” (Lakoff, 2007, p. 58). In this 
effort, the analytical approach has been confronting not only the technical mentality 
(and its abstract scientific concepts) but also the bioethical mentality (and its general 
ethical principles). Thus a typical analytical claim is: “Rather than focusing on 
normative theory of ethics and ideal conditions, I maintain the importance of 
apprehending the norms that are being propagated and how they are being 
reconstructed in actual and diverse conditions” (Petryna, 2006, p. 55). 
 Philosophically speaking, one could draw a distinction between analysts and 
technicians. On the one hand, the technical mentality (held by technicians) proposes a 
metalanguage that speaks in the science’s name, using scientific concepts. In this way, 
a set of immediate and widespread ideas is no longer essential and, therefore, a 
universe is built up in which “[...] reality and human reason have parted company” 
(Arendt, 1958/1998, p. 300). 
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On the other hand, the analytical mentality (held by analysts) stays in touch 
with background knowledge (via communitarian mentality). Immediate, common-
sense claims (such as “clinical trials imply financial interests”) do not disappear from 
the core of analytical discourses in their process of constructing a foreground theory. 
Therefore, background and foreground knowledge, ideological periphery and core, 
remain connected, enabling the emergence of a “communicative flow,” to use 
Habermas’ (1996) expression. To be sure, discourses voiced by analysts are sometimes 
very sophisticated and even hermetic. Yet this complexity does not tend to form an 
enclosed world, for there are strong attachments to background knowledge. As a 
consequence, one can say that compared to the technical mentality, the analytical 
approach has been more successful at preserving what Habermas (1996, p. 360) called 
“[...] the general  comprehensibility of everyday communicative practice.” 
In the following section, we focus on a particular relation between the technical 
and communitarian mentalities. 
 
5.3.6 Mental colonization and mental inversion 
 
In the previous section, it was argued that committee members who have a 
biomedical background are more likely to voice technical claims. This does not mean, 
however, that other categories of members do not have access to the technical 
mentality. In my fieldwork, technical claims were voiced not only by physicians, 
pharmacists, biologists and so on, but also (albeit in lower degrees) by lawyers, 
bioethicists, social scientists, nurses and lay members. In these cases, though, technical 
claims assume two particular features. Firstly, they tend to constitute a group of 
ancillary claims in a discourse dominated by other mentalities. Secondly, they seem to 
be “colonizing” one’s mental life. In order to study this second phenomenon, let us 





Figure 5.7 – Discourse graphic n. 10 




 This is one of the two lay members interviewed in my fieldwork.81 As the 
graphic shows, this discourse is dominated by communitarian claims but there is a 
group of technical claims (TECH13) that seems strangely important here. This group of 
claims stresses the scientific role played by ethics committees and the importance of 
scientific expertise in ethical review. This is one example of a situation in which the 
interviewee advanced these ideas: 
 
“But is there any situation [in the meetings] in which you don’t feel confident to ask a 
question or to give your opinion? 
[Immediate reply.] Oh, yes, no, no, then I don’t. No, no. Especially when it comes to 
things like drugs and things like that. I’ll review... I’ll do a drug protocol review, but I’ll 
state that I don’t know... that I’m not qualified to comment on the drug [...].” 
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 Holders of the communitarian mentality, regardless of their background, 
proved very likely to advance this sort of claim. I present two more examples: 
 
“Is it more difficult to review clinical trials [compared to academic studies]? 
I think for a non-medical person. I mean, I’ve got nursing, I’ve got some of the 
background, but things like your pharmacokinetics and your pharmacodynamics, I’m 
not that clued upon it because in nursing, of course, we don’t do it in that depth. So I 
wouldn’t know what kind of effect certain drugs would have if it is used in this 
particular way, you know. So those kinds of things I can’t judge, but I would look at the 
ethics of it [...] Things like the insurance documents, the budgets and those kind of 
things, I would give an opinion [...].” 
(Cape Town/C6/Nurse/08-11) 
 
“Is there any situation or any type of discussion [in the meeting] in which you don’t feel 
very confident to advance your opinion? 
Yeah. I mean, I think it is... you know... Well, it is not... it is not really confidence so 
much as lacking expertise [...] 
Ah, okay. Okay, but do you think that the view of doctors tends to predominate 
because they have this medical expertise? 
Hm... [Pause.] Yes, it does. Hm... You know, I don’t think it only predominates, I think it 
is sort of taken for granted. You know, that is the taken-for-granted opinion, and it is 
often right because they know the medical science and it does become difficult to 
challenge that, at times. Yeah.” 
(Cape Town/C7/Social scientist/07-11) 
 
What is interesting is that this point was insistently made in these interviewees’ 





Table 5.2 – Committee members holding the communitarian mentality: 
number of times in which interviewees recognized 
the physicians’ knowledge advantages 
 
Interviewee 
Occurrence of the 
claim 
Length of the interview 
recording 
(Cape Town/C7/Lay member/05-11) 4 53min08s 
(Cape Town/C7/Anthropologist/07-11) 3 55min30s 
(Cape Town/C6/Nurse/08-11) 3 63min12s 
(São Paulo/C3/Lay member/05-11) 3 33min25s 
(São Paulo/C2/Social scientist/05-11) 2 49min42s 
(Porto Alegre/C5/Lawyer/05-11) 2 26min04s 
(Cape Town/C7/Anthropologist/07-11) 1 55min36s 
(Porto Alegre/C5/Psychologist/05-11) 1 44min57s 
(Cape Town/C7/Anthropologist/08-11) 0 58min14s 
(Brasília/C4/Physician/04-11) 0 25min03s 
 
 
 This table is based on the ten interviews in which discourses were dominated 
by the communitarian mentality.82 The first committee member (whose interview was 
the basis for the discourse graphic shown above) spontaneously voiced this claim four 
times, at different moments of a recording that lasted 53 minutes. There were only 
two interviewees (holders of the communitarian approach) who did not make this 
point. Thus, there is a technical claim punctuating communitarian discourses, like a 
background noise. 
 In the example analyzed, one particular group of technical claims was focused 
on (TECH13). However, there are other claims that can be taken from the technical 
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 I am considering only “strong interviews,” that is, interviews that lasted 30 minutes or more. 
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mentality in order to reverberate in communitarian discourses. The following discourse 
graphic provides us with an example. 
 
 
Figure 5.8 – Discourse graphic n. 32 




 This communitarian discourse, voiced by a social scientist, is permeated not 
only by TECH13 but also by TECH12 (which stresses the importance of methodologies 
in the ethical review) and TECH11 (which frames clinical research as an enterprise 
aimed to enhance scientific knowledge). Holders of the communitarian mentality can 
also mobilize the technical idea that ethical analyses done by physicians are more 
important than the analyses done by other members, or the idea that ethics 
committees aim to enhance research progress. 
 
“Do you think there is any type of protocol that deserves more attention? 
Yes, there is. These are the protocols that involve surgeries, medicines, devices, shifts 
of medicines, hospitalizations. For me, this is a bit complicated. So these protocols go 
to specialists in the topic. I avoid getting it because, as I told you, I’m not a physician, 
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so who am I to analyze the patients... Do you understand? So I avoid these things. Yes, 
yes, there are protocols that are more difficult, others are easier.” 
(São Paulo/C3/Lay member/05-11) 
 
“And in your opinion, what is the main goal of an ethics committee? 
The main goal is to prevent harm but also to facilitate research. It is a balance between 
allowing good research to go on and to protect vulnerable groups and people, to see 
that there is no harm.” 
(Cape Town/C7/Anthropologist/07-11) 
 
 In this last example, there is a telling combination between a communitarian 
concern (harm to research participants) and a technical idea (research progress). 
In my discourse graphics, this sort of claims was generally grouped into 
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 Other examples can be seen in Chapter 4, Figure 4.5 and 4.7, as well as Chapter 6, Figure 6.6. 
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 I am considering that these interviewees are advancing technical claims. 
However, this is a “passive” way to use the technical mentality. For true holders of the 
technical approach, who generally are physicians and bioscientists, these claims 
assume an active vein, in terms of “we are the most competent people to analyze 
clinical trials; we know it.” For holders of the communitarian mentality, who frequently 
are social scientists and lay members, the claim is passively advanced, in terms of 
“they are the people with expertise to analyze clinical trials; we recognize it.” 
We can speak of mental inversion, in the sense that in communitarian 
discourses, some technical claims are adopted and begin to punctuate the discourse. 
Moreover, these claims are simply recognized, without discussion, and become taken-
for-granted ideas. Thus these claims start playing a role that in other mentalities, is 
played by the background knowledge. In other words, the technical mentality becomes 
the background knowledge of committee members who embrace the communitarian 
mentality. They are willing to discuss and develop pragmatic and communitarian 
concerns, whereas the notions coming from the technical approach remain hidden and 
protected from debate. Background knowledge turns into foreground knowledge, and 
vice-versa. It is as though, when looking at a discourse graphic depicting a 
communitarian discourse, we were seeing it upside-down. Hence, the idea of mental 
inversion, a phenomenon that has an important political implication. 
 As we have seen in this chapter,84 the analytical mentality opposes technical 
claims with the idea that everybody is qualified for reviewing research proposals, 
insofar as even physicians have their knowledge limitations. The communitarian 
mentality, when faced by technical claims, proves to be more docile, recognizing the 
knowledge primacy of physicians and bioscientists. What is more, this recognition (by 
means of mental inversions) becomes a sort of background knowledge and therefore 
acquires an irresistible force. This is the phenomenon of mental colonization: some 
claims move from the technical into the communitarian mentality; as a consequence, 
even if the technical mentality does not manage to impose its force in a direct way, it 
can always exercise an indirect influence upon committee members who embrace the 
communitarian mentality. 
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 Section 5.3.2. 
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 On the one hand, the communitarian approach does not imply any type of 
practical and political project, as seen in Chapter 4. On the other hand, we have seen in 
this chapter that the technical mentality holds a very strong and precise political 
discourse, which foregrounds the importance of promoting research progress and 
supporting global clinical trials. The phenomenon of mental colonization enables the 
diffusion of this political project from the technical mentality to the holders of the 
communitarian mentality. In other words, technical notions come to fill the political 
gap that characterizes the communitarian approach. The following figure summarizes 
these politico-ideological relations. 
 
 





















Critical mentality Healing mentality 
Analytical mentality Technical mentality 
Communitarian 
mentality Bioethical mentality 
Direct relation Indirect relation (mental colonization) 




Due to ideological similarities, the technical mentality has direct influence upon 
the bioethical and healing mentalities, which rapidly accept the political discourse 
pouring from it. The same phenomenon occurs at the communicative side, but here 
the political relation between the analytical and communitarian mentalities is curtailed 
by the ideological interference of the technical mentality, which ends up having more 
political say within the communitarian realm. 
In Chapter 4, it was said that my interviewees favoured bioethical and 
communitarian claims.85 In this way, one might assume that the phenomenon of 
mental colonization is of minor importance. However, by using the tools of inferential 
statistics, we can consider my interviewees as a sample representing their whole 
committees. This exercise is possible for only committees 3 and 6, for which I have 
representative samples.86 Thus, it is possible to estimate what the average score of 
each mentality would actually be if I had interviewed all the committee members. The 
following graphics derive from this exercise. 
 
 
Figure 5.11 – Committees 3 and 6: 
Estimating the average score of each mentality for the whole committee 
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 See section 4.2.8, as well as Figure 4.2 (page 110). 
86
 In committee 3 I interviewed 9 members, 5 of which (55%) were either physicians or bioscientists; 
whereas in committee 6 I interviewed 6 members, 5 of which (84%) were either physicians or 





 With these graphics, I am estimating the average score that would have been 
obtained if I had interviewed all the committee members rather than only a sample of 
members.87 As we are dealing with estimations, we end up having a range instead of 
precise values. As the number of interviewees is small (9 people in committee 3 and 6 
people in committee 6), the estimations of some mentalities have big variations. For 
committee 3, the actual average score of technical mentality lies somewhere between 
0.08 and 0.37. For committee 6, this average lies somewhere between 0.16 and 0.35. 
These big variations disturb the analysis but the two graphics are quite 
similar,88 enabling us to indicate three trends. First, there is a group of mentalities 
(pragmatic, healing and critical) displaying small proportions. Second, the analytical 
mentality seems to occupy an intermediate position (almost reaching the top group in 
committee 3). Third, there is a group of mentalities (bioethical, technical and 
communitarian) that occupy the top of the ranking. 
 When we consider the claims actually voiced in my interviews (Figure 4.2, page 
110), the technical mentality occupies an intermediate position. Nevertheless, by 
estimating what happens to the whole committee (graphics above), this mentality 
assumes an outstanding role. There are good reasons to trust this estimation. In most 
ethics committees, more than 50% of members are physicians and bioscientists, who 
tend to favour technical claims.89 However, among my interviewees (considering 
strong interviews), only 13 people (38%) have this background, whereas 21 people 
(62%) have other backgrounds. Therefore, we can suppose that in Figure 4.2, the 
importance of the technical mentality is under-represented, while the previous 
estimations correct this distortion.90 
In conclusion: the technical mentality seems to play an overwhelming political 
role, be it because of its historical and institutional weight or because of the (direct 
and indirect) political influences it manages to realize. As a consequence, ethics 
committees tend to become a fertile field for a specific political discourse to be 
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 The confidence interval is of 90%. 
88
 Comparing one same mentality in the two graphics, and looking at the extreme values, we have almost 
the same numbers for the pragmatic, healing and communitarian mentalities. 
89
 See Table 5.1 and Figure 5.13, in this chapter. 
90
 Arguably, the massive presence of physicians and bioscientists in the composition of committee 6 
explains the low estimations of the analytical and critical mentalities for this committee. 
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ideologically cultivated, speaking of standards, science, statistics, globalization and 
studies sponsored by companies. 
The following section presents the ways in which the technical and analytical 
approaches frame the role of ethics committees. 
 
5.3.7 Technical or analytical committees 
 
Of 42 interviewees, only four talked about ethics committees by using ideas 
that are somehow related to the analytical mentality. In contrast, twenty people 
conveyed a technical approach to committees. This huge difference can be explained 
by different phenomena. Firstly, let us consider the following discourse boxplots. 
 
 




 The proportion of analytical claims remained clearly below that of technical 
claims. The median of the technical and analytical mentalities are of 0.17 and 0.05, 
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respectively. By performing a statistical test,91 a very strong significant difference was 
identified.92 
Thus, the technical approach seems to be much more consolidated in the ethics 
committees I studied, a phenomenon that can be explained in two ways. Firstly, as 
seen in Chapter 4, the bioethical mentality provides committee members with a strong 
practical reference. As this approach can be smoothly associated with the technical 
approach, the bioethical/technical mindset acquires more and more space. Secondly, 
the technical (contrary to the analytical) mentality has been highly institutionalized. 
Universities, scientific associations, academic journals, and sometimes even the media, 
speak the technical mentality’s language. The analytical mentality, with its recent 
development and its low level of institutionalization, can barely balance this technical 
weight. Thus, every type of issue tends to be addressed from a technical rather than 
analytical point of view, and this is also valid for the issue of ethics committees. 
 Technical views of ethics committees are frequent also because as claimed in 
the previous section, members who embrace the communitarian mentality tend to use 
technical claims to speak of committees. In other words, the phenomena of mental 
inversion and mental colonization help to disperse a technical approach to ethics 
committees. 
 How can we then define this technical approach to ethics committees? The 
main idea is that committees do not review research proposals from the outside, for 
they are actually part of the clinical research system. Thus, the scientific progress 
sought by researchers is complemented by the reviewing tasks of committee 
members. 
 
“The industry does not wish to just do research and develop products. The industry 
wishes to have a final product that is viable. They don’t need a compound that will 
need a recall after one year and will be withdrawn from the market. That is why they 
are concerned with their quality standards [...] They establish relations to research 
centres by making sure that taps are in the correct place or fridges work in the right 
temperature. Equally, the issue of ethics belongs nowadays to quality standards, and 
that is also true for the industry [...] Sometimes they [companies] criticize us 
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 Wilcoxon test (2 related samples) for non-normally distributed data. 
92
 p less than 0.0005. 
220 
 
[committees] because of our deadlines [...] Have we got problems in terms of 
deadlines? Yes, we have. We can improve, incorporate technologies and solve these 
problems. But we’ve got quality [...].” 
(São Paulo/C4/Bioethicist/05-11) 
 
“You have basic research, you have clinical research, and you have the side of 
bioethical and social aspects pertaining to all this research [...] I often say that without 
the bioethical side playing its role, you cannot circulate among the others, because you 
cannot develop, you don’t begin with a standard that is accepted as being... that is 
acceptable, ethically speaking. So you don’t do the so-called good science. Good 
science follows a range of prerequisites and standards of behaviour that... It is as 
though you put a stamp saying that you’re doing good science, you know.” 
(São Paulo/C1/Bioethicist/02-11) 
 
 From this point of view, committees are not alien to a scientific universe that is 
composed by standards, scientific methods and certified procedures (“stamps”). 
Eventually, committees, and especially those which are based in universities, come to 
be seen as a sort of academic department. 
 
“The committee members don’t get paid for this work. 
Yes. 
Do you think they should get paid? 
[Immediate reply.] No, I don’t see any ethical compelling argument in favour [....] I 
think this is just part of the duty of being... part of the duties that come with being an 
academic. So scientists and academics are pursuing knowledge, right? And I think in 




“I think the committee does follow a scientific protocol. Because projects arrive and 
there are guidelines, according to... Actually, I don’t know where these rules come 
from, but I think they also have a scientific nature. Because there are phases to comply 





 Thus the ethical guidelines followed by committees would be a sort of 
extension of the scientific guidelines followed by clinical researchers. The argument 
goes on that committees, once they are integrated into an academic scenario, must 
play all the roles played within universities. Therefore, they would also be supposed to 
accomplish teaching tasks. 
 
“[...] And generally, do studies have a good scientific underpinning? 
[...] what we get from the pharmaceutical industry is generally well-organized and 
well-described; generally, but not always. In the other part that we analyze, which is 
the part of student projects, there are many methodological flaws, and we’re even 
willing to teach the person who is submitting the new protocol. So we explain where 
we think the flaw is [...].” 
(Porto Alegre/C5/Physician/05-11) 
 
“And in your opinion, what is the main goal of an ethics committee? 
To see to it that trials are done ethically and safe and [pause] to... Sometimes, it could 
be that people are also ignorant of... (the people that put the protocol together) it 
could be that they are ignorant of certain things, and then the ethical committee can 
review the trial and then give advice. Because sometimes it is people that are new to 
research, you know, and then the people on the committee, when they review it, they 
can see: ‘Here there are loopholes, here there are things that should be corrected...’ 
and they can give that advice [...].” 
(Cape Town/C6/Nurse/08-11) 
 
 In the end, committee members would be conducting a sort of anonymous 
academic job and would therefore be comparable to peer-reviewers contributing to 
academic journals. 
 
“Do being a researcher and being an ethics committee member cause any kind of... 
duplicity? [Laughter.] 
No. 
Of double personality? Because, sometimes, it seems that these two roles don’t match. 
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No, they match, because you’re assessing something that is your own activity [...] 
Look, there is something that exists in any field of knowledge: peer review [pause]. So 
the peer review [laughter] is the best way known to mediate something. This is true 
for any field of knowledge, any field of human relation, of scientific relation. Peer 
review is a fundamental point, not only in Brazil, we’re talking about the world. I mean 
[laughter], the assessment by peers is the essential point. And why? Back to what I 
said. I mean, there is no better assessment than the one which is made by someone 
with adequate knowledge in the field, which includes ethics.” 
(São Paulo/C3/Physician/04-11) 
 
 Here, there is, once more, much leeway for the mental colonization suffered by 
holders of the communitarian mentality. According to the technical approach, 
committee members are undertaking a useful scientific work while remaining 
anonymous and hidden. This idea attracts holders of the communitarian mentality, 
who appreciate good deeds undertaken behind the scenes, without widespread 
recognition. Formulating a technical/communitarian claim, some committee members 
end up framing their actions as scientific/social service or contribution. 
 
“Look, our ethics committee, like committees in most places, doesn’t offer 
remuneration, doesn’t offer any kind of benefit [...] So why am I saying that? 
Participating in an ethics committee isn’t exciting at all [laughter]. Is there any 
advantage? No. You have to study things that are not in your expertise area, you have 
to become familiar with issues that sometimes aren’t directed related to your work, so 
it is... I think it is a contributing role. I like teaching, I’ve been a lecturer for many years, 
I think this is part of a sort of general contribution to knowledge [...].” 
(São Paulo/C2/Physician/04-11) 
 
 These technical claims, which foreground the scientific worth of committees, 
can be easily coupled with bioethical ones, and the final result is the idea that ethics 
committees are supposed to take care of both ethical principles and scientific 
standards. 
When it comes to ethics committees, the analytical mentality has, once again, a 
cautious attitude. Considering that clinical research, and especially studies sponsored 
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by companies, are fraught with interests, committee members would have to carefully 
analyze proposals in order to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant projects. 
 
“What would be the main goal of an ethics committee? 
[...] In my opinion? Well, in addition to its legal functions [...], I think an ethics 
committee does precisely this selection, you know, this scientific selection of research 
with human beings, you know [...] 
Hm. So it selects. 
Yeah, it is a selection. 
It distinguishes between research that is... how can I say that... research that is 
interesting and the one that is not so... 
Of course. To identify the research that is relevant, always searching for human 
dignity, as legal people like to put it [...].” 
(Porto Alegre/C5/Lawyer/05-11) 
 
 In this example, even though I did not invite the interviewee to further explore 
his claim, the idea of selection appears as a novelty, being strange to the realm of the 
technical mentality. Admitting that some studies come to be more “relevant” than 
others differs from the technical view, according to which all studies can be 
commensurated at the outset, because they all look for knowledge advancement. 
Another interviewee voiced a claim expressing an analytical approach to committees: 
 
“In your opinion, what is the main goal of clinical research? 
[Deep breath.] Now, clinical research... Are you talking about academic research? 
No, I’m talking about both, academic and industrial... 
Oh, then, you’ve got to split it quite clearly. I’ve no doubt, in my mind, that the drug 
companies design their trials in an attempt to show that their drug is better than the 
existing drugs. I think clinical research is much clearer, there is no financial incentive... 
There are some incentives. I mean, if you get a PhD, you’re more likely to become a 
professor, you’re more likely to go overseas and things like that. But it is my 
impression that their research is more directed at trying to advance our knowledge. 





 Thus, in the analytical mentality, it is impossible to talk about research in a 
general way. It is rather necessary to “split it,” putting academic studies on the one 
side, industrial trials on the other. Moreover, the real search for knowledge would be 
implemented not by companies but by independent researchers. In this way, the 
analytical mentality converses with the background knowledge, a normal attitude to it. 
 This same interviewee gave me an example (a typical analytical attitude) of 
clinical trials in which he has not been involved either as investigator or reviewer. 
According to what he said, some pharma companies have tried to explore a class of 
drugs called biological agents. Even though some studies have shown that it would be 
more efficient and less expensive to combine old compounds, therefore safeguarding 
national budgets, these actors are carrying on with their studies, sometimes applying 
available drugs in very low dosages in order to show clinical improvements. 
 
“[...] So you see, this is why I think one has to look at the whole picture, and this is why 
I think the facts that I’ve mentioned to you are becoming important, because it is the 
ethics committee that actually should be trying to... [pause] regulate this sort of thing. 
And I think this is an example of a gross expenditure which the world doesn’t need 
[...].” 
 
 Thus the analytical mentality assumes that ethics committees need to stop 
working with general concepts and begin to delve more accurately into methodological 
aspects, in order to select proposals that are socially relevant. In this effort, companies 
should be looked at more carefully, because of their interests and willingness to reach 
financial targets by any means. From the idea of committee-facilitator, which prevails 
in the technical mentality, we go towards the idea of committee-inspector. 
 
“And in your opinion, what is the main goal of an ethics committee? 
It is to control. You have to... You can’t just leave people go ahead and experiment 
with people. That’s what they’re doing. A trial is an experiment. When you look at 
some of the things that they want people to do, it is like: ‘My God! I wouldn’t do that.’ 
Oncology trials, to me, are the worst. You take a person who’s got three months to live 
225 
 
and want to give him a new drug. No way! I don’t agree with that at all [...] No, we 
need an ethics committee, otherwise the industry would run... you’d have trial all 
over, people would be advertising: ‘Join... Come to our trials, blah blah blah, we’re 
trying a new drug, do this, do this.’ 
So the committee has to control the industry. 
Definitely. Definitely. 
And that is a hard job [laughter]. 
It is a hard job [laughter] [...].” 
(Cape Town/C7/Lay member/05-11) 
 
“It is hard, I think, to be places like South Africa and Brazil, because of that actual job. 
Because there are people who want to put funding in there and it is tempting for the 
researchers to get the funds, but, you know, you have to control those ones at the top 
[laughter]. 
Yeah. And that is hard to do. 
You have to put limits on them, yeah. Because they’ve got all the power [laughter] [...] 
They’re second only to the armaments industry. Hm, it is big money! 
Yeah. 
And they play with poverty. Sickening! [laughter]” 
(Cape Town/C7/Social scientist/07-11) 
 
 These claims are still highly shaped by communitarian concerns, such as 
physical sufferings and international inequalities. However, it seems that the analytical 
mentality will not be able to diffuse its political view without allying itself to the 
communitarian mentality. As soon as more committee members are willing to describe 
pharma companies as research tricksters, rather than research gurus, an analytical 
view to committees will certainly have more leeway to be diffused. In the political 
scenario of ethics committees, the communitarian mentality has become a strategic 






5.3.8 Political implications of the technical and analytical mentalities 
 
The following discourse boxplots show the proportions of technical and 












 We shall scrutinize these graphics in three stages. Firstly, we see the boxplots 
going up as we shift from the analytical to the technical mentality, with the exception 
of social scientists (who display a decrease). By performing a statistical test,93 I found 
significant expansion for lay members, nurses & social workers (p=0.03), bioethicists 
and lawyers (p=0.03), and physicians and bioscientists (p=0.00). This outcome 
corroborates what has been said throughout this chapter: bioscientists and physicians, 
when choosing between technical and analytical claims, tend to favour the former. The 
expansion in the first group (lay members, nurses and social workers) is a graphic and 
statistical demonstration of the phenomenon of mental colonization. In fact, these 
committee members tend to adopt communitarian concerns, being thus subjected to 
the ideological influence of technical claims. 
Secondly, focusing on the analytical approach (Figure 5.13), no clear difference 
can be seen. Thirdly, we can compare boxplots within the technical approach (Figure 
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 Wilcoxon test (2 related samples). Exact values quoted. 
Figure 5.13 – Analytical mentality 
(South Africa and Brazil): discourse 
boxplots according to background 
Figure 5.14 – Technical mentality 
(South Africa and Brazil): discourse 
boxplots according to background 
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5.14). We see that bioethicists, lawyers, physicians and bioscientists voiced higher 
levels of technical claims than interviewees with other backgrounds. 
 These nuances do not remain within the universe of committees but can also 
be verified in several social spheres.  Over the last years, some authors have published 
papers and books in which they denounce and unravel, in an analytical vein, the subtle 
manipulations carried out by pharma companies in clinical trials. As we have seen, the 
analytical language operates with the tools proposed by the technical mentality but 
tries to derive unexpected conclusions and meanings. Thus, it is not surprising that: 
 
“The first critique comes from clinical researchers and statisticians themselves 
[...] Such critique proceeds by elaborating on the methodological difficulties of 
doing trials, and on ways to mitigate their effects using new techniques for data 
review and summation” (Will and Moreira, 2010, p. 2). 
 
This analytical stance may have practical manifestations. In the United States, 
for instance, Aids activists who “invaded” clinical trials in the 1980s to provide their 
personal feedback, ended up being recognized by national regulatory agencies 
(Epstein, 1996). Even though this recognition came to eventually appease their political 
energy, they proved that scientific domains can also be subjected to non-expert 
scrutiny and guidance. Nowadays, non-experts continue to be important for the design 
of clinical protocols, giving their input in topics as diverse as priority areas, ethical 
aspects or informed consent procedures (Oliver and Buchanan, 1997, Thornton, 1998, 
Hanley et al., 2001, Koops and Lindley, 2002, Caron-Flinterman et al., 2005). As 
Faulkner (2010, p. 138) showed, clinical trials are likely to generate social debates, for 
there are situations when “[...] the scientific space becomes more socially permeable.” 
In a sense, as Rothman (1991) argued, the ethics committee model itself can be 
considered as an intervention by non-physicians in the domains of experimental 
medicine. 
To be sure, holders of the technical mentality will react to such non-scientific 
intrusions. In Brazil, for instance, the national government launched, in the 1990s, a 
research program to study a drug produced by the American company Cerezyme. The 
medicine, aimed to treat the Gaucher’s disease, is provided for free by the Brazilian 
government. With the program, frailties of the original trial could be unravelled and 
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new effective dosages could eventually be discovered, leading to savings in the 
Brazilian Ministry of Health’s budget. The program was immediately condemned by 
many Brazilian scientists, who argued that political and ideological concerns were 
distorting the scientific assessments done by the medicine’s producer (Petryna, 2009). 
Thus, it is clear that technical claims can be used to speak not only of particular 
research projects but also to gauge a national policy’s worth. 
 Actually, the technical mentality has been able to acquire an overwhelming 
power thanks to a twofold movement. Firstly, some technical claims have been largely 
diffused, reinforcing the phenomenon of mental colonization. When it comes to 
affirming its ideological influence, the technical mentality proves particularly greedy, 
spreading its claims through several social relations. For example, Jill Fisher verified 
that in clinical trials, study coordinators frequently give informal lectures to 
participants, explaining the meaning of participation and research. “[...] coordinators 
are trying to show subjects that they are part of something bigger than themselves: 
the advancement of scientific knowledge and the progress of medicine” (Fisher, 2009, 
p. 174). By means of such pedagogic efforts, everyone is invited to join the ideological 
universe of technical mentality. 
Secondly, and complementing this ideological diffusions, it has been possible to 
maintain domains to which scientists have privileged or exclusive access. For example, 
in ethics committees, bioscientists and physicians continue to be the members who 
receive the biggest proportion of drug studies to access, whereas members with other 
backgrounds deal with the plethora of academic (“low-risk”) studies with which 
committees overflow. In the committees I studied, reviewers are selected by the 
committee chair with help from some secretaries,94 and the main criterion used in this 
selection is the members’ expertise area. In Cape Town, this issue emerged in an 
interview with a committee chair: 
 
“And all the members are reviewers. 
Er... Yes, all the members are reviewers but, obviously, we won’t let the person that is 
representing the community review a difficult trial. You know, they would provide 
inputs into the trial but they won’t be a primary reviewer of the project. 
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Ah, okay. So for clinical trials, the primary reviewer is always a physician. 
Er... depending on the nature of the trial. So it will be a physician or somebody in the 
sub-specialty or something like that, yeah. Yeah.” 
(Cape Town/C6/Physician/08-11) 
 
 Nowadays, some drug studies include certain qualitative tools, a circumstance 
that renders social scientists more likely to review them as well. For the most part, 
however, bioscientists and physicians continue to be favoured. In one committee I 
studied in Cape Town, for instance, the chair tries to always include a pharmacologist 
into the review of drug studies. In this way, most members remain isolated from the 
world of trials sponsored by pharma companies. The point to be made is that without 
having such reviewing experience, committee members who embrace the 
communitarian mentality are less likely to “take the ideological stairs” leading up to 
the analytical mentality. This is so because for reviewers with no bioscientific or 
medical background, the only way to become capable to assess the methodological 
side of drug trials is to actually read proposals, struggle with them, identify relevant 
scientific issues, and formulate personal strategies to cope with all this complexity. 
One of my interviewees, a social scientist, voiced a discourse that was strongly 
marked by analytical concerns.95 She says that when she began to receive protocols 
pertaining to drug trials, the task proved very difficult. 
 
[...] I made this point, you know, in the sense that: ‘Look, I’m not the most competent 
person to do these reviews. You could get other people’ [...] When I said: ‘Look, it gives 
me much work, I read the project over and over again...’ I got this answer: ‘Look, this is 
a positive issue.’ Because those who work in the area think they understand, they read 
it and skip pages in the reading. And as I don’t work in the area, I have to understand, 
based on the project... Either the project is very well-written or I cannot understand it, 
you know. And to me, personally, this has to do with both the quality of the project 
and myself, because I have to go back and forth to understand what is going on [...].” 
(São Paulo/C3/Social scientist/05-11) 
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 The discourse graphic is presented on Chapter 6, Figure 6.3. 
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 She has been involved with ethics committees for ten years. In addition to the 
committee I studied, she is member of another committee in São Paulo. As a result, 
she has become “a sort of specialist in the design of research protocols,” according to 
her words. She developed her own techniques to review projects, involving frequent 
consultations to medical online databases such as Medline. 
 
“So what I see is that there are phases. My reviews have not always been like that. So I 
think this is maturity. We get mature, you know. My experience [...] showed me that 
this is very serious, that we can’t... I’m not talking about meetings. But you can 
imagine the number of reviews in clinical research I’ve done [...] It is much work, you 
know. And then, you learn, you build it up. So I think it is a process, you know. So, 
today, I wouldn’t review a clinical trial without having access to the internet, without 
having at least a primary and general look on that... At least on Medline.” 
 
 Therefore, even committee members who lack a medical background can 
acquire satisfactory skills at reviewing protocols, because reviewing projects demands 
abilities different from those which are necessary to design or conduct clinical studies. 
However, for most members, these abilities are kept at bay, for two reasons. Firstly, 
there is the simple fact that most members are not assigned the review of drug studies 
and cannot become familiar with this task. Secondly, as committee members work on 
a voluntary basis, some members simply leave the committee after some years, thus 
abandoning the experience they have acquired. Shifts in the committees’ composition 
are more frequent in Brazil than South Africa; most Brazilian committees establish a 
four-year term for their members. 
Thus, for most members, and especially newcomers, the theoretical framework 
provided by science (as well as the ideological framework provided by the bioethical 
mentality) becomes a sort of scapegoat, which is much more easily accessible than the 
notions of the analytical approach. As a consequence, there is only a small number of 
members who eventually take the lift from the communitarian up to the analytical 
mentality. The non-professional nature of committees, coupled with the (technical) 
idea that drug trials should be reviewed only by specialists, help to maintain the 
ideological primacy of bioethical and technical claims within ethics committees. 
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Arguably, this phenomenon takes place not only in committees but in other 
bodies dealing with clinical trials, such as regulatory agencies. For example, Jasanoff 
(1990, p. 229), studying the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Food and 
Drugs Admistration (FDA), concluded: “Regulatory practices at EPA and FDA would 
seem to indicate that the technocratic vision of public policy has scored important 
gains over the competing democratic paradigm.” So far social science studies have 
been conducted to verify regulatory agencies’ financial or institutional conflicts of 
interest, speaking of “regulatory capture” (Huntington, 1952, Bernstein, 1955, Stigler, 
1971, Kalt and Zupan, 1990, Levine and Forrence, 1990, Laffont and Tirole, 1991). One 
could also argue that in some occasions, these agencies can suffer from “ideological 
capture,” for they may end up suffering the mental colonization imposed by technical 
views springing from pharma companies and CROs. 
Potentially, the technical approach can become appealing for several social 
groups. During my fieldwork, for example, there was a debate going on in Brazil about 
the review of the Resolution 196, which established, in 1996, the first Brazilian 
guidelines on clinical research and ethics committees. Since that moment, more than 
600 ethics committees have emerged, most of which are not really qualified and well-
equipped for their tasks. In the National Council of Health, but also in the National 
Commission for Research Ethics and some departments of the Ministry of Health, a 
(analytical) feeling was gaining momentum, during my fieldwork, stressing that Brazil 
needed stronger and more qualified committees. As a result, the National Council of 
Health drafted a new Resolution, which was published on the internet so that different 
groups could assess it and give their feedback. 
Once the draft legislation was published, many people, including members of 
the Brazilian Society of Bioethics, voiced concerns with international guidelines, which 
according to their view, should be complied with and accurately quoted in the new 
legislation. The Brazilian Society for Pharmaceutical Medicine (SBMF, Sociedade 
Brasileira de Medicina Farmacêutica), an association gathering physician-researchers, 
reacted by publishing an alternative draft, which had very disciplinary features, 
including many scientific definitions and details of procedures to be looked at in the 
conduct of clinical studies. Another actor was the Brazilian Society of Clinical Research 
Professionals (SBPPC, Sociedade Brasileira de Professionais em Pesquisa Clínica), which 
is organized as an independent, non-profit organization. This Society had been 
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engaged in partnerships with small local companies that offer training courses on 
clinical trials, on the one hand, and maintained indirect relations to multinational 
pharma companies and CROs, on the other. When the proposal of the new legislation 
was published, SBPPC begun to campaign for the process to be interrupted because 
according to this Society’s view, time should be allowed for more debate. At the same 
time, it organized some discussion meetings, which were open to the public and aimed 
to facilitate the reflection that according to SBPPC, was necessary. 
Then, the renewal of the Brazilian regulatory framework, motivated by 
analytical concerns that emerged mainly in the Ministry of Health, awaked many types 
of claims. The bioethical mentality manifested itself in the concerns with international 
guidelines. The draft prepared by SBMF expressed technical concerns with scientific 
standards. Finally, the SBPPC’s campaign seemed to be an attempt to foster mental 
colonizations by means of a public mobilization that could underpin the Society’s effort 
to turn the Brazilian clinical research scenario into a professional, standardized and 
globalized environment. At the same time, of course, pharma companies and CROs 
were knocking on the Ministry of Health’s doors, feeling that the time had come to 
finally try to speed up the slow turnaround times of the Brazilian ethical review 
system. 
In the framework of my study, I focus on the existence and relationships of 
rationalities and mentalities within ethics committees. Nevertheless, as soon as one 
tries to look at broader scenarios, it is possible to surprise the same rationalities and 
mentalities being constantly marshalled in order to built up political discourses. 
Political processes involve not only resources, funds, weapons and other sorts of 
material products; they also have to do with discourses, claims, ideologies and 
rationalities. Therefore, the comprehension of the ways in which mentalities are 
formulated and combined, not only in particular institutions but in society at large, is 




By studying and comparing the technical and analytical mentalities, we cannot 
verify the complementarities identified in the comparison between the bioethical and 
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communitarian mentalities. On the one hand, technical and analytical claims do not 
maintain a frequent conversation, sharing only concerns with the methodologies 
advanced in clinical studies. On the other hand, the technical approach has been more 
ideologically effective, in the sense that committee members tend to favour technical 
rather than analytical claims when dealing with issues of clinical research and ethics 
committees. 
The technical mentality’s ideological success has to do with the following 
circumstances. 
 
 We are dealing with a secular philosophical construct whose consolidation and 
expansion is guaranteed by a vast set of institutions such as universities, 
scientific associations, academic journals, the media, among others 
 The scientific expertise of bioscientists and physicians is largely recognized and 
respected by committee members 
 Scientific concepts and statistical tools can provide committee members with 
concrete yardsticks to assess research projects 
 The ideas of improvement and progress, which are central in the technical 
discourse, sound quite meaningful and appealing to members of different 
backgrounds 
 
On the other hand, the precarious diffusion of the analytical mentality can be 
explained by another set of reasons. 
 
 The relatively recent emergence of this approach has not yet allowed enough 
time for a solid ideological development. In a sense, analysts are not simply 
holding a mentality but also building it up 
 In order to be embraced, the analytical mentality requires either some 
scientific knowledge or much experience at reviewing drug proposals. Both 
characteristics are not very common for many committee members, who can 
stay in the committee for only a couple of years or can be kept away from the 
analysis of drug protocols 
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 The analytical approach often counters the technical approach; the ideological 
success of this latter impose barriers to the diffusion of analytical claims 
 So far the analytical mentality has not elaborated clear references to guide 
committee members in their reviews. In this way, for most members, and 
especially those who are new to the world of clinical research, the analytical 
discourse can sound murky or too politicized 
 
These asymmetries are important because at this level of the foreground 
knowledge, discourses have to do not only with moral stances but also with political 
stances. In other words, both the technical and analytical mentalities are engaged in a 
discussion about the ways in which clinical trials should be assessed by ethics 
committees and government agencies. The technical approach stresses the relevance 
of scientific standards and the accuracy of trials undertaken by pharma companies and 
CROs. The analytical approach has a much more cautious stance, especially in its 
assessment of industrial studies. Thus, it proposes to delve into methodological details, 
trying to detect manipulations or too flexible choices that protocol designers make in 
order to preserve financial interests. 
Once again, it is important to remember that even though these approaches 
tend to stress methodological aspects of clinical research, their language can always be 
translated into common terms and be made understandable to most committee 
members. In the case of technical claims, this translation is quickly done, for society 
has formulated many artifices to make scientific notions become diffusible and largely 
recognizable. For instance, the media helps circulate scientific notions kept at 
superficial levels in order to sound, at the same time, clear and legitimate. As for 
analytical claims, their translation has been more problematic, for the process seems 
to depend, to a large extent, on personal attempts to unravel the intricacies of clinical 
trials. 
If these mentalities reflect political discussions, there is a necessary corollary: 
the stances they represent may at any moment reach extreme degrees. In this way, 
one can speak of a technical and analytical fundamentalism or, more precisely, a 
healing and critical mentality. Studying these extremes views is our goal in the 




6 Chapter 6 – Back to background knowledge: 
the healing and critical mentalities 
 
 The mentalities focused on in this chapter are an extension of those studied in 
Chapter 5. We can say that they take the stances advanced by the technical and 
analytical approaches to extreme degrees. This is the reason why the chapter begins 
with a brief overview of the sociological study of extreme behaviours and ideologies. 
The mentalities we begin to study now (healing and critical mentalities) do not share 
characteristics. This is why we shall study them in two separate moments, beginning 
with the critical mentality and then moving on to addressing the healing mentality. 
 
6.1 IDEOLOGY AND EXTREME VIEWS 
 
As Lévi-Strauss (1964) classically argued, social life always implies certain 
efforts of classification and organization. To be sure, some leeway for creative 
arrangements can always be found but in order for groups to have some stability, a 
certain degree of normalization is needed. According to Habermas (1996), social life 
involves both validity, defined as the flexibility and freedom for negotiation implied by 
communicative actions, and facticity, which refers to fixed rules and meanings for 
which negotiation is closed. If as Geertz (1973) argued, culture is a net of meanings 
knitted by men, there is flexibility in the act through which meaning is established but 
a great deal of rigidity in the compliance with meanings previously determined. 
Thus classifications and normalizations are ubiquitous social events. This ends 
up imposing more or less serious difficulties to people that are somehow perceived as 
different, such as those who are mentally ill (Estroff, 1981), physically disabled (Oliver, 
2009, Mladenov, 2011), or outlaws (Hobsbawn, 1969/2004). This was perhaps the 
inspiring evidence for Durkheim (1960) to claim that society imposes normalization to 
individuals, and therefore the normal person can be defined as the average person. 
Nevertheless, Durkheim himself recognized that at certain points, some 




subsequently acquire more acceptation and eventually guide society toward new 
pathways. Thus social actors who struggle with established norms can eventually play 
decisive roles and introduce scientific, philosophical and behavioural changes. 
In the previous chapter, it was shown that the technical and analytical 
mentalities are involved in a political debate. In some of their claims, these approaches 
are not only distinct but also mutually exclusive. For instance, the technical approach 
tends to frame pharma companies as models of clinical researchers, a capacity that is 
attributed to their financial resources with which all the details of trials can be 
carefully looked at. The analytical approach is very cautious (and even suspicious) 
toward pharma companies, assuming that methodological flaws can derive from 
financial interests. Obviously, these stances can eventually constitute extreme views. 
In this way, pharma companies would be seen either as fully-fledged scientific masters 
or scientific charlatans. 
Even though such type of attitude proved quite rare in the interviews I 
conducted, it was possible to identify two divergent kinds of extreme discourses. On 
the one hand, there is a range of claims that expand some conclusions taken from the 
technical mentality. As a result, some ideas such as universal benefits and therapeutic 
progress end up being overstated. On the other hand, some committee members take 
some conclusions selected from the analytical mentality to unexpected heights. The 
final result is a set of claims that depict clinical trials as a domain fraught with 
insurmountable flaws. 
Even though these extreme discourses draw heavily on the ideological work 
carried out by the technical and analytical mentalities, they do contain some 
ideological novelties, such as the ideas of therapy and crisis, which appear as pivotal 
elements. Eventually, there emerge two ideological trends that can be summarized in 








 Clinical research promotes progress and knowledge, which are materialized in 
medicines and procedures endowed with healing capacities 
 
 Clinical research contains methodological and procedural flaws that are 
necessary to the whole system, and that is why we can speak of a critical 
enterprise 
 
This chapter aims to describe and interpret these two stances, which I call 
healing and critical mentalities. Contrary to what happens to other approaches, here 
ideological conversation disappears. In other words, there is neither common claim nor 
political debate between these two mentalities. They follow different pathways, 
identifying different relevant issues and applying different schemes. As we can see in 
Figure 3.1, page 71, these are the only approaches that do not share something with 
another approach located in the contrary field of rationality. The only small trait they 
do share is the fact that they are extreme views, and this is why they are presented 
here in this same chapter. However, the differences between them are so salient that 
my exposition is realized in two moments. Firstly, I shall describe the critical mentality 
and once this task is accomplished, I move on to discussing the healing mentality. 
 
6.2 THE CRITICAL MENTALITY 
 
In the history of social and economic thoughts, the idea of crisis has been 
invoked several times. Two main ways to deal with this idea can be identified. First, 
there is an interpretative tradition inspired by Schumpeter, according to which 
capitalism operates by creating and finally overcoming successive crises. Through a 
process of “creative destruction,” capitalism is always unmaking the previous situation, 
triggering new arrangements and forestalling stagnating processes (Schumpeter, 
1942/1954). Second, the tradition of thought initiated by Marx points out that 
capitalism is a huge crisis itself. Through a productive process which generates 
decreasing surplus value, capitalism would slowly march towards self-destruction. This 
second notion of crisis is precisely the one which is embraced by the critical mentality. 
238 
 
Here, crisis is not seen as an error to be corrected; rather, it is hailed as an 
insurmountable trait of clinical trials. 
 This is the view that comes to be advanced in Adriana Petryna’s studies. She 
claims, for instance, that in clinical trials, adverse events are poorly reported and 
harms are under-hypothesized. “Such underhypothesizing does not necessarily mean 
deliberate suppression of adverse events. Rather it reflects logistical incapacities of the 
trial operational model and of the system of modern drug regulation that created it” 
(Petryna, 2009, p. 27). Here, the idea of interests, which travelled from the pragmatic 
through the communitarian and into the analytical mentality, tends to have less 
importance. In critical claims, research flaws have to do with the organization of the 
whole research system and appear as necessary elements. 
 Petryna (2005) proposed the idea of “ethical variability,” arguing that ethical 
standards followed by the trials industry vary according to the country and the social 
context. In countries marked by intense social and health crises, standards can be 
relaxed (Petryna, 2005, Petryna, 2009). “But one can also ask, are crises exceptions or 
are they the norm? To what extent does the language of crisis become instrumental, 
granting legitimacy to experimentation that otherwise might not have any?” (Petryna, 
2006, p. 43). Therefore, Petryna’s analyses are a good example of a critical view, for 
her claims suggest that the state of crisis as an inherent and necessary feature of 
global trials. 
 To be sure, this type of analysis is also shaped by concerns that stem from 
background knowledge and are subsequently processed by communitarian and 
analytical views. However, there is something new in the critical mentality, for it is 
neither shaken by the emotional tones of the communitarian discourse nor paralyzed 
by the heavy methodological concerns of the analytical discourse. The critical 
mentality, albeit stimulated by pressing concerns identified by its communicative 
counterparts, leads to sober discourses. Thus, it is important to be able to distinguish 






6.2.1 The idea of proto-critique 
 
Throughout my explanation, I used some discourse graphics to depict the 
ideological structure of some discourses. As the pragmatic approach belongs to both 
the instrumental and communicative rationalities, the bars corresponding to this 
approach are symmetric. However, there are some cases in which this symmetry is 
broken, like in the following discourse graphic. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 – Discourse graphic n. 28 




 Whenever interviewees voiced pragmatic claims, I attributed scores to both the 
instrumental and communicative sides. However, by looking at the graphic above, we 
see that pragmatic claims show a higher score at the communicative side. This 
happened because at certain points of this interview, some claims were voiced which I 
considered as proto-critique. In the following quote, I take one example from this 




“Over the last years, there has been a great expansion of clinical research. There are 
more and more protocols, more and more studies... Do you think that this expansion is 
important and necessary? 
Not always. 
Not always. And why? 
Well... I think that medicine has become dominated by the pharmaceutical companies 
and I think that whilst, often, very valuable compounds have been tested for diseases 
such as cancer, it is not always true that, say, for instance, in this context, those 
compounds are going to be available to the general population. So the research and 
testing happen in South Africa but the medications aren’t available [...] I’m a lot 
circumspect about pharmaceutical companies. And they make such vast profits. And I 
think medicine is about care. And I think a lot of the committee work that we do goes 
to pharmaceutical companies, to developing new protocols and following through 
clinically based research rather than actually generating research on the ground here 
that is maybe more meaningful [...] And a lot of money might be coming in from the 
pharmaceutical research but [...] tends to go to researchers who are involved with the 
pharmaceutical company [...].” 
(Cape Town/C7/Social scientist/07-11) 
 
 In my fieldwork, other interviewees trumpeted similar complaints: 
 
“So, you know, you’re interested in clinical trials. I’ll give you some good views 
[laughter] [...] This is just my view and it came through my experience, so consider 
what I’m saying in that sort of context. [Pause.] I can’t escape the feeling that there is 
a lot of easy-thinking about clinical trials that happen in this country. There is a lot of 
people who... I have a strong suspicion that there is a bit of, you know, it is cheap, it is 
easy to do clinical trials in a country like South Africa because, you know, maybe 
regulations aren’t quite strict or they certainly are much cheaper than they would be if 
these trials were conducted in another part of the world and, you know, this is a needy 
country, so any money is better than no money. I think that this is also often the view 
that people hold. And so it is entirely legitimate for medical doctors in this country to 
conduct maybe seventeen different clinical trials at the same moment, because they 
actually find clinical care for his patients, or her patients, and because it also, then... 
you know, there is a bit of funding that they can use to finance capacity development 
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in medical research and stuff like that. I think, you know, because this country is a 
needy country and it is a resource-poor country, or relatively resource-poor, that it is 
okay to them to do these clinical trials here on the scale that it happens [...].” 
(Cape Town/C7/Bioethicist/08-11) 
 
“Do you think that the fact that there are foreign companies doing research in Brazil is 
bad? 
Look, it is not, as long as they have partners in Brazil, right? If they’re alone, why are 
they alone? They have to justify it, and they have to justify it very well. Are they 
coming here because there are indigenous populations, poor populations here, and 
they don’t have it there? So let’s analyze it [...] But to do it as they did in Africa, in the 
period of Aids, this is completely non sense, and I don’t agree with it.” 
(São Paulo/C3/Lay member/05-11) 
 
At first sight, it seems fair and correct to consider such discourses as critical. 
Nevertheless, if we take into account the arguments that are mobilized, it is easy to 
see that we are dealing with the same concerns that define other mentalities. In fact, 
there are pragmatic claims (economic interests held by companies and researchers) 
and communitarian claims (international inequalities, exploitation of vulnerable 
populations). Thus, instead of a new approach, these discourses express pragmatic and 
communitarian approaches. Considering the immediacy and the emotive vein with 
which claims are often voiced in the pragmatic and communitarian mentalities, there 
is no surprise in the fact that these proto-critiques also assume emphatic tones. 
It is the presence of proto-critique that explains the “pragmatic distortion” in 
the graphic above.96 Apparently critical and innovative, this stance is actually repeating 
what has been built up by other mentalities. By the way, proto-critiques can be 
constructed not only with ideas from communicational but also from instrumental 
mentalities. From the technical mentality derives a proto-critique according to which 
companies are failing to comply with established scientific standards, an interpretation 
that was proposed, for example, by Abrahan (1993, 2007). There is also a fairly 
widespread proto-critique whose source lies in the bioethical approach, as the next 
quote exemplifies. 
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“In your opinion, what is the main goal of an ethics committee? 
A research ethics committee. It would be, I guess... Again, I’m back, to looking at, I 
suppose, the quality of the informed consent. I’m not a great believer in the way we 
push informed consent, that it has to be written in a certain way. I think, I believe that 




 In the literature on clinical trials, criticizing the informed consent process and 
proposing new and more comprehensive processes has become a very frequent 
(bioethical) proto-critique. This notion is in tune with the bioethical conception 
according to which ethics is a field in constant evolution. 
In the case of the communitarian mentality, proto-critique seems to be 
associated with a lack of analytical resources, as the following quote suggests. 
 
“[...] Over the last years, there has been a big expansion of clinical trials in countries 
like South Africa and Brazil. Do you think that this growing number of protocols is really 
important and necessary? 
Ah... I don’t... I don’t know enough to have the kind of... You’re talking about clinical 
trials and particularly pharmaceutical trials. I don’t... Personally, what I’ve read about 
is things, for example, like me-too drugs, you know. And I think there is probably some 
significant part of trial work that is driven by companies needing to just produce more 
patentable, you know, reinventions of previous drugs, which I don’t think it is a good 
thing. I think some of the growth in places like South Africa, Brazil or other places is 
that drug companies are finding it harder to do work in Europe and the US, because of 
the regulatory systems there [...] But I don’t know the sense of... [Pause.] Yeah, I don’t 
know enough to make my own independent judgment but I imagine that there is kind 
of good reasons and bad reasons for this expansion.” 
(Cape Town/C7/Social scientist/08-11) 
 
In spite of being emphatic, proto-critical claims are usually accompanied by 
qualifications, for as this interviewee points out, information is lacking in order for 
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definitive conclusions to be advanced. Without being processed by the analytical 
mentality, communitarian claims cannot assume a true critical nature, missing the 
point where proto-critique becomes actual critique. In addition, these types of proto-
critical claims still admit the search for solutions. In a true critical discourse, as we 
begin to see in the next section, the interpretation assumes a more drastic vein. 
 
6.2.2 Unnecessary trials 
 
One of my interviewees told me that she once found a methodological flaw in a 
project designed by a pharma company. She pointed to the problem and the principal 
investigator refused her arguments. A meeting was then organized, involving this 
reviewer, the committee chair and the physician-investigator. 
 
“And then I looked at her [the investigator] and said: ‘You know, this medicine has 
counter-indications... it has bigger carcinogenic potential than what is available in the 
market.’ She said: ‘Absolutely not. This is not true at all.’ And I had downloaded a 
publication that had appeared one month and a half before the meeting [...] a study 
that showed exactly that. So I presented her this article, which I had fully printed, and 
said: ‘Look, madam, we have this information here.’ And she almost felt on her back. 
She said: ‘Well, I’ll look at it, I’ll talk to the sponsor to see what the proper procedures 
are’ [...] 
And do you often find this kind of problem? Is that frequent? 
Well, there are problems that are a bit unbelievable [...] this surprises me, you know, 
and makes me a little frustrated, because it is an easy thing to detect (even I, who 
don’t work on that area, can detect it), I ask for changes, and then, when you point to 
it, they say: ‘Oh, it is true, we should have included it.’ 
(São Paulo/C3/Social scientist/05-11) 
 
 Based on her ten-year experience in committees, this interviewee says that 
pharma companies may try to push inaccurate research methods, being supported by 
investigators. In this way, the relaxation of scientific and clinical rules would be an 
inherent aspect of trials. Juni and collaborators, by studying the Vioxx scandal and 
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carefully analyzing the data from this clinical trial, argued that Merck was intentionally 
late in withdrawing the defective and dangerous medicine from the market. If Merck 
stated, in 2004, that the drug should not remain on the market, “[…] then the same 
statement could and should have been made several years earlier, when the data [...] 
first became available” (Juni et al., 2004, p. 2027). 
 In the critical mentality, methodological flaws are framed as a fundamental and 
necessary characteristic of global trials. In many occasions, this phenomenon is 
attributed to the commercial nature of pharma companies and CROs, which are always 
engaged in business competitions and need to design several trials, collect samples 
and analyze data very quickly. 
 
“Do you think there are fundamental differences between an academic study and a 
trial sponsored by the industry? 
Yes, I do [laughter]. I think a trial sponsored by industry is profit-driven. Very much so 
[...] Okay, some academics probably would finally end up in the industry [laughter], 
okay, but I think while they’re still academics, I think they would see to it... they would 
probably see that the science is [pause] perfect for the trial, whereas I’m not so sure 
that the industry... I think the industry has so many trials that they want... that they 
have going at a certain time, and for them it is to get it out, to do the trials quickly to 
have the results so that they can put the drug on the market. And so that is why I think 
there is a difference between academically sort of funded trials and then the industry-
funded trials. 
So the industry’s trials are more likely to have scientific problems. 
Scientific? 
Problems. 
I would think so. [Pause.] I think so.” 
(Cape Town/C6/Nurse/08-11) 
 
 Methodological flaws, which are pointed out by the analytical mentality, are 
considered, in the critical mentality, as a fundamental aspect of clinical trials. Thus the 
adoption of the analytical approach is a prerequisite for a full access to the critical 









 There seems to be a positive correlation between the two scores. To test this 
correlation, I divided the interviewees into three groups according to the following 
levels of critical claims:97 
 
 Low level: null score 
 Medium: from 0.01 to 0.06 
 High: 0.07 or more 
 
By performing a statistical test98, I found a positive correlation coefficient of 
0.38, which according to Cohen (1988), indicates a medium correlation.99 Thus, 
                                                     
97
 As critical claims are very rare, these levels differ from those I used for the pragmatic mentality in 
Chapter 3. Eighteen interviewees had no critical claim at all. The other sixteen interviewees displayed 9 
different scores, which were divided into two groups (five intermediate scores and the top four scores). 
98
 Spearman correlation. 
99
 The associated p value is of 0.02. 
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whenever the proportion of analytical claims increases, the level of critical claims also 
increases at a medium rate. The coefficient of determination is of 0.14, meaning that 
14% of the increase in critical scores is explained by the increase in analytical scores. 
Thus the critical mentality seems to really draw on assumptions and conclusions taken 
from the analytical mentality. 
There are not only pharma companies that can be targeted by such critiques. 
Regulatory agencies and clinical guidelines are often focused on by critical views. For 
instance, McGoey and Jackson (2009) identified flaws in the UK’s pharmaceutical 
regulations, whereas Petryna (2009) pointed to fundamental insufficiencies in the 
Food and Drugs Administration’s procedures. Some analysts complain that regulations 
focus on drug trials and overlook the particularities of other studies (Watson and 
Gelling, 2012). One of my interviewees said that guidelines and ethics committees are 
frequently addressed in the lectures she gives to medical students. 
 
“Knowing the operation of a committee must help students to submit proposals, right? 
Oh, sure. This is what I tell them: ‘Guys, you may like the guidelines or not. In my PhD, I 
showed that current guidelines (current Brazilian guidelines) are not adequate for the 
review of qualitative health research. However, in order to agree or disagree, there is 
no way: you have to know it and dialogue with what is available. I’m not claiming that 
you have to be subservient and always say amen, but you have to know and dialogue 
with what is available.’” 
(São Paulo/C3/Social scientist/05-11) 
 
 In this example, the interviewee has even conducted a study to scrutinize 
Brazilian guidelines, which according to her view, are inaccurate. 
In this flawed research environment, many clinical trials, from a critical point of 
view, would eventually be unnecessary.100 Hence, the strategic need for analyses and 
negotiations, as the same interviewee puts it. 
 
                                                     
100
 Pogge claims that many studies aims to explore drugs that are not essential, from a social and 
political point of view. See POGGE, T. 2007. Could glozalisation be good for world health? Global justice: 
theory practice rhetoric, 1-10. 
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“And are you concerned with the fact that foreign companies are doing research in 
Brazil? 
No, I’m not concerned [...] I think that when we sit down to negotiate with foreign 
sponsors, they... be it foreign or national... they have to be seen as partners. So we’ll 
sit down at a table and we’ll see what the advantages are for you, what the 
advantages are for the country, the values, because, okay, everybody will get paid, 
that is okay [...] I think we have to have dignity to negotiate, indeed, something that is 
good and correct for everyone.” 
 
 Interestingly, when it comes to pharma companies and CROs, the idea of 
negotiation acquires a special worth in the analytical/critical approach. The technical 
mentality tends to be very permissive, due to its respect towards companies. The 
bioethical mentality, by means of symbolic operations,101 provides vague answers. 
Finally, the communitarian mentality tends to be antagonistic towards foreign 
companies. In spite of its sharpness, the analytical/critical approach seems to be 
endowed with a rare willingness to weight several aspects and search for negotiations 
and reflected decisions. 
 The following section addresses the sources of the critical approach. 
 
6.2.3 Philosophical and historical sources 
 
 Three phenomena can be considered as motivators of the critical approach. 
Firstly, this mentality draws on the same sources that foster the analytical approach, 
but mainly on some recent examples of methodological failures in drug research. 
 Secondly, there is a psycho-sociological phenomenon related to the ways in 
which people react when confronted by homogeneizing contexts. As we have seen, 
ethics committees have turned into friendly environments for both the bioethical and 
technical mentalities. Thus, when it comes to concerns and claims, little space has 
been conserved for creativity and distinction. This circumstance acquired a very 
tangible shape during my fieldwork. In some interviews, after spending the five initial 
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minutes listening to the interviewee’s claims, I could predict with great success what 
the following claims would be for the remaining forty or fifty minutes. 
Insofar as mentalities can be subjected to globalizing processes, the primacy of 
the bioethical and technical approaches has eventually been transformed into a sort of 
ideological imperialism. We can even recur to the idea of behaviour, as it was defined 
by Arendt (1958/1998, p. 40): “[...] society expects from each of its members a certain 
kind of behavior, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 
‘normalize’ its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or 
outstanding achievement.” By analyzing the discourse of most of my South African and 
Brazilian interviewees, one could point to a sort of ideological behaviour. Ethics 
committees would eventually contribute to the emergence of the globalized “single 
thought” pointed to by Milton Santos (2000). 
For many committee members, this ideological homogenization constitutes a 
guiding reference, for technical and bioethical concerns become a sort of guideline to 
be followed in the review of research protocols. However, some individuals (and 
especially those who privilege the communicational rationality) may react differently 
and look for alternative ideological pathways instead of complying with established 
norms. Opposing a mental behaviour, we would then identify a mental rebellion. This 
attitude does not lead to any search for isolation. On the contrary, people who look for 
distinctiveness have to engage in conversations and relations, the only means through 
which they can eventually grasp their uniqueness and voice their particular ideas. 
According to Arendt (1963, p. 116), “[...] it is the desire to excel which makes men love 
the world and enjoy the company of their peers, and drives them into public 
business.”102 
Finally, the critical mentality draws on a characteristic that is typical not only to 
ethics committees but to mass society: in homogenised contexts, distinctive actions 
can only be undertaken in the interstices of the system. In Scott’s (1998, p. 58) terms, 
an alternative “social experience” can emerge in spite of the “formal order.” To use 
Certeau’s concepts, powerful “strategies” are growing bigger and bigger, leaving only 
small spaces in which wise “tactics” can emerge and search for preservation. We are 
dealing with a “[...] sort of cybernetic society, subjected to the Brownian movements 
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of invisible and innumerable tactics. We would have a plethora of random and 
untameable manipulations, within a huge grid of constraints and socio-economic 
safeguards [...].” In ethics committees, these invisible tactics are possible because the 
review of projects continues to rely on the solitary reading undertaken by members.103 
Thus, even though analytical/critical views tend to be suffocated by the 
bioethical/technical procedures of committees, a great deal of analysis and criticism is 
still possible when committee members realize their lonely conversation with research 
projects. Even though all committee members must comply with the standards of the 
ethical review model, this compliance does not come to forestall every possibility of 
distinctiveness. We can repeat Timmerman and Berg’s (2003, p. 70) words to say that, 
for some individuals, “[...] the guideline is not a goal in itself but a means, acted upon 
in terms of their own aims and the local constraints structuring the situation in which 
the guideline happens to be placed.” Thus the critical mentality preserves the 
possibility of personal views, as claimed subsequently. 
 
6.2.4 Personal formulation 
 
As Figure 3.1 (page 71) shows, the emergence of a critical view depends not 
only on the adoption of the analytical mentality but also on a mental process that I 
name personal formulation. With this expression I am referring to individual pathways 
through which a critical view can be eventually obtained. In my fieldwork, out of 34 
strong interviews (lasting at least 30 minutes), only four members voiced discourses 
that can be interpreted as analytical or critical (or both). In order to understand this 
phenomenon of personal formulation, it is interesting to look at these committee 
members’ examples. 
 
1. Physician (analytical discourse), Committee 6 
He defines himself as an “almost retired” physician. He works in a medical field 
that is poorly explored by pharma companies. However, as a recognized physician (an 
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opinion-leader), from time to time he receives invitations to be the principal 
investigator in some trials and does join some studies.104 
 
2. Social scientist (analytical/critical discourse), Committee 3  
She has acquired large experience in 
ethics committees (more than 10 years), 
having worked in different institutions. At 
the beginning, she used to review only 
qualitative studies but subsequently began 
to analyze drug studies as well. Nowadays, 
in addition to this committee, she is 
member of a committee that is also based 
in São Paulo. However, this second 
committee seldom receives proposals for 
drug studies. Therefore, she argues that her experience at committee 3 is important 
for her to keep in touch with drug trials, as she is “afraid of losing the practice.” 
 
3. Social scientist (analytical/critical discourse), Committee 3 
She is a social scientist and gives lectures on research ethics, sometimes for 
medical students. She is one of the new members of committee 3, in addition to being 
a new lecturer in the faculty.105 
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4. Lawyer (analytical/critical discourse), Committee 3 
 He affirms to play a particular role 
in the committee due to his law 
background. Thus, physicians may consult 
him from time to time to address legal 
doubts. As the discourse graphic shows, his 
discourse is dominated by one group of 
claims (ANALYT13), according to which 
physicians are not the only ones who can 
assess drug trials proposals. From his point 
of view, in order to streamline the 
committee’s operations, “[...] it would be important to have higher participation of 
people who are alien to the clinical staff of the hospital [...].” 
 
 
 The fact that three of these members are based in committee 3 is important. 
Some outstanding, nationally respected physicians sit in this committee. Some five 
years ago, a new internal guideline was approved, stating that the majority of 
members should be non-physicians. Maybe feeling somehow threatened, the 
physician-members reacted by reinforcing their positions in the meetings. For 
instance, in one of the meetings I observed, some members (non-physicians) voiced 
concerns about physician-investigators who do not disclose their conflicts of interest, 
providing little information, if at all, about payments they receive from pharma 
companies. According to these members, a clear declaration of financial commitments 
should be a requisite for proposals to be accepted by the committee. After some 
discussion, physicians who were present in this meeting managed to suffocate the 
claim by arguing that this matter should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. 
Arguably, such types of debates have been repeated over the last years, in this 
committee, as a consequence of the increase in the number of non-physicians. With 
more debate, there can be an expansion in the leeway for analytical and critical views 
to emerge. 
Figure 6.4 – Discourse graphic n. 27 
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It is difficult to identify the precise causes triggering the emergence of 
analytical and critical approaches. Here, statistical tests fail. However, there seems to 
be a common trait between the mentioned interviewees: they do not belong to the 
clinical trials’ mainstream of their institutions. One of them is physician, having some 
relations with pharma companies and CROs; however, these relations are not frequent 
and ended up helping him to understand the ways in which the industry operates. The 
other members are professionals based in non-medical departments. Therefore, it 
seems that the analytical/critical view is more likely to emerge when committee 
members can look at trials with eyes of invaders, that is, as people who come “from 
the outside,” bringing about social and political concerns to the realm of clinical 
research. By the way, this point was made by one of the interviewees focused on in 
this section. According to him, trials should also be justified on the basis of their social 
usefulness. 
 
“[...] it would be interesting if ethics committees had a more stringent stance, in order 
to oblige researchers to show the viability of their studies. To oblige them to either 
show this viability or have a broader view. I think people just say: ‘Oh, that is okay, so 
it is fine.’ 
Okay, and that would imply a new section in the protocol. 
No, I think within the protocol, that could be asked more directly, but I think physicians 
do not have this concern any longer because they’re used to it. I think only outsiders 
are able to see that.” 
(São Paulo/C3/Lawyer/04-11) 
 
Here, we deal with one of the limitations of my study. Fully understanding the 
ways in which analytical and critical views are formulated would require more study 
and different types of interviews, exploring life stories, for example. In addition, it 
would be necessary to take psychological aspects into account, for even though the 
social and individual sides of mental life can be disentangled for the sake of 
interpretation, there are certainly connections between them. 





6.2.5 Criticizing committees 
 
Members who embrace the critical mentality also target ethics committees, 
pointing to flaws that can compromise their operation. The basic assumption is quite 
simple: clinical trials are thriving in South Africa and Brazil, making committees become 
too busy and obliging them to struggle to meet deadlines and accomplish tasks. One 
interviewee claimed that when she joined the committee, in 1993, the number of 
projects to be reviewed and discussed was quite small. Nowadays, discussions are 
sometimes sacrificed because the committee needs to rush its job. 
 
“I know they can’t extend the time for the meeting [...] sometimes, he [the chair] 
would say: ‘Just concentrate on the important points, the problem areas.’ And I feel, 
for others around the table, to know about this trial... And the things that you may... 
There may be something inside of you that says: ‘But something here is wrong,’ but 
you can’t pinpoint it, but if you discuss it in the meeting, somebody might pick up on it, 
people who have other expertise than yours [...].” 
(Cape Town/C6/Nurse/08-11) 
 
 Indeed, I observed meetings in five committees (2, 3, 6, 7 and 8). With the 
exception of committee 2, I realized that time is really an issue. Frequently, the 
atmosphere gets somewhat awkward, as people note that the final time is 
approaching while a considerable number of projects remain to be discussed. In the 
critical mentality, this problem is seen as a structural question, for it has to do with the 
national and global expansion of clinical trials. Thus, making the meeting longer would 
only be a palliative measure. 
 In Brazil, another structural problem is pointed out. As there are economic 
differences between regions within the country, ethics committees reproduce this 
imbalance, being more equipped in Southern states. 
 
“So what would be the main goal of an ethics committee? 
[...] to make sure that issues pertaining to the protection of subjects are guaranteed. 
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And do you think committees have been reaching this goal? 
Committees or Conep?106 
Both. 
[...] Speaking of committees in general, I would say no. Considering the sample that we 
currently get at Conep, we’ve seen many problems depending on the location of 
committees in Brazil, depending on whether the place is resourceful (Southeast for 
example) or less resourceful, like for instance the less advantaged states. So I mean, 
there are problems in the system as a whole [...].” 
(Brasília/C4/Bioscientist/04-11) 
 
 In the critical mentality, another flaw of the reviewing system is the precarious 
funding of committees. As a consequence, their work ends up being too abstract, for 
there is no contact to the actual procedures of studies. Thus, “[...] the oversight system 
turns a blind eye to the day-to-day work of trials” (DeBruin et al., 2011, p. 130). 
 
“And do you think that ethics committees, in the way they are organized today... Do 
you think they are capable of protecting people? 
No... because we... You know, we have to look at the paper but ethics committees 
rarely go out and look at what happens in the real world. So you don’t... You get SAEs 
[Serious Adverse Events] reported, you get protocol violations reported, you look at 
the protocol, but that is all on paper, you know, and... I don’t think there is a lot of 
ethics committees in the world that’s got the money or the infrastructure or the 
resources or the people to physically go out and make sure that what you approve on 
paper, that is what is happening at the sites. So, no, I don’t think... I don’t think that is 
a South-African issue, I don’t think it is an African issue, I think it is a worldwide 
problem... 
Yeah, it is a global issue, yeah. 
... that you just don’t know, you approve it and then you have to trust that the 
sponsors and the investigators are going to do their job.” 
(Pretoria/C8/Lawyer/08-11) 
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 As this quote indicates, committees are said to be poorly funded, which 
prevents them to realize effective ethical assessments. 
Finally, the critical mentality frequently turns into a weapon to attack the 
bioethical ideology that has dominated committees. Such stance is often expressed by 
means of a critique of the idea of informed consent, one of the bioethical mentality’s 
tenets. 
 
“From your point of view, is there any part or section of the protocol that is more 
important? 
[...] I actually haven’t paid much attention to the consent forms, so I don’t think that 
the consent forms are... I think they can be fetishized, you know: ‘It is going to be okay 
if you have a good consent form’ [...] So I tend to stay away from paying too much 
attention to the consent form.” 
(Cape Town/C7/Social scientist/08-11) 
 
“I think there is too big a concern with only the issue of the informed and free consent 
form [...] Not all the reviews but many reviews always look exclusively at the relation 
to the patient, and few reviewers raise questions pertaining to sample sizes or the 
issue of patient recruitment [...] there seems to be a big concern with formal aspects, 
basically, with the consent form and with the patients’ rights, whereas the 
methodological dimensions of research, you know, I think many reviewers consider 
them as a technical aspect, which, as they are not really within their expertise area, 
remain a bit overlooked [...] This is also a concern I have, you know, because research 
ethics involves not only the relation between researcher and patient but many things 
more.” 
(São Paulo/C3/Social scientist/05-11) 
 
 Of course, the critical approach to committees generates more or less intense 
disappointments and frustrations. Committee members holding the critical mentality 
recognize that they somehow belong to a flawed global research system. At an 
individual level, the main question is thus how to find motivations to continue to work 




“After these years of work in the ethics committee... what do you think this work has 
brought to you, personally? 
[Laughter.] Well... I don’t know, I think there are many things, you know. On the one 
hand, I get very tired with these reviews, they give me much work and so on, they 
often take away my leisure time [...] But I believe, honestly, that my work... this work is 
socially relevant [...] patients of SUS107 depend on that health service. Most of them 
have few years of study, they ignore their rights, they are very vulnerable. So I always 
think: ‘If we don’t do a good job, this will get to a mother, for example, who is, say, 
functionally illiterate and will consent to the inclusion of her child into a study or not, 
for instance, which may involve a high risk for the child.’ And what force does she 
have, in the health service, to say no, if she depends on that service? So I think it is a 
very relevant work [...].” 
(São Paulo/C3/Social scientist/05-11) 
 
 As this quote shows, the communitarian approach can become a sort of 
ideological scapegoat. As the critical mentality highlights unsolvable problems, 
members may look for motivations in the altruistic and emotive notions of the 
communitarian mentality, therefore imparting some vibrant hues to an ideological 
picture that might eventually become dull and dry. 
In spite of its sharpness, the critical approach remains a diluted social 
phenomenon, being unable to generate partnerships and collective actions, as we shall 
see in the following section. 
 
6.2.6 Political implications of the critical mentality 
 
The critical mentality perpetuates the political weakness verified in the other 
communicational mentalities: it has been unable to underpin organized, collective 
actions. In this way, it depends on individual stances and personal formulations. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be special moments in which critical claims get more 
likely to be voiced. Frequently, these are either moments in which big scandals come 
to light or moments of widespread debates. 
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In Chapter 3, we remembered the South African national policy for anti-
retroviral drugs, which was adopted in 1997 and provoked a bitter legal reaction from 
pharma companies. At that moment, the story turned into a national issue, and many 
people came to blame what they saw as an unfair, interested attitude of multinational 
drug companies. Quickly, the communicational rationality and its mentalities were 
activated, from the pragmatic to the critical approach, in an ideological chain reaction. 
Another example comes from Brazil with its current effort to renew and 
streamline the ethical review system. As the process opens up much leeway for 
decisions to be taken and changes to be implemented, all the mentalities awake. The 
critical approach is then mobilized to point to flaws that according to some analysts, 
have compromised the Brazilian system. The National Commission for Research Ethics 
(Conep) has been one of the main targets of critical claims. Indeed, some of my 
interviewees think that Conep should not review protocols, decentralizing some of its 
tasks and allowing itself more time for overseeing the national system. 
 
“Conep [...] has its own problems pertaining to excessive amount of work, little time to 
deal with issues that could modify the system, making it more flexible and more 
controlled, which could also favour the committees’ work locally. I mean, there are 
certainly problems to be tackled.” 
(Brasília/C4/Bioscientist/04-11) 
 
“It seems that one of the ideas for Conep will be the decentralization, you know... Does 
this idea sound interesting for you? 
[...] Conep must stop reviewing from 80 to 100 projects per month. It must stop [...] 
Because it looks like a giant ethics committee doing that. And Conep is not a giant 
committee. It is the only national commission with specific functions. A group of 
people that is discussing guidelines on research ethics, which will be valid for the 
whole country, should not undertake this discussion in the remaining time, searching 
for one hour for this discussion because that is not possible in the meeting [...].” 
(São Paulo/C3/Social scientist/05-11) 
 
 When Conep was created, in 1996, bioethical concerns dominated the process, 
especially via the influence of the Brazilian Society of Bioethics. The two-layer system, 
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with studies considered as “special” being reviewed by both Conep and local 
committees, was aimed to enforce compliance with ethical principles. The claims 
quoted above, however, ask for (analytical and critical) stringency from Conep, which 
should make sure that committees are able to fully assess the clinical studies’ worth. 
Therefore, analytical and critical claims can also be fostered in particular historical 
contexts. Even though these approaches display very low levels of institutionalization, 
they continue to have their political and social efficacy. 
 From the viewpoint of mental life, then, the critical mentality is a 
troublemaker, in the sense that it identifies problems whose solution requires drastic 
measures. This is the only approach for which the idea of transformation is really 
decisive. It admits that the crises experienced within the current schemes of clinical 
research cannot be solved without deep changes in the funding, conducting and 
overseeing of trials. Hence, some claims such as the one voiced by Pogge (2007, p. 3), 
according to whom health research needs “a concrete and specific reform plan,” which 
should be inspired by political considerations. Broad issues are stressed also by 
Petryna (2009, p. 197), who affirms that “[...] we need alternative international 
frameworks for pricing and intellectual property, frameworks that address the needs 
of the developing world and thus provide a more cogent social imperative.” 
Thus the critical mentality depicts our historical moment as a critical one, for 
solutions would not be possible without radical shifts in the global research scenario. 
Seen from this perspective, the globalization of trials is framed as a research system 
fraught with problems, a circumstance that asks for a new research system, which 
would probably stress national needs and solutions. 
 In complete opposition to this stance, the healing mentality tends to appease 
tensions and avoid controversial issues, as we begin to analyze in the next section. 
 
6.3 THE HEALING MENTALITY 
 
Each mentality described in my study foregrounds one key concept, as the 










Fairness, justice, non-maleficence, 
beneficence... 
Technical Standards and progress 
Communitarian Compassion108 




 It is time to add a new row to this table by saying that for the healing mentality, 
the main concept is therapy. However, this approach has a particularity, for this 
concept does not seem to suffice. It would be necessary to refer to the idea of 
medicines, even though, as it is clear, this is not an idea as such but a word used to 
describe a tangible object. Thus, the healing mentality cannot exist without being 
constantly oriented towards concrete therapies, whether they appear in the form of 
medicines, devices or medical procedures. From this concrete consideration, however, 
it rapidly goes towards very broad ideas, stressing universal potentialities of research. 
 
6.3.1 Global solidarity 
 
In the same way that the critical mentality depends on analytical concerns, the 
healing approach inherits some notions formulated by the technical approach. The 
main example is certainly the technical idea according to which research brings about 
advantages for every type of groups and individuals. In the healing mentality, this idea 
becomes the basis of a discourse in which the search for therapies goes beyond 
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individual preferences and political projects. This point was made, for instance, in an 
interview in which the question of biological samples being exported was addressed. 
 
“For you, this is not an issue. 
It is not an issue sending it out, no. And also, I don’t care about what they do with it 
afterwards. If I am giving my blood sample, I’ve given it, it’s out of my body, it can’t 
come back and they can’t do anything to me. What does it matter? As far as I am 
concerned, it is for the benefit of the mankind [...].” 
(Cape Town/C7/Lay member/05-11) 
 
 Acknowledging that clinical research can be advantageous for the “mankind” 
implies the admission of “an undifferentiated global epidemiological space,” to use 
Lakoff’s (2005, p. 32) words.109 The idea can grow bigger and bigger because, 
undeniably, there is indeed a common trait to all human beings, which is the fact that 
every-body possesses a physical body. Thus the healing mentality is also informed by 
the “one-ness of man-kind,” as this fact was described by Arendt (1958/1998, p. 45-
46). 
 At the core of the healing approach, we find this humanitarian notion whose 
consequence is the avoidance of tensions for the sake of a communistic view. “Behind 
the ‘harmony of interests’ stands always the ‘communistic fiction’ of one interest, 
which may then be called welfare or commonwealth” (Arendt, 1958/1998, p. 44 note 
36). From this viewpoint, the globalization of clinical trials is seen as a natural 
development of the history of humankind in its secular fight against disease. This is the 
source of several claims pointing out the therapeutic purposes of clinical research. 
 
6.3.2 Clinical trials and therapy 
 
The healing purposes of trials can be voiced in two related, albeit different, 
ways. Firstly, there is a range of claims admitting that by means of their participation in 
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clinical studies, people can improve their health condition. Therefore, there would be 
direct advantages in research participation. 
 
“In your opinion, what is the main goal of clinical research? 
To generate results that can benefit the population and bring about, on the other 
hand, for those who investigate, some rewards over the product they propose. So let’s 
us make clear that, if possible, there must be benefits for both sides, for the research 
subject and the researcher [...] So I mean, the ideal situation would be a win-win 
relation between all the parts involved. 
Okay. And the subjects’ benefit would be therapy. 
Therapy; access to care that they could not have when they are in a less resourceful 
hospital; there could be a more frequent assessment of their disease condition, which 
they wouldn’t have in a less resourceful hospital; a more multiprofessional view; 
access to examinations that they couldn’t generally have. So in fact, research subjects 
almost always have benefits in that sense, in terms of health assessment, you know, 




“The HIV trials and the TB [tuberculosis] trials, clinical trials, that we’re doing now are 
done quite differently from, say, a cancer drug trial. HIV and TB trials now, the ethical 
requirements are far stricter; things like having a community advisory board, most of 
your HIV trials have to have that now [...] Plus your standard of care has to be good. I 
mean, in your prevention trials, you’ve got to provide treatments for SAEs [Severe 
Adverse Events], you’ve to give very good HIV test counselling... So there is very good 
standard of care in those trials [...].” 
(Cape Town/C7/Bioethicist/07-11) 
 
 Thus, one considers that participation in a trial would eventually become a sort 
of alternative health service. In addition to being mobilized by committee members, 
these ideas may be voiced at research sites. For example, in her study about clinical 
trials in the United States, Fisher found out that the argument is often used by the 
research staff in order to convince patients to join clinical studies. These professionals 
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would then stress “[...] the benefits that individual patient-subjects experience as a 
direct result of their participation in drug studies” (Fisher, 2009, p. 199). 
 The second way to voice the healing capacity of trials is to actually focus on the 
production of medicines and therapies, seen as the ultimate goal of studies. Even 
though people acknowledge that the means used in trials may be controversial or 
problematic, it is as though the ends of trials were powerful enough to justify these 
troubles. 
 
“In your opinion, what is the main goal of clinical research? 
[...] It is to develop [pause] better clinical treatments. And it depends on what you 
mean by clinical, yes. Clinical, to me, means medical, means clinical context, so it 
means either pills, injections, it means treatments, it means techniques, surgical 
techniques, it means equipment or whatever else it is [...] So I think the problem is to 
do that better, more effectively, possibly more cheaply, because it is important to do 
things more efficiently [...].” 
(Cape Town/C7/Social scientist/08-11) 
 
“In your opinion, what is the main goal of clinical research? 
[...] [Laughter.] From which point of view? 
What do you mean? 
[Laughter.] Do you mean, from my point of view? 
No, in general [laughter]. 
In general? From my point of view, research is to improve the health system, to 
improve the lives of people, to fight disease, to fight illness [...] I mean, what other 
opinion can one have of clinical research? Anyone knows what clinical research is 
about. It is about improving lives, improving medicine, improving treatments. I just 
wish that they can get on with some of these treatments so I can be treated 
[laughter].” 
(Cape Town/C7/Lay member/05-11) 
 
“[...] Typically, what happens in the pharmaceutical industry... You’re testing 
medications. So it is about response, it is about getting better, it is working towards a 





 Healing patients is a major concern for the healing mentality. Nevertheless, 
even in the case of diseases with no cure, research would still be useful insofar as new 
drugs could prolong some patients’ lives and enable them to live better. As a result, 
healing claims are often exemplified with references to medicines to fight cancer and 
other rare diseases. 
 
“In your opinion, what is the main goal of clinical research? 
[...] To help with the discovery of new treatments to treat... whatever, diseases, 
especially your serious diseases like your cancers, your HIVs, your malarias, things like 
that, you know. You have to try and find cures for incurable diseases and, obviously, 
better what we have and try and make advances in what is already available, because 
you often have effective medication but it’s got a very high side effect profile and 
things like that [...].” 
(Pretoria/C8/Lawyer/08-11) 
 
“In your opinion, what is the main goal of clinical research? 
[Pause.] Well, it is for your and my well-being. That is what clinical research should be 
all about. It is to enhance health [...] I was always sort of sensitive and nervous about 
cancer protocols [...] the reason why you often saw another emphasis in cancer 
research, which is prolonging people’s lives but it is also directed at a better quality of 
life, ’cause these people often don’t have a good quality of life, because of the toxicity 
of all these drugs. So, yeah, in a way, I would think, any clinical research should also 
keep quality of life in the back of their heads, which I think they do. You know, why, for 
example, combining drugs into one tablet? That protects you from four or five tablets 
that you carry and etcetera etcetera. And it is often, you know, that two drugs will 
perform the same but the one with the least side effects will be the favoured one, 
which contributes to quality of life [...].” 
(Pretoria/C8/Bioscientist/07-11) 
 
The emergence of mentalities also depends on social and historical factors. The 
healing mentality is more likely to appear in situations of health problems and 
epidemics. South Africa, for example, has been fighting, for many years, tuberculosis 
and HIV, which have infected large populations in the country. As a consequence, 
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healing claims can be voiced to depict trials as one therapeutic alternative for South 
Africa. 
 
“Over the last years, there has been a big expansion of international clinical trials in 
countries like South Africa. 
Hm hm. 
Do you think that this growing number of protocols is really important and necessary? 
For South Africa? Yes. Because we have a big problem. If you think about HIV alone, 
the companies put a lot in HIV research coming out of this country [...] That is very 
important [...].” 
(Cape Town/C7/Lay member/05-11) 
 
“In your opinion, what is the main goal of clinical research? 
[Silence.] Hm. We could say, improve the situation of the patients [...] Here in the 
country, very much in need is... There are lots of studies going on HIV-TB-malaria 
(malaria not so much in South Africa but HIV-TB) and there are lots of open questions 
that need to be answered outside of industry sponsors’ studies: what is the 




 Such statements can be swiftly combined with technical claims, and the final 
result is the ideological justification of global studies conducted by pharma companies 
and CROs. 
 
“But do you think it is important for Brazil to take part in this kind of [international 
industrial] research? 
I think so [...] because, look, these are new medicines that should be tested in our 
population, because nowadays pharmacogenetics is very important. We know (for 
many reasons that we don’t have to discuss here) that medicines have different effects 
in different populations, right? And why? Because there are genetic variations that 
sometimes may... especially in certain enzymatic complexes... There are populations 
that metabolize a certain medicine more quickly, so it remains in the organism for a 
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shorter time, whereas other populations are slower. So there is a vast range of issues 
that make it important to test it in several populations, you know. I think there is no 
doubt that yes, it is important for Brazil. There is no doubt. For every country [...].” 
(Brasília/C4/Bioscientist/04-11) 
 
 Justifying the globalization of trials with reference to ethnic factors, like this 
interviewee did, is a discursive strategy used in some studies (Marschner, 2010, 
Cummings et al., 2011). In this way, the technical mentality gets covered by a moral 
shield. On the one hand, there are bioethical claims pointing to benefits outpacing the 
risks of trials. On the other, there are healing claims foregrounding the universal duties 
fulfilled by clinical research. 
In the following section, we focus on the ideological sources of the healing 
mentality. 
 
6.3.3 Philosophical and historical sources 
 
In the mid-1980s, Burroughs-Wellcome (subsequently called GlaxoSmithKline) 
conducted a clinical trial to test the efficacy of a compound named zidovudine (or 
simply AZT) to treat HIV-Aids. Results were outstanding, for AZT was the first drug to 
display positive effects at fighting the new disease, helping to prolong some research 
subjects’ lives. Prospects proved so auspicious that the trial was actually terminated so 
that patients on the placebo arm could access the real drug. From the first tests in 
clinical settings to the market, the process took twenty-five months, a very short time 
in the field of drug research. 
This story, recalled in Epstein’s (1996) book, reminds us of a relevant 
circumstance: in some clinical studies, certain participants do improve their health 
conditions. Over the last years, many social actors have learnt to frame clinical trials as 
a potential source of therapies and useful drugs. That is why, for instance, some 
groups campaign for the right to enrol in trials (Epstein, 2007) or the right to access 
medicines just tested in clinical studies (Petryna, 2009). The healing mentality is one of 




The issue is as old as clinical research itself. Fox’s (1959/1998) study focused on 
a medical ward in which research was conducted without many of the sophisticated 
equipments and notions that are accessed by today’s investigators; yet, even in those 
conditions, a certain amount of care and therapy could be gleaned from perilous 
experiments.  
It is not worth discussing here the complex issue of placebo effects and 
measurements of health and illness. From a sociological standpoint, there is no need 
to ask whether the healing mentality would express a wise perspective or simply a 
discourse voiced by innocent dupes. Even if clinical trials are devoid of “therapeutic 
efficacy,” the emergence of the healing mentality shows that they are full of “symbolic 
efficacy,” to use Lévi-Strauss (1958/1974) classic expression. In other words, clinical 
trials have been given social sanction to figure in the list of recognized therapeutic 
alternatives. As some studies have shown (Benoist, 1989, Etkin, 1988, Lefèvre, 1991, 
Van der Geest et al., 1996), medicines are effective not only because they may have 
positive clinical outcomes, but also because they are collectively expected and hoped 
to be effective. As claimed by Van der Geest and collaborators (1996, p. 167): “Efficacy 
is brought about in a context of belief and expectation and through social 
communication and interaction.” 
Another phenomenon allowing the formation of the healing mentality was 
explained by Arendt. Modern society has been marked by massification and behaviour. 
Ancient concerns with political life and distinction have been replaced by the sheer 
concern with the maintenance of the individual life. Thus, discourses tend to conquer 
almost immediate social approval whenever one foregrounds issues such as biological 
preservation, health, well-being, physical satisfaction, among others. “[...] it is the life 
process itself which in one form or another has been channelled into the public realm” 
(Arendt, 1958/1998, p. 45). 
 This conception tends to be reinforced in our days, following to advances in 
fields such as genetics, stem cells, assisted reproduction or neurosciences. Society 
turns hopeful eyes to biosciences, which promise to explain the hidden causes of every 
behaviour, disease or thought (Habermas, 2008). By plunging into these explanations, 
one would expect to understand human beings in their most fundamental 
characteristics, those which do not depend on nationalities, contexts and 
particularities. The globalized nature of many medical studies enhances these hopes, a 
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trend that is also verified in clinical trials. There would be a global solidarity promoted 
by global research, insofar as everyone may at some point be a research participant or 
the consumer of a final medication. In the healing mentality, technical and 
humanitarian claims are mixed up to formulate a powerful discourse. As Lakoff (2007, 
p. 65) argued: “For contemporary theorists of the symbolic efficacy of biomedicine, the 
shared sense of the authority of scientific knowledge and its techniques produces its 
own healing effect.” 
 There is another important idea underpinning the healing mentality. Since 
Adam Smith (1776/1979), the image of a market guided by an “invisible hand” 
circulates. Thus, one admits that balances and equitable distributions are generated by 
the spontaneous mechanisms of market, rather than being triggered by massive 
policies. Through simple, administrative procedures, national and global schemes, 
including health research, would acquire desirable formats. 
 
“A complete victory of society will always produce some sort of ‘communistic 
fiction’, whose outstanding political characteristic is that it is indeed ruled by an 
‘invisible hand’, namely, by nobody. What we traditionally call state and 
government gives place here to pure administration […]” (Arendt, 1958/1998, 
p. 44-45). 
 
 The healing mentality cannot be sustained without this underlying assumption 
of spontaneous market mechanisms. If research and technology have potentially 
humanistic, universal effects, as it is admitted, then, in the long run, current 
imbalances and inequalities can be sorted out thanks to distributive tendencies 
embedded in research and technology themselves. As a consequence, holders of the 
healing mentality do not need concepts such as state, economic actors, companies, 
pressure groups, among other terms formulated by the political thought. Eventually, 
the discourse reaches heights of abstraction and all kinds of processes, whether they 
are biological or social, are framed as natural events. Thus the healing mentality has 
been one of the main ideological frameworks responsible for the “unnatural growth of 
the natural,” to use Arendt’s (1958/1998, p. 47) expression. 
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 In addition to these philosophical and historical sources, the healing mentality 
has been composed and diffused through the effort of big companies engaged in 
clinical trials, as I claim in the next section. 
 
6.3.4 Industrial formulation 
 
All the mentalities described in my thesis derive from widespread processes. 
One can say that instead of being planned and promoted, they are the result of diffuse 
processes, which converged to finally form a set of cogent and meaningful claims. 
However, the healing mentality has one crucial particularity: it has been adopted by 
pharma companies and CROs in their official discourses. These companies, by means of 
claims strategically formulated and diffused, strive to present healing ideas to many 
types of social actors. 
For example, the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & 
Associations (IFPMA), an entity which gathers many companies and national 
pharmaceutical associations, presents its goals, in its website,110 in the following 
fashion: “The IFPMA advocates policies that encourage discovery of and access to life-
saving and life-enhancing new medicines to improve the health of patients 
everywhere.” Another example comes from a report ordered by the Association of 
Clinical Research Associations (ACRO) and prepared by a consulting firm; in this 
document, the following statement is found: 
 
“Clinical research [...] provides benefits well beyond the direct effects of the 
therapeutic intervention. Patients get access to a standard of care that might 
otherwise be unavailable, investigators are exposed to advanced medical 
techniques and the larger society benefits from improved health infrastructure 
and economic development” (Voi Consulting, 2009, p. 15). 
 
Such claims are frequently echoed in many social milieus, including academic 
ones. In a 2006 paper, for example, Wood advanced the following conclusion: “In spite 
of the criticism directed toward them, pharmaceutical companies have produced a 





substantial public health benefit” (Wood, 2006, p. 618).111 Indeed, the trials industry 
seems to be looking for different media in order to convey the humanitarian, public 
nature of their clinical studies. 
Eventually, the companies’ official discourse depicts a pharmaceutical universe 
in which, beyond practical goals, the universal fight against disease would prevail. 
These ideological efforts are in tune with the tendencies of our historical period, in 
which companies, but especially huge multinational corporations, launch foundations 
and non-profit projects in order to convey their “corporate social responsibility” 
(Pereira, 2007). The phenomenon is already visible in the pharmaceutical domain, in 
which the industry “frames its work [...] in terms of philanthropic or humanitarian 
priorities” (Fisher, 2009, p. 213). 
In the previous chapter, it was argued that in the procedures of modern 
science, knowing is highly dependent on making. In other words, scientific knowledge 
is derived from experimental situations carefully produced and controlled by scientists. 
These blends of knowing and making are at the core of the technical mentality. Pharma 
companies and CROs, seen as clinical researchers, reproduce this feature of modern 
science. In addition to conducting studies to understand illnesses and drugs, they also 
have to produce experimental situations, in two ways. Firstly, they need to construct 
concrete research networks, recruiting investigators and settings, contacting 
regulatory agencies, outsourcing some research procedures, and so on. Secondly, they 
have to build up ideological scaffolds to sustain all these concrete structures. 
On this second point, Lakoff provides us with an example. Focusing on a clinical 
study conducted in Argentina at the end of the 1990s, he showed that Genset, a 
biotechnology company, strived to teach physicians about the existence of bipolar 
disease, a condition that was not medically recognized in Argentina at that moment. It 
was necessary to show that bipolar disease exists objectively, that is, it can be 
diagnosed regardless of national particularities. If the condition can be verified in 
several countries, the company argued, then a global clinical trial should be 
undertaken in order to derive therapies to fight the disease globally (Lakoff, 2005). 
Thus, from Genset’s point of view, before undertaking the actual clinical study, it was 
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necessary to ideologically prepare the field, “producing” the idea of a certain disease 
and convincing people that it was worth fighting. 
These ideological efforts are difficult to grasp, especially because they are less 
evident than the concrete research networks constructed by companies. Perhaps, 
things become clearer if turn our eyes, for a while, toward the final stages of drug 
development. Frequently, advertisements and even physicians’ discourses may impart 
a magic image to medicines, be it in a direct or indirect way (Fisher, 2009, Frazzetto, 
2008). Publicity campaigns may stress not only the superiority of particular medicines 
but also the seriousness of pharma companies (Busfield, 2006). 
Coming back to the domain of clinical trials, the conduct of studies can also be 
used to signal the companies’ commitment to science, progress and therapy. As 
Frazetto (2008) claimed, the efficacy of some drugs (for instance, antidepressants) is 
sometimes publicly contested, but the image of medicines can eventually be improved, 
for companies can always counter-argue that research is underway to verify the 
accuracy of contestations. By the way, pharma companies and CROs have become 
quite responsive to criticisms over the last years. For example, as Will and Moreira 
(2010) explained, companies have reacted to claims according to which the over-
controlled environment of trials was not conducive for testing medicines to be used in 
the real world. “In this context, there has been an increase in trials designed to assess 
‘effectiveness’, defined as the benefit of an intervention under usual conditions (rather 
than the ‘ideal’ conditions produced in a highly controlled efficacy trial)” (Will and 
Moreira, 2010, p. 1). 
Shaping norms and guidelines is another way to diffuse mental frameworks, for 
as Luhman (1972/1983) explained, standards and guidelines are powerful instruments 
to normalize and transmit social expectations. By means of lobbying activities, pharma 
companies and CROs strive to standardize national legislations. According to 
Timmermans and Epstein (2010, p. 76): “Over time, especially in the United States, the 
power of governmental standardizing agencies has declined and the power of industry 
standard setting agencies has grown.” International guidelines are also subjected to 
these trends. The Declaration of Helsinki, for instance, has undergone several 
amendments, as a result of companies’ pressures (Shah, 2006). Finally, pharma 
companies have been preparing ethics handbooks to guide the ethics committee 
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members’ work. In my fieldwork, for example, one Brazilian interviewee declared to 
keep an ethics handbook prepared by Merck in her personal files. 
Not to forget is the role played by the media in these ideological efforts. For 
instance, the media was interestingly mentioned by one of my interviewees. 
 
“In your opinion, what is the main goal of clinical research? 
To improve the people’s quality of life. 
Hm. To improve the quality of life. Do you mean, medically, from a medical point of 
view? 
Yeah, I mean, to improve the people’s health. 
And do you think that this goal has been reached? 
[Pause.] Yes... Oh, surely, there has been much progress, right? But I don’t draw on my 
experience in the committee but on what we see in the media, because there is always 
news about studies... This is interesting, you know, people don’t know the work of 




Thus the media is sometimes decisive at making healing notions widespread. In 
this case, the circulation of news made the interviewee conclude that clinical trials aim 
to “improve the people’s health.” 
Indeed, the global diffusion of healing claims seems to be the product of a huge 
effort of ideological engineering. As some authors have noted (Fisher, 2009, Petryna, 
2009, Shah, 2006), pharma companies and CROs always hasten to point out the 
beneficial effects of trial participation. The pharmaceutical industry claims that studies 
are specially relevant in poor areas “because in these regions clinical trials have 
become social goods in themselves,” insofar as “they provide healthcare where there 
is none […] and medical relief for participants’ specific ailments for the duration of the 
trial” (Petryna, 2009, p. 42). 
We are dealing here with series of ideological reversals. In a first moment, the 
technical mentality, drawing on a plethora of individual cases and particular diseases, 
claims that these particularities are not very relevant, for the general, abstract 
knowledge gleaned from such observations is what really matters. In a second 
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moment, the healing mentality affirms that general knowledge is important, but 
invites us to pay attention to particular diseases and the sufferings of humankind. 
Eventually, one can foreground either the idea of knowledge (and the image of 
accuracy it conveys) or the idea of disease (and its associated humanitarian image), but 
the discourse never leaves a very general, intellectual, conceptual level that is typical 
to the instrumental rationality. According to Arendt, it was Plato who introduced the 
possibility of philosophical reversals, showing that “[...] reversals within the course of 
intellectual history no longer needed more than purely intellectual experience, an 
experience within the framework of conceptual thinking itself” (Arendt, 1958/1998, p. 
293).112 Presently, ideological reversals can also serve the political purposes of global 
economic actors. 
The ultimate result of these ideological operations and reversals would be the 
diffusion of beliefs and trust pertaining to medicines and clinical trials. For instance, I 
quote the words of a lay member interviewed in my fieldwork. 
 
“After having worked in an ethics committee, has the way in which you see medicine 
and drugs changed? 
Look, before working here, I used to think about it in a certain way, and now I think 
differently. And what does it mean? Now I have more knowledge, you know. I didn’t 
know how medicines arrive here. ‘They’re selling the medicine in the United States but 
not here. Why?’ So I didn’t understand the bureaucracy, the technical part... I didn’t 
know. Now I know that you don’t do it overnight. There are criteria that must be 
adjusted. And my knowledge has improved a lot [...] 
Is it possible to say that now you trust more medicine and drugs? 
Oh, it is. It is. It is, because I know what physicians are doing, the drug has come 
through here, it’s been analyzed, studied, approved, we look at the patients, they’re 
there, if there are any problems we can go there and talk to them [...].” 
(São Paulo/C3/Lay member/05-11) 
 
 Thus the conduct of clinical studies, but also the reviewing tasks of ethics 
committees, underpin the idea that a huge, international healing program is 
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underway. Even though I quoted one layperson’s words, physicians and scientists 
would not be protected from such beliefs, which would assume a different form in 
their case. By listening to some claims voiced by these specialists (some of them 
quoted in the previous chapter), it is hard not to have the impression of faith in 
scientific standards, statistical tools and biological notions. In addition, claims 
formulated by pharma companies and CROs are rapidly channelled into medical 
conferences, and physicians end up becoming key diffusers of an official medicalized 
rationale (Almeida and Bicudo, 2010). This function may be further enhanced when 
physicians also play the role of clinical investigators, for it seems unlikely that 
physicians and their research staff, when recruiting patients for trials, impart a 
negative impression of clinical studies to potential participants. In her study, Fisher 
(2009, p. 193) noted that the research staff actually engages in “education” efforts, 
letting patients know the advantages of clinical trials, and stressing mainly “[...] the 
impact of subjects’ participation on the future of medicine.” 
From the point of view of the communicative action’s theory, clinical trials can 
be seen as a set of meaningful actions through which the belief in scientific and ethical 
norms can be constructed. Thus, one can invoke Certeau’s (1990, p. 262) words: 
“Nowadays, it is no longer enough to handle, carry and refine beliefs; it is necessary to 
analyze their composition, for one wishes to produce them artificially [...].” 
It seems that this artificial production of beliefs has been quite successful. For 






Table 6.2 – The six most widespread claims 






“Clinical research aims to generate 
useful medicines and therapies” 
Healing 31 73% 
“Research subjects need to be protected 
against physical harms” 
Communitarian 30 71% 
“There are financial interests 
involved in clinical research” 
Pragmatic 29 69% 
“In order to be protected, research subjects 
need to receive full information about the 
studies’ goals and procedures” 
Bioethical 24 57% 
“Guidelines and legislations help to keep 
the ethical nature of clinical research” 
Bioethical 23 54% 
“Clinical research aims to generate 
and improve 
knowledge of drugs and illnesses” 
Technical 22 52% 
 
 
There is no surprise in the fact that the third position is occupied by a 
pragmatic claim (spontaneously voiced by 69% of my interviewees), for the contents of 
the pragmatic mentality are largely recognized. The fact that a communitarian claim 
appears in the second position (71% of my interviewees) is not strange either, for here 
we are in a region of the mental life where pragmatic and communitarian claims 
overlap. Nevertheless, it is interesting to find a healing claim in the first position, 
having been voiced by 31 interviewees (73%). This circumstance reflects, on the one 
hand, the force of the historical and philosophical sources from which the healing 
mentality springs (as explained in the previous section), while expressing, on the other 
hand, the industrial formulation’s efficacy. By repeating healing claims in several social 
milieus, pharma companies decisively strengthen the force of this approach. 
We are dealing with a twofold process. On the one hand (as can be seen in 
Figure 4.2, page 110), healing claims do not seem to constitute big proportions of 
                                                     
113
 Percentages were calculated over 42, the total number of interviews I conducted. 
275 
 
people’s discourses. On the other, the table above shows that at least a small number 
of healing claims are accepted by a large set of committee members. Indeed, even 
those members who voiced discourses strongly marked by the analytical and critical 
approaches also advanced a small number of healing claims. Thus, it can be said that 
the healing mentality has turned into one of the elements of background 
knowledge.114 In other words, the therapeutic usefulness of clinical research came to 
figure in the list of taken-for-granted ideas, which are protected from debate and 
suspicion. This phenomenon can be shown with statistical tools as well. Let us consider 
the following boxplots. 
 
 




There is no statistically significant difference between the healing and critical 
mentalities.115 However, an interesting finding comes to light when one compares 
them to the pragmatic mentality. On the one hand, there is no significant difference 
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between the healing and pragmatic approaches (p=0.14). On the other, I verified a 
significant difference between the critical and pragmatic approaches (p less than 
0.0005). In conclusion: considering the proportion of claims in my interviewees’ 
discourses, the healing mentality has reached the same ideological level of the 
pragmatic mentality (background knowledge) while the critical approach remains at a 
significantly inferior level. 
I would not deny that most clinical studies may end up having pharmaceutical 
or therapeutic implications.116 However, this is just an idea or, more precisely, a claim, 
which is devoid of meaning when looked at in isolation. It is important to verify how 
claims are combined and put to work in the framework of different mentalities and 
rationalities. For holders of the analytical/critical approach, healing claims are quickly 
tamed by considerations that go beyond the immediate purposes of trials, seeking to 
understand social and political structures. For holders of the technical/healing 
approach (as well for those who embrace the communitarian mentality and suffer the 
effects of mental colonization), healing claims are fundamental components of an 
ideological framework stressing the relevance of science, progress, therapy, global 
research, scientific knowledge, among other ideas. 
 The healing mentality is pushed into the background knowledge by means of 
repetitive discourses voiced by the trials industry in different media (industrial 
formulation). Nevertheless, it constitutes an atypical component of this background 
knowledge. As we saw in Chapter 3, the pragmatic mentality is composed by simple 
claims deriving from practical observations that do not depend on specialized skills or 
knowledge. Pragmatic concerns are largely meaningful not only because they are easily 
understandable but also because, in a sense, everybody participates in their 
formulation by taking them into account, understanding them, and assenting to their 
facticty. Healing claims certainly need this type of social recognition but, to a great 
extent, their initial formulation and subsequent diffusion have depended on 
ideological efforts undertaken by the industry, which strives to make the therapeutic 
advantages of trials resonate in the media, medical conferences, state institutions 
(lobbying activities), research settings, among other milieus. The fact that in both 
South Africa and Brazil, a large number of committee members voiced healing claims 
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as taken-for-granted ideas may be signalizing that as Bufield (2006, p. 302) claimed,  
the “ideological power” of the industry needs to be taken into account. 
 The following section aims to analyze the relationships between the healing 
and communitarian mentalities. 
 
6.3.5 Healing mentality and mental colonization 
 
As explained in the previous chapter, I am calling mental colonization the 
process through which one or more claims, which are initially crucial to the technical 
mentality, “migrate” and come to occupy a central place for the holders of the 
communitarian mentality. Although this migration generally happens with claims of 
the technical approach, it can also happen to healing claims. In the next quote, I am 




“And with these differences [between academic and industrial research], 
do you think it is important for Brazil to take part in international 
protocols? 
? I don’t have any doubt it is. It is very important for several reasons... 
Technical 
Technology transference, which is something we struggle for all the time 
in Conep. 
Communitarian 
                        So we don’t want researchers only to come here to collect 
blood from Brazilian people and take it out. What we want them to do [...] 
is to come here, collect blood, take it out but to make all the information 
that comes from that blood available to all the Brazilian scientific 
community, as well as for patients, right? [...] 
Technical 
                                                                                              Apart from that, it is 
new information, it is knowledge, 
Healing 
                                                                        it is new medicines, it is new 




Thus technical and healing concerns frequently colonize communitarian 





 This interviewee has been in the 
committee for four years. With a 
background in social sciences, she is 
nowadays a lecturer. During her interview, 
she clearly manifested a suspicious stance 
toward pharma companies, a frequent 
attitude in the communitarian mentality. 
This discourse graphic displays all the 
typical traits of a communitarian discourse: 
the big variety of communitarian claims; 
the important role played by pragmatic 
concerns; the “distortion” of pragmatic claims toward the communicational side, as a 
result of proto-critique;117 the conversation with bioethical claims; and the mental 
colonization performed by the group of claims TECH13. In addition, there is a 
considerable score in the group HEAL16, which stresses, precisely, the healing 
purposes of clinical trials. 
 It is important to note that as a consequence of mental colonization, 
communitarian discourses are shaken by an astonishing antinomy. On the one hand, 
holders of the communitarian mentality are concerned with national and individual 
particularities, stressing injustices and sufferings inflicted to vulnerable research 
subjects. On the other hand, the phenomenon of mental colonization proposes claims 
according to which clinical research is promoting advances whose scope go beyond 
national and personal differences. As we have seen, some holders of the 
communitarian mentality may experience mental inversions,118 transforming 
background into foreground knowledge and vice-versa. Thus, not only background and 
foreground knowledge are inversed but there is also a lack of coherence between 
them. These paradoxes must be contributing to provoke the difficulties faced by some 
holders of the communitarian approach when asked to express their ideas.119 
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Figure 6.6 – Discourse graphic n. 13 
(Cape Town/C7/Social scientist/07-11) 
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 A common tactics used to deal with these antinomies is to admit the existence 
of an ideal situation, in which every clinical researcher would be searching exclusively 
for therapies and medicines. Parallel to this ideal situation, there would be the real 
world, where other purposes come to corrupt the researchers’ goals. The committee 
member whose interview was the basis for the discourse graphic shown above 
addressed this question in the following manner. 
 
“In your opinion, what is the main goal of clinical research? 
Ideally, it should be better health care, whatever it will make better health care. That is 
what it should be. Making it possible, you know, without doing any harm. 
Ideally. 
Ideally. 
But in practice... it is not [laughter]. 
Not always [...] Because, you know, there is so much over-research in America, they’ve 
moved into Africa and places like that, looking for research populations, and there are 
those sort of commercial organizations that actually do it for you... 
The CROs. 
Is that what they’re called? 
Yeah, CROs.” 
 
 Thus universal healing purposes would be valid in an “ideal” situation, whereas 
the actual contexts of research reveal inequalities and abuses.120 This solution may 
sound weak or incoherent but there seems to be no strong manners to combine 
communitarian concerns with particularities, on the one hand, and healing concerns 
with universal health needs, on the other. 
Of course, committee members can also mobilize original ideas in order to cope 
with such antinomies imposed by the phenomenon of mental colonization. Even 
though mentalities constitute ideological patterns, their choice and expression also 
implies some leeway for creativity and individuality. However, the huge weight 
acquired by the bioethical/technical/healing ideological structure seems to be reducing 
the space for personal formulations, as we shall see in the following section. 
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6.3.6 Lack of personality 
 
The concept of mentality, one of the key concepts in my thesis, comes from 
German sociologist George Simmel’s (1903/1950) theory. One of the main 
contributions of Simmel’s thought was the distinction between objective and 
subjective culture. Each society is characterized by a set of traditions and material 
objects, composing the objective culture. In order to adjust and respond to the 
features of this concrete environment, individuals develop certain types of ideas and 
philosophies, building up the subjective culture. “The entire life-style of a community 
depends upon the relationship between the objectified culture and the culture of the 
subjects” (Simmel, 1900/1997, p. 453). 
Still according to Simmel, one of the distinctive traits of modern society is that 
the overwhelming development of material culture is not accompanied by a 
correspondent development of subjective culture. “[...] the things that determine and 
surround our lives, such as tools, means of transport, the products of science, 
technology and art, are extremely refined. Yet individual culture [...] has not 
progressed at all to the same extent; indeed, it has even frequently declined” (Simmel, 
1900/1997, p. 448). 
There are two main factors provoking this apparent paralysis of subjective 
culture. On the one hand, scientific thought (or “intellect,” as Simmel calls it) has 
proposed fixed cognitive patterns that must be simply followed by individuals, with no 
need for creative solutions. On the other hand, the monetary economy 
commensurated almost all sorts of values, reducing the leeway and need for 
negotiations. As a result, personal and inventive schemes become less and less 
necessary, and that is why Simmel proposed the idea of “lack of character.” Modern 
society is therefore permeated by an expanding set of material products whereas 
individuals are asked to use more and more standardized forms of behaviour and 
thought (Simmel, 1900/1997). 
By using these ideas from Simmel, and adjusting them to fit into the theory of 
communicative action, I am proposing the concept of “lack of personality.” In order to 
understand it, it is important to consider that mental life can also be considered as part 
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of our social environment. Sartre (1960) had already noted that words can be 
interpreted as something material because, frequently, their meaning and scope can 
only be recognized and accepted, like objects, by individuals. By the same token, the 
mentalities described in my thesis have a material dimension, insofar as they are fixed, 
solidified forms that must be recognized and handled by individuals. Social actors can 
certainly contribute to transform the mentalities’ contents but this transformation 
cannot be fully carried out without a long and collective process. 
Mentalities can also be seen in the light of the idea of technique, in the 
anthropological sense of this word. According to Mauss (1936, p. 9), technique can be 
defined as “traditional and efficacious acts.” In this sense, mentalities can be said to be 
ideological techniques, for they are both traditional (they can be passed on from 
generation to generation) and efficacious (they can be used to build up socially 
meaningful discourses). Therefore, the objective culture described by Simmel has also 
an ideological dimension. The consolidation and sophistication of mentalities signalize, 
at an ideological level, the development of the objective culture. 
As Simmel noted, we can therefore say that this objective ideological expansion 
does not seem to be followed by a parallel development of the subjective culture. On 
the contrary, there seems to be an over-reliance on mental patterns provided by the 
different mentalities, and the result is the formulation of standardized discourses that 
echo each other. For example, let us consider the following quotes in which three 
claims appear: one healing claim (“clinical research is aimed to generate new 
medicines”), one bioethical claim (“in clinical research there is a risk-benefit ratio”), 





“[...] the people that get the burden of the 
research must also get the benefit from the 
research. So we would often look at... Let’s say 
it is a drug trial where a drug might be found 
to be of benefit in the end but then what 
happens to the trial participants that have 
now benefited from it and the trial is finished? 
Are you then going to stop the medication or 
are you going to continue giving it to them? 
Etcetera etcetera. So the people that take the 
burden of the research must also be able to 
participate in the benefits.” 
(Cape Town/C6/Physician/08-11) 
  
“[...] If you are administering a new medicine, 
this new medicine should be better, 
theoretically, than the old one, otherwise 
there would be no point in incurring the risks 
of complication or unknown adverse events if 
you’re not benefiting anybody. So all the 
answers obtained in a clinical study are 








“In your opinion, what is the main goal of 
clinical research? 
Obviously, it is to improve... it is to improve... I 
mean, there is always room for improvement 
in everything we do, not only in clinical 
research [...] There will always be need for 
research. Getting better treatments that have 
less side-effects, that are easier to take. 
For the improvement... For the benefit of the 
patients. 
As long as the risk-benefit is better... the risk-




“[...] society depends on new techniques, on 
new procedures, on new medicines, on new 
cosmetics, on new... on innovations, and 
people have interests when they make these 
innovations possible [...] And this is not only 
bad. This can bring about benefits for society, 
especially when we talk about new drugs. 
This brings about benefits. It can produce 
troubles, it can produce risks, but it leads to 
many benefits [...] The development of 
society is realized through research, trough 
the observation of phenomena. And 
phenomena happen either naturally or by 
induction. In human beings, induction is done 
through chemical products. Such chemical 
products may be beneficial or not. When 
they’re not beneficial, ethics committees 
have to evaluate if it is worth approving the 





 Here, there is no need to ask if the ideas advanced are really important. This 
question is certainly much more useful for committee members than for sociologists. 
What is really necessary is to ask whether, with the globalization of clinical trials, there 
might be such extreme degrees of standardization of discourses. Indeed, with the 
quotes above, I am giving only four examples of a list that could consume several 
pages. After reviewing all the quotes speaking of healing trials, risk-benefit ratio and 
progress in research, we would then be ready to select other widespread claims and 
spend many more pages with standardized discourses. 
We have seen that the critical mentality emerges through a personal 
formulation that has to do with biographies and individual ways of processing 
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established claims. That is why critical discourses never acquire the force of self-
evident ideas. There is certainly some part of critical discourses that ends up plunging 
into the background knowledge, therefore becoming immediate references for holders 
of the critical mentality. However, there is another part of critical discourses that is 
always ideologically awaken and ready for debate.121 
For the healing mentality, such personal efforts and vacillations are lacking. The 
contents of healing discourses circulate smoothly in society and are strongly 
underpinned by social products such as medical associations, statistical disciplines, 
scientific reports, pieces of news in the media, among others. Thus holders of the 
healing mentality are supported by powerful ideological references, and their 
arguments lie on very strong social scaffolds. For some individuals, “standing on the 
shoulders of giants” represents an opportunity to see further away; for other 
individuals, however, it simply means that protection and success has been obtained, 
and that there is no need to aspire to go any higher. As a result, people voicing strong 
healing discourses mobilize vague arguments, circulating between the bioethical, 
technical and healing approaches without much coherence. The following discourse 
graphic gives us an example. 
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 By the time of our interview, this nurse had been in the committee for only a 
couple of months. Several times, she stressed her doubts in terms of scientific 
procedures and research methodologies. Even though she receives only qualitative, 
“low-risk” projects, she appears to be extremely cautious in her reviews, being 
somehow afraid of making mistakes. In my observations of meetings, it was interesting 
to see that she interfered in discussions by the single means of asking questions about 
methodologies and concepts. In one particular meeting, in a moment when the 
committee discussed one project she had reviewed, her questioning attitude was 
reinforced, for in addition to asking about methods, she had many questions about her 
own way of framing the project. 
Two aspects call the attention in the graphic above. First, the discourse is 
massively dominated by two claims: TECH13, which stresses the competence of 
specialists to analyze research proposals; and HEAL18, which foregrounds the 
humanistic and dynamic features of clinical research. In the following quote, she 




“Maybe in the future... I don’t know the evolution of other committees, but things are 
rethought, you know. Are these procedures the best ones? Are they appropriate? I 
think there is... And there is a dynamics. I think the committee is a dynamic thing. 
That is, in ten year’s time, it will be a different thing. 
It may be. I think it tends to advance, you know, as in the whole scientific world. It is 
not a paralyzed, still thing. I think so. 
And do you think that because it is scientific... Even though it is scientific, can it get 
close to the patients or do you think it remains far away from patients and closer to 
this scientific world? 
It depends very much on how this is presented to the patient, to those who are going 
to participate in research [...] So when you explain, when you elucidate, you somehow 
make the subject participate in your research in a different way. 
So it all depends on the explanation. 
On the explanation. I think this is important. What is going to happen. I think 
everything must be very well explained to the person, without implicit things. Each 
phrase. The reasons. I think the subjects have this right because they’re going to make 
it possible for the researcher to discover something, to claim something, you know, 
depending on the kind of research.” 
 
 During this whole interview, the conversation was kept at this highly general 
level and the interviewee did not refereed to examples or more precise concepts. This 
is exactly the second point to be stressed in the previous discourse graphic: there are 
many gaps between claims, an unusual event if we compare it to other graphics. We 
went on jumping from the idea of the specialists’ expertise (claim TECH13) to the idea 
of full informed consent (BIO8), and from this topic to the broad purposes of trials 
(HEAL18). Although this discursive strategy may be imposed by her little experience as 
a committee member, this fact does not seem to be decisive, because another 
interviewee, who voiced a strong analytical/critical discourse, had been in another 
committee for only a couple of months as well.122 Therefore, it seems that the main 
aspect to be considered here is the internal discursive structure of the healing 
mentality, which reduces claims to a small and unspecific set of ideas that end up 
being framed as self-evident. 
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 This discourse graphic can be seen on Chapter 5, Figure 6.4. 
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 The concept of lack of personality, then, points to this high level of 
standardization in people’s discourses. In different cities and countries, claims seem to 
be echoing each other, with very little interference of an actual personal formulation. 
Whereas the critical mentality presupposes an individual effort to combine personal 
experiences with lessons provided by the analytical approach, people holding the 
healing mentality seem to be satisfied with only marshalling ready-made claims and 
repeating arguments springing from ideologically powerful social institutions and 
actors. 
 In this way, it is worth asking if people are really voicing what we can call 
opinions. The formulation of opinions depends on lengthy reflections, through which 
events are seen in the light of personal formulations. According to Arendt (1963, p. 
272): “Opinions are formed in a process of open discussion and public debate, and 
where no opportunity for the forming of opinions exists, there may be moods – moods 
of the masses and moods of individuals, the latter no less fickle and unreliable than the 
former – but no opinion.” Therefore, the highly standardized discourses voiced by 
many of my interviewees would be expressing not so much opinions, but moods 
suggested by massifying processes. 
 This aspect has not only philosophical and personal consequences but political 
ones as well. The global system of clinical trials is strongly supported by the ethics 
committee model. As some authors noted (Kohlen, 2009, Petryna, 2006), the 
proliferation of ethics committees was in tune with the trials companies’ needs. Since 
the 1990s, the “impetus for ethics committees” has been derived not only from 
governments but also “[...] from the self-regulation of the health care industry: mainly 
in connection with ‘quality assurance’” (Kohlen, 2009, p. 85). Parallel to my PhD study, 
I conducted another research project focusing on the organization of global trials in 
the UK, Spain, France, Brazil and South Africa.123 It was possible to see that CROs and 
physician-investigators hasten to point out that everything is being approved by ethics 
committees, especially when they speak of controversial aspects of trials (such as 
placebos or payments made in clinical studies). 
A political dilemma emerges. On the one hand, ethics committees are said to 
be the gatekeepers of morality and fairness in clinical trials, assessing the industry’s 
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 Further information about this parallel study is provided in Chapter 2. 
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actions. On the other hand, committee members seem to hold precarious ideological 
tools to assess the worth of studies, frequently limiting themselves to the repetition of 
claims diffused precisely by the industry. As a result, the ethics committee model 
threatens to turn into mere discursive justification, rather than being a really decisive 
part of the global research system. 
 The healing mentality, when focusing on ethics committees, brings about the 
idea that committees would be carrying out a useful service. However, we are not 
dealing with a service in the same sense that the communitarian mentality describes it, 
that is, we are not dealing with a service that would benefit particular groups and 
institutions. The healing mentality frames committees as providers of a humanistic 
work, as we shall see in the next section. 
 
6.3.7 Healing committees 
 
The healing idea that clinical trials aim to generate medicines that can 
eventually prove beneficial for humankind has direct connections with the technical 
idea that knowledge gleaned from trials is universally valid. By combining these two 
claims, one eventually proposes a very ambitious description of clinical research. As we 
have seen, such descriptions are often formulated by pharma companies and CROs. 
Such discourses have been largely diffused, as well as assimilated by a vast range of 
social actors. For example, Fisher found out that in research settings in the United 
States, many study coordinators come to internalize a “big picture” of trials. “From 
coordinators’ own perspective, they are always already engaged in what they see as 
the ‘big picture’ – the advancement of medicine for the benefit of humanity” (Fisher, 
2009, p. 87). 
Even though this type of view was not manifested very frequently in my 
fieldwork, I came across some discourses in which ethics committees were covered 
with healing hues. In this way, committee members would be participating in a huge, 






“Today, what is your main motivation to continue to work in the committee? 
[...] I would say it is to improve my knowledge-basis even further, for me to know what 
the breakthroughs in science are. Okay? And for me to actually... It is actually a feeling 
of euphoria when I hear that these new methods of treating debilitating conditions... 
You know? It is almost like... It is... It is like a relief for the patient. If the patient was 
limited to be walking around in callipers or wheelchair all the time, if they take this 
medication, they’ll maybe be able to walk a little bit or be more flexible or be more 
mobile and things like that. So every time I go... I go with this enthusiasm that I’m 
hearing something new today... You know. So that is the incentive, so to say [...].” 
(Cape Town/C7/Nurse/07-11) 
 
 The underlying assumption is that clinical research forms a global scientific 
community, involving researchers, statisticians, companies, research subjects... and 
committee members, everybody joining this universal battle against illnesses. At times, 
some interviewees sounded somewhat disturbed by this broad vein of their own 
discourses, like in the following example. 
 
“In your opinion, what is the main goal of clinical research? 
[Pause.] I think... [Long pause.] I think that the main goal, theoretically, is to 
understand how a medicine or a therapeutic activity can (any type of therapeutic 
activity) can benefit (with quotation marks), or to understand the effects provoked by 
this activity in human beings. I think that, theoretically, this would be the goal. To 
understand how a therapeutic activity x, y, z (no matter how, whether a medicine is 
used or there are other things) can influence, can act in human beings. I think this 
would be.... But for that... This is so... This is actually so utopian and so distant, you 
know, in terms of research, and especially here in Brazil, where you have an idea for 
something today and it takes maybe fifteen years for you to have a final answer, you 
know. And this will never arrive: ‘the end.’ It is always partial [...].” 
(São Paulo/C3/Bioscientist/04-11) 
 
Indeed, by listening to some technical/healing discourses, one might have the 
impression of “utopian” or “distant” notions, as this interviewee put it. The same 




“Do you think an ethics committee is somehow related to teaching activities? 
I think it fosters knowledge, it fosters research. The majority of our studies here are 
not linked to big amounts of money... You participated in one meeting, you saw it. It is 
much more related to the studies of our post-graduate students, our junior 
researchers, our research assistants [...] Sometimes we have a huge multidisciplinary 
study with... That is true, we have an excellent head of department here and he 
sometimes come up with a very big study, and that is also good. We’ve been working 
for eight years in a study on papiloma virus, the HPV virus [...] If I forget my humble 
position as a humble lecturer with a couple of students for a while, and if I think of the 
macro-level, as a health worker, participating in the development of a vaccine that is 
so beneficial for the population... That is perhaps a bit idealistic from me, but that is 
how I am. So there is no other way to define me [laughter], do you understand?” 
(São Paulo/C2/Physician/04-11) 
 
 It is important to say that this physician was not engaged in the mentioned HPV 
study. Actually, he does not conduct clinical trials. Therefore, when he says “We’ve 
been working for eight years in a study,” he is assuming that, somehow, the whole 
hospital, and certainly the ethics committee as well, are involved in this research 
effort. As the quote shows, this grand assumption is quickly tempered and interpreted 
as “idealistic.” The following discourse graphic derives from the interview with this 
physician. 
The interviewee has worked in the 
hospital, as well as in the committee, for 
thirteen years. As a consequence of this 
large experience, he has developed, so to 
say, a feeling of solidarity towards the 
hospital and the committee, institutions 
where he feels at home. His discourse can 
be defined as technical/healing, being 
strongly supported by bioethical claims. 
In this type of discourse, pragmatic claims 
tend to be even less important than they are here. As the graphic shows, his discourse 
Figure 6.8 – Discourse graphic n.1 
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is dominated by the group of claims TECH11, which stresses the relevance of trials for 
the generation of new knowledge, but there is an important role being played by 
HEAL16, which foregrounds the therapeutic purposes of trials. 
When speaking of ethics committees, holders of the communitarian mentality 
can also experience the effects of mental colonization. As a result, committees end up 
being described, at the same time, as institutions imparting a relevant service to a 
country or region, and institutions making it possible to investigate and generate new 
therapies. The following quote has been broken in different parts. 
 
 
Question “Do you think the [committee] members should get paid? 
? 
No, I don’t think so. 
Why? 
I think that... That is my personal view. I think it doesn’t take 
away from me any... 
Communitarian 
                                          Let’s say I consider it as a relevant service. 
We have in our Constitution, as examples of citizenry, the 
possibility of giving our contribution with relevant services, 
almost like non-profit organizations. And I think in the committee 
people are... 
Communitarian/Healing 
                            the time people spend there is to do a service 
devoted to other people, you know, 
Healing 
                                                                         to other people’s well-




 Focusing on two research settings in the United States, Timmermans (2011) 
verified that negative results can be frustrating for the research staff, as these people 
are motivated by the idea of being “at the forefront of testing a drug.” Thus 
professionals involved in a trial (such as nurses, data analysts, study coordinators, and 
the principal investigators themselves) may develop “a commitment to both the 
therapeutic and the expected scientific goal of the trial,” as well as “the expectation of 
making a difference in people’s lives” (Timmermans, 2011, p. 558). In Fisher’s (2009, p. 
202) study, it was also verified that the research staff often hopes to see “the 
marketing of experimental drugs on which they worked.” 
 Ethics committee members are not immune to such wishes. Working on a 
voluntary basis, with no remuneration and little institutional recognition, they may 
accept a healing approach to committees in order to find some type of motivation. 
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One might suppose that this motivation, as well as other assumptions that prevail in 
the healing mentality, are more frequent for physicians and nurses, who are the 
“professional healers” of society. However, it was already shown that healing claims 
are largely diffused, being independent from professional backgrounds. This is one of 
the issues explored in the next section. 
 
6.3.8 Political implications of the healing mentality 
 
In my fieldwork, healing claims were mobilized not only by committee 
members engaged in healing activities (physicians and nurses) but proved to be very 
widespread. By performing statistical tests, I could not verify significant differences in 
terms of professional background and experience in the committee. Strong 
correlations with other mentalities were not detected either. Thus, healing claims 
demonstrate a characteristic that is typical to the background knowledge: they have 
become natural and obvious enough to acquire large acceptation. 
Once again, the consolidation of a mentality can have important social 
consequences. As soon as healing claims become largely recognized, some actors can 
struggle for the right to become research subjects. In the United States, for instance, 
some groups have campaigned for the inclusion of minorities in trials, claiming that 
these groups should also be taken into account in medical investigation (Epstein, 
2007). In this same country, some people try to join clinical studies in order to solve 
pressing health problems (Fisher, 2009). Ethics committee members are quite aware 
that at some point, clinical trials may be framed as a therapeutic scapegoat. 
 
“When you’re reviewing a protocol, do you somehow think about the people who will 
take part in the study? 
Oh, I think this is natural, you know. You have to think about them. Even though you’re 
analyzing a document, that involves, in fact, patients’ lives, you know. And when we’re 
analyzing an oncologic protocol, for instance, we imagine a complete hopeless patient 





In countries such as South Africa and Brazil, where large populations still face 
difficulties to access health care services, trial participation can be framed as a 
therapeutic alternative. One interviewee, for instance, complained that many people 
in South Africa, by considering the health hardships of the country, have become 
excessively permissive towards global trials, considering them as obviously necessary. 
 
“Maybe committee members can also share this view about clinical trials. Do you think 
so? 
I think there are certainly some people on the committee that share this view, 
whereas some people are quite concerned. [Pause.] But these are not easy arguments 
because what I just stated is also factually true: this is a needy country; lots of patients 
do not get adequate care for their conditions; there is not enough funding for medical 
research in this country; and pharmaceutical trials fulfil and have a role in that regard 
because they fund medical doctors and it, in the end, you know, benefits this country 
that these doctors are here; they provide clinical care to patients that they wouldn’t 
otherwise get; and they are let with funding from these trials; it actually does fund 
medical research [...] I think it is a very difficult situation because... It really isn’t black 
and white. Not having these trials or preventing these trials that are happening here, 
that might cost the patients more than these trials actually happening.” 
(Cape Town/C7/Bioethicist/08-11) 
 
Pharma companies can use this complex context strategically, as we can 
exemplify with a story from Brazil. The Brazilian government has an internationally 
renowned programme that provides free anti-retroviral drugs to every citizen infected 
with HIV. Over the last years, the maintenance of the programme has not been a 
simple matter. It is known that in 2003, 63% of the Brazilian Ministry of Health’s 
budget was spent on only three anti-retroviral medicines produced by Abbot, Roche 
and Merck (Bicudo, 2006). This proportion has been reduced by internalizing the 
production of some medicines for HIV-Aids. However, companies, having realized that 
the state is a good buyer, have tried to replace anti-retrovirals with other sorts of 
medicines. 
On this point, the story told by Petryna (2009) is illustrative. Over the last years, 
some pharma and biotech companies have tried to enlarge the list of medicines 
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bought by the Brazilian state and provided for free to its citizens. The strategy consists 
in funding advocacy groups, lawyers or individual patients so that these actors open 
lawsuits against the Brazilian state, asking for the inclusion of certain medicines into 
the free-provision programme. As a consequence: “The number of legal suits filed by 
patients against municipal and state health departments has skyrocketed throughout 
Brazil in the last decade” (Petryna, 2009, p. 151). Admitting that the search for health 
is as a universal and natural right, one forces a political situation in which these rights 
should be guaranteed by the national state. Insofar as the healing mentality has 
attributed healing purposes to every kind of social actor (healing physicians, healing 
companies, healing scientists, healing ethics committees, and so on), the state can 
finally be asked to assume healing functions as well. As healing capacities are seen in 
the framework of globalized pharmaceutical studies and productions, the healing state 
should necessarily be the state-provider-of-medicines. 
Here, the issue of lack of personality plays a decisive role. The fight for health, 
understood as the fight for the individuals’ physical well-being, has become so self-
evident that there seems to be no leeway for discordant voices. As soon as one wishes 
to contest the pathways through which medicine and research have been taken, it is 
necessary to counter the strong rock of healing claims, which have acquired the 
ideological force of uncontested background assumptions. On the one hand, the 
formation of opinions about global trials and medicines depend on lengthy, careful 
reflections. On the other hand, the standardization of discourses, as well as the 
advanced triumph of the healing mentality, tends to reduce the leeway for alternative 














 Statistically speaking, the technical mentality is significantly superior to all the 
other three approaches.124 There is no significant difference between the healing and 
critical mentality. However, there is an interesting discrepancy when we compare 
them to the analytical mentality. While there is no significant difference between the 
healing and analytical approaches (p=0.92), I verified a significant difference between 
the critical and the analytical approaches (p less than 0.0005). 
Thus, there are two conclusions to be drawn. Firstly, the healing and critical 
approaches can really be described as extreme views, for they are significantly inferior 
to the majority of other mentalities. Secondly, if we consider the healing and critical 
mentalities as extreme views, the critical approach seems to be particularly extreme, 
for it is significantly inferior even when compared to the rare analytical approach. 
 The widespread occurrence of certain healing claims can be explained by the 
following factors: 
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 The tests I used here were: Friedman’s test (K related samples), to compare all mentalities; and 
Wilcoxon’s test (2 related samples), to compare mentalities individually. 
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 Healing claims are anchored in the basic assumption that every-body, by 
possessing a human body, can at some point engage in a struggle against 
disease 
 The globalization of research projects, with partnerships involving not only 
companies but also universities and state agencies, suggests the idea that 
illnesses are being fought through humanitarian efforts 
 The assumption that committee members are somehow contributing to 
generate new, useful medicines can be personally rewarding, especially 
because committee members generally work with no economic remuneration 
and little institutional recognition 
 Healing claims are in tune with the powerful technical mentality, which has 
obtained a large political dominance, be it by means of direct influences (upon 
the bioethical mentality) or through indirect influences (upon the 
communitarian mentality) 
 
On the other hand, critical claims continue to be ideologically marginal. They 
are not only rare (representing small proportions in most interviewees’ discourses) but 
also particularly extreme (being significantly inferior to all approaches but the healing 
one). Their precarious diffusion can be explained by the following circumstances. 
 
 The poor diffusion of analytical claims (whose aspects were addressed in the 
previous chapter) provokes a timid development of critical claims, for the 
analytical mentality is a condition for the emergence of the critical mentality 
 Homogeneizing trends of the mass society leads most people to prefer 
“ideological behaviour” to engaging in the costly personal formulation of a 
critical view 
 For most committee members, problems of clinical trials are framed as 
obstacles to be transposed by means of scientific, social or methodological 
corrections. Therefore, there is little leeway for the idea that these problems 




 The critical mentality may sound politically costly, insofar as it concludes that 
reforming clinical trials would require drastic and radical measures, involving 
the transformation of a complex system 
 
Differently from the communitarian and analytical mentalities, the critical 
approach brings about some clues in terms of practical measures and actions to be 
undertaken. Nevertheless, many actors may look at these proposals as too unlikely to 
succeed. Thus, the internal discursive structure of the critical mentality impairs its 
social dissemination. 
However, if we come back to the boxplots presented in Figure 6.9 above, it is 
possible to see that, for both the analytical and critical mentalities, there are four 
interviewees (represented as dots above the actual boxplots) who voiced atypically 
high proportions of analytical and critical claims. These are rare interviewees voicing 
rare discourses. In statistical boxplots, they are simply numbers (in this case, numbers 
6, 11, 27 and 29). However, I remember these persons very well. I recall the feeling of 
surprise and bewilderment experienced at the end of these interviews. This is certainly 
the feeling that one experiences when facing the new and different after having 
become used to the standard. 
It is somewhat strange to verify that analytical and critical stances are very rare 
among ethics committee members who are supposed to analyze and criticize. 
However, it is also interesting to see that analytical and critical instances are still 
possible, albeit rare, being supported not only by individual preferences but also by 






7 Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
 
 After having described all the mentalities identified in my research, this 
conclusion recalls and reinforces the main ideas advanced previously. Parallel to this, 
some ideas are presented whose scope go beyond the specific study of ethics 
committees and clinical trials. We begin these tasks by reviewing the main 
characteristics of mentalities, as well as pointing to the advantages of this 
communicative approach for sociological explanation. Subsequently, we draw 
attention to the growing number of heavy responsibilities that ethics committees have 
assumed. After discussing the political aspects of my interpretation, I focus on the 
nature of a communicative approach to ethics committees. Finally, the globalization of 
ideologies is addressed. 
 
7.1 MENTALITIES AND SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 
 
 Even though my PhD research process involved careful literature reviews and 
some observations, the analysis of committee members’ discourses clearly constitutes 
the most central aspect of it. Todorov’s (1984) distinction must be remembered: in my 
study, I was not concerned with “truth” (the accurate expression of one’s internal 
universe) but with “verisimilitude” (the expression of discourses endowed with cultural 
meaning). In this way, there is no need to ask whether my interviewees voiced real 
points of view or simply tried to construct embellished discourses. Even if social actors 
wish to deceive by voicing dishonest claims, these latter must be somehow referred to 
broad, socially available, historically constructed ideological structures. My study 
draws the attention to these social structures, instead of focusing on psychological 
characteristics. 
In addition to my central qualitative interpretation, ancillary statistical tools 
were used to test differences and display discourses graphically. These statistical 
operations might be considered as too flexible or heterodox methods, going too far 




considering the objectives established at the beginning of our trajectory, it seems to 
me that very conservative research pathways could not lead to interesting outcomes. 
In addition, it is important to consider that for any kind of discourse analysis, a certain 
amount of discretion and choice is required. According to Denzin (1998, p. 313): “In 
the social sciences there is only interpretation. Nothing speaks for itself.” As Becker 
(1996, "The actors point of view") argues: 
 
“[...] all social scientists, implicitly or explicitly, attribute a point of view and 
interpretations to the people whose actions we analyze. That is, we always 
describe how they interpret the events they participate in, so the only question 
is not whether we should, but how accurately we do it.” 
 
 I tried to guarantee my interpretative accuracy by describing mentalities 
without being judgmental towards them. However, as claimed in Chapter 5, this target 
cannot be fully reached. Insofar as every discourse is situated, or embedded in the 
“lifeworld” as Habermas (1996) would put it, and insofar as my text is also a discourse, 
it is not possible to voice a neutral interpretation, which would be separated from all 
mentalities. As it seems to me, my interpretation is proposed from an analytical point 
of view, and my description of mentalities is influenced by this circumstance. However, 
the worth and coherence of my analysis is guaranteed by an effort to comprehend the 
nature and sources of all mentalities. 
 This point needs to be reinforced. When I claim that my point of view is 
analytical, I am not suggesting that this is the best approach. Sociologically speaking, 
there is no need to depict one particular mentality as the “cleverest” or “most 
appropriate.” Whenever social actors embrace a certain mentality, they draw an 
ideological field in which the definition and scope of “cleverness” and 
“appropriateness” assume new forms. In this sense, there is a correspondence 
between the concept of mentality and the idea of “styles of reasoning,” as proposed 
by Hacking (1990, p. 7): 
 
“[…] styles of reasoning are curiously self-authenticating. A proposition can be 
assessed as true-or-false only when there is some style of reasoning and 
investigation that helps determine its truth value. What the proposition means 
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depends upon the ways in which we might settle its truth. That innocent 
observation verges nervously on circularity. We cannot justify the style as the 
way best to discover the truth of the proposition, because the sense of the 
proposition itself depends upon the style of reasoning by which its truth is 
settled. A style of thinking, it seems, cannot be straightforwardly wrong, once it 
has achieved a status by which it fixes the sense of what it investigates. Such 
thoughts call in question the idea of an independent world-given criterion of 
truth.” 
 
Once one individual adopts a certain mentality, he or she is immediately 
defining relevant questions, as well as possible answers and explanations. Thus a 
sociological interpretation must not try to indicate what is the best approach, but try 
to understand how different approaches converse, reinforcing or opposing each other. 
This does not mean that everything is possible and laudable in mental life. It only 
means that truths and mystifications are products of social debates and relations, 
instead of being a priori, evident ideas to be defined at the outset of our analyses.
 My interpretation diverges from those in which linguistic aspects tend to 
acquire a certain explicative autonomy. In Latour, for example, claims are said to be 
valid as soon as they are trusted and supported by other claims. “One sentence can be 
made a fact or a fiction, depending on the ways in which it is inserted into other 
sentences. In itself, one sentence is neither fact nor fiction; it becomes one of these 
things later, thanks to other sentences” (Latour, 2000, p. 45). In the theory of 
communicative action (Habermas, 1981/1987, Habermas, 1996), which underpins my 
study, claims do not have this sort of autonomy. One bioethical claim (like “the 
research subjects’ autonomy must be protected”) will necessarily die out if it is not 
underpinned by the actual organization of committees and regulatory agencies, the 
bioethical vein that is often assumed by guidelines on clinical trials, the operations of 
bioethical associations, among other underpinnings. Thus communicative actions are 
not referred to themselves; rather, they are always referred to concrete processes 
happening in particular countries and places.  By means of this theoretical stance, 
claims are “brought down from transcendental heaven to the earth of the lifeworld” 
(Habermas, 1996, p. 18-19). 
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 The flexibility of communicative processes, as well as the communicative liberty 
of social actors, needs to be carefully described as soon as we consider, for instance, 
the presence of background knowledge (which was described as pragmatic mentality 
in the framework of my study). Certain basic assumptions about clinical trials have 
come to be widely diffused, imposing themselves as taken-for-granted ideas, not 
because they are supported by previous claims, but because the global economy of 
trials has taken a certain shape. One can therefore assume that the contents of 
background knowledge must change as soon as this economic organization changes.  
 The point to be stressed here is that rationalities and mentalities are subjected 
to geographical and historical processes. As for their geographical dimension, 
mentalities can be described with reference to the mechanism pointed to by Santos 
(2000): global processes bring about certain possibilities, which are realized in distinct 
ways by different countries. Thus in each country the effects of global trials acquire 
particular features and, consequently, mentalities are also differently constituted. For 
example, as explained in Chapter 4, the communitarian mentality, in South Africa, is 
shaped by the Aids epidemic, whereas Brazilian holders of this mentality are frequently 
concerned with regional inequalities. 
 The historical dimension of mentalities is equally decisive. As we have seen, 
each mentality is the product of a process through which claims are consolidated and 
disseminated. To be sure, all mentalities derive from the same historical processes.  
However, each mentality deals with historical events in its own fashion. For instance, 
past scandals in clinical trials are seen, by the communitarian mentality, as proofs that 
uncertainties are always present in clinical research; whereas the bioethical mentality 
frames these scandals as evidence that bioethical principles have been overlooked and 
must be mandated by regulations more strongly. 
 The globalization of trials itself is given a different meaning by the different 









 In the pragmatic mentality, global trials are said to be motivated by financial and 
economic interests held by companies and investigators 
INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY 
 In the bioethical mentality, global trials are thought of as activities triggering 
ethical problems whose solution requires the mobilization of ethical calculations 
 In the technical mentality, they are said to be the product of scientific and 
statistical imperatives 
 The healing mentality understands them as a natural stage in the history of the 
human fight against diseases 
COMMUNICATIVE RATIONALITY 
 In the communitarian mentality, global trials are framed as opportunistic 
enterprises threatening the particularities of vulnerable countries and populations 
 The analytical mentality frames them as activities through which companies 
tinker with scientific methods in order to reach financial goals 
 In the critical mentality, they are thought of as activities fraught with 
fundamental problems whose solution asks for radical changes in the global 
research scenario 
 
 Mentalities are, thus, lenses through which social processes are observed. Even 
though individuals do have some space for the formulation of personal, original ideas, 
the consolidation of mentalities, as well as the fact that they can be identified in 
different cities and countries, indicates that in mental life, there is also much leeway 
for imposition, colonization and standardization. The nature of mentalities reminds us 
of the “series of acts” described by Mauss (1936, p. 21): “[...] one of the reasons why 
these series can be easily constructed in individuals is precisely that they are 
constructed by and for social authority.” In the same way, mentalities are, as it were, 
ideological boxes limiting the individuals’ scope of choice. 
 In communicative action theory, the concept of background knowledge points 
to rigid aspects of mental life. It was shown that, to a great extent, the ethics 
committee members’ work is informed by background assumptions. The pragmatic 
approach is widely diffused. The bioethical and communitarian approaches (which are 
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embraced by a large number of my interviewees) maintain important direct 
connections with the background knowledge. The healing approach has been 
transformed into a background approach, thanks to the industrial formulation focused 
on in Chapter 6. Finally, the critical approach itself is partly embedded in the 
background knowledge. Therefore, there are only two mentalities (technical and 
analytical) that are fully related to the foreground knowledge, the realm of debates 
and contestable claims. If we consider the small number of interviewees who voiced 
analytical discourses, then it is clear that, for the most part, committee members seem 
to be favouring immediate, taken-for-granted ideas (background knowledge).125 As a 
consequence, standardized discourses end up prevailing, and there seems to be little 
leeway for the formulation of actual opinions. 
 On the one hand, committee members seem to maintain timid contacts with 
the foreground knowledge. On the other hand, by discussing research proposals in 
regular meetings, they are supposed to deal with pressing questions brought about by 
global trials. We further explore this dilemma in the following section. 
 
7.2 COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND THEIR SUPERHUMAN TASKS 
 
 As explained in the Introduction, the globalization of the ethics committee 
model derived not only from local efforts but was also fostered by the United States’ 
regulatory agencies and the trials companies themselves (Epstein, 2007, Kohlen, 2009, 
Petryna, 2009, Shah, 2006). This is how Petryna (2009, p. 38) summarized the logic of 
the process: “Let regulators name the responsible local parties (in some cases, this 
would mean first creating such oversight bodies) and surely those parties can gather 
information and make the right decisions; surely they can prevent inappropriate 
research.” 
 In some countries, the creation of an ethics review system has not been 
straightforward. For instance, Shah (2006, p. 135) referred to a 2001 report published 
by the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC), which advises the US National 
Institutes of Health: 
 
                                                     
125
 Analytical discourses are equally rare in the social science literature on clinical trials. 
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“NBAC researchers had found that in Morocco […] there were no ethical review 
committees, and ‘the Ministry of Health does not feel that it is necessary.’ 
Turkish officials had ‘serious reservations’ about setting up ethics review 
committees. Researchers in Haiti said there had been no ethics committees in 
their country until 1999. Researchers in Uganda revealed that ‘the notion of an 
unbiased, uninvested review committee’ was still ‘quite new’ to the country.” 
 
For many interpreters, including Shah herself, this evidence suggests that ethics 
committees should be created and reinforced wherever they are lacking. It seems that 
apart from Kohlen (2009), no one has asked whether the ethics committee model, as it 
was formulated in the United States, is really worth being globalized and taken as the 
“gold standard” of ethics review. This question is important because, as explained 
throughout my thesis, this current model fosters the consolidation of a 
bioethical/technical approach, which, in its turn, brings about a particular political 
discourse. 
 National settings that, in the 1990s, were suddenly engulfed in the storm of 
global trials (including South Africa and Brazil) had to constitute their ethics 
committees system as rapidly and carefully as they could. As a result, many countries 
ended up constructing somewhat fragile ethics systems. For example, Nyika and 
collaborators (2009, p. 192) studied 31 African ethics committees in 2007 and 
concluded: “Whereas the volume of trials being conducted in Africa is increasing, 92% 
of the surveyed committees reported that they are inadequately trained to properly 
review and monitor trials.” 
  Indeed, training is a decisive issue. Apart from courses and seminars on ethical 
aspects, frequently attended by committee members, the South African and Brazilian 
committees I studied do not offer other sorts of training on clinical trials, in order to 
explore technical, economic and methodological aspects of research projects. In 
addition to these knowledge gaps, there seem to be ideological gaps, as most 
members tend to rely on standardized discourses, deeply informed by background 
assumptions. Ethics committees, which are supposed to analyze, discuss and debate 
protocols, seem to be limited to procedural tasks and standardized discourses. 
Committee meetings (and I observed 11 of them during my fieldwork) tend to become 
simple formalities, while committee members (and especially those who hold 
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analytical and critical approaches) are paralyzed by bureaucratic ways to assess 
research proposals, in addition to being suffocated by busy meetings in which a 
growing number of projects must be discussed in a couple of hours. 
 It is crucial to stress this issue because over the last years, ethics committee 
members have been given superhuman tasks. On the one hand, as claimed in Chapter 
4, committees’ decisions are sometimes seen as an early form of justice. On the other 
hand, after many measures taken to flexibilize international guidelines on clinical 
research, ethics committees were made responsible for taking decisions on thorny 
issues such as the use of placebos in trials (Petryna, 2006, Dirceu Greco in Oselka and 
Oliveira, 2007, Petryna, 2009, Shah, 2006).126 
 From the viewpoint of the trials industry, this state of things looks rather 
convenient. In order to fulfil their tasks, ethics committees may struggle in the middle 
of knowledge, infrastructural or ideological limitations. However, the final approval 
they issue will anyway provide companies with the ethical sanction they are looking 
for. “The company is ostensibly safe from liability concerns if the local institutional 
review board approves the protocol and patients sign the informed consent forms […]” 
(Petryna, 2009, p. 105). In this system, defined by Petryna (2009, p. 67) as “privatized 
and highly individualized,” both research subjects and ethics committees end up being 
framed in the same way: as autonomous, rational decision-makers. When it comes to 
ethics committees, this definition is not extremely unrealistic, insofar as committees 
have been forced to embrace a bioethical/technical/healing approach that proposes 
commensurable, general principles and procedures, and which, on many occasions, is 
in tune with the trials companies’ expectations. Therefore, in addition to being 
concerned with “regulatory capture” , analysts and policymakers have reasons for 
being concerned with ideological capture, defined (in Chapter 5) as the process 
through which the reviewers of research proposals begin to share hopes, expectations 
and theoretical frameworks with researchers and companies that submit proposals. 
 This is perhaps why, over the last years, committees have been obliged to 
adopt a rather permissive stance; hence, the idea of justification, frequently invoked 
                                                     
126
 When it comes to advisory scientific committees, expectations can be even higher. This is how Salter 
describes this situation: “By providing a framework within which often emotive cultural divisions can be 
addressed, bioethics committees enable disputes to be defined in ways capable of producing policy 
outcomes.” See SALTER, B. 2007. The global politics of human embryonic stem cell science. Global 
governance, 13, 277-298. 
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by committee members. Most members acknowledge that some issues of global trials 
are quite controversial, but many seem to get easily satisfied as soon as investigators 
justify their procedures. One instructive example is the issue of post-trial access. Shah 
(2006, p. 136) described the situation in the following manner: “Researchers should 
make ‘reasonable, good faith efforts’ to provide study drugs to subjects after trials’ 
end, but if not [...], they should simply present their justifications to their ethics 
committees.” Here, justification turns into a password with which dire dilemmas seem 
to be quickly circumvented. 
 
“[...] these are the sort of things we look at. Is there going to be post-trial access? Not 
only for HIV; for cancer, for some of these rare diseases, for patients with direct 
benefit. We think we should continue until the drug is registered or until it can be 
accessed from the public sector [...] 
Hm. But it is difficult to make sure that there will be post-trial access, isn’t it? 




 Confronted by multinational corporations, which have established high-skilled 
offices with the ability to scientifically “justify” many sorts of procedures, ethics 
committees may become a docile part of a global ethical ceremony. Arguably, this is 
why, as Chamblis (1996) argued, committees are frequently prone to focus on less 
controversial, highly standardized issues of clinical research. By the same token, Bosk 
and Frader (1998, p. 113 note 10) argued that committees “[...] can be nothing more 
than an attempt to preserve professional power by internalizing a critique and thereby 
disarming it.” In this sense, committees are repeating the operations described by 
Edelman (1992): symbols of compliance to law become more important than an actual 
willingness or capacity to comply. In a politically harmful way, committees can thus 
mediate between the global market and the legal life of countries. They would be 
state-law-laden (whether this happens at a concrete or purely symbolic level) so that 
the industry can be market-standard-laden. 
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 In spite of all these processes, committees have not become the instrumental 
rationality’s free zone. There is still some space for ideological controversies and 
debates, as explained in the following section. 
 
7.3 ETHICS COMMITTEES, COMMUNICATION, AND POLITICS 
 
 Identifying the communicative rationality in committee members’ discourses 
was an important finding of my study. This means that some members have an 
approach that is not only different from, but can also be opposite to, the hegemonic 
bioethical/technical discourse. To be sure, the analytical and critical mentalities seem 
to be quite rare among committee members. However, in the framework of a mass 
society, rarity seems to be a necessary characteristic of divergent thoughts and 
reflected opinions. 
 The point to be stressed is that committees participate in broad 
communicational processes. Seen from a communicative standpoint, they are spaces 
where discourses are voiced, and such discourses are shaped not only by global issues 
but also by local aspects. For instance, some committee members may be holders of 
communitarian concerns whose contents are contextual phenomena such as the 
possibility to pay 150 Rand to research subjects in South Africa, the high levels of 
illiteracy in a certain Brazilian hospital or the high incidence of tuberculosis in South 
Africa. Each topic can only be identified because there are mentalities available in 
order to grasp and interpret them. In this way, committees are not favouring the 
interplay of interests, but the interplay of meanings. Individuals are not 
representatives of classes or interest groups; they are channels through which 
meanings circulate throughout society. Subsequently, these meanings will underpin 
the identification of relevant issues and the formulation of discourses to address them. 
Therefore, and this is a purely Habermasian statement, whenever one speaks of 
communication, one refers to widespread debates, these “‘subjectless forms of 
communication” (Habermas, 1996, p. 135-136) which can always lurk behind the 
launch of official programs. We are dealing with the everyday political life described by 




“The political processes of all nations are wider and deeper than the formal 
institutions designed to regulate them; some of the most critical decisions 
concerning the direction of public life are not made in parliaments and 
presidiums; they are made in the unformalized realms of what Durkheim called 
‘the collective conscience’ (or ‘consciousness’; the useful ambiguity of 
conscience is unavailable in English).” 
 
 Even though the critical mentality depends on personal formulations, it also has 
its social and historical sources (as shown in Chapter 6). Thus it is possible to argue that 
this approach to clinical trials is not destined to fade away. In a sense, it has become as 
“traditional” as other mentalities. On this point, Arendt’s (1963) conclusion, derived 
from the analysis of the American Revolution, can be instructive: traditions are much 
harder to be broken than forms of government. Anchored in global processes, the 
critical mentality can now emerge in different cities and countries. 
 Thus it would be imprecise to consider ethics committees as a sort of global 
community. Rather, mentalities must be seen as global communicative communities. 
For example, the holders of the technical mentality, whether they review protocols in 
Porto Alegre, Pretoria, São Paulo or Cape Town, mobilize similar concepts, search for 
similar issues in research proposals, are informed by similar concerns with scientific 
standards and expect that a similar scientific progress will eventually derive from 
global trials. Even though the background knowledge plays a minor role for them, 
background assumptions do not completely disappear here. At the same time, these 
people also share the contents of a foreground knowledge that is decisively shaped by 
medical, biological and statistical concepts. In this sense, the technical mentality, as 
well as other mentalities, constitutes a global community of meaning. 
 I am not arguing that committee members debate for society. Even though, 
from an administrative point of view, they might be seen as representatives of 
research subjects and researchers, this is not the case in a communicative 
interpretation. Mentalities are not formed within committees, even though they 
become stronger and more real when adopted by committee members. These 
members are not speaking for society; rather, they are speaking with claims and 
concepts formulated through social processes. They are neither inventors nor 
receptors of claims; they are channels through which claims circulate and resonate. As 
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Denzin (1997, p. 39) put it, the other to whom I talk and I are engaged in a social 
context: “Together, we create a historical situation, a social structure, a moment of 
experience, and enlivened culture.” 
 In this sense, ethics committees potentially play a crucial institutional role. 
Being permeated by meanings that cross over society, they guarantee, to at least a 
small degree, the occurrence of democratic debates. As explained by Habermas, 
political debates must be solidified through the production of law and institutions in 
order to obtain legitimacy. “[...] ideas produce effects only throughout the idealizing 
presuppositions of established or institutionalized practices. Only when the practices 
have acquired a foothold in legal institutions, for example, must the fictions or 
presuppositions on which participants operate be taken seriously as facts” (Habermas, 
2008, p. 334).  In this way, ethics committees can be seen as mediating institutions, for 
they are midway between everyday, ordinary ideas carried by citizens, and formal, 
precise policies carried out by government agencies. 
 In Chapter 4, it was seen that the South African Medicines Control Council 
(MCC), by implementing the “capacity-building” policy, is trying to reduce the 
inequalities between research sites, as well as between black and white physician-
investigators. This policy can certainly be interpreted as the effect of communitarian 
concerns that circulate throughout South African society and are reinforced by South 
African ethics committees. We are dealing with the “communicational flow” pointed 
out by Habermas (1996): concerns crossing over society have reached the core of the 
political system and led to official policies. In the South African case, the MCC’s 
measure has already provoked the first changes in the country’s clinical research 
system (like the inclusion of some new settings and researchers into international 
studies), representing a certain success for holders of the communitarian mentality. 
 These considerations can have important consequences for sociological (and 
communicative) explanation. Over the last years, the “sociological imagination” (Mills, 
1959/1970) has been sometimes threatened by the use of concepts that are not in 
tune with society’s contemporary configuration. For instance, sociologists tend to 
disregard the crucial lesson of Arendt (1958/1998), according to which the old division 
between private and public is no longer meaningful and explicative for sociology. 
Habermas (1996) himself kept speaking, for many years, of a “public sphere,” thus 
making his communicative theory less communicative. The concept of mentalities 
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seems to capture the nature of current social debates, in which public and private 
aspects are forever intermeshed. Indeed, mentalities cannot be “public” (becoming 
socially available and meaningful) without being, at the same time, “private” (being 
nested in the individuals’ internal axiological universe). 
 These are the basic clues for a communicative explanation of clinical research 
and ethics committees, as explained in the following section. 
 
7.4 A COMMUNICATIVE APPROACH TO ETHICS COMMITTEES 
 
 Due to the goals of my study, this thesis had to be, for its most part, composed 
by sociological, philosophical and historical descriptions. Little space remained for the 
advancement of an original explanation, whose development would require many 
more chapters. However, it seems to me that my descriptions indirectly provided some 
clues for what would constitute a communicative approach to ethics committees. This 
approach would be characterized by two main traits. 
 Firstly, a communicative explanation would emphasize the symbolic dimension 
of ethics committees. As explained in the previous section, the ethical review system 
has acquired formal structures with which one can signal concerns with scientific 
seriousness and legal responsibility. This aspect, which constitutes an ancillary aspect 
in other sorts of explanation, would be at the core of a communicative explanation. 
Even though committees may fail to fully accomplish their scientific and ethical tasks, 
they serve as a cultural (or ideological) indicator of the accuracy of trials. The 
globalization of the ethics committee model reveals that even at the international 
scale, clinical research must be socially justified by means of formal structures capable 
of conveying the fairness and precision of studies. 
 Secondly, a communicative explanation would necessarily incorporate the 
dissensions focused on by Habermas’ theory of communicative action. Therefore, the 
interpretation of ethics committees cannot be carried out without considering that 
they serve, at the same time, instrumental and communicative purposes. In other 
words, they help resonate not only (instrumental) concerns with principles, progress 
and cure but also (communicational) concerns with individualities, social responsibility 
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and political changes. Thus, one should consider the interplay between all the 
mentalities described in this thesis. 
 This perspective can be considered as an innovative aspect of my study. So far 
ethics committees have been framed through one-dimensional approaches. Some 
analyses emphasized institutional commitments and the pragmatic dimension of 
committees (Rothman, 1991, Bosk and Frader, 1998, Bosk, 1999/2008, Dixon-Woods 
et al., 2007, O'Reilly et al., 2009, Kohlen, 2009); some pointed out the social 
situatedness and the communitarian dimension of committees (Eckenwiler, 2001); 
some stressed procedural and moral difficulties, highlighting bioethical tasks (Nyika et 
al., 2009); some suggested a moral assessment of trials that would be inspired by the 
ideas of progress and societal advantage, thus foregrounding technical aspects (Jonas, 
1969). 
 The theory of communicative action is the only explicative framework that 
allows us to work on a multi-dimensional basis. In other words, it enables us to 
recognize that committees, rather than being informed by one single rationale, are 
actually permeated by different rationales, which may reinforce or weaken each other. 
Even though some rationalities come to be ideologically hegemonic, a diversity of 
approaches never cease to exist within committees. From a communicative 
standpoint, an accurate explanation of committees has to point to aspects such as 
diversity, interpretations, negotiations and dialogues. 
 In this way, it is possible to see that communicative processes can never be 
dissociated from political and economic processes. Globalization has been framed as a 
mighty process that would eventually submerge biological life in its sea of manifold 
risks (Beck, 1986/2005, Nowotny et al., 2001/2007). Nevertheless, one should not 
forget that globalization implies not only political and economic changes, but cultural 
ones as well. However severe the threats to biological life might be, global research 
and development seem to carry, nowadays, a much more concrete danger: the 
annihilation of alternative ways of living and thinking, through the diffusion of the 
instrumental rationality. The main challenge of sociological explanation is not the 
provision of the ultimate definition of ethics committees, but the formulation of 
descriptions that help grasp the coexistence of different definitions within committees. 
The fact that committees are composed by diverse people with diverse 
backgrounds and life stories is not a minor feature of a collective body from which 
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unified actions and visions might somehow be expected. This personal diversity is, 
indeed, the source of an ideological plurality that guarantees a certain degree of 
vitality in committees. In a world threatened by ideological homogeneity, explanations 
that unravel heterogeneous aspects can only be disciplinarily and politically beneficial. 
With the right view and effort, it is possible to stress differences between standpoints 
and construct (institutional, legal, cultural, artistic) mediations among them, allowing 
for fruitful dialogues. 
In this sense, the methodology chosen in this study proved useful. The conduct 
of individual interviews allowed committee members to give utterance to claims full of 
cultural and political meaning. At the same time, the comparison between committees 
located in different cities and countries made it possible to capture aspects of 
discourses that go beyond local and national frontiers. Nevertheless, this methodology 
could not avoid having its limitations. The practicalities of the fieldwork led to the 
formation of a group of interviewees in which physicians were somewhat under-
represented. Even though physicians constituted the largest group of interviewees, 
when we look at each committee individually, the proportion of physicians intrerviewd 
remained below the proportion of physicians in the whole committee. In addition, the 
study of a traditional location of global trials (the United States or a Western European 
country) could have enriched the analyses presented previously. In spite of these main 
limitations, it was possible to detect and scrutinize some important ideological trends 
in the universe of global trials. 
 
7.5 GLOBALIZED IDEOLOGIES 
 
 The instrumental and communicational rationalities inform not only practical 
actions but also discourses and mental life. However, from the viewpoint of 
individuals, they are too broad to be assimilated. To be sure, whenever one voices a 
technical discourse, for instance, we could say that the instrumental rationality is 
expressed. However, this description would be as precise as saying that when one 
person breathes, he or she is aspirating the earthly atmosphere. Even though the 
atmosphere forms one single element, it is known that depending on the place, there 
are many differences in terms of air pollution, air quality, humidity, and so on. Equally, 
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rationalities are not a continuous phenomenon, but have “discrete levels” (as 
physicists would put it), sorts of quanta, which I am calling mentalities. 
The concept of mentalities is endowed with a considerable analytic import. 
Especially, it constitutes a theoretical mediation, allowing the conduct of empirical 
analysis moving smoothly from broad theoretical concepts to specific empirical 
situations. In this way, it is no longer necessary to force abrupt interpretive passages, 
suggesting, for instance, that a particular discourse or action is the manifestation of 
instrumental rationality. For rationalities cannot be realized without mediating steps 
through which mentalities are constructed and through which local processes are 
connected with global processes. 
 Conversations between rationalities and mentalities are frequently dependent 
on national processes. Since its beginning, the globalization of trials has happened as 
the diffusion of tendencies, guidelines and procedures from country to country. In 
addition, regulatory frameworks, and the ethics review system itself, have always been 
organized nationally. Therefore, the country and the national state can only be 
decisive references for social actors who build up discourses about clinical trials. In the 
previous chapters, I quoted some examples in which committee members 
spontaneously advanced claims such as “Here in South Africa” or “In the case of 
Brazil.” 
Thus, in a communicative explanation, the state is another element, and a 
decisive one, of mental life. Indeed, as Anderson (2006) teaches us, states hold 
communities that are not natural, being instead “imagined.” Without renouncing a 
political approach, we do not need to mobilize concepts such as civil society, classes or 
public spheres. The notion of meanings circulating throughout society can be 
compared to Sartre’s (1960) idea of “projects”: they are, at the same time, cognitive 
structures and supports for concrete actions. Once again, we can compare the concept 
of mentalities to “styles of reasoning,” as proposed by Hacking (1990, p. 6): “[…] the 
growth of a style of reasoning is a matter not only of thought but of action.” 
As claimed in Chapter 5, holders of the technical mentality, on the one hand, 
and holders of the analytical mentality, on the other, are sociologically relevant not 
only because they reinforce two different ideological structures but, mainly, because 
their discourses frame the management of global trials in ways that, in many aspects, 
contradict each other. In Brazil, as seen Chapter 5, the current reformulation of the 
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ethics review system has opened up some leeway for analytical/critical views to 
emerge and try to reshape the Brazilian system, which has been marked by bioethical 
concerns. 
Nevertheless, the communitarian, analytical and critical approaches have been 
decisively weakened by their little ability to permeate collective actions, as well as 
their weak representativeness in consolidated institutions. In contrast, the bioethical 
and technical approaches have been adopted by different institutions (such as medical 
associations and bioethical societies), while the healing approach has received nothing 
less than the trials industry’s sanction. Consequently, from a political point of view, 
imbalances emerge between mentalities, because: 
 
“Ideas [...] must, as Max Weber, among others, never tired of insisting, be 
carried by powerful social groups to have powerful social effects; someone 
must revere them, celebrate them, defend them, impose them. They have to 
be institutionalized in order to find not just an intellectual existence in society, 
but, so to speak, a material one as well” (Geertz, 1973, p. 314). 
 
Thanks to the hectic, and sometimes chaotic, ways in which global trials have 
been brought to countries like South Africa and Brazil, it is impossible for individuals to 
formulate discourses that do not express, at the same time, different approaches to 
clinical research. Thus a clear-cut classification of individuals, based on ideal types, 
would lack precision. This finding is similar to the one obtained by Felt and Focher in 
their study on the views held by people about scientific governance. Two main 
ideological models were identified, but research participants did not remain 
exclusively attached to one particular model. “Participants thus switched, 
deconstructed, reassembled and hybridised elements of models” (Felt et al., 2008, p. 
320). The mentalities described in my thesis also allow for these examples of 
ideological flexibility. 
However, two aspects must be taken into account. Firstly, for each individual 
one type of approach is stronger than others. Secondly, yes, it is difficult to capture the 
political side of global trials and discourses by focusing, exclusively, on individual 
interpretations; it is rather necessary to pay attention to geographical scales. The 
communicational rationality is stronger at the local scale whereas the global scale is 
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the instrumental rationality’s realm. In other words, communicational meanings will be 
stronger whenever individuals are decisively engaged in, and concerned with, 
contextual matters (epidemics, transport, hospitals’ research structures, exchange 
rates, among others), whereas instrumental meanings are stronger for those who 
foreground global matters (scientific standards, statistical aspects of trials, universal 
principles, among others). That is also why physician-investigators, who are often 
interested in issues such as knowledge of diseases and scientific advancement, tend to 
hold technical views. 
In this way, globalization becomes a central characteristic of mental life. Even 
though mentalities can assume different contents depending on the place, they tend 
to be globalized, playing their typical roles in different contexts. Arguably, the 
occurrence of mentalities transcends the field of clinical trials. Indeed, interesting 
sociological studies could derive from the analysis of the (pragmatic) discontentment 
against global finance; the (bioethical) discussions about the globalization of research 
on stem cells; the (technical) discourses pointing out the progressive role played by 
financial institutions; the (healing) initiatives to protect the endangered natural 
environment; the (communitarian) initiatives aimed to soften the hardships of poor 
people; the (analytical) efforts to unravel dietary malpractices incited by the globalized 
fast food industry; or the (critical) views that campaign for drastic reformulations in 
the network of supra-national institutions. Thus individuals never cease to be 
confronted by debates that have something to do with global processes. More than 
ever before, the phenomenon identified by Simmel (1903/1950) takes place: urban life 
amounts to a huge ideological stimulation. 
It is indeed important to note that urban life has become an appropriate 
scenario for mentalities to be formulated and dispersed. As I claimed elsewhere 
(Bicudo, 2011), the big city provides the trials industry and researchers with the 
needed research infrastructure. It is also in the big city that we find manifold relations, 
enterprises and means of communication, forming the “communicational densities” 
pointed out by Santos (2000). This favours the circulation of ideas and expectations, 
reinforcing mentalities. As Geertz (1983) explains, everyday knowledge is generally 
equal to knowledge of the lived space, constituting a “local knowledge.” At the same 
time, as noted by Santos (2000), the local scale and its contents (which includes 
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ideological products) are more and more dependent on processes happening at the 
global scale. 
The final outcomes of the relationship between rationalities and mentalities are 
not to be seen within individuals but within territories and states. Individuals 
participate in the globalized process in a discursive, ideological manner. As for their 
concrete lives, they continue to be decisively attached to concrete places. Thus they 
are not “world citizens,” but people engaging in local contexts and receiving some 
specks of globalization in the form of discourses, promises, claims and ideologies. 
Multinational companies and CROs, in their turn, operate at the global scale, making 
choices and taking relevant decisions that affect the destiny of many countries. 
Moreover, and in spite of persistent discordant views, they have been quite successful 
at promoting an ideological domestication that threatens the autonomy of ethics 
committees. Critiques and analyses continue to smoulder, but nowadays, they have to 





8 Appendix 1: 
Structure of the interview 
 






Years in the committee/Previous experience in ethics committees 
 
2. Joining the committee 
How the interviewee joined the committee 
Invitation? From whom? 
Why accepted the invitation? 
The reasons why the person was invited 
Knowledge of the committee at the time of joining it 
 
3. Social relations 
Do your colleagues know you are a committee member? 
Do you introduce yourself as a committee member? 
Do you have friends in the committee? Is that somehow good or bad? 
 
4. Ethical review 
Do you review protocols? 
Of which type (qualitative studies, drug trials)? 
How many per month? 
When do you review? 
 
5. Views about the review 
Is it necessary to have a medical background? 




When reviewing, do you think of the research subjects? 
Is the review a subjective activity? 
Is there any part of the protocol that is more important? 
Is there any type of protocol which deserves more attention? 
Would it be good to observe the actual research procedures? 
 
6. Meetings 
How is the atmosphere? 
Do you always attend? 
Do you remember a big disagreement in a meeting? 
Are you always at ease to speak? 
Is the meeting the most important thing? 
 
7. Payment 
Should committee members receive payments? 
Do you consider your activity as work? 
 
8. Clinical research 
What is the main goal of clinical research? 
Is the expansion of clinical research a good thing? 
Is there a difference between academic and industrial research? 
 
9. Committees 
What is the role of ethics committees? 
Are they equipped to play this role? 
 
10. Final questions 
Has your view about drugs and medicines changed as a result of your activity in the 
committee? 
Today, what is your motivation to be in the committee? 
What is the advice you would give me for me to be a good committee member? 
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9 Appendix 2: 
List of claims and mentalities 
 
 I am listing all the claims identified in my study. I present the groups of claims 





Institutional interests: physician-investigators are motivated by institutional and 
economic interests 
PRAG2 
Committees and interests: Institutional and economic interests affect the ethical 
review done by ethics committees 
Hierarchies and committees: power relations and hierarchies affect the operations of 
ethics committees 
PRAG3 
Financial interests: the trials industry is motivated by financial interests 
Access to medicines: Due to high prices, products deriving from clinical trials cannot be 






Scandals in trials: stories of past abuses in clinical trials 
Cheap countries: it is cheaper to run clinical trials in countries like South Africa and 
Brazil 
BIO4 
Risks and benefits: in every clinical trial there is a risk-benefit ratio 
BIO5 





Bioethical guidelines: national and international guidelines enhance the ethical review 
BIO7 
Bioethical committees: committees must put bioethical principles into practice 
Committees and expertise: committees benefit from the presence of different 
professionals with different expertises 
Bio-pedagogic committees: in committees, people learn reviewing techniques and 
bioethical principles 
Bio-pedagogic meetings: in committee meetings, people learn reviewing techniques 
and bioethical principles 
BIO8 
Full information: committees must make sure that research subjects are provided with 
full information about participation 
Free choice: people must join clinical trials by taking free decisions 
BIO9 
Reviewing techniques: reviewing research proposals depends on techniques that can 
be transmitted and assimilated 
Ethical training: examples of interviewees that did courses on bioethics 
BIO10 
Principlism: references to bioethical principles that inform the work of my interviewees 





Universal science: there is no fundamental difference between different types of 
research 
Universal ethics: the ethical reasoning can be used to assess any kind of research 
TECH11 
Enhancing knowledge: in clinical trials, one gathers scientific knowledge of bodies, 
diseases and drugs 
Borderless science: scientific knowledge goes beyond national frontiers 
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Technical guidelines: regulations belong to broad scientific structures that make it 
possible to gather scientific knowledge 
Research and progress: progress can be realized only through research 
Moral science: the doing of good science is a moral duty 
Scientific standards: in order to do good science, scientists must comply with objective 
scientific standards 
TECH12 
Technical methods: the methodology of research proposals is a pivotal aspect to be 
looked at in any ethical review 
TECH13 
Technical committees: committees help researchers improve and develop their studies 
Competent review: the ethical review is better when it is done by reviewers with 
scientific expertise 
Technical hierarchy: the scientific assessment of proposals is more difficult than their 
ethical review 
Techno-pedagogic committees: in committees, people learn the scientific design of 
proposals 
Recognizing expertise: committee members stating that they not feel confident to 
review drug trials because they lack scientific expertise 
TECH14 
Accurate trials: pharma companies have money and expertise to design excellent 
clinical trials 






Healing research: taking part in research is therapeutically beneficial for subjects 
Blocking standards: too stringent regulations are making the conduct of research 
become too difficult 
HEAL16 
Healing trials: clinical trials aim to generate medicines and therapies 
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Beneficial trials: clinical trials aim to improve the people’s quality of life 
HEAL17 
Healing committees: committees help develop medicines and therapies 
Healing-pedagogic committees: in committees, people become aware of new 
medicines and therapies 
HEAL18 
Humanitarian research: research is done for the sake of humankind 





Cheap countries: it is cheaper to run clinical trials in countries like South Africa and 
Brazil 
Global shopping: it is easier to meet regulatory requirements in countries like South 
and Brazil 
COMM4 
Global inequalities: in clinical trials, inequalities between countries are manifested 
Distorted research: trials designed in developed countries do not fit the context of 
other countries 
COMM5 
Communitarian protection: vulnerable people must be protected by ethics committees 
COMM6 
Uncertain research: clinical trials bring about insurmountable uncertainties 
Hazardous shift: the passage from health care to clinical research involves 
uncertainties 
COMM7 
Communitarian committees: committees defend the community’s integrity, looking at 
research proposals from the viewpoint of research subjects 
Committees’ funding: concerns with shortages of resources in committees 
Concrete ethics: ethics is learnt not only by studying reviewing techniques but also by 
experiencing the everyday life of committees 
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Communo-pedagogic committees: in committees, people learnt several aspects of 
trials’ practicalities 
Altruistic members: committee members do a service for the community 
Review time: committee members need to give some of their time to the committee 
COMM8 
Protecting bodies: studies with invasive procedures deserve more attention from 
committee members 
Protecting samples: concerns with biological samples being taken, stored and exported 
COMM9 
Concrete studies: concerns with particular procedures and costs of trials 
COMM10 
Poor subjects: concerns with poor people taking part in clinical trials 
Age and trials: concerns with research on children or elderly people 







Social trials: trials affect not only personal relations but also the organization of society 
Underserved subjects: concerns with people who take part in trials because they do 
not have access to health services 
Sick subjects: concerns with severely sick patients who frame clinical trials as a 
therapeutic scapegoat 
Communitarian work: examples of committee members who work for national or 
international communitarian programmes 
ANALYT11 
Flexible standards: scientific standards allow for different arrangements, according to 
one’s interests 
ANALYT12 
Analytical methods: the methodology of research proposals is a pivotal aspect to be 




Analytical committees: committees have to avoid the conduct of trials of no social 
worth 
Analytical-pedagogic committees: in committees, people learn the methodological 
tricks used in clinical trials 
Overlooking hierarchies: those who lack a medical background are also able to assess 
drug trials 
ANALYT14 
Analytical guidelines: based on current guidelines, members can detect flaws and 
inaccuracies in research proposals 
ANALYT15 
Giving examples: committee members citing particular trials and methodologies used 
in past studies, excluding studies reviewed by themselves 
Quoting texts: examples of committee members citing ideas or data they found in 
texts 
Comparative view: examples of committee members comparing clinical trials with 
other types of research, or comparing national situations 
Analytical training: examples of committee members who did courses on scientific or 





Over-consumption: trials are used as strategies to promote medicines that are not 
really necessary 
Analyzing guidelines: examples of committee members scrutinizing guidelines on 
clinical trials 
CRIT16 
Criticizing committees: examples of committee members pointing to flaws in the ethics 
committee model 
Criticizing bureaucracy: committee members criticizing the heavy bureaucracy of the 
ethics review system 
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Criticizing guidelines: committee members criticizing national or international 
guidelines on clinical research or ethics committees 
CRIT17 
Inaccurate trials: trials conducted by the industry tend to contain methodological flaws 
CRIT18 
Defying hierarchies: renowned researchers and powerful companies can also design 
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City: Cape Town 
Date: 05 July 2011 
Duration of the recording: 55min36s 
Professional background: social scientist 
Years in the committee: 4 
Gender: female 
Code used in the thesis: Cape Town/C7Social scientist/07-11 
 
The interview is presented in a table. The first column displays the full transcript. The 
second column contains the quantitative analysis, showing the claims advanced (see 
Appendix 1) and the scores attributed according to the type of claim (see Table 2.5 on 
page 55). 
As for the type of claims, the following acronyms were used: Central claim=CT; 
Ancillary=AC; Confirmatory=CF; Indirect=ID; Repetitive=RP. 
 
BEGINNING OF RECORDING 
So today is the 5
th
 July (already!), this is the committee seven, the interview 
with [interviewee’s name]. Okay... So you’re a social scientist. Okay. And you 
studied here in Cape Town. 
Yes. 
[Confidential information.] 
And how long have you been in the ethics committee? 
Since 2007. 
Ah okay, four years. Okay. And is it your first experience in a committee? 
Yes. 
Hm. Okay. Did you do any course on bioethics? 
No. I’ve always felt bad that I don’t really have a formal ethics training. I 
don’t have a recognized ethics certificate of any sort. That sometimes has 
concerned me. How much training should you have to go onto... You know, 
you often get fixed questions. Would more training help? That kind of thing. 
So I have no real formal training. 
But do you think it would be good to have formal training? 
I think so sometimes. I’m not sure. I don’t... I don’t know if it always 
addresses the questions that you encounter in the meeting. Would a formal 
training help that? 
 
But are you in the meeting as a... How can say... a layperson, a non-






We do have two people from what they call the community. So we are 
more... I wouldn’t say I am... What is good about the committee is that it 
does include people from other disciplines. So our, sort of, role, I think, are 
the issues around vulnerability and also issues around the definitions of 
populations. Are they varied? It is fluid. It could vary from, you know, 
contexts. And the local and global thing. You know, sometimes what is 
perceived as a definition of population in America might not be the same 
sort of thing that we would do here ’cause of these social constructs and 
these kinds of things. And even in Brazil it could be another different, sort of 
situation. So I think it is those kind of issues, the context, that kind of thing, 






Why do you think they invited you to join the committee and not other social 
scientist? 
[Confidential information.] It might have been because of my boss. 
[Confidential information.] He’s had a long association with the ethics 
committee. Maybe it was on the basis of his suggestion, I don’t know. But... I 
must say, it’s been an extraordinary and enriching, in many ways... I’ve 
learnt an awful a lot, to be in a multidisciplinary, sort of, situation, grappling 
with issues. And, you know, you not always have the answers. 
But when you were invited to join the committee, did you know the role of 
the committee? 
From being on the other side, from being a researcher we know the 
committee. Not from inside. And this sort of formality, I think, in terms of 
ethics committee and the way that it is changing, also in social sciences and 
humanities, it is not as... This committee works very hard, you know, and it 
is very well organized administratively, but I think it is because of the 
amount of research that comes through, funded research in health sciences. 
So you know that the sort of workings of the ethics committee will vary. You 
know, they vary in the social sciences. So I had an idea of it, but I wasn’t sure 
of exactly how it would work.  
 
Somebody told me (I don’t remember who told me that) that is good to 
belong to the committee because it is good for the CV. Do you think so? 
I’m not sure [laughter]. I think, you know, any committees that you belong 
to would be good on the CV. It tells, I would imagine... I don’t really do a 
good CV, so [laughter]... But I think it says that I do things for the university 
that are not only research and teaching, I’m engaged in, you know, some 
other work that isn’t... I’m giving up myself to the university. So I think on 





Your colleagues know that you’re on the committee. 
Not all of them. It is not... I don’t... It is not something that comes up in 
conversations, often. And I’m not terribly sure if I want them all to know 
[laughter], then in case issues come up and they come to you and they say: 
‘Why is this happening?’ [laughter] But it is not something that comes up in 
conversations. But I think the association... Few people do know that... And 
it worked for me in many ways. It is having... I’ve learnt a lot and [name of 
the committee’s deputy chair] is extraordinarily good in the sort of 
academics of an ethics committee as well. She always has the right answers 
if you have a query, and she always comes out with this... You know, she is 
always available to discuss issues. If you have a review and you’ve got 
questions and so forth. Always available. Very, very supportive and 
committed. So those kinds of things I find... That where the benefit to me is. 









Concrete ethics (ID)-1 
Is there any situation in which you introduce yourself as a committee 
member? 
I don’t think I know... In some... I think... In a... It’s been, I suppose, 
seminars. But they’ve been, largely, people from different kinds of ethics 





In Cape Town. 
Yes. And they came from, you know, computer sciences, social sciences, 
business school and all of that. And that is when I introduced myself as a 
member of the committee. But otherwise I can’t remember. 
Okay. So you’re a reviewer. 
We do review, yes. 
 
Okay. And do you reserve some part of the week or the day to review 
protocols? 
I usually do it in the weekend. I find they take quite a bit of time. And you 
need some sort of dedicated time to it. So you know, it is... It is reading 
through first and then... You have to read through a few times, I would say. I 
find that clinical trials are hard because sort of I don’t know all the ins and 
outs of clinical trials so well. But there are, certainly, some people on the 
committee who are able to do that and there also other people in the 
university. It is not only members of the committee that review. It also goes 
out to the university. So... 
 
 





But do you review any particular kind of protocol? 
Usually, the ones that come to me are sort of social sciences things. You 
know... HIV raises lots of social questions, those issues around... you know... 
So those kinds of things would come. Research with disabled people, 
research with children, those kinds of issues. There is more and more 
research with children. So it is those kinds of issues. And those are the sort 
of areas where things change, you know, national institutions are changing 
rules on, you know, children and dissent and consent and things like that 
and the change in which... So those kinds of things are where [the 
committee chair and the deputy chair] are very up-to-date in everything 
that is happening. I feel very comfortable with this committee. They’re nice 
people, you know, they’re very... It is a good crowd of people. [Confidential 
information.] Sometimes, days after the meeting, the whole questions that 
came up... Sometimes they don’t leave you because you don’t always 
resolve them ethically. There is a resolution but it is never... It  could have 
gone on and on the debate, do you know what I mean? So sometimes it... 














Review time (AC)-2 
Are there people in the committee that you consider as friends? 
Hm. I would say... And sometimes I think to myself that I don’t know how 
they would feel. But I think I feel comfortable... I have a colleague, [name of 
one committee member], whom I think I could ask... Because I suppose it 
should be someone you could make a full of yourself. So there are, I would 
say, I could ask [the committee’s deputy chair] any questions that might 
make me look silly but she would understand. And I think I could do that 
with [the aforementioned committee member]. So there are people who... 
with whom I share sort of philosophy, I think, about things. I would certainly 
have... [The deputy chair] I can ask... She’s recently done me a huge favour. 
[Confidential information]. So [in research] there are all sorts of issues of 
trust along the way. So ethics is a big thing but... You know, it is not an easy 
thing to teach people because of all the concepts and things. So she and [a 
third committee member] gave me a lot of time recently to explain... So in 
things like that she would be very supportive as well. You know, watch me, I 
can go to all sorts of themes, so keep me focused on your interview 
[laughter]. 
Concrete ethics (ID)-1 
No [laughter]. Is there any average of protocols that you review per meeting, 
per month? 
I suppose, not more than one. They’re very. They spread them. They don’t 
ask for more than that. 
And that is good because you have time to read carefully... 
Yes, exactly. They don’t overload. 
 
Okay. And do you think a member who doesn’t have a medical background  
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could have some difficulties at reviewing a protocol? 
I think, again, it is... We have people who don’t... I think so, there are certain 
protocols that I would not be able to review... 
For instance. 
Clinical trials, [pause] vaccines, you know, this sort of more medical issues 
around those kinds of things. But in a sense, I suppose, that depends on the 
sort of distribution of the people and the availability of others they can draw 
on. They do get... And sometimes two people will review a single protocol. 
And they... Do you know how it works? There is... We all get the summary 
and... So if you review, you can review the whole protocol but then a time 
before the meeting, you get all the summaries plus the research instruments 
and the consent forms. So those are... I’m sure it is the same in many places. 
So those things take time to... Because some of the consents [consent 












Review time (AC)-2 
And when you’re reviewing a protocol, what is your main concern? 
Hm... It is... I suppose, in a sense, it is that the people will know... First of all, 
it is there is a sense of... that people will be informed about what is going 
on. So it is to know, myself, what they’re doing, what the researcher wants 
to do, and to make sure that all that information will be available at a level 
of language that they [the subjects] understand. Often, protocols or 
consents tend to take quite a stiff language instead of... There is not enough 
explanation, you know, they talk about the [Declaration of] Helsinki... 
People don’t know what all those things are about. And I also like... We’ve 
got a... It is the good... Hm... What is ...? Standard operation procedures. I 
never remember that. 
S.O.Ps. [laughter]. 
Yes, that is right [laughter]. And there is a suggestion number one to use a 
number of questions to reflect back with the person who is being 
interviewed, just to check whether what you’re saying people understand. 
’Cause in my [research] experience, it doesn’t always happen that people 
understand straightaway. Even people that I work with in my own research 
don’t even know what research is. You can’t just do something, you have to 
test it first. So there is a whole kind of consent and things to get through and 
how do you do that in a language that people understand in enough space 
that you don’t lose them. 
Full information (CT)-3 
Do you think that reviewing a protocol involves a subjective aspect? 
Yes. I think that all things always involve a subjective aspect. It is both. But it 
is always something that...if it [the protocol] is well written, if it is attractive, 
if it is not well written... You know, these things that you start to make 
decisions about before you’ve even worked with it. If they leave track 
changes and, you know, if the references aren’t done properly. In some 
ways, it is like marking, although... Because you’re practising marking, you 
can’t help raising issues like that. I don’t like to... One of the hard things to 
me is reviewing a protocol from another discipline, even if it is another 
humanities or social sciences, because you’re not sure... Different disciplines 
would emphasize different things. So I think you need to say things carefully. 
And I think it is useful... I always find it helpful if a reviewer has made 
suggestions that would improve my protocol. So I do it... I try to do it in that 
kind of spirit. But I think there is a subjective aspect to everything I do. You 
know, the choices you make as a researcher, the things you chose to 
research, where you want to work. You know, I could have said no to going 
to the ethics committee. So all of those things... I don’t know where 
subjective begins and objective ends [laughter]. 
Concrete ethics (CT)-3 
Yeah. And do you think there is any part of the protocol which is more 
important from your point of view? 
Hm [pause]. I’m not sure. I think there is... Hm. I think, sometimes, as a 
social scientist, an informed consent is a kind of a ritual, in the sense that... 








sciences as whether you should have signed consents, ’cause some people 
don’t sign... ‘Is it embarrassing?’ You know. ‘Is it always appropriate?’ If 
you’re participating and observing, you can’t sort of ask the whole of the 
clinic to sign a consent. So... But I still think that that forces... The fact that 
you do have a consent [form] to read out or discuss forces us to stop and 
inform. I think research can be very intrusive. I think we have to put some 
limits on researchers sometimes, especially amongst poor people, because 
we assume sometimes that poor people will have time for us, and what we 
sometimes ask poor people we will never ask a lawyer or a doctor. We 
wouldn’t ask them for two hours of their time. We would have to pay a lot. 
So it is those kinds of issues, I think. 
So, really, poor people would be more vulnerable. 
I think so. It is... On the other hand, you can’t say that they won’t be able to 
make decisions on their own, hm! I think it is about making sure that they 













Free choice (ID)-1 
And do you think it is easier to inform someone who has a higher 
educational... 
No, I don’t always think so. I find it hard to understand some of the consent 
forms and protocols. If I was in a clinical trial... You know, if someone asked 
me to come on to do some medical... to test some drug, I would find it 
difficult to know all the ups and downs that might be involved. So I don’t 
think it is... I think everybody needs to be informed. 
Communitarian 
committees (ID)-1 
Okay. And do you think there is any type of protocol that deserves more 
attention from an ethics committee? 
I think the ones with vulnerable groups. But what is a vulnerable is also a 
thing to question. But... I wouldn’t know that. I think they [protocols] all 
need... Some can be expedited. They are likely to this. For instance, it might 
just be... they don’t involve intrusive things. For instance, taking blood from 
children. ‘Is that necessary?’ I think those kinds of issues around. But, you 
know, watching children playing or something would not be an intrusive 
issue unless it was in a very private space, for instance to hung around and 
observing someone’s home would be an intrusive thing to do. So it is... 
There are many things but I think things like, you know, how much you’re 
going to... taking blood. I think those issues. I would be concerned about 
making available... I have concerns about, you know... I know open access is 
a good thing but making available, you know, all the biological material from 
South Africa into, you know, the hands of the first world... You know, we just 
don’t have the same access and skills, and they will in the end, you know, 
get the benefit of having all that kind of information. Do you know what I 
am saying? Those are the kinds of things that... I am going out of the 
subject. But there are, I suppose, concerns about vulnerable groups and sort 


















How would you describe the atmosphere of the meetings? 
Supportive. I don’t think... The point is to facilitate the research, not to be a 
gatekeeper. It is not to... That is what I appreciate about it. Not all protocols 
will go through in the first time but they [committee members] are not 
there, really, to throw them back. It is, if you need what it is necessary to get 
it through... It is a facilitating process much more than which is often... 
People outside often assume that it is quite a gatekeeping operation but it 
isn’t. 
Do you enjoy the meetings? 
Yes, I do. I sometimes become very concerned and... but can you... you 
know, you wonder if you really are making a contribution. You know, you 
sort of think, you know: ‘Someone else would be doing a better job’ 
[laughter]. There are those days when you think, you know: ‘I shouldn’t be 
here.’ So I suppose it is those kinds of things. But in terms of collegiality with 
people, what I’ve learnt, I have no regrets about it. It is terrible time of the 




In addition to reviewing the protocol, is there any kind of preparation that 
you do for the meeting? 
Only reading all the... It is the review that you do. That needs to be handled 
a week beforehand, and then reading in time for the... That is all the 
preparation. And reading the summaries. 
Do you think the meeting is the most important moment of your 
participation in the committee? 
Hm... Hmm... In some ways, I suppose, it is a sort of outward sign of the 
commitment, to get to... Sometimes it takes... Sometimes I think: ‘Oh, I think 
I’m not going this time,’ but, you know, you go. But I think it is a bit of both 
[reviews and meetings]. The review takes time... I think it is a bit of both. I 
think there is a... Say it again. If I think the meeting is the most important... 
Yeah. If you think the meeting is the most important moment of your 
participation in the committee. 
I don’t think so, I think there is a range of sort of things that make you 
belonging to the committee. Sometimes I think the meeting could go on 
happily without me ’cause there are enough people there to make it 






Review time (AC)-2 
You work in the committee is not paid. You don’t get paid. 
No, no. 
Do you think the members should get paid for their work? 
I’m not sure what the... [pause]. I suppose... You get paid for supervising the 
thesis. Extra-work. Extra-teaching. I’m not sure about that. I’ve thought 
about that sometimes but I’m not sure. You know, it is... Do you think it 
would still look good on the CV? [laughter] 
Not on the CV but maybe on the bank account. 
Yes, yes, yes [laughter]. Do other committees get paid? 
No, I haven’t seen any committee. 
Yes, I think it is supposed to be a kind of taking advantage of people’s... you 
know... good will. 
But maybe people would feel more committed to work. 
This one is committed. I suppose there is a core that is committed. You 
would have... You could... I don’t know, maybe you could pay them for each 
meeting that they attend. You would probably have competition to attend 
then [laughter]. 
Yes, depending on the salary [laugther]. But do you consider you activity 
within the committee as work? 
Hm [pause]. Yes, I suppose so. It is not fun, you know, it is not... But I don’t 
regret it, I don’t... Sometimes I think: ‘Oh, my goodness!’ You know, you get 
this big paper pack that comes into your pigeonhole, and sometimes I think: 
‘Oh, no! There they come.’ You know [laughter]. You’ve got to get ready for 
those things. But they always ask you if you can review, they don’t... They’re 
always... So they ask you if you’ve got time in the month. So they don’t sort 
of do it without asking but then when you see a new [project] coming, you 
think: ‘Oh, my goodness!’ 
You review the protocol but you don’t have any contact with the actual 
procedures of the research. 
No, we don’t have any... We can’t... The researcher is responsible for that. 
 
But do you think it would be good to have contact with the procedures, to 
see what is going on? 
Hm [pause]. I’m not sure if... I know this is a sort of... I think of my own 
research and think to myself: What happens if they come on a bad day when 
everything is going wrong? Research is like that. You know, you don’t arrive 
and, you know... You like chaotic and looks as if you’re not doing anything 
properly. So sometimes I don’t that the policing kind of... I’m not sure if the 
committee should be a policing issue but I think, sometimes, I know in my 
own... Sometimes it is tempting to rush a consent [process], because you’re 
in a hurry and you want to get things done. And I’m sure with people like 
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me, who also... [laughter]. And because I’m on the ethics committee, I sort 
of feel: ‘I can’t rush this,’ you know. And to train people not to rush, to get 
people time to think and... even if it is... So I think we should be looking at 
how people take consents sometimes, who does it, where do they do it, 
when do they do it. If you can find a private room, should you push it all that 
you can? Do you snick into a corner somewhere and... I work with people 
who sign. So you can’t actually have a signing consent taken in the middle of 
a waiting room and no one would know. And sometimes you think: ‘Oh, this 
is just as private...’ I often think that he could find a private space, but those 
are the... But when there is no private space, you think: ‘Oh, dear. Do I come 
tomorrow?’ So those are the kinds of... I think consent taking, what is 
happening at that consent taking... Rushing things. It is tempting to rush 
things. 
In your opinion, what is the main goal of clinical research? 
Ideally, it should be better health care, whatever it will make better health 




But in practice... it is not [laughter]. 
Not always, I think there is... No, I wouldn’t say not. I have concerns 
sometimes. The research that comes through the research ethics committee 
at the university goes through many, many things. It goes through your 
carers, then it should go through the department, then the ethics 
committees, and even the Department of Health. So it goes through many 
things. But there are... There is research which is carried out that doesn’t go 
through research ethics committees. And that is a sort of thing, you know... 
I’m sure it goes through their committee. How do those committee work? I 
don’t know how they work. There is... Because, you know, there is so much 
over-research in America, they’ve moved into Africa and places like that, 
looking for research populations, and there are those sort of commercial 
organizations that actually do it for you... 
The CROs. 
Is that what they’re called? 
Yeah, CROs. 
So that is the kind of thing. What do you... what is going on there? Is it 
good? I don’t know, maybe it is not. They come and they practically got the 
paper out for you, you know, by the time they finish. 
 
















So over the last years, there has been a big expansion of clinical research in 
countries like Brazil and South Africa. Do you think that this increasing 
number of studies is important? 
I don’t know. I sometimes think places like Brazil and South Africa have the 
infrastructure and the universities and that sort of things to do it, and they 
don’t... The populations in America, in the UK, in Europe no longer are 
available to do research. They just say no. So they’ve moved in here to do it. 
So I think there is a stage where people will start to say no. People will 
become over-researched. I think there is a point at which too much 
research... There is a level at which people get over-researched and they 




Yeah, yeah. Do you think there is a difference between academic research 
and the research that is sponsored by the industry? 
Not always. Sometimes there is and sometimes there isn’t. I think that it is 
one way of departments and researchers getting funds, from the drug 
companies. But I do feel the drug companies... You know, I would like to, 
you know, see some of them commit to things a little bit more than they do. 
They make a lot of money and sometimes they don’t always offer... We 











Department of Health. So sometimes, if something works, you may need to 
sort of see whether those people who were involved in the research, who 
made it happen, should be looked after for as long as it is necessary. Those 
kinds of things, I think the drug companies could be more... I think they 
could pay people more... They don’t... 150 Rand, you know... They 
wouldn’t... 
150 Rand!? That is the amount? 
For... You know, compensating for inconveniences. It is not a lot of money. 
So if you have to stay in hospital and things like that but I still think, people 
are concerned, you know, if they’re given too much money, they’ll only say 
yes to research. That is the sort of balance. But I don’t know. I still think that 
one should... You can’t ask... Rich people would not do it for 150 Rand 
[pause]. And 150 Rand is not a lot of money any more. 
Yeah, I know [laughter]. 












Poor subjects (AC)-2 
But they are not obligatorily paid 150 Rand. They are paid if something goes 
wrong. 
No, no, no, no, no. That is not the insurance thing. 
So I didn’t understand. 
It is for the inconvenience of your transport or your... Those kinds of things. 
Ah, okay. 
But still, I think you could have more than that. No, the insurances, we do 
have... There are lawyers on the committee and I think one of them 
particularly knows those kinds of insurance issues and that sort of thing. But 
what, you know... Do you have get your insurance? It is really hard to... to 
prove anything. 
And it is 150 Rand per visit. Each time they go to the hospital. 






Okay. And in your opinion, what is the main goal of an ethics committee? 
The main goal is to prevent harm but also to facilitate research. It is a 
balance between allowing good research to go on and to protect vulnerable 







When you’re reviewing a protocol, do you think about the people who are 
going to participate in the study? 
Yes. I think that is where  I thing the most. 
So the participant is not an abstract thing for you. 
No. I do... I’ve been in those situations. You know, I still meet them in my 
own work. They’re not an abstract. 
And would it be possible to say that the committee has some duty or 
responsibility towards the participants? 
I think that they do take that... They are aware of that. Yeah. Some more 
than others. But there certainly is an awareness. Very much so. 
 
So after four years in the committee, has your view about medicines, 
medicines and health care changed somehow? 
Hm [pause]. Not really. I think I started, I suppose, a bit suspicious of drug 
companies and I probably still am a bit suspicious of drug companies 
[laughter]. 
Oh, yeah? More suspicious now. 
No, not really more [laughter]. But, say... I read ‘The constant...’ What was 
the name? Before I came... You know the book called ‘The constant 
gardener’? [laughter] 
Oh, yeah, yeah. There is a film too. 
 Yes. 
Have you read this book? 















social scientists are sort of... We’re interested in local issues in terms of this 
sort of political and power of this inter-relationship between the global and 
that sort of the local. So I think my concerns have always been the relative 
power of the drug companies as opposed to, you know, the contexts. So 
those kinds of things are always in my... [laughter] 
But don’t you think that the power of big companies can be balanced by the 
power of doctors? 
Yes, I do! There is a balance. But you have to... I don’t think they’re going 
without being balanced, and I think that is partly what the ethics committee 




Do you think that your colleagues in the committee are as concerned as you 
about the power of companies... 
I’m sure some of them would say that I was far too worried a bit [laughter]. 
But that is fun, because that is what the committee is supposed to be. It is 
supposed to be a range of opinions that sort of balance things up. 
 
And do you think that committees, nowadays, are well-equipped to prevent 
harm in clinical research, in the way they are organized today? 
I think they do their best but... And I think that... I certainly think they do 
their best. And whatever they’ve jurisdiction over, I think they... There is not 
as much harm or potential for harm... I think there is very... A lot of that, I 
think is just thoughtlessness, it is not deliberate, that leads to harm. And 
that is just, sometimes, things you haven’t thought about, but something 
might need more of attention or new ideas that... So I think they do their 
best. Some harm is bound to happen. You know, it is not bound, but harm 
does happen. You know, in the sort of... ’Cause research... A lot of research 
that is not in a laboratory and it is with people often leads to messy things. It 
is not... You know, it is not neat. It is ups and downs. I think some of the 
hard job is in that front line, people at the front line who are doing the 
actual fieldwork. Those are the hard jobs. And whether we give enough 
attention to that level of researcher... They do get trained, but some people 
do training a lot better than others, I think, with the fieldworkers. 
Uncertain research 
(CT)-3 
Okay. I would ask you two final questions. Today, what is your main 
motivation to continue to work in the committee? 
Hm [pause]. My main motivation to work in the committee. I think it is to 
keep, to know what is going on. I think in many ways, it’s been an eye-
opener for me in terms of the range of the research and things that are 
happening, and to see my own role relative to what other people do. And it 
is very humbling! You know. So in a sense, I think it is the learning side of it 
[pause]. I don’t think as one person, you make a major difference It is, you 









Let’s imagine that I’m going to start working as a committee member. What 
is the advice you would give me so that I can be a good committee member? 
I suppose I would say it might be a good idea to talk to the deputy or the 
chair. Ask them what is expected of you. And then I would... The first review, 
I would ask someone to have a look at it. And then, after that, I would, I 
suppose, participate and observe for a while and then I would engage more, 
in the sense that I see how the debates go and where you think you can 
make a contribution. I think that happens quite soon, as soon as... It is, I felt, 
a little intimidating in the beginning, I would say. You feel, you know... In any 
new situation, I think it is finding what it is going on and finding... You can’t 
explain always. So take a bit of time to find your way and then, you know... 
and then it gets easier and you feel more comfortable contributing, ’cause 
sometimes you think, you know, you sort of get the feeling of... of... In a 
seminar, even, you know, you think: ‘Do I make a comment now or don’t?’ 
You know, those kinds of questions. And sometimes it is an awkward 
question because it is going to be debating someone else’s views, so you 
just... But you have to do it, you know, it is part of your responsibility. But I 
would give myself a bit of time to see how things go, and then you keep 




Do you think that, if the committee was composed only by social scientists, 
you would feel intimated at the beginning as well? 
Yes. 
It is because it was a new situation. 
Yes. 
Not because of the expertise of the other members. 
I don’t think so ’cause there is a lot of social scientists that are much more 
expert than I. I think it is partly finding your labels. You know: ‘What is here? 
What are they...’ You can read a lot about ethics and you can do a course in 
ethics, but the actual practice of the committee is a different thing. It is sort 
of... It is putting meaning in the whole sort of ethics process and that, in a 
sense, is what you need to find out about. Are you in an ethics committee at 
all? 










Concrete ethics (CT)-3 
[Laughter]. May I ask you something now? 
Yeah. 
What brought you to this thesis? 
It is a long process. Because in my Master’s Degree, I studied the 
pharmaceutical industry. And so I discovered this universe of clinical 
research. And I wanted to understand this relation between global 
companies and local contexts. And so I thought: ‘Oh, maybe ethics 
committees are a mediating institution, between the local level and the 
global level. 
It is hard, I think, to be places like South Africa and Brazil, because of that 
actual job. Because there is people who want to put funding in there and it 
is tempting for the researchers to get the funds, but, you know, you have to 
control those ones at the top [laughter]. 
Yeah. And that is hard to do. 
You have to put limits on them, yeah. Because they’ve got all the power 
[laughter]. 
Because they are strong [laughter]. 
Yes. They’re second only to the armaments industry. Hm, it is big money! 
Yeah. 
And they play with poverty. Sickening! [laughter] And how did you. Did you 



















Poor subjects (ID)-1 
No, but I’ve been talking to people who work in CROs. 
Okay. 
Yeah. 
And how do they... 






SUMMARY OF QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
GROUP OF CLAIMS SCORE PERCENTAGE MENTALITY 
commercial research-instr. (3) 3 4.6 Pragmatic 
commercial research-comm. (3) 7 10.8 pragmatic 
interested research (1) 3 4.6 pragmatic 
bioethical committees (7) 3 4.6 Bioethical 
bioethical protection (5) 3 4.6 bioethical 
discursive protection (8) 8 12.3 bioethical 
scandals in trials (3.5) 3 4.6 bioethical 
technical committees (13) 6 9.2 technical 
healing trials (16) 3 4.6 healing 
communitarian committees (7) 10 15.4 communitarian 
communitarian protection (5) 3 4.6 communitarian 
concrete protocols (9) 2 3.1 communitarian 
global inequalities (4) 1 1.5 communitarian 
poor subjects (10) 4 6.2 communitarian 
protecting bodies (8) 3 4.6 communitarian 
uncertain research (6) 3 4.6 communitarian 
TOTAL 65 100.0 
  






11 Appendix 4: 
Histograms 
 
 In order to justify the types of statistical analyses I performed, I am presenting 































Type of analysis: parametric tests. 
The normal curve has been added to this graphic in order to show that these data can 
be considered as normally distributed. Thus, whenever the bioethical mentality was 
assessed in isolation, parametric tests were performed. However, non-parametric tests 
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